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Document 968 18th May 1984 
ORDER OF BUSINFSS 
of the First Part of the Thirtieth Ordinary Session Paris, 18th-21st June 1984 
MONDAY, 18th JUNE 
Morning 
Meetings of political groups. 
Aftemooa 3 p.m. 
1. Opening of the thirtieth ordinary session by the Provisional President. 
2. Examination of credentials. 
3. Election of the President of the Assembly. 
4. Address by the President of the Assembly. 
5. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly. 
6. Adoption of the draft order of business of the first part of the thirtieth ordinary session. 
7. Situation in the Middle East and European security: 
presentation of the report tabled by Lord Reay on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
TUFSDAY, 19th JUNE 
Moming10Lm. 
1. Deterrence and the will of the people: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Lagorce on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
2. State of European security: 
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments. 
Debate. 
Aftemooa 3 p.m. 
1. State of European security: 
Resumed debate. 
3.30 p.m. 
2. Address by Baroness Young, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the 
United Kingdom. 
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3. State of European security: 
Resumed debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
4. Control of armaments and disarmament: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. de Vries on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
WEDNESDAY, lOth JUNE 
MorniDg 10 a.m. 
I. Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty - reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the 
Council: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. De Decker on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments. 
Debate. 
2. Political implications of European security in 1984 - reply to the twenty-ninth annual report 
of the Council: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Thoss on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
Debate. 
11.30 a.m. 
3. Twenty-ninth annual report of the Council: 
presentation by Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council. 
4. Resumed debate. 
Votes on the draft recommendations. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. Reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Spies von BUllesheim on behalf of the Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
Debate. 
2. AWACS and Nimrod aircraft: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Spies von BUllesheim on behalf of the Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
Debate. 
3.30 p.m. 
3. Address by Mr. van .Houwelingen, Minister of State for Defence of the Netherlands. 
4. AWACS and Nimrod aircraft: 
Resumed debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
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5. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial 
year 1983: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. de Vries on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
THURSDAY, 21st JUNE 
MorniDg 10 a.m. 
Military use of space: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
Action taken in parliaments on recommendations adopted by the WEU Assembly on the 
standardisation and production of armaments: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Antretter on behalf of the Committee for Relations 
with Parliaments. 
Debate. 
CLOSE OF THE FIRST PART OF THE THIRTIETH ORDINARY SESSION 
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Twenty-ninth annual report of the Council to the Assembly 
of Western European Union on the Council's activities for the period 
1st January to 31st December 1983 
INTRODUCfiON 
2nd March 1984 
1. The Council of Western European Union transmit to the Assembly the twenty-ninth annual 
report on their activities, covering the period 1st January to 31st December 1983. 
2. The main questions considered by the Council are dealt with in the following chapters : 
I. Relations between the Council and the Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 
11. Activities of the Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 
Ill. Agency for the Control of Armaments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 
IV. Standing Armaments Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 
V. Public Administration Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 
VI. Budgetary and administrative questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 
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CHAPTER I 
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COUNCIL AND THE ASSEMBLY 
Presenting the Council's twenty-eighth 
annual report to the Assembly, the Chairman-
in-Office and French Minister for External 
Relations, Mr. Cheysson, recalled that this 
Assembly occupied a unique position as the 
only European parliamentary body empowered 
by treaty to debate defence matters. 
He stressed the fact that the Council greatly 
appreciated the conscientious and serious man-
ner in which the Assembly discharged its duties 
which, in the present circumstances, were of 
great importance. 
The Council welcomed the reaffirmation by 
the Assembly, at its twenty-ninth ordinary 
session, of its determination to fulfil the whole 
range of its duties by dealing as thoroughly as 
possible with the many aspects of European 
security. 
The exercise of this responsibility by the 
Assembly calls for a dialogue with the Council 
for which, as was reiterated in their reply to 
Recommendation 394, they hold themselves 
continuously available. 
Throughout 1983 this dialogue has been 
maintained on questions relating to the appli-
cation of the modified Brussels Treaty including 
- in accordance with the undertaking given in 
1972 and subsequently renewed - those dealt 
with by member governments of WEU in other 
international fora. 
A. Annual report of the Council to the 
Assembly 
1. The activities of the ministerial organs of 
WEU during 1982 were described in the 
twenty-eighth annual report of the Council. The 
progress of co-operation between the WEU 
member states in other international fora in 
areas in which the Assembly is particularly 
interested was also referred to in that report. 
The Council noted that the Assembly particu-
larly welcomed the information it received on 
European political co-operation. 
2. Moreover, additional information was pro-
vided to the Assembly on the activities of the 
Agency for the Control of Armaments in 
accordance with the procedure applied since 
1971, which was set out in the Council reply to 
Written Question 123. 
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B. Work of the Assembly -Assembly 
recommendations to the Council, written 
questions put by members of the Assembly and 
replies by the Council 
1. (a) The Council took note, with interest, of 
the reports presented by Assembly committees 
during the two parts of the twenty-ninth 
ordinary session. 
It is recalled in this connection that the 
Council, in reply to a request from the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions, had authorised the head 
of the international secretariat of the Standing 
Armaments Committee to offer technical help 
to this committee in its work of preparing and 
drafting, principally on the basis of information 
it had gathered, the second part of its report on 
the harmonisation of research in the fields of 
civil and military high technology1• 
(b) As the Chairman-in-Office stated in his 
speech to the Assembly, it is desirable, in view 
of the solid content of reports drawn up by the 
committees, that these documents be made 
available to the Council as early as possible 
before each session, in particular in order for 
ministers participating in the debates to make 
the fullest possible contribution. 
2. The Council have followed the Assembly's 
debates with interest. They gave careful 
consideration to the eight recommendations2 
adopted during the second part of the twenty-
eighth ordinary session and the first part of the 
twenty-ninth ordinary session and to the nine 
written questions3 put by members of the 
Assembly in 1983. 
With the assistance of the national adminis-
trations, the working group and the 
Secretariat-General, the Council replied as 
substantially as possible to these recommenda-
tions and questions. 
Through these replies the Assembly received 
information about the consultations in which 
representatives of the WEU member states had 
taken part in the framework of European 
political co-operation and of the Atlantic 
Alliance. 
3. As a follow-up to the reply given to 
1. See also Chapter IV. 
2. Nos. 388 to 395. 
3. Nos. 232 to 240. 
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Assembly Recommendation 380 concerning 
Annex IV to Protocol No. Ill, the Council 
informed the Assembly in November of progress 
in the matter'. 
C. Informal meetings between the Council and 
Assembly bodies 
1. Three informal meetings took place in 
Brussels on 17th May 1983 after the ministerial 
session of the Council held under the chair-
manship of Mr. Tindemans, the Belgian 
Minister for External Relations. 
At a working lunch organised by the Belgian 
Chairman, the members of the Council met the 
Assembly Presidential Committee. 
During the afternoon, the Council met two 
Assembly committees in succession and dis-
cussed with each the matters which it had 
proposed. The discussions with the Committee 
on Defence Questions and Armaments covered 
the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, 
the collaboration of the Standing Armaments 
Committee in the work of the Assembly 
committees, relations between NATO and 
WEU, relations between Europe and the United 
States on arms procurement and disarmament. 
The exchanges of views with the General 
Affairs Committee covered WEU activities, 
European union, the situation in Poland, East-
West trade, the situation in the Middle East, 
relations between European countries and 
China. 
On the same day, Mr. Tindemans, as 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, received the 
Chairman of the General Affairs Committee. 
D. Speeches made by the Chairman-in-Office' 
and other ministers at the Assembly 
1. It is customary for the Chairman-in-Office 
to present to the Assembly the annual report of 
the Council's activities. 
I. See Chapter 11, part B. 
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The Council also encourage the participation 
of ministers, particularly defence ministers, in 
the Assembly's debates. At the Assembly's 
invitation ministers come to address the Assem-
bly in as far as their many commitments allow 
them to do so. 
2. During the first part of the twenty-ninth 
ordinary session, Mr. Cheysson, the Chairman-
in-Office, outlined the main aspects of the 
activities of the WEU ministerial organs in 
1982 and added certain information on the 
current year's activities. 
Both Mr. Cheysson, as French Minister for 
External Relations, and Mr. Mollemann, Minis-
ter of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, outlined to the Assembly 
their respective government positions on topical 
questions concerning European security and the 
main aspects of their national defence policies. 
The ministers took this opportunity to 
reaffirm their governments' interest in WEU 
and the great importance which they attached 
to the work of the Assembly. 
During the second part of the twenty-ninth 
ordinary session, Mr. Hernu, French Minister 
of Defence, delivered a speech in which he 
emphasised the solidarity which united the 
member countries of WEU and stated that the 
thirtieth anniversary of the Paris Agreements 
should confirm and demonstrate Europe's abi-
lity, in the face of new challenges, to work 
towards common security. In this context, he 
pointed out that the French Government was 
giving detailed consideration to the possible 
measures to be taken to ensure that WEU 
played its full and rightful role. The minister 
also gave details on the direction and action 
being taken by France on defence. 
After their speeches, Mr. Cheysson, Mr. 
Mollemann and Mr. Hernu answered questions 
put by members of the Assembly. 
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CHAPTER 11 
ACfiVITIFS OF THE COUNCIL 
Introduction 
I. In presenting the twenty-eighth annual 
report of the Council, the Chairman-in-Office 
reaffirmed the member countries' attachment to 
WEU, the only European organisation which, 
by treaty, has been given competence in defence 
matters, and their determination to fulfil their 
obligations under the modified Brussels Treaty, 
among which the commitment to collective 
self-defence contained in Article V was one of 
the cornerstones of the European security 
system. 
2. During 1983, the Council met at ministerial 
level on 17th May in Brussels under the 
chairmanship of Mr. Tindemans, the Belgian 
Minister for External Relations. 
They held twelve meetings at permanent 
representative level. Their working group met 
twenty-six times. 
3. The Council ensured that the provisions of 
the modified Brussels Treaty and its Protocols 
were applied and observed, taking care to avoid 
- as required by the treaty - duplication of 
work with that in which WEU member states 
participate in other international fora. 
Various aspects and phases of the imple-
mentation of the Paris Agreements appeared 
twenty-five times on the Council's agenda. In 
this context, the examination of the question of 
modifying Annex IV to Protocol No. Ill was 
continued. 
The Council's discussions at ministerial level 
covered the development of East-West relations, 
the situation in the Mediterranean, and a set of 
proposals relating to the future work of the 
Standing Armaments Committee of WEU. 
4. The Council maintained the dialogue with 
the Assembly, which constitutes an important 
part of their activities. 
A. Political questions 
1. East-West relatio•s 1 
(a) At the ministerial meeting in Brussels on 
17th May 1983, the Council had a detailed 
1. See also Part B of this chapter. 
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discussion on the development of East-West 
relations. 
The Council noted with considerable concern 
that these relations continued to be seriously 
affected by a number of tension-inducing 
factors. In this connection, the ministers referred 
to Soviet military action in Afghanistan, which 
was continuing and intensifying, and to the 
crisis situation in Poland where government 
policy still failed to respect the deep-seated 
aspirations of the Polish people and where 
Soviet pressure was still felt ; they also noted 
that the continued build-up of Soviet armaments 
greatly exceeded the Soviet Union's defence 
requirements and was a threat to the security 
of Europe. 
The ministers reiterated the principles 
underlying their governments' policy, the prime 
aim of which was the maintenance of peace in 
freedom. The Council noted that the member 
countries of WEU were in favour of dialogue 
with all countries, that each country's security, 
essential for any genuine dialogue, had to be 
fully safeguarded and that it presupposed a 
military balance at the lowest possible level. 
The ministers reaffirmed their governments' 
support for the two sets of negotiations taking 
place in Geneva between the United States and 
the Soviet Union concerning, respectively, their 
strategic arms (START) and intermediate-
range nuclear forces (INF) ; they expressed the 
hope that these negotiations would achieve 
positive results. As regards INF missiles, the 
ministers confirmed the different aspects of 
their countries' well-known positions. 
They also referred to the progress of the 
Madrid CSCE follow-up meeting and expressed 
the hope that this meeting would be concluded 
quickly with the adoption of a substantial and 
balanced concluding document which, in parti-
cular, contained a precise mandate for a 
conference on conventional disarmament in 
Europe. They emphasised that such a conference 
should, in a first phase, be devoted to the 
negotiation of a series of measures designed to 
strengthen confidence and security in Europe. 
The Council noted that the member coun-
tries intended to maintain a firm, realistic and 
constructive attitude on questions relating to 
security and disarmament and that they 
attached great importance to the solidarity 
between European countries and between mem-
bers of the Atlantic Alliance in this field. 
Furthermore, the Council believed that it 
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was vital to alert and inform public op1mon 
about the problems of defence. The ministers 
stated that their governments paid close 
attention to the trends of public opinion in their 
countries and would continue to answer any 
questions which might be raised. In this 
connection, they pointed out that the national 
parliaments and the WEU Assembly had, for 
their part, a vital role to play. 
At the joint meeting between the Council 
and the General Affairs Committee, which took 
place in the afternoon of 17th May, the 
discussions centred, among other things, on two 
questions concerning East-West relations, 
namely the situation in Poland and East-West 
trade. 
(b) In a press release issued after their meeting 
of 21st September, the Council stated that they 
strongly condemned the destruction of a civil 
airliner of the Korean Airlines1• They added 
that they deeply deplored this action caused by 
Soviet military aircraft which resulted in the 
tragic loss of a great number of human lives. 
They also recalled that the member states of 
WEU had made public their positions and their 
reactions and that they had also expressed their 
determination within the ICAO, that the 
necessary measures be adopted to avoid any 
recurrence of such a tragedy. 
(c) The member countries of WEU have taken 
an active part in the consultations concerning 
East-West relations which took place in 1983 
within the frameworks of European political 
co-operation and the Atlantic Alliance. 
In this part of their report, the Council 
would like to refer to the views expressed by 
the Ten and by the North Atlantic Council 
concerning the developments in Poland in the 
months following the WEU ministerial meeting 
and on the conclusions of the CSCE follow-up 
meeting in Madrid. 
In a declaration published on 20th June in 
Stuttgart, the European Council, noting the 
depth of the aspirations of the Polish people, 
expressed their conviction that only a national 
reconciliation which took full account of these 
aspirations could lead Poland out of its grave 
crisis. 
In his address to the United Nations 
General Assembly on 27th September, the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council of the 
European Communities stated that : " The Ten 
have taken note of the measures adopted by the 
Polish Government on 22nd July 1983, some of 
which go in the right direction while others 
provide the authorities with the legal means to 
I. See Annex I. 
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repress more effectively possible dissident acti-
vities. In a spirit of friendship towards the 
Polish people, the Ten hope that these steps 
will be followed by further measures leading to 
reconciliation, dialogue and reform, in accor-
dance with the aspirations of all the national 
and social elements of the population. " 
Turning to the outcome of the Madrid 
meeting, he expressed the satisfaction felt by 
the Ten and added: "Although the concluding 
document does not represent the maximum that 
could have been achieved, it was substantial 
and balanced. We attach as great an importance 
to the human dimension of that document as to 
its provisions concerning the convening of a 
conference on disarmament in Europe. " 
The views of the North Atlantic Council on 
these two subjects, expressed at the ministerial 
meeting on 8th and 9th December in Brussels, 
were recorded in points 5 and 8 of the published 
final communique 1• 
On the question of economic relations 
between East and West, which the General 
Affairs Committee studied and which the 
Assembly debated during the second part of its 
twenty-ninth ordinary session, the conclusions 
reached by the North Atlantic Council were 
recorded under point 7 of the final communique2 
of that meeting. 
(d) Finally, it should be mentioned that in a 
declaration published on 9th December in 
Brussels the member countries of the Atlantic 
Alliance extended to the Soviet Union and the 
other countries of the Warsaw Pact the offer to 
work together with them to bring about a 
long-term constructive and realistic relationship 
based on equilibrium, moderation and recipro-
city3. 
l. Sitlllltion in tire Meditem11rean and tire Middle EllSt 
(a) At their ministerial meeting of 17th May 
in Brussels, the Council discussed the situation 
in the Mediterranean. They noted that the 
WEU member countries paid great attention to 
the developments in the various parts of the 
Mediterranean and that they were willing to do 
all in their power - both individually and within 
the appropriate international fora - to contri-
bute to peace, security and co-operation in this 
region. 
(b) The Council's hopes about the situation in 
the Middle East expressed in their last year's 
report were severely dashed in 1983. 
I. See Annex 11. 
2. See Annex 11. 
3. See Annex Ill. 
The Council would like to point out that in 
the context of their reply in April to Assembly 
Recommendation 389 they reaffirmed ·their 
support for a global negotiated settlement of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict - based on Security 
Council Resolutions 242 and 338 - leading to 
the mutual recognition of the rights of the 
parties involved. They reiterated the opinion 
that such a solution should allow the Palesti-
nians to realise self-determination, with all that 
that implied, as well as security for all the 
states in the region, including Israel's right to 
exist. They again voiced their deep concern and 
outright opposition to the continuing Israeli 
policy of settlement in the occupied territories, 
particularly in view of the fact that an 
opportunity for peace had been offered in 
September 1982 by the Reagan plan and by 
the declaration adopted at the Arab summit in 
Fez. 
In their reply to the Assembly, the Council 
also emphasised that they considered it vital for 
the purposes of achieving lasting stability in 
Lebanon and for the restoration of its full 
sovereignty and political independence that all 
foreign forces whose presence was not explicitly 
requested by the Lebanese Government be 
withdrawn from the country. 
The Council affirmed their solidarity with 
the Lebanese Government and their support for 
the full re-establishment of its authority over 
all its national territory; in this connection they 
emphasised the substantial contribution made 
by some WEU member countries (France, Italy 
and the United Kingdom) and the United 
States, in deploying a peacekeeping force in the 
Beirut area. 
The Council pledged their support for all 
humanitarian aid to the civilian population of 
Lebanon who had been so cruelly affiicted by 
events in that country. 
At the ministerial meeting of the Council 
the WEU member countries reaffirmed their 
support for all efforts to promote the restoration 
of the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of Lebanon. 
The Council also wish to recall that in the 
declaration1 published by the Ten on 12th 
September in Athens, the latter stated that 
their governments were ready to work both 
jointly and individually for the objectives to be 
attained for a return to normality in Lebanon. 
In his address to the United Nations General 
Assembly on 27th September, the Chairman-
in-Office of the Council of the European 
Communities, noting that the cease-fire conclu-
ded on 25th September was to be followed by 
1. See Annex IV. 
21 
DOCUMENT 969 
a dialogue between the Lebanese, emphasised 
the Ten's hope that this dialogue would lead to 
national reconciliation and ensure the unity of 
the country ; on that occasion he confirmed the 
position that the Ten had expressed in the past. 
Moreover, following the meeting on 27th 
October after the tragic attacks on American 
and French troops of the multinational peace 
force deployed in the Beirut area, the foreign 
ministers of the four participating countries 
reaffirmed their support for this- force, in the 
framework of the mission assigned to it ; they 
reiterated their support for the process of 
national reconciliation in Lebanon and, laun-
ching an appeal for Lebanese unity, they urged 
in particular those who would be participating 
in the Geneva congress to agree to this end. 
As regards the conflict between Iran and 
Iraq, it is recalled that the member countries of 
WEU had, in concert with their partners in the 
European Community, urgently appealed to the 
two belligerents to spare the civilian population 
and to abide by all international conventions 
applicable in time of war ; they also made 
repeated calls for a cease-fire, the cessation of 
all military operations, the withdrawal of forces 
to internationally-recognised frontiers and for a 
just and honourable settlement, negotiated in 
accordance with the resolutions of the United 
Nations Security Council. The Ten confirmed 
their readiness, if requested by both parties, to 
participate in the efforts aimed at restoring 
peace in the area. 
3. Asia 
(a) In their April reply to Assembly Recom-
mendation 389, the Council expressed their 
deep concern at the Soviet military occupation 
of Mghanistan which had continued for more 
than three years and which was being met with 
the determined resistance of the Mghan people. 
They stressed that this occupation, together 
with the continuing violations of human rights 
which it involved, showed flagrant disregard for 
the principles of the United Nations Charter 
and remained a serious source of tension in 
East-West relations. 
The Council stressed the urgent need for a 
negotiated settlement to the Afghan problem in 
accordance with the relevant United Nations 
resolutions, i.e. one based on an immediate and 
complete withdrawal of Soviet troops, respect 
for the independence, sovereignty and non-
alignment of the country and the restoration of 
the right of the Mghan people to self-determi-
nation and conditions in which the Mghan 
refugees could return to their homeland in 
safety and honour. Only in this way, the 
Council believed, would it be possible to find a 
genuine political solution which could put an 
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end to the grief and destruction inflicted on the 
Afghan people. 
In their reply to the Assembly, the Council 
also stressed the need to take all possible 
measures to alleviate the suffering of the 
Afghan refugees who had found welcome 
shelter in Pakistan from the horrors of an 
externally-imposed war. 
As stated under point 1, the situation in 
Afghanistan was mentioned at the ministerial 
meeting of the Council in Brussels on 17th 
May. After the meeting, the Chairman-in-
Office spoke of the deep concern expressed by 
the ministers at the recent increase of Soviet 
bombing raids in this country. 
The member countries of WEU restated 
their position on the Afghan problem at the 
ministerial meetings of the North Atlantic 
Council which took place in Paris on 9th and 
lOth June and in Brussels on 8th and 9th 
December 1983 respectively. They also associa-
ted themselves with the overwhelming majority 
of the member countries of the United Nations 
who, in a resolution passed on 23rd November 
by the United Nations General Assembly, 
renewed the appeals regularly made by the 
Assembly since 1979. 
The Council would finally like to mention 
the declaration published by the Ten on 27th 
December, the fourth anniversary of the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan, in which they 
stressed that the withdrawal of Soviet troops 
was the key to any long-term solution of the 
Afghan problem and recalled their proposal of 
30th June 1981 concerning the calling of an 
international conference on Afghanistan. 
(b) Developments in relations between the 
countries of Western Europe and the People's 
Republic of China was one of the topics 
discussed during the Council's meetings with 
the Presidential Committee and the General 
Affairs Committee of the Assembly in Brussels 
on 17th May. On this occasion, Mr. Tindemans, 
in his capacity as Belgian Minister for External 
Relations, spoke of his visit to this country in 
March. 
The Council noted with interest Recommen-
dation 393 on China and European security 
which the Assembly submitted in June. 
In their reply, the Council began by giving 
the following information : 
The member states of WEU individually 
maintained a wide range of political contacts 
with the Government of the People's Republic 
of China through exchanges or visits and other 
channels. These contacts provided good oppor-
tunities for consultations on international ques-
tions, and on many of these similar views were 
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shared. Moreover, in May 1983, the member 
states of the European Community, acting 
within their political co-operation framework, 
had decided to establish regular political 
consultations every six months between the Ten 
and the People's Republic of China. Pursuant 
to this decision, the first consultations had taken 
place at the end of May 1983. 
Generally speaking, trade and economic 
co-operation between China and the individual 
member states of WEU were growing in a spirit 
of equality and mutual benefit. The member 
states of WEU welcomed this development and 
would endeavour to encourage its continuation. 
They did not consider that either individual 
national policies or other existing regulations 
currently presented a major obstacle to the 
development of trade and co-operation with 
China. They believed, however, that the appli-
cation of those regulations to trade with China 
should be reviewed from time to time. The 
member states of WEU would continue to 
maintain close contact with the United States 
and their other OECD partners on this matter. 
With regard to the other questions raised in 
the Assembly recommendation, the Council 
made the following comments : 
As they had already stated within the 
alliance, the member states of WEU supported 
the position that the threat posed to Europe by 
Soviet missiles should not be reduced at the 
expense of countries of the Far East. 
The member states of WEU had repeatedly 
declared their opposition to the presence of 
Vietnamese troops in Cambodia, their demand 
for the complete withdrawal of these troops and 
their wish to see Cambodia return to its former 
neutral, non-aligned and independent status. 
The United Kingdom's partners had com-
plete confidence in the United Kingdom in its 
search for a negotiated solution for Hong Kong 
which would maintain Hong Kong's stability 
and prosperity. 
B. Defence questions 
During the year under review, the Council 
have carried out their customary tasks in the 
defence field, in accordance with the modified 
Brussels Treaty and its protocols. In addition, 
they have pursued the matter of modifying the 
list of types of armaments to be controlled at 
Annex IV to Protocol No. Ill. 
The Council's desire to adjust, where 
necessary, their activities in the matters of 
European defence for which they are competent 
in order to take due account of relevant 
developments in a wider context, while scrupu-
lously maintaining their traditional obligations, 
was reflected in the contributions made by 
ministerial representatives of member govern-
ments to the two part-sessions of the Assembly. 
Thus, Mr. Cheysson, French Minister for 
External Relations and Chairman-in-Office of 
the Council, in presenting the Council's annual 
report, reaffirmed the determination of the 
member states to honour their commitments 
under the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty 
and more particularly the commitment to 
legitimate collective defence under Article V. 
He recalled, on that occasion, the care exercised 
by the Council to ensure that the provisions of 
the treaty and its protocols concerning control 
of the levels of forces and armaments of 
member states are implemented. The sugges-
tions made by the Assembly in Recommenda-
tion 380 regarding Annexes Ill and IV to 
Protocol No. Ill were being very carefully 
considered by governments. Speaking on behalf 
of the French Government, Mr. Cheysson 
stressed that WEU had to remain the living 
and renewed expression of the solidarity of the 
member countries and that the overall structure 
created by the modified Brussels Treaty should 
remain intact. 
For his part, Mr. Mtsllemann, Parliamentary 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, addressing the 
Assembly, referred to adapting WEU to the 
changes that have occurred since its foundation 
in the political situation in Europe. Adjustments 
were needed, to ensure that WEU remains a 
viable and functioning body in the 1980s. 
Mr. Hernu, French Defence Minister, recal-
led the solemn undertaking of mutual assistance 
in the event of aggression entered into by the 
member states in the modified Brussels Treaty. 
He further emphasised that the four component 
parts of WEU were in his government's view 
indispensable for the purpose of reinforcing the 
security of member countries. In this respect 
the Minister stated that the thirtieth anniversary 
of the signing of the Paris Agreements should 
be made an occasion for seeking to pursue 
further this aim. 
1. Lnel of forces of member states 
Control of forces (and of armaments for 
these forces) maintained by member states on 
the mainland of Europe remains a regular task 
of the Council, assisted by the Agency for the 
Control of Armaments, and also by NATO and 
SHAPE. The procedures governing this control 
remain unchanged, and accordingly the Council 
have carried out, in 1983, their usual duties in 
this field. 
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(a) Forces under NATO command 
The maximum levels of ground, air and 
naval forces which member states of WEU 
place under NATO command are fixed in 
Articles I and 11 of Protocol No. 11 to the 
modified Brussels Treaty. Article Ill of the 
protocol provides for a special procedure, if 
necessary, to enable these levels to be increased 
above the limits specified in Articles I and 11. 
So that they may satisfy themselves that 
the limits laid down in Articles I and 11 of 
Protocol No. 11 are not exceeded, the Council 
receive information every year concerning the 
levels in question, in accordance with Article 
IV of that protocol. This information is obtained 
in the course of inspections carried out by the 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and is 
transmitted to the Council by a high-ranking 
officer designated by him to that end. 
The information, as at the end ~f 1982, was 
conveyed at the appropriate time. It was 
presented to the Council on 13th April by 
SACEUR's representative to the Council. This 
occasion afforded the representatives of member 
governments in WEU an opportunity to be 
given up-to-date information on their countries' 
force dispositions, modernisation efforts and 
collaborative programmes. For his part, the 
United Kingdom delegate used this opportunity 
to state that his government's commitment to 
its obligations under the modified Brussels 
Treaty and to the defence of Europe remains 
firm (see also 2 below). 
Information giving the status of these forces 
as at the end of 1983 was requested in 
December. 
Furthermore, the Council take the necessary 
steps to implement the procedure laid down in 
their resolution of 15th September 1956, 
whereby the levels of forces under NATO 
command are examined in the light of the 
annual review. 
For the year 1982, the permanent represen-
tatives to the North Atlantic Council of 
Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom, at a meeting held on 27th 
January in Brussels, examined the levels of 
forces of WEU member states and reported to 
the Council. 
The Council, at their meeting of 22nd 
March, noted that the level of forces of the 
member states of WEU, as set out in the 
NATO force plan, fell within the limits specified 
in Articles I and 11 of Protocol No. 11, as at 
present in force. They also took note of a 
declaration on French forces made by the 
representative of France. 
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The same procedure is under way for the 
year 1983. 
(b) Forces under national command 
The strength and armaments of forces of 
member states maintained on the mainland of 
Europe and remaining under national command 
- internal defence and police forces, forces for 
the defence of overseas territories, and common 
defence forces - are fixed each year in 
accordance with the procedure specified in the 
agreement signed in Paris on 14th December 
1957 in implementation of Article V of Protocol 
No. 11. 
* 
* * 
By means of the methods set out in 
paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the Council have 
been able, in 1983, to carry out their obligations 
under Protocol No. 11 to the modified Brussels 
Treaty concerning levels of forces. 
2. U•ited Ki•gdom forces statio•ed 01f the co1fti1fe1ft of 
E11rope 
In accordance with the Council's reply to 
Assembly Recommendation 331, the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom have informed the 
Council that the average number of British land 
forces stationed on the mainland of Europe in 
1983 in accordance with the commitment in 
Article VI of Protocol No. 11 of the modified 
Brussels Treaty was 58,420. The continued 
need for the presence of troops in Northern 
Ireland made it necessary for units of the 
British Army of the Rhine to be redeployed for 
short tours of duty there. In 1983 there were on 
average 995 men in Northern Ireland. As has 
been previously stated, these units would be 
speedily returned to their duty station in an 
emergency affecting NATO. 
Furthermore, in accordance with the Coun-
cil's reply to Assembly Recommendation 348, 
the Government of the United Kingdom have 
informed the Council that the strength of the 
United Kingdom's contribution to the Second 
Allied Tactical Air Force in 1983 was : 
Role Aircraft/Equipment Squadrons 
Strike/ Attack 
Offensive support 
Reconnaissance 
Air defence 
Buccaneer 
Jaguar 
Tornado 
Harrier 
Jaguar 
Phantom 
1 
4 
1 
2 
1 
2 
Rapier surface-to-air missiles 4 
Air transport Puma 1 
Chinook 1 
Ground defence RAF regiment 1 
3. A1f1fex IJI to Protocol No. Ill 
This annex lists armaments held by each 
WEU member state on the mainland of Europe 
(i.e. armaments for forces maintained under 
national command and under NATO command) 
to be controlled. 
The Council have continued to examine in 
depth the technical, military and political 
aspects of varying the list of armaments at 
Annex IV to Protocol No. Ill. Their discussions 
on this complex question have been assisted by 
a technical study prepared by the Armaments 
Control Agency. The Assembly will be informed 
as soon as possible after the completion of the 
Council's examination of the problem. 
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4. St11dy of the armame1fts sector of i•d11stry ;, the 
member COII1ftries I 
On 21st April, the Council received the 
updated classified version of the first section of 
the economic part of the SAC's study. On 27th 
April, in the course of his annual presentation 
to the Council on the SAC's activities, the head 
of its international secretariat commented on 
this updating. 
The ministerial Council of 17th May 
examined progress made with the study. At the 
conclusion of their exchanges, it was agreed 
1. See also Chapter IV, A. 
that the economic study would be taken into 
consideration by member governments. 
After subsequent discussions, the Council 
requested the SAC to carry out an annual, 
simplified updating of the economic study. 
S. Set of proposals relating to the future work 
of the SAC1• 
The head of the international secretariat of 
the SAC presented to the Council on 27th April 
nine proposals for future SAC activity. One of 
them concerned the economic study, mentioned 
under 4 above. Another recommended that the 
Committee should carry out a study on the 
future position of Japan in the armaments 
market. These two suggestions received the 
endorsement of the Council. 
The other proposals are still being examined 
by governments, bearing in mind the need to 
avoid unnecessary duplication of work with 
other fora. 
The Council welcome the Assembly's inte-
rest in matters relating to armaments co-
operation and in the SAC's activities. They will 
continue to keep the Assembly informed of 
developments in these fields. 
6. Replies to Assembly recommendations and written 
questions 
The Council continued to give careful 
consideration to the opinions expressed by the 
Assembly, the only European parliamentary 
body competent in the field of defence. 
(a) In their dialogue with the Assembly, the 
Council have continued to emphasise the 
usefulness of information activity carried out 
within parliamentary bodies and also in the 
course of contacts between the elected represen-
tatives and public opinion. At a time of 
heightened world tension and deep public 
concern regarding security and defence issues, 
this role assumes particular significance. 
(b) Thus, when the Assembly adopted Recom-
mendation 388 on the problems for European 
security arising from pacifism and neutralism, 
the Council commented that this recommenda-
tion well illustrated the importance attached by 
the parliamentarians to these matters. Member 
governments, for their part, continued to believe 
that the security policy of the member countries 
- consisting of deterrence and defence as well 
as of arms control and disarmament - enjoys 
the genuine support of the overwhelming 
majority of public opinion. 
1. See also Chapter IV, E, 2. 
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The theme of European security, and the 
need to maintain and improve the allied defence 
efforts, with more effective use being made of 
existing resources, was taken up again in the 
Council's reply to Recommendation 390. Mem-
ber governments agreed that these efforts need 
to be accompanied by the active pursuit of 
arms control negotiations with a view to 
achieving balanced, equitable and verifiable 
agreements leading to enhanced security at a 
lower level of forces. 
In the context of their reply to Recommen-
dation 391 on the Falklands crisis, the Council 
stated that it does not appear that the 
deployment of British troops there need give 
rise to concern about the strength of allied 
forces in the North Atlantic. They noted that 
United Kingdom forces in the South Atlantic 
remain committed to NATO. The matter of the 
implications for alliance members of events 
beyond the NATO area which threaten vital 
allied interests - and in particular the conse-
quences for NATO of deployments outside the 
area to meet such threats - was addressed in 
the same answer. The question of the export of 
defence equipment to non-allied countries was 
also referred to. 
With regard to the Standing Armaments 
Committee, the Council, in replying to Recom-
mendation 394, commented that the study of 
the armaments sector of industry in the member 
countries carried out by the Committee (see 4 
above), appears to be a step towards improved 
co-operation between the members and could 
help them in directing their programmes and 
military investment expenditure. Reference was 
also made, in the Council's reply, to the 
proposals for study by the SAC, advanced by 
the head of the Committee's international 
secretariat (see 5 above). 
(c) Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty 
and French nuclear forces were the subject of 
Written Question 233. The Council's reply 
underlined the determination of member coun-
tries to honour the contractual obligations under 
the treaty, and in particular the commitment to 
collective self-defence agreed in Article V. It 
was also underlined that France fully assumed 
the obligations arising from her membership of 
WEU. 
The Council used the opportunity provided 
by Written Question 238 to furnish information 
to the Assembly on the situation regarding 
procurement by France of an airborne warning 
system, and its place in the European AWACS 
cover; and on the United Kingdom's contribu-
tion to NATO AEW. 
(d) Written Question 235 dealt with SS-20 
warhead numbers. In order to formulate an 
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accurate reply, the Council requested NATO to 
contribute to the text being prepared. 
(e) In December, the Council began their 
study of the three recommendations on defence 
matters transmitted to them following the 
second part-session of the Assembly. Where 
questions relating to the North Atlantic Alliance 
are concerned, the Council will as usual take 
into account, in preparing their replies, develop-
ments within that body and in particular the 
declaration issued by the alliance on 9th 
December 19831 on relations with the Soviet 
Union, to which all WEU member countries 
subscribed. 
7. Meeting between the Council and the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments of tire Assembly 
After their meeting at ministerial level on 
17th May, the Council of Ministers held a joint 
meeting with the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments to discuss certain 
questions proposed by the committee (see 
Chapter I, C). 
8. Contacts witlr SHAPE 
The Council accepted a further invitation 
from SACEUR to exchange views on questions 
of mutual interest at a meeting to be held early 
in 1984 at SHAPE. Council representatives 
attended SHAPEX 83 in May and observed 
certain NATO military exercises. 
9. Military arclri-,es of the Brussels Treaty Organisation 
An ad hoc group of experts representing 
member governments met from 15th to 17th 
March in London to examine the 1948-1950 
military files of the Brussels Treaty Organisa-
tion, with a view to their release for research 
purposes. On 13th July, the Council decided 
that these archives should be released in 
accordan~ with the recommendations of the 
group. The necessary preparations having been 
completed, arrangements were made for the 
Public Record Office in London to microfilm 
and store the archives, and make them available 
to approved researchers in accordance with 
agreed rules of access as from 1st March 1984. 
As in the case of the Brussels Treaty 
Organisation political archives covering the 
same period, the President of the Assembly will 
be informed when the files have been opened 
for study. 
l. See Annex Ill (attached to parts A and D of Chapter 
11 which are transmitted separately). 
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10. Meeting of the Liaison Sub-Committee on the joint 
production of armaments 
The Council, after examining a request by 
the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments of the Assembly, agreed to a 
meeting of the Liaison Sub-Committee, to be 
held on 14th February 1984 in Paris. The 
Council noted that the purpose of the meeting 
was to examine with the parliamentarians, 
informally and in confidence, matters of mutual 
interest concerning the responsibilities of the 
Standing Armaments Committee which would 
be submitted to the Council beforehand. 
C. Scientific, technological and aerospace 
questions 
The Council noted with interest the reports 
prepared by the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions 1• They 
followed closely the discussions arising from 
these reports during the twenty-ninth ordinary 
session of the Assembly. 
The Council replied to Assembly Recom-
mendation 392, relating to the energy situation 
in Europe, and 395, concerning the law of the 
sea, as well as to Written Question 237 put by 
a member of the Assembly on the subject of 
the future of the Airbus programme. 
1. Energy situation in Europe 
In their reply to Recommendation 392 on 
energy requirements and the security of Europe 
- Norway's contribution to meeting these 
requirements, the Council noted the importance 
of good relations between Norway and the other 
countries of Western Europe with respect, inter 
alia, to energy. They referred to consultations 
on the subject within OECD, of which Norway 
is an active member. 
As regards future European energy requi-
rements, the Council indicated that detailed 
studies were already available or taking place. 
They mentioned the OECD and International 
Energy Agency's study entitled" World Energy 
Outlook ", which contained a thorough analysis 
of European energy requirements in the next 
decades, as well as the study on the energy 
supplies of OECD member countries and their 
security, currently being carried out within that 
organisation. 
Considering that the result of these studies 
and other initiatives might provide further 
criteria for assessing the desirability of setting 
l. See also Chapters I, 8, 1 and IV, E, 4. 
up an interconnected intra-European gas pipe-
line network, the Council stated that they were 
not yet in a position to take a more definite 
stand on that subject. 
Furthermore, the Council stated that they 
were confident that the measures which WEU 
member countries had taken both individually 
and collectively within the framework of the 
European Communities and - for those who are 
members of it - of the International Energy 
Agency for example, would be sufficient to 
ensure regular and adequate supplies of energy 
in order to meet their security requirements. 
The measures related inter alia to the pursuit 
of policies of conservation and of diversification 
by developing all sources of energy. The Council 
noted that the member countries of WEU were 
firmly determined to promote effective imple-
mentation of those measures. 
l. Law of the sea 
The Council wish to recall the main points 
of their reply in November to Assembly 
Recommendation 395. 
The Council noted that two WEU member 
countries, France and the Netherlands, had 
signed the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, while the others did not at 
present intend to do so or had not yet taken a 
decision. They pointed out that the obstacles 
which prevented signature of the convention by 
the majority of member countries lay mainly, 
if not entirely, in the deep seabed regime, 
beyond national jurisdiction, as it had been 
drafted in the convention. 
The Council therefore took the view that 
every effort must be made to arrive at 
constructive and acceptable solutions to the 
issue of the deep seabed regime. Success in this 
respect would undoubtedly advance the general 
acceptability of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea. The Council noted that 
the WEU member countries would do every-
thing possible, through the appropriate channels, 
to achieve this aim. 
In the present situation, only France and 
the Netherlands, which have signed the conven-
tion, were members of the preparatory commis-
sion responsible inter alia for the elaboration of 
rules and regulations for deep seabed mining; 
the other WEU member countries participated 
as observers. The Council welcomed the fact 
that the first meetings of this preparatory 
commission had demonstrated that co-operation 
between WEU member states was very good. 
Those WEU member states with full voting 
rights, as members of the commission, had 
made every effort to ensure that the observers 
were allowed to participate in the work of the 
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commission to the full extent as laid down in 
Resolution I of the final act of the Conference 
on the Law of the Sea: In the view of the 
Council, the success obtained in this respect 
was of course in the interest of the commission 
as a whole because, in working out the deep 
seabed regime, it was necessary to make 
maximum use of the knowledge and expertise 
in the field of deep seabed mining, which was 
primarily available in those states which had a 
deep-sea mining capability. 
Obviously, the influence of the preparatory 
commission members with deep-sea mining 
expertise would facilitate the establishment of 
satisfactory rules and regulations for the mining 
regime and help avoid any unnecessary control 
or protectionism. The Council noted that France 
and the Netherlands, together with WEU 
member countries participating as observers, 
would work to this end in the negotiations 
within the preparatory commission. 
As the Council also noted, it was to be 
hoped that with the elaboration of a satisfactory 
seabed mining regime, the convention could be 
made fully acceptable not only to WEU 
member countries, but also to the United States 
whose position was referred to in the reply to 
the Assembly. 
3. European aeronautics 
In reply to Written Question 237 relating to 
the Airbus A-320, the Council in December 
gave the following information to the Assembly : 
The industrial partners and the governments 
participating in the Airbus programme recognise 
the need to develop a more comprehensive 
range of Airbus products in order to enhance 
the competitive position of the European civil 
aerospace industry. The governments involved 
are aware that the industrial partners are 
concentrating their efforts on fulfilling the 
necessary conditions for the launching of the 
A-320 programme. 
McDonnell-Douglas has expressed a firm 
intention to develop new versions of its 
intermediate DC-9 series of aircraft, although 
it has decided to abandon the launch of its new 
generation short medium-range aircraft MD-
90. In the circumstances, the possibility is that 
Boeing will have the monopoly of the new 
120-150 seat aircraft class. Moreover, Boeing 
will remain the only aircraft producer in the 
world able to offer a complete product range 
covering short-, medium- and long-range air-
craft. 
The member governments have signified 
their willingness to consider support for the 
launch and development of the Airbus A-320 
provided it can be demonstrated that the 
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programme has sound prospects of commercial 
viability. 
In principle an aircraft of the A-320 type is 
of possible interest to all airlines operating older 
design aircraft of this size which will need to be 
replaced from the late 1980s onwards. Orders 
for the A-320 have been placed by Air France, 
Air Inter and British Caledonian. Negotiations 
between Airbus Industrie and other airlines are 
continuing. 
D. Secretariat-General 
The Secretariat-General assisted the Council 
and its working group in all their activities 
during 1983. 
The Secretary-General or his principal 
officers, representing ~EU, ~ttended a ';lu~ber 
of meetings of other mternational orgamsations 
when questions of concern to WEU were under 
consideration. As in previous years the most 
frequent of the Secret~'j'-General's contac~s 
were with the authonties of the Atlantic 
Alliance and the Council of Europe. 
ANNEX I 
Press release issued by the Council of Western 
European Union on 22nd September 1983 
The Permanent Council of Western Euro-
pean Union at their meeting of 21st September 
1983 strongly condemned the destruction of a 
civil airliner of the Korean Airlines on 31st 
August 1983. They deeply deplored this action 
caused by Soviet military aircraft, which 
resulted in the tragic loss of a great number of 
human lives. 
The Council recalled that the seven WEU 
member states have already made public their 
positions and reactions, and also expressed their 
determination within the ICAO that the 
necessary measures be adopted to avoid any 
recurrence of such a tragedy. 
ANNEX 11 
Points 5, 7 and 8 of the final communique of 
the meeting of the North Atlantic Council held 
in Brussels on 8th and 9tlt December 1983 
5. The situation in Poland continues to give 
cause for serious concern. Some of the steps 
taken by the Polish authorities, such as the 
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lifting of martial law and the amnesty for most 
political detainees, contrast w~th the. introduc-
tion of other measures whtch remforce a 
repressive system. The allies ca~l 0';1 the Polish 
authorities to respect the aspirations of the 
people for reform and to abide by the 
commitments in the Helsinki final act and the 
concluding document of the Madrid. conference, 
particularly with regard to trade umon freedom 
and civil rights. They are ready to respond to 
steps which create the opP?rtunit~ for co~struc­
tive political and economic relations with the 
West. 
7. Trade conducted on the basis of commer-
cially sound terms and mutual advantage, t~at 
avoids preferential treatment of the Soviet 
Union, contributes to constructive East-West 
relations. At the same time, bilateral economic 
relations with the Soviet Union and the 
countries of Eastern Europe must remain 
consistent with broad allied security concerns. 
These include avoiding dependence on the 
Soviet Union, or contributing to Soviet military 
capabilities. Thus, development of western 
energy resources should be encoura_ged. In. order 
to avoid further use by the Soviet Umon of 
some forms of trade to enhance its military 
strength, the allies will remain vigilant in their 
continuing review of the . securit~ aspects ?f 
East-West economic relations. This work will 
assist allied governments in the conduct of their 
policies in this field 1• 
8. The successful conclusion of the Madrid 
meeting contributes to the strengthening of the 
CSCE process. Although the concluding docu-
ment agreed in Madrid falls somewhat short. of 
the allies' proposals, it is nonetheless substantive 
and balanced. The allies attach equal impor-
tance to the implementation by all the CSCE 
countries of all provisions of both the Helsinki 
final act and the Madrid document, including 
their humanitarian aspects. An important result 
of the Madrid meeting was the agreement on 
a precise negotiating mandate for the Con-
ference on Confidence and Security Building 
Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) 
due to open in Stockholm in January 1984. 
ANNEX Ill 
Declaration issued by the member countries of 
the Atlantic Alliance in Brussels on 9th 
December 1983 
We, the representatives of the sixteen 
member countries of the North Atlantic 
1. Greece recalled its position on various aspects of this 
paragraph. 
Alliance, reaffirm the dedication of the allies to 
the maintenance of peace in freedom. 
Our alliance threatens no one. None of our 
weapons will ever be used except in response to 
attack. We do not aspire to superiority, neither 
will we accept that others should be superior to 
us. Our legitimate security interests can only be 
guaranteed through the firm linkage between 
Europe and North America. We call upon the 
Soviet Union to respect our legitimate security 
interests as we respect theirs. 
We are determined to ensure security on 
the basis of a balance of forces at the lowest 
possible level. Faced with the threat posed by 
the Soviet SS-20 missiles, the allies concerned 
are going forward with the implementation of 
the double-track decision of 1979. The ultimate 
goal remains that there should be neither Soviet 
nor United States land-based long-range INF 
missiles. The deployment of United States 
missiles can be halted or reversed by concrete 
results at the negotiating table. In this spirit we 
wish to see an early resumption of the INF 
negotiations which the Soviet Union has 
discontinued 1• 
We urge the countries of the Warsaw Pact 
to seize the opportunities we offer for a balanced 
and constructive relationship and for genuine 
detente. In all arms control negotiations progress 
must be made among the states participating, 
in particular in : 
- the strategic arms reductions talks 
(START); 
- the intermediate-range nuclear forces 
talks (INF) ; 
- the negotiations on mutual and balanced 
force reductions (MBFR) ; 
- the endeavours for a complete ban on 
chemical weapons in the Committee on 
Disarmament. 
We are also resolved to use the forthcoming 
Stockholm conference as a new opportunity to 
1. Denmark and Greece reserve their positions on this 
paragraph ; Spain, not having been a party to the double-
track decision of 1979, reserves its position on this 
paragraph. 
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broaden the dialogue with the East, to negotiate 
confidence building measures and enhance 
stability and security in the whole of Europe. 
We shall continue to do our utmost to 
sustain a safe and peaceful future. We extend 
to the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact 
countries the offer to work together with us to 
bring about a long-term constructive and 
realistic relationship based on equilibrium, 
moderation and reciprocity. For the benefit of 
mankind we advocate an open, comprehensive 
political dialogue, as well as co-operation based 
on mutual advantage. 
ANNEX IV 
Declaration issued by the Foreign Ministers of 
the European Community in Athens on 12th 
December 1983 
The situation in Lebanon is more critical 
than at any other time in the last sixteen 
months. The number of innocent victims 
increases every day. 
The international community must do all it 
can to help put an end to this tragedy before it 
leads to the disintegration of Lebanon. 
The Ten appeal for an immediate cease-fire 
leading to the cessation of violence and pressure 
in Lebanon, and to national reconciliation. 
They call upon all parties to respect the 
independence, sovereignty and territorial integ-
rity of Lebanon, and the authority of its 
government. 
They stress the need for early progress 
towards the complete withdrawal of all foreign 
forces from Lebanon, except as the Lebanese 
Government may request otherwise. 
They are ready to work for these objectives, 
jointly and individually. 
They are convinced that the abnormal 
situation in Lebanon, so long as it continues, is 
a further obstacle to the achievement of a just 
and lasting settlement in the Middle East as a 
whole. 
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CHAPTER Ill 
AGENCY FOR THE CONTROL OF ARMAMENTS 
Under the terms of Article VII of Protocol 
No. IV, the Agency is required: 
- firstly, to control the level of stocks of 
armaments held by member countries on 
the mainland of Europe, this control 
extending to production and imports to 
the extent required to make the control of 
stocks effective ; 
- secondly, to satisfy itself that the under-
takings given by the Federal Republic of 
Germany not to manufacture certain 
types of armaments on its territory are 
being observed. 
Subject to the restrictions referred to under 
point B of this chapter, the Agency's control 
activities in 1983 were performed at a satisfac-
tory level. 
A. General operating methods 
The methods used by the Agency are 
determined by the provisions of the modified 
Brussels Treaty and by Council decisions on the 
subject. During the year under review, they 
remained basically unchanged. 
Within the Agency's terms of reference, 
controls from documentary sources serve mainly 
for checking levels of armaments as a whole. 
They also contribute to the preparation of field 
measures for the control of levels and of the 
non-production of certain categories of arma-
ments. This aspect covers all activities concerned 
with processing, for the purposes defined above, 
any useful documentary material including, in 
particular, countries' replies to the Agency 
questionnaire, and the results of field control 
measures carried out earlier. 
The execution of test checks, visits and 
inspections, and all that is linked with these 
functions, constitutes that part of control carried 
out physically wherever there are activities and 
stocks subject to control and, more generally, 
wherever this is necessary to ensure that the 
information supplied is correct and that under-
takings are observed. 
The control system is b~sed primarily on 
controls from documentary sources, the purpose 
of field control measures being to verify, 
physically, the accuracy of all the information 
collected in implementation of Part Ill of 
Protocol No. IV. 
30 
Documentary and field control measures are 
complementary, and equally essential for the 
accomplishment of the Agency's task. 
Traditionally, the annual report has always 
presented documentary and field control mea-
sures separately, in the interests of both 
convenience and clarity. However, it must not 
be forgotten that these measures together make 
up a single control function. 
Continuity of method allows the Agency, 
through a steadily growing knowledge of the 
organisation of the forces of each member state 
and of the progress of armaments production or 
procurement programmes, to develop its control 
activity efficiently and logically, both in the 
fixing of levels and quantities of armaments 
and in the choice and assessment of its control 
measures. 
B. Situation concerning the control of atomic, 
chemical and biological weapons 
1. Atomic weapons 
Since the situation has remained the same 
as in previous years, the Agency did not 
exercise any control in the field of atomic 
weapons. 
2. Biological weapons 
All the member countries again gave their 
agreement, for 1983, on the renewal of the list 
of biological weapons subject to control as 
accepted by the Council in 1981. The Council 
noted the fact. 
As in previous years, however, the Agency 
did not exercise any control in the field of 
biological weapons. 
3. Chemical weapons 
The Agency asked member countries for 
their agreement to renew in 1983 the list of 
chemical weapons subject to control. This 
agreement was given and the Council noted the 
fact. 
The Agency therefore continued to use this 
list for its control activities during 1983. 
- In accordance with the resolution appro-
ved by the Council in 1959 and in application 
of the Council directive extending to chemical 
weapons the provisions laid down for the control 
of non-production of the armaments listed in 
Annex Ill to Protocol No. Ill, the competent 
authorities of the country concerned provided 
the Agency with a detailed, precise and 
complete reply. In addition, the procedure 
applied with these authorities since 1973 was 
again used. 
The agreed non-production controls carried 
out by the Agency in 1983 are referred to 
under points D.2 (b) and 3 (b) of this chapter. 
- In application of Article Ill of Protocol 
No. Ill, which lays down conditions to enable 
the Council to fix levels of chemical weapons 
that may be held on the mainland of Europe by 
those countries which have not given up the 
right to produce them, and in accordance with 
the Council decision of 1959, the Agency asked 
the countries concerned, in its questionnaire, 
whether production of chemical weapons on 
their mainland territory had passed the experi-
mental stage and entered the effective produc-
tion stage. As in the past, all the states replied 
in the negative. 
- In addition, the Agency asked the member 
states, in the covering letter to its questionnaire, 
to declare any chemical weapons that they 
might hold, whatever their origin. Since all the 
member states replied in the negative, the 
Agency carried out no quantitative controls of 
chemical weapons in 1983. 
C. Controls from documentary sources 
In this field of control, the Agency studies 
the relevant documents with the main purpose 
of comparing the quantities of armaments held 
by the member states with the levels fixed by 
the Council and thus establishing whether these 
constitute appropriate levels within the terms of 
the modified Brussels Treaty. 
1. Information processed by tire Agency 
During 1983, documentary controls were 
carried out in the normal way by studying, 
processing and collating documents and infor-
mation obtained from various sources. 
The principal source of information available 
to the Agency is the reply sent by each member 
state to its annual questionnaire which, when 
processed in conjunction with data provided by 
NATO concerning the forces placed under 
allied authority, allows the fixing of appropriate 
levels. 
Secondly, the study of national defence 
budgets throws useful light on the replies to the 
annual questionnaire and to some extent 
31 
DOCUMENT 969 
facilitates the surveillance of production pro-
grammes of armaments subject to control. 
Finally, published material collected and 
circulated by the Central Documentation Office 
gives some confirmation of data obtained 
through official channels and allows the deve-
lopment of armaments programmes and the 
entry into service of equipment to be monitored. 
(a) Annual Agency questionnaire and replies by 
member states 
The follow-up action on the replies to the 
questionnaire sent, as every year, to member 
states was twofold. Some of the facts reported 
were checked physically by means of field 
control measures. In addition, all the replies 
were studied by the Agency experts who 
compared them with the other sources of 
information available, including member coun-
tries' earlier replies to Agency or NATO 
questionnaires and budgetary documents. 
(b) Request for annual information 
The control of undertakings' given by one of 
the member states regarding the non-production 
of certain types of armaments takes the form of 
field control measures. 
These measures are partly prepared from a 
study of documents based on the replies of the 
country concerned to the annual questionnaire 
and to the Agency's requests for annual 
information. 
As in previous years, the replies received 
from the country concerned in 1983 were taken 
into consideration for selecting and preparing 
the Agency's field control measures. 
(c) Information provided by NATO 
See point 2 (a) below. 
(d) Information provided by the United States 
of America and Canada 
(Article XXIII of Protocol No. IV) 
The Agency received, through the Council, 
information supplied by the Governments of the 
United States and Canada concerning their 
programmes of external aid in military equip-
ment to the forces of member states stationed 
on the mainland of Europe. Since 1966, no aid 
has been provided by these countries to the 
forces concerned. 
(e) Scrutiny of budgetary information 
In accordance with the provisions of Article 
VII of Protocol No. IV, the aim of the 
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budgetary studies is to ascertain how the credits 
intended for the manufacture and procurement 
of armaments subject to control were appor-
tioned and spent. They are based on an analysis 
of national statistical and budgetary documents, 
of the member states' replies to the Agency's 
annual questionnaire and of the specialist press. 
As in previous years, timetable constraints 
dictated that the Agency's budgetary study for 
1983 had to be based on the year before. Its 
findings confirmed the validity of the conclusions 
drawn from the declarations made by the 
member countries in 1982 and the information 
obtained from NATO. The still somewhat 
superficial study of the budgetary resources for 
1983 in no way contradicted the appropriate 
levels of armaments drawn up by the Agency 
for that financial year. 
{f) Processing of open sources of information 
The documentation provided by the techni-
cal press specialising in armament matters, 
together with official documents from the 
member states, is a source of information of 
ever-increasing importance. Its evaluation per-
mits the Agency to improve its awareness 
followed by a better understanding of matters 
arising within the context of its control mission. 
These sources also provide the means of keeping 
the experts up-to-date in matters of defence 
policy and armament techniques. 
The Agency's Central Documentation Office 
maintains a range of documentation compri-
sing : daily newspapers, specialised periodicals 
(military and technical reviews, publications of 
other international organisations such as NATO 
or OECD) and finally works of reference (basic 
studies, reports, catalogues concerned with 
armaments production, etc.). 
2. Verijiclltion of appropriate lnela of artumenta 
(a) Appropriate levels of armaments for forces 
placed under NATO command 
After receiving and processing the member 
states' replies to the annual questionnaire and 
studying the statistical reports furnished by the 
authorities of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (Article VII, 2 (a) of Protocol No. 
IV) and, in particular, by the NATO interna-
tional staff, the Agency arranged, as each year, 
for the annual consultations with the NATO 
military authorities called for by Article XIV of 
Protocol No. IV. 
These consultations included a joint study 
session at Casteau on 18th November 1983 
attended by Agency experts and the appropriate 
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officers from SHAPE, and concluded with a 
meeting in Paris on 2nd December 1983 which 
was attended by representatives of the Agency, 
SHAPE, SACLANT and CINCHAN and the 
International Military Staff of NATO. The 
meeting concluded that the quantities of 
armaments declared by the member states for 
their forces placed under NATO authority and 
stationed on the mainland of Europe correspon-
ded to the appropriate levels for the control 
year 1983 within the terms of Articles XIV and 
XIX of Protocol No. IV, in respect of those 
armaments over which the Agency has hitherto 
been able to exercise its mandate of controlling 
stock levels. 
(b) Appropriate levels of armaments for forces 
maintained under national command on the 
mainland of Europe 
In accordance with the procedure in force 
for the implementation of the Agreement of 
14th December 1957, the Agency supplied the 
Council with the information relating to the 
armaments of this category of forces which had 
been supplied by the member states in response 
to the Agency's annual questionnaire. The 
Agency, having received from the Council the 
statements by the member states on force levels, 
analysed on the Council's behalf the data for 
armaments and forces, having regard to the 
roles of their forces. 
The Council subsequently accepted or appro-
ved for 1983 the maximum levels of armaments 
of these forces and notified the Agency 
accordingly with a view to drawing up the final 
tables of the abovementioned forces. 
D. Field control measures 
1. Prineiplea go11erning the application of fold control 
meu•rea tllfd general methods of exec•tion 
As recalled in the introduction to this 
chapter, the treaty requires the Agency to: 
- satisfy itself that the undertakings not to 
manufacture certain types of armaments 
are being observed ; 
- control the level of stocks of certain 
armaments. 
The field control measures provided for by 
Article VII of Protocol No. IV, which are an 
essential part of the Agency's work, continued 
during 1983 on the same basis as in previous 
years. 
(a) Initial studies 
The accumulated experience, information 
received and the results of its controls in 1982 
led the Agency to draw up a programme for 
1983 on the same scale and lines as those of 
recent years, i.e. : 
- for non-production field control measures, 
a limited programme was considered 
adequate for verifying the undertakings 
of a member state not to manufacture 
specified armaments. The Agency was 
again aided in this task by the reply to its 
request for information from the member 
state concerned ; 
- for the quantitative field control measures, 
the sampling methods were again thought 
adequate to verify the accuracy of the 
data supplied by the member states and 
thus provide an acceptable level of 
confidence in the Agency's documental 
control. 
(b) Programme definition 
(i) No factor has emerged to prompt the 
Agency significantly to vary the distribution of 
field control measures either between member 
states or between the armaments of their land, 
sea and air forces. However, a number of 
known armament procurement programmes in 
some member states were still thought to be 
vulnerable to change, perhaps at short notice, 
as a result of funding problems. Accordingly, 
the proposals for control measures in some 
production plants were prepared on the clear 
understanding that last minute changes could 
well be necessary. A number of depot stock 
controls were therefore prepared as readily 
available alternatives. 
(ii) Depot and unit stock patterns were 
reassessed in the light of organisational changes 
and re-equipment programmes. The resultant 
basic programme of quantitative field control 
measures was examined in the light of 
production figures declared by the member 
states. Where these studies suggested the need 
to extend such controls to factories, their 
production programmes were reviewed to ensure 
that each such control measure took place at 
the most appropriate time. For those factories 
where different control measures (for example 
non-production and quantitative field controls) 
were indicated, proposals for all these types of 
control measures were co-ordinated with the 
aim of keeping the frequency of the Agency's 
visits to p_rivate concerns to a minimum. 
(iii) To avoid duplication, Article VIII of 
Protocol No. IV provides for control measures 
to be undertaken by the appropriate NATO 
authorities themselves for those forces placed 
under NATO authority. Thus, the forces under 
the control of the Agency vary from country to 
country, a factor which should be weighed in 
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preparing the programme. The depots to which 
Article VIII equally applies are subject to 
different considerations. Since logistic support 
for forces under NATO authority remains a 
wholly national responsibility, difficulties could 
arise in defining which armaments in some 
depots are, or will be assigned to forces under 
NATO authority and which armaments would 
remain under national command. Accordingly, 
the system of joint Agency /SHAPE inspections 
introduced in 1957 and used each year since 
was again authorised in 1983. Some depots 
were programmed for inspection by an 
Agency /SHAPE team. 
(iv) On the basis of these considerations and 
of the information already available to it, the 
Agency was able to draw up its 1983 
programme with sufficient confidence early in 
the year. In keeping with the usual procedure, 
this provisional programme was later modified 
following analyses and reviews of the member 
states' replies to the Agency's questionnaire and 
some changes were made. 
2. Met/rods, type and extent of fold control meuures 
(a) In keeping with the customary practice, 
each inspection team included one member of 
the nationality of the establishment visited, the 
head of mission and another expert, all three of 
different nationalities. 
No major changes were made in 1983 to 
the Agency's established procedure for the 
conduct of its field control measures. 
(b) The total number of field control measures 
was seventy-two. 
These measures fall broadly into the 
following categories : 
(i) quantitative control measures at depots ; 
(ii) quantitative control measures at units 
of forces under national command ; 
(iii) control measures at production plants : 
- agreed quantitative control measures ; 
- agreed non-production control mea-
sures. 
Most of the quantitative control measures 
related to ammunition (all services) and land 
materiel, others related to air materiel and 
naval materiel; a significant number of those 
measures related to missiles. 
The agreed quantitative control measures at 
manufacturing plants related to ammunition, 
tanks, missiles, aircraft engines and warships. 
The non-production agreed control measures 
were carried out at plants manufacturing 
chemicals or missiles. 
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At some plants, a production control 
measure was, for the reason mentioned under 
point 0.1 (b) (ii), linked with a depot inspection, 
or a quantitative inspection of stocks under 
repair or a non-production control measure. 
(c) It should be pointed out that the reports 
on field control measures are protected by the 
tightest security at all stages of their prepara-
tion, custody and subsequent analysis. 
3. Conclusions 
(a) In the fields where it is authorised to 
exercise its mandate, the Agency was able 
effectively to carry out its task of applying 
control measures. Such problems as arose in 
this very complex field of inspections were dealt 
with satisfactorily through the excellent rela-
tions maintained with the national authorities. 
(b) On the basis of all the field control 
measures carried out in 1983, the Agency was 
able to report to the Council that: 
- the measures taken for the control of 
the stocks of armaments at depots, 
units under national command and 
production plants amply confirmed the 
data obtained from documentary con-
trol measures ; 
- the non-production control measures 
revealed no production contrary to 
undertakings. 
E. Other Agency activities 
1. Studies and documentary work 
(a) At the Council's request, the Agency 
carried out a detailed technical study concerning 
a modification of the list of types of armaments 
to be controlled in accordance with Annex IV 
to Protocol No. Ill. 
(b) Work continued on the updating of the 
"overviews" which summarise the way in which 
the armed forces are organised in each of the 
WEU member countries. These documents are 
intended to help the experts perform their 
control functions. 
(c) Among the other Agency studies, mention 
should be made of the one carried out by the 
biological and chemical experts on the military 
use of herbicides. 
1. Tei:ltnical information 11isits 
As in previous years, technical information 
visits were arranged in 1983 to keep the Agency 
experts up-to-date on defence forward thinking 
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and the state of the art of armaments subject 
to control. 
The programme of visits was carefully 
tailored to make best use of the limited 
resources available to the Agency. 
Agency experts visited the Ateliers de 
Constructions Electriques at Charleroi in Bel-
gium where they were briefed on electric 
traction for armoured vehicles and saw produc-
tiqn ·of major components for guided weapons 
and for warship weapon systems. 
The land force experts were invited to make 
a guided tour of the "Satory 9" exhibition in 
France. They were also able to visit an 
explosives filling factory at Glascoed in the 
United Kingdom and the Royal School of 
Artillery at Larkhill. At the latter establish-
ment, the team was briefed on the r6le of 
artillery in a European land battle and the 
requirements to be met by the next generation 
of artillery weapons for BAOR in the i 990s. 
They also heard a talk on the use of artillery in 
the Falklands campaign. They saw a demon-
stration of the Rapier anti-aircraft guided 
weapon system. 
Before commencing an inspection mission in 
Italy, Agency experts attended a military 
exercise staged by the Scuola Militare di 
Paracadutismo of Pisa which included a 
demonstration of an attack and counter-attack 
with air f ground support and the use of 
helicopters. 
Naval experts were invited to attend the 
Royal Naval Exhibition at Portsmouth in the 
United Kingdom; during this visit, they heard 
a talk on the lessons of the Falklands campaign 
from a naval point of view. 
The air force experts paid an interesting 
visit to the Le Bourget Air Show where mock-
ups of the next generation of interceptors were 
on display. Finally, during a break in an 
inspection programme they visited the RSU 
Pratica di Mare in Italy to learn of ongoing 
flight trials and techniques. 
The biological and chemical experts were 
invited to visit the Bayerische Landesimpfans-
talt at Munich in the Federal Republic of 
Ger~any to see the work being done on 
vaccmes. 
3. The information gathered by the Agency 
concerning the procurement and construction of 
various types of armaments in the member 
countries of WEU is set out in an annex to this 
chapter. 
F. General conclusions 
In accordance with Articles VII and XIX of 
Protocol No. IV, the Agency was able to report 
-----~-------------------------
to the Council that, as a result of the control 
exercised in 1983, the figures obtained in 
accordance with Article XIII of Protocol No. 
IV: 
- for armaments of forces under NATO 
command under the terms of Article XIV 
of Protocol No. IV, and 
- for armaments of forces maintained under 
national command under the terms of 
Articles XV, XVI and XVII of Protocol 
No. IV and the Agreement of 14th 
December 1957, concluded in execution 
of Article V of Protocol No. 11, 
represented for the control year 1983 and for 
each of the member states, the appropriate 
levels of armaments subject to control for those 
categories of armaments over which the Agency 
has so far been enabled to exercise its mandate. 
As required by Article XX of Protocol No. 
IV, the Agency confirmed that, in the course of 
field control measures carried out at force units 
and military depots and during agreed control 
measures at production plants, it did not detect 
for the categories of armaments which it 
controls : 
- either the manufacture of a category of 
armaments that the government of the 
member state concerned had undertaken 
not to manufacture (Annexes 11 and Ill 
of Protocol No. Ill) ; 
- or the existence, on the mainland of 
Europe, of stocks of armaments in excess 
of the appropriate levels (Article XIX of 
Protocol No. IV) or not justified by export 
requirements (Article XXII of Protocol 
No. IV). 
In 1983, the Agency again applied controls 
in those fields which are open to it in an 
effective, simple and inexpensive manner. As in 
the past, the help and co-operation of national 
and NATO authorities, and of heads of staff of 
both the private firms and the military 
establishments visited played an important part 
in the accomplishment of its mission. 
ANNEX 
Production and procurement of various types 
of armaments in the WEU member countries 
1. Armaments for land forces 
In spite of the high cost of armaments, most 
of the member countries continued to re-equip 
their forces with modern weapons. 
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The German army has continued to intro-
duce into service Leopard 11 battle tanks and 
APCs of the modem wheeled type TPZ-1. Its 
anti-aircraft capacity has been increased by the 
addition of Roland anti-aircraft tanks. 
The Belgian army has modernised its anti-
tank capacity by the introduction of Milan 
anti-tank missile launchers in addition to those 
launchers already in service. Belgium also 
purchased Milan missiles to increase overall 
operational effectiveness. A further delivery of 
M-113 APCs marked the commencement of 
the modernisation of armoured fighting vehicle 
holdings. 
The French army has continued to re-equip 
its land forces with modem and more effective 
materiel. Large quantities of AMX-30 battle 
tanks, VABs (vehicule de l'avant blinde), 
AMX-10 variants and AMX RC (roues canons 
-wheeled guns) have been brought into service. 
In the field of artillery, self-propelled F-1 GCT 
(rapid firing) howitzers were procured and 
anti-aircraft Roland tanks based on the AMX-
30 chassis have been delivered. The introduction 
of the rifled 120 mm mortar has increased the 
range accuracy of this type of indirect 'fire 
weapon. With regard to ammunition, anti-
aircraft Roland missiles and considerable quan-
tities of 105 mm tank guns, 120 mm mortars, 
and 155 mm howitzers have been procured. 
The Italian forces have continued moderni-
sing their tank and anti-tank potential by 
procuring Leopard I battle tanks from national 
production and by importing Milan and Tow 
anti-tank systems. Modem APCs (VCC-1 type) 
have been brought into service to replace 
obsolete materiel. In the field of munitions, a 
large quantity of shells for the new FH-70 field 
howitzer is being procured and a significant 
quantity of missiles for Milan and Tow is due 
to enter the inventory. 
The Netherlands is continuing to increase 
its stocks of ammunition in the following 
categories: 105 mm and 120 mm tank guns, 
155 and 203 mm howitzers and anti-tank Tow 
missiles. 
The British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) is 
slightly increasing the number of Chieftain 
battle tanks; holdings of Tow launchers have 
also been increased during 1983. 
2. N1111al armaments 
Procurement programmes for fleet moder-
nisation in general went ahead as planned in 
the various WEU member countries, notwith-
standing the continuing economic recession. 
However, in some cases their slowing-down to 
spread costs over a longer period was noticeable. 
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In the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
Rheinland-Pfalz and Emden missile frigates of 
type F-122 class, have been introduced. Delivery 
to the German navy of fast missile attack craft 
of the Gepard class has continued. Tornado 
attack aircraft have partially replaced the F-
104 Starfighters. The Standard lA, Kormoran 
and Sidewinder 9L missiles have also been 
added to the inventory. 
In France, the Var, the third in a series of 
four under-way replenishment ships of the 
Durance class, was due for delivery in 1983. 
Super-Etendard attack aircraft were planned to 
enter into service and the delivery of quantities 
of the following guided missiles was due : 
Masurca, Crotale Navale, MM-40 (an up-
graded Exocet missile), AS-12 and AM-39 
(Exocet air-launched). 
In Italy, the Scirocco and Aliseo, missile 
frigates of the Maestrale class, were due to join 
the fleet. The last of the hydrofoil fast missile 
attack craft of the Sparviero class have been 
procured in accordance with the programme. 
Deliveries of Terrier, Tartar and Otomat 
missiles were made. 
In the Netherlands, the Crynssen, Van 
Brake} and Pieter Florisz, missile frigates of the 
Kortener class, were due for delivery, thus 
completing the programme for this class of 
vessels. ASM long-range maritime patrol air-
craft of the Orlon P-30 type were purchased. 
3. Air force armaments 
The member countries have not slackened 
their efforts to modernise their air forces during 
1983, despite innumerable difficulties, princi-
pally of a budgetary nature. 
Each air force has pursued its programmes 
either by procuring more modern armaments or 
by modernising and improving existing holdings. 
In Germany, the programmes have conti-
nued with the manufacture and delivery to the 
air and naval forces of Tornado aircraft, with 
deliveries of the last Alpha-Jets, which will then 
raise their stocks to the foreseen holdings. A 
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large number of RB-199 engines (fitted to 
Tornado aircraft) have been manufactured. 
Finally, there has been a significant increase in 
the stocks of the Sidewinder 9L air-to-air 
missile, the components of which were purch-
ased abroad except for the guidance system, 
which was manufactured in Germany. 
The Belgian air force has continued its 
modernisation programme by procuring new 
F-16 aircraft. Production of the F-16 aircraft 
and its associated F-100 jet engine has 
proceeded as planned in 1983. 
In France, the manufacture of Mirage 2000 
aircraft has proceeded at a steady pace; the 
first production models of this aircraft have 
been delivered to the air force. The Strike 
version of this aircraft, the Mirage 2000-N 
(nuclear) two-seat version, which is capable of 
carrying a medium-range missile (100 km), 
made its first flight on 3rd February 1983. 
Similarly, the manufacture and delivery of the 
new Mirage F-1-CR, a reconnaissance variant, 
has continued, and this aircraft will replace the 
obsolete Mirage 111-R. Production and delivery 
of the Mirage F-1-C (normal interceptor 
version) has continued. 
There has been large-scale production of jet 
engines (Atar K-50 for the Mirage F-1, the 
M-53 and the Mirage 2000). There has also 
been extensive production of the Crotale 
surface-to-air and the Super 530 and R-550 
air-to-air missiles. 
In Italy, modernisation has continued with 
the production and acquisition of new Tornado 
aircraft. There is also a limited improvement 
programme for Nike Hercules missiles through 
the purchase of certain major components. 
The production of Tornado aircraft and the 
associated RB-199 engine (end items of major 
assemblies) has gathered pace at Aeritalia and 
Fiat Aviazione. 
In the Netherlands the modernisation of the 
air force has continued with the production of 
F-16 aircraft. 
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CHAPTER IV 
STANDING ARMAMENTS COMMITTEE 
In 1983, the Standing Armaments Commit-
tee met three times, on 18th March, 16th June 
and 14th October. At the invitation of the 
French authorities, the Committee visited the 
Cherbourg naval base on 15th June. 
The main items on the agenda of its 
meetings were : the study on the armaments 
sector of industry in the member countries of 
WEU, the updating of WEU Agreement 4.FT.6 
on trials methods for wheeled vehicles and the 
question of a similar agreement for tracked 
vehicles, the follow-up to a FINABEL agree-
ment on a future light helicopter, the activities 
of Working Group No. 8 on operational 
research and the possible reconvening of 
Working Group No. 9 on possible hindrances to 
enemy action. 
A. Study on the armaments sector of industry 
in the member countries of WEU1 
1. The Standing Armaments Committee has 
finished work on the updating (for the period 
1972-81) of the classified version of the first 
section of the economic part of its study on the 
armaments sector of industry in the member 
countries of WEU. This updated version was 
sent to the Council in mid-April. 
2. The SAC was instructed by the Council to 
provide a simplified, annual updating of the 
figures given in the economic study. In this 
context, the Committee approved a question-
naire drawn up by the international secretariat 
and a specimen set of graphs designed to make 
it easier to read and understand the statistical 
information. 
3. With regard to the preparation by the SAC 
of the second section of the economic part of its 
study - which will give an analytical description 
of the armaments industries based on the 
information supplied by them - the Committee 
stuck to its decision to await the replies to the 
questionnaire sent out by the IEPG to avoid 
duplicating the work of this body. 
B. WEU Agreement 4.FT.6 on trials methods 
for wheeled vehicles 
The Standing Armaments Committee, 
having noted NATO's intention to produce a 
1. See also Chapter 11, part B. 
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standardisation agreement on vehicle trials 
(based on WEU Agreement 4.FT.6) and having 
also obtained information on the type of 
documentation required by FINABEV for its 
own studies, convened the group of national 
experts on trials methods to determine WEU's 
future course of action in this field. 
The group, which met on 20th December 
1983 under the chairmanship of France, 
forwarded its findings to the SAC for conside-
ration at its first meeting of 1984. 
C. Follow-up to a FINABEL agreement 
The SAC has examined the possibility of 
following up the FINABEL agreement on the 
military characteristics of a future light helicop-
ter with development work. The replies received 
from the member countries to a questionnaire 
designed to ascertain whether they had any 
helicopter to propose which met the criteria laid 
down by the agreement or whether they were 
thinking of building or procuring one, led to the 
conclusion that there were no grounds at 
present for taking any follow-up action. 
D. Activities of the working groups 
1. Working Gro11p No. 8 on operational research 
The remit of Working Group No. 8 is to 
exchange the findings of national operational 
research studies, to organise symposia on 
operational research methods and techniques 
and to arrange visits to national operational 
research centres. The group held two meetings 
in 1983, on 16th-17th May and 6th-7th October 
respectively. The second meeting was coupled 
with a visit to the Fiat research centre in Turin 
(Italy). 
(a) Exchanges of information 
During the year, the delegations presented 
sixteen information forms, six of which related 
to new studies and ten to updatings. The total 
1. Co-ordinating committee between the army chiefs-of-
staff of the WEU member countries. This committee draws 
up standard definitions of the military characteristics of 
future land forces' equipment. 
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number of studies presented by the member 
countries has therefore now reached 353. 
(b) Visit to Turin (Italy) 
At the invitation of the Italian authorities, 
the group visited the Fiat research centre in 
Turin. 
Talks were given by engineers from Fiat 
and Elettra and these were followed by a 
discussion. 
(c) Lexicographical activity 
The group continued its work on the pilot 
study designed to assess the time needed to 
produce a second improved and extended edition 
of the five-language glossary of operational 
research terms. 
(d) Seminar on methodology 
Following the eight seminars previously 
organised by the group, it was decided that the 
next one would be held in spring 1984 on the 
following topic: "Operator/computer interface 
and related subjects". 
(e) Exchange of documentation with NATO 
The NATO Panel VII, having in 1982 
received a copy of the annual report by the 
Chairman of Working Group No. 8, and reports 
on the visit to CELAR in Bruz and on the 
eighth seminar on methodology, reciprocated by 
sending the group a copy of the report by its 
Chairman and other documents relating to its 
work. 
l. Working Gro11p No. 9 on pouible hindrances to enemy 
tu:tion 
The Standing Armaments Committee has 
investigated the possibility of reconvening 
Working Group No. 9 to gather and analyse 
the information which FINABEL would like to 
receive on new methods of obstacle-building. 
The question has still not been settled, but 
the international secretariat has been instructed 
to seek possible candidates for the rdle of pilot 
country for the proposed study. 
E. International secretariat 
1. The international secretariat has assisted 
the SAC and Working Group No. 8 in their 
work. 
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2. On 27th April 1983, the head of the 
international secretariat presented an oral report 
to the Council on the SAC's activities. His 
report contained nine proposals for the future 
work of the Committee1• 
Following the decision taken by the Council 
the international secretariat has begun a 
programme of research for the SAC study on 
the future prospects of the Japanese armaments 
industry. 
3. The head of the international secretariat, 
who took up his duties on 1st November 1982, 
has begun to make contact with both the 
political and military authorities in the member 
countries of WEU. He paid visits to the 
Netherlands, Italy, United Kingdom and the 
Federal Republic of Germany where he had 
high-level talks. He also took these opportunities 
to visit a number of armaments industries. 
The head of the international secretariat 
subsequently had a further contact with the 
armaments directorate in The Hague concerning 
co-ordination of the work of the SAC with that 
of the IEPG, the chairmanship of which was to 
pass to the Netherlands with effect from 1st 
February 1984. 
4. Acting on the Council's instructions2, the 
international secretariat assisted the Committee 
on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace 
Questions in the preparation of the second part 
of its report on the harmonisation of research 
in the fields of civil and military high 
technology. 
5. As a follow-up to each part of the twenty-
ninth ordinary session of the WEU Assembly, 
the international secretariat distributed to SAC 
members a document containing extracts of any 
speeches, reports, debates and recommendations 
dealing with armaments questions. 
6. Relations between the SAC international 
secretariat and the FINABEL secretariat have 
continued in accordance with the provisions for 
co-operation laid down in 1973. The results of 
this co-operation have been described under 
points B, C and 0.2 above. 
7. Acting on the Council's instructions, the 
head of the international secretariat forwarded 
to the Chairman of the IEPG the updated, 
classified version of the SAC economic study on 
the armaments sector of industry in the member 
countries of WEU. 
8. As regards contacts with NATO, the head 
of the international secretariat took part as an 
observer in the June and October sessions of 
1. See also Chapter 11, part B. 
2. See Chapter I, point B, 1. 
the North Atlantic Assembly which were held 
in Copenhagen and The Hague respectively. 
The international secretariat was also repre-
sented by an observer at the April and October 
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meetings in Brussels of the Conference of 
National Armaments Directors and also in the 
June and December meetings in Brussels of the 
NATO Naval Armaments Group. 
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CHAPTER V 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE 
A. Meetings of the committee 
The Public Administration Committee meets 
once every six months. The two meetings in 
1983 took place in Luxembourg from 3rd to 
5th May and in York from 4th to 6th October. 
As usual, these meetings were devoted to 
exchanges of information on significant admi-
nistrative developments in the member countries 
during the preceding six months and to the 
preparation of the multilateral course for 
government officials organised in the autumn of 
each year under the auspices of the committee. 
The exchange of views between the members 
of the committee on administrative develop-
ments in the member countries is one of the 
most productive items on the agenda of each 
meeting. It provides the members with an 
opportunity to describe the most significant 
reforms or innovations which have taken place 
in their administrations, to identify the problems 
raised and, where appropriate, the obstacles 
with which they are confronted. Where the 
questions are of interest to all the member 
countries (gradual introduction of new techni-
ques into government, repercussions on govern-
ment of a difficult economic climate), these 
exchanges of view provide the opportunity for 
a va~uable ':omparis~n of the experiments being 
earned out m a particular country, all of which 
are aimed at improving the way in which 
government departments and their staff adapt 
to the realities of modern society and to the 
constraints imposed by the economic situation. 
Occasionally, there is a natural follow-up to the 
discussions in the committee in the form of the 
subsequent study visits which provide officials 
from t~e. m.ember countries with an opportunity 
to famihanse themselves, through direct con-
tact, with new, or especially successful experi-
ments in another country. 
A~ong the .many subjects discussed by the 
committee durmg the year, two key issues 
emerged. 
First, the importance of better training for 
officials was gaining greater recognition every-
where. It had been calculated in one of the 
mem~r. countries that the average time spent 
on trammg scar~ly amounted to 1% of working 
time, although an increasing number of complex 
tas~ required ~pecialist ~raining. ~t was hoped 
to mcrease this proportion. Special attention 
sh?uld be giv~n to .i~proving the management 
skills of semor c1Vll servants and training 
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institutes were directing their efforts accord-
ingly. One such institute had recently been set 
up in one of the member countries where none 
existed before. In another country, a programme 
of correspondence courses had been launched 
foi: the training of C-grade staff. At all levels in 
fact, efforts were being made to set up facilities 
to achieve more efficient use of the staff 
available. 
At the same time, reductions in staff levels 
were being sought in several countries. Increa-
sing interest was now being shown in the ideas 
of deregulation and privatisation which reflected 
the desire to reduce the role and activities of 
the state which had become increasingly costly 
and bureaucratic. Even in those member 
countries where these ideas had not been 
manifested, efforts were being made to limit 
recruitment in order to cut or at least stabilise 
the cost of the civil service. The concept of 
recruitment was, to some extent, giving way to 
that of redeployment of staff within each 
organic unit. Moreover, if (mainly young) 
people were to be given jobs to help cut the 
level of unemployment, this would have to be 
offset by a number of measures such as part-
time work, early retirement, etc. 
B. Courses for government officials 
The twenty-eighth annual report of the 
Council outlined the main features of the course 
held in Bonn in autumn 1982 under the 
auspices of the Public Administration Commit-
tee, at which the following subject was studied: 
"Providing efficient government services on a 
reduced budget and the control of public 
expenditure". The course brought together some 
twenty officials from the administrations of the 
member countries who were interested in this 
subject. Participants' reactions and their evalua-
tion of the course - which were received at a 
later date- could not be included in the report. 
Generally speaking, the conclusions reached on 
the basis of their comments were very positive 
and may be summarised under four points as 
follows: 
- better knowledge, on the basis of a very 
detailed questionnaire, of budgetary tech-
niques in the various member countries ; 
- detailed examination of a highly topical 
budgetary issue ; 
- definite contribution by the participants 
from other countries to knowledge of 
techniques and regulations, thus enabli,1g 
different approaches for one's own coun-
try; 
- contact with officials from various coun-
tries, opening up the prospect of subse-
quent exchanges of view at a personal 
level. 
Clearly, the participants on the course were 
not able to solve the problems raised but this in 
no way detracted from the quality of the 
various delegations' contributions ; it arose from 
the fact that, in the difficult field selected for 
investigation, there were no clear-cut answers. 
The 1983 course for government officials 
was held in Ostend, Belgium, from 16th to 
22nd October. Its objective was to study the 
changes brought about in the public services by 
the introduction of office automation systems, 
i.e. the automation of administration services. 
In accordance with the committee's terms of 
reference, the discussion was not about tech-
niques but about the administrative repercus-
sions of the introduction of office automation 
systems. 
The main topic of the course concerned the 
organisational changes in working methods and 
in the structure of administrative departments. 
A number of other side issues (e.g. psycho-
sociological and legal consequences and the 
social and financial implications, etc.) were also 
discussed. 
The course brought together seventeen 
senior civil servants in charge of personnel 
management or policy whose responsibilities 
included departments where office automation 
systems had been introduced. Each national 
group of participants had been asked before the 
course to answer a detailed questionnaire on 
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the main topic and to prepare a talk on one 
aspect of the subject considered to be particu-
larly important. 
An appraisal of the course would be made 
at the next meeting of the Public Administration 
Committee once all the findings and comments 
of the various national delegations had been 
made known; as was customary, this would be 
reported in the next annual report of the 
Council. 
C. Study visits 
Examples of visits organised during the year 
are shown below: policy and practice in relation 
to prisoners serving long sentences, particularly 
those claiming political motivation (subject 
studied in the Federal Republic of Germany); 
the workings of the "Caisse centrale de 
cooperation economique" (central fund for 
economic co-operation - subject studied in 
France); the training of managers in the public 
service (subject studied in Italy) ; staff welfare 
in the civil service; local tra~sport subsidies 
and operating arrangements (subjects studied 
in the Netherlands). 
These study visits enable an official from 
one member country to study his own specialist 
subject in the administration of one of the 
member countries. It is regretted that the 
programmes of visits have been cut back in 
recent years as a result of increasingly restrictive 
budgetary policies for they are indeed a 
remarkable way of providing further training. 
It is to be hoped, however, that the growing 
attention, referred to earlier, being given to 
ways of improving the training and efficiency of 
civil servants will generate a revival of interest. 
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CHAPTER VI 
BUDGETARY AND ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTIONS 
A. Budget 
As has already been noted in recent previous 
annual reports, the economic situation in the 
member countries necessitates the utmost 
discipline in expenditure, and this policy was 
also rigorously pursued in 1983. 
The approved budgets for 1984 of the 
ministerial organs combined show an increase 
of the total net expenditure of exactly zero 
growth (6%), including the cost for pensions, 
over the 1983 budgets. If the total net cost for 
pensions were to be excluded, then the increase 
would have been just over half the combined 
anticipated inflation rate {3.4%). 
Tables showing summarised versions of 
these budgets are attached in Annex. 
The Council emphasise that these economies 
have been obtained without generally impairing 
the efficiency of the organisation. 
The year 1983 has seen the end of a period, 
which may be said to have started in 1974, of 
radical administrative reforms applied in the 
organisation and to which reference has been 
made in earlier reports. The pension scheme, 
social security agreements, the provident fund, 
following sometimes lengthy negotiations with 
governments as well as discussions in the Co-
ordinating Committee of Government Budget 
Experts, have all now become matters of well-
established routine procedures. 
Although as mentioned in the twenty-eighth 
annual report, VI A, the 1983 budget increase 
of the Secretariat-General has been maintained 
in real terms at a below zero growth level 
(negative growth), it has nevertheless been 
possible within the budget constraints to 
complete modernisation of office equipment in 
two phases. 
Detailed studies have been made of all such 
equipment. The central purpose has been to 
improve the general standard of presentation 
and quality of documents, considerably speed 
up and simplify their duplication by replacing 
old machines by others incorporating the most 
up-to-date techniques. 
Programmes for a continuing process of 
modernisation are regularly reviewed by the 
Council's Budget and Organisation Committee. 
The results achieved so far in both the London 
and Paris offices have been highly satisfactory, 
while keeping the budgets within the govern-
ments' constraints. 
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Communications, heating and security sys-
tems have also been a part of this programme. 
Its application has enabled efficiency to be 
maintained whilst achieving economies. 
As will be seen under section B, further 
significant changes, particularly as regards the 
salary structures of the co-ordinated organisa-
tions, are now being studied in the Co-
ordinating Committee. 
B. Activities in the framework of co-ordination 
The Co-ordinating Committee of Govern-
ment Budget Experts held nine meetings, each 
of one-and-a-half or two days' duration. In 
addition, there were thirteen meetings of the 
Heads of Administration, nine joint meetings of 
the Standing Committee of Secretaries-General 
and the Standing Committee of the Staff 
Associations, as well as two meetings of the 
Secretaries-General. 
The main subjects dealt with, some of which 
are still under review, were as follows : 
- the question of improving staff participa-
tion in the framework of co-ordination ; 
- the introduction of wage restraint, starting 
1st July 1983, on the remuneration of B 
and C grade staff salaries by phasing out : 
(i) the fiat-rate additional element of the 
expatriation allowance; 
(ii) a salary correction which compensates 
for differences in the number of 
working hours per week in the 
organisations and those in the civil 
service and private enterprise of the 
host country ; 
(iii) a salary correction which compensates 
for fringe benefits, other than those 
relating to transport and canteen 
facilities ; 
- the introduction of wage restraint in the 
remuneration of A and L grade staff by 
applying a temporary levy on the basic 
salary, starting 1st July 1983 and covering 
a period of three years, the first year of 
1.5%, the second year of 3% and the third 
year of 4.5% ; 
- the detailed implementing instructions for 
these wage restraints, incorporating a 
guarantee on basic nominal salaries ; 
- the periodic adjustment of salary and 
allowances ; 
- the principle and the modalities to apply 
to a feasibility study on comparisons of 
duties, grades and levels of remuneration 
in the co-ordinated organisations, other 
international organisations, certain civil 
services and certain private sector firms; 
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- the problem of retention or discontinua-
tion of the use of international indices for 
salary comparisons ; 
- a comparison between the children's 
allowances in the international organisa-
tions and a number of reference countries. 
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Summary of WEU main budget for 1983 
A* 8* c• Total 8 + C 
£ F. frs F. frs F. frs 
Salaries and allowances .............. 1,307,145 9,927,49.0 20,636,600 30,564,090 
Pensions .......................... 113,290 1,390~-()00 2,676,500 4,066,500 
Travel ............................ 26,850 207,200 512,700 719,000 
Other operating costs ................ 197,375 654,550 961,750 1,616,300 
Purchase of furniture, etc. ............ 10,290 70,250 115,300 185,550 
Buildings .......................... 
- 45,000 81,000 126,000 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE ............... 1,654,950 12,294,490 24,983,850 37,278,340 
WEU tax ......................... 484,395 3,495,600 7,197,300 10,692,900 
Other receipts ...................... 28,750 95,000 200,000 295,000 
Pension receipts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45,460 258,550 672,000 930,550 
TOTAL INCOME .................... 558,605 3,849,150 8,069,300 11,918,450 
NET TOTAL ...................... 1,096,345 8,445,340 16,914,550 25,359,890 
National contributions called for under the WEU main budget for 1983 
600ths 
Belgium .......................... 59 
France ............................ 120 
Germany .......................... 120 
Italy ............................. 120 
Luxembourg ....................... 2 
Netherlands ....................... 59 
United Kingdom .................... 120 
TOTAL .......................... 600 
• A Secretariat-General. 
8 International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee. 
C Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
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£ F. frs 
107,807.26 2,493,722.52 
219,269.00 5,071,978.00 
219,269.00 5,071,978.00 
219,269.00 5,071,978.00 
3,654.48 84,532.96 
107,807.26 2,493,722.52 
219,269.00 5,071,978.00 
1,096,345.00 25,359,890.00 
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Draft Recommendation 
on deterrence llnd the will of the people 
The Assembly, 
(i) Recalling its Recommendations 383 and 388 and welcoming the positive replies received from 
the Council; 
(ii) Recalling that, as long as more progress has not been made jn disarmament, the security of 
Western Europe will be ensured only by deterrence and that nuclear weapons are an essential part 
of that deterrence; 
(iii) Considering that fear of the devastating effects of any armed conflict in Europe is still a 
prominent and justified concern of the peoples of Europe; 
(iv) Underlining however that deterrence is ensured not by the accumulation of armaments alone 
but also by governments and nations showing their determination to defend their freedom; 
(v) Regretting that the failure of the Geneva conference and the Soviet Union's continued 
deployment of intermediate-range nuclear weapons together with its refusal to hold negotiations on 
these weapons on a reasonable basis have compelled the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance 
to start deploying missiles of similar range in Western Europe in application of the twofold decision 
of December 1979; 
(vi) Noting that the need to apply this twofold decision has been recognised by all the 
democratically-appointed governments of the WEU member countries; 
(vii) Hoping that constructive proposals will soon be made to allow negotiations to be opened on the 
limitation of nuclear weapons of all kinds; 
(viii)Noting that the security of Western Europe forms an inseparable whole; 
(ix) Deploring that this de facto solidarity is not expressed in more intensive consultations on 
external and defence policies; 
(x) Considering that the improvement of relations between the countries of Western and of Eastern 
Europe in the context of the CSCE can be a significant help to negotiations on disarmament, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Continue to keep European public opinion informed of the threats to which the European 
members of the Atlantic Alliance are exposed and of the measures available for countering them 
with particular regard to the type and level of weapons deployed in Europe; 
2. Show the cohesion of the alliance and of its European members by making optimum use of the 
organs of WEU and of the Atlantic Alliance· 
3. Concert its views inter alia on the implications of the modified Brussels Treaty for the defence 
policy of each member and for working out a joint position on the limitation of armaments or 
disarmament; 
4. Continue to apply the NATO twofold decision of 1979 while seeking, with the Soviet Union, 
ways and means for negotiating balanced and controlled disarmament, particularly in intermediate-
range nuclear weapons; 
5. In the appropriate frameworks, seek to develop exchanges of all kinds between Western Europe 
and the countries of Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union; 
6. Bear in mind in future negotiations the relationship between the production of armaments and 
the North-South problem and recognise that the North-South dialogue should continue to engage 
attention. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Lagorce, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. On 30th November 1982, the WEU 
Assembly adopted Recommendation 388 on 
problems for European security arising from 
pacifism and neutralism based on a report by 
the General Affairs Committee which your 
Rapporteur had had the honour to present and 
in which he defined the notions of pacifism and 
neutralism and considered that although they 
were quite distinct they embraced significant 
convergences in Europe today. In this report 
the Assembly stressed the gravity of the 
problems then raised by the development of 
pacifism in Europe and the need for the 
Western European states to take them fully 
into account in order to ensure peace and 
security, first by demonstrating their desire to 
do their utmost to ensure the success of the 
ongoing negotiations on the limitation of 
armaments and renunciation of the deployment 
of strategic nuclear weapons targeted on 
Europe, second by giving public opinion "full, 
accurate and objective information on the levels 
of forces and armaments" of both parties and 
third by strengthening their development assist-
ance policy in order to demonstrate clearly to 
public opinion that their defence effort was set 
in the context of a policy which sought to 
consolidate peace in Europe and throughout the 
world. In its reply, the Council confirmed that 
such were indeed the intentions of the seven 
WEU member governments. 
2. Since then, a number of events have 
occurred which, without detracting from these 
principles, might guide their application: 
3. (i) At the end of 1983 it became evident 
not only that the Soviet Union was not at all 
prepared to stop deploying SS-20s in Eastern 
Europe but that it was starting to deploy new 
medium-range SS-22 missiles in certain coun-
tries in that area. This inevitably led the NATO 
countries to start deploying Pershing 11 and 
cruise missiles in Western Europe in application 
of the twofold decision of December 1979, and 
the United States took the first steps in this 
direction in the United Kingdom and the 
Federal Republic. 
4. (ii) By insisting on including French and 
British nuclear weapons in calculating what the 
Americans and the Soviets consider as western 
theatre weapons in Europe, the Soviet Union 
showed that it had little interest in bringing the 
negotiations on the withdrawal of such weapons 
from Europe to a successful conclusion. On the 
one hand it put forward a prior condition which 
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was unacceptable politically, i.e. that the United 
States could negotiate for its allies, which 
would have meant that British and French 
forces were merely a back-up for American 
forces without specific deterrent value of their 
own. On the other hand, it denied the fact that 
missiles deployed on submarines cannot be 
counted as theatre weapons but merely as 
strategic weapons. Even the French missiles on 
the Plateau d' Albion cannot be considered, 
technically, as anti-personnel weapons since the 
type of nuclear warheads with which they are 
equipped and their main role in France's 
strategy of nuclear deterrence of the strong by 
the weak precludes such a role. These factors 
set them apart from the SS-20s and Pershing 
lis in all respects. 
5. There is every indication that the Soviet 
aim in adopting this attitude was to stir up 
trouble among the countries of Western Europe 
and break the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance, 
using the agitation of pacifist movements which 
were calling for nuclear disarmament. 
6. (iii) After the deployment of American 
missiles had started, the Soviet Union 
announced that it was terminating all ongoing 
disarmament negotiations. However, this did 
not affect its participation in the Stockholm 
conference which was to start in January 1984 
covering all problems relating to disarmament 
in Europe, following a proposal made by France 
at the Madrid conference on security and co-
operation in Europe. Furthermore, the prospect 
of the MBFR talks on the level of conventional 
forces being resumed in Vienna in February 
1984 seems to be accepted by both the Soviet 
Union and the United States. The resumption 
of the negotiations on nuclear weapons therefpre 
no longer seems out of the question although 
the United States is criticising the Soviet Union 
for not keeping to its earlier undertakings, as 
President Reagan recalled on 22nd January 
1984, and although the Soviet Union is accusing 
the United States of having prevented negotia-
tions by the premature deployment of Pershing 
11 and cruise missiles on the territory of several 
of its European allies and is continuing to insist 
on the withdrawal of these missiles as a prior 
condition for negotiations. 
7. (iv) The continued occupation of and war in 
Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, the spread of 
conflicts in the Middle East with the formation 
of a force consisting of detachments from four 
western countries in Lebanon, the Chad crisis, 
the continuing highly tense situation in Central 
America and the landing on and occupation of 
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the island of Grenada by American forces 
enhanced the fears of many Europeans that one 
of these conflicts might deteriorate to a point 
where it would bring the United States and 
Soviet Union face to face outside Europe and 
thus trigger off a major war, this probability 
being augmented by the fact that the areas 
concerned are not directly protected by a 
system of nuclear deterrence, although it is still 
very improbable that Soviets and Americans 
will come to grips directly. 
8. (v) In 1982, the United States military 
authorities adopted a new doctrine for the 
defence of Europe. Drawing the full conse-
quences of the principle of flexible response, the 
new doctrine was to counter by the most 
appropriate means any Soviet attack on Western 
Europe while avoiding the use of their intercon-
tinental weaponry. It was thus a matter of using 
the most sophisticated conventional weapons, 
tactical nuclear weapons and, in case of need, 
European-targeted strategic nuclear weapons to 
ward off an attack by engaging the enemy 
forces at the moment they were being concen-
trated and moved forward, i.e. before being 
deployed to positions which would make them 
less vulnerable to such preventive retaliation. 
NATO did not accept this doctrine but, because 
it was that of the American military authorities, 
it is liable to have decisive consequences for all 
the member countries of that organisation by 
committing them to action which is both 
offensive and preventive. One member of the 
committee pointed out that this difference 
between the doctrine of American forces and 
that of NATO was particularly unfortunate in 
that it was the same American general who 
commanded American forces in Europe and 
NATO forces, thus arousing serious and 
regrettable uncertainty about the true nature of 
the western allies' strategy. 
9. These various factors explain the develop-
ment of pacifism and neutralism in Europe 
since 1982. On the one hand the campaign 
against the deployment of Pershing 11 and 
cruise missiles can now be said to have failed, 
after reaching a climax in autumn 1983. 
Conversely, other aspects of pacifist unrest have 
emerged which are no less dangerous for 
western cohesion. These the Assembly should 
examine and assess their implications. 
10. The main aspect is probably the growing 
awareness of the total vulnerability of North 
American territory to the possible firing of 
Soviet intercontinental missiles or submarine-
launched missiles, and hence the realisation, 
through the increased risks to European 
territory, that there has been a remarkable 
weakening of the cohesion of Euro-Atlantic 
defence such as it had been guaranteed for 
more than thirty years. Henceforth, a potential 
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aggressor is able to speculate on what he knows 
about the new American strategy and the 
various reactions of public opinion in Europe 
and in the United States in order to work out 
the odds of the Atlantic Alliance not operating 
effectively, Europe being abandoned in practice 
by the United States or the American presence 
in Europe being rejected. The upshot of one or 
other would leave Western Europe at the mercy 
of the Red Army and consequently of any 
political or military pressure exercised by the 
Soviet Union. 
11. Peace and deterrence 
11. Before considering what is discernable 
concerning the will of Europeans in security, 
defence and deterrence, a number of fundamen-
tal aspects of relevant European policy should 
be recalled. First, the aim of European policy 
is to maintain, strengthen and organise peace. 
None of Western Europe's present problems 
can be solved by the use of force and any 
attempt to do so could but have catastrophic 
effects for Europe. In this connection, pacifist 
demonstrations in recent years have revealed a 
fundamental and quite legitimate aspect of the 
concerns of Europeans who well know that any 
war between the two great powers would 
devastate Europe and kill a large proportion of 
its population. No political or other goal is 
worth this price, not even the reunification of 
Europe, which has been divided for almost forty 
years, or of any European nation. 
12. No absolute distinction can be drawn 
between a war in which limited use is made of 
nuclear weapons and a purely conventional war. 
The second world war, when no nuclear weapons 
were used in Europe, left more than forty 
million victims there. Subsequent progress in 
conventional weapons, greater urbanisation, the 
ever-greater sensitivity of the people and their 
dependence on transport, electricity and indus-
try mean that most probably another war, even 
if relatively short - as experts generally believe 
but which is far from certain- would leave an 
even larger number of victims and would ruin 
Europe's economy for many years. 
13. Furthermore, in view of the number of 
nuclear weapons of all strengths and ranges 
now deployed in Europe or on the territory of 
the two great powers, neither of which could 
possibly support the other taking over the whole 
continent of Europe, and particularly in view of 
existing imbalances in purely European-targeted 
strategic nuclear weapons and chemical weapons 
and of the existence of national nuclear 
deterrent forces in Europe, there is every chance 
of the nuclear threshold being crossed in the 
event of a war in Europe. No prior understand-
ing, no guarantee and not even partial or total 
denuclearisation of the European continent in 
peacetime could prevent this. Any speculation 
about the possibility of keeping a European war 
on the conventional level would be, to say the 
least, extremely risky. 
14. The defence policies of the European 
countries, as well as that which a united Europe 
might have, can therefore have no aim other 
than to avoid war or, if hostilities were to break 
out somewhere, to circumscribe it and prevent 
it becoming a continental- or worldwide war. 
This is the principal meaning of the strategy of 
deterrence to which all members of the Atlantic 
Alliance have subscribed from the very outset. 
Deterrence is not designed to ensure political or 
other advantages for those practising it but 
solely to avoid war. Disagreements between 
allies have never been about this aim but solely 
about the means of attaining it. 
15. Today western public opinion has a 
tendency - the scale of which your Rapporteur 
will try to assess in the next chapter - to refuse 
deterrence and consider peace would be better 
protected by abandoning nuclear weapons or 
even refusing to defend Europe in the event of 
aggression from without. This tendency is 
prevalent in the United States as well as in 
Europe and is illustrated in several ways which 
your Rapporteur will examine. It is based on 
moral disapproval of weapons of mass destruc-
tion and on the conviction that accumulating 
such weapons does not improve the prospects of 
true peace but increases the risk of war and 
would make hostilities worse. 
16. This argument is not unfounded and your 
Rapporteur is prepared to subscribe to any 
proposition for limiting armaments and multi-
lateral, progressive and controlled conventional 
and nuclear disarmament. Inter alia, he wel-
comes the opening in January 1984 of the 
Stockholm conference on confidence-restoring 
measures and on disarmament in Europe, as 
well as the current American-Soviet talks on 
the resumption of negotiations, be they on the 
limitation of intercontinental nuclear weapons 
or on the deployment of intermediate-range 
weapons or conventional forces in Europe. He 
is prepared to admit that for the entire world, 
expenditure on armaments is an unacceptable 
waste of material and intellectual resources 
which would be infinitely better used in trying 
to solve present international economic prob-
lems, relieve underdevelopment and reduce 
unemployment. 
17. However, he feels that no serious start has 
ever been made with disarmament. This can be 
done really and truly only if international 
society is first organised so as to ensure new 
and more solid foundations for peace. As long 
as this is not so, deterrence with its stabilising 
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nuclear elements, will still be essential for 
maintaining peace. Admittedly, international 
order based on the balance of terror is far from 
satisfactory, but it is better than no order at all 
where one or other may feel he can impose his 
own order or his own peace. Conversely, within 
the order guaranteed by mutual deterrence, it 
is possible to envisage a more satisfactory 
organisation of international order. 
18. There are two essential reasons why this 
organisation is becoming increasingly urgent. 
First, nations, particularly in Europe, are 
finding the financial effort of developing credible 
and consequently increasingly sophisticated 
weapons systems less and less bearable. It 
seems increasingly difficult for some to accept 
the feeling that their survival depends on the 
effective deployment of weapons of mass 
destruction over which they have no control but 
of which they would be the first victims should 
these weapons no longer fulfil their deterrent 
role to perfection. The other reason is that 
conventional and nuclear technological devel-
opment is progressively calling in question the 
notion of deterrence. Whereas it was almost 
absolute while the doctrine for the use of 
nuclear weapons was one of massive retaliation, 
certain concepts of deterrence have led the 
Americans and NATO to resort to the doctrine 
of flexible response. The deployment of nuclear 
weapons of various strengths mounted on means 
of delivery of various ranges has resulted in a 
loss of credibility for the doctrine of massive 
retaliation as practised by the United States 
because it seemed hardly probable that the two 
great powers would take the risk of causing 
intolerable destruction on their own territory in 
the event of an aggression limited in area or by 
the type of weapons used by the aggressor. This 
obviously does not apply to France which, in its 
concept of deterrence of the strong by the weak, 
has kept to a strategy of massive retaliation 
against the adversary's demo-economic struc-
ture should an independent operation to re-
establish deterrence fail. 
19. Today it may be wondered whether this 
doctrine of flexible response is again being 
called in question by the miniaturisation and 
improvements due to the enhanced radiation 
effect of nuclear weapons and by improvemento; 
in conventional weapons making the limits o:' 
the nuclear threshold less clear-cut. This is the 
case with the new American air-land battle 
doctrine which in fact tables on the failure of 
deterrence and recourse to a near-preventive 
use of the most modem weapons to counter any 
serious threat of aggression. 
20. The air-land battle is a combat doctrine 
worked out by the United States TRADOC 
(Training and Doctrine Command). According 
to General Rogers, this doctrine would help 
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NATO forces to defend themselves without 
using nuclear weapons thanks to improvements 
in conventional weapons. The official United 
States army handbook (FM100-S), published 
in August 1982 to describe this doctrine, 
underlined two crucial elements: early offensive 
action in order to take the initiative in 
operations and in-depth attack on the enemy, 
i.e. action on his areas of concentration and 
movement, before he can deploy for attack. 
These notions, which are now applied to all 
United States army operations throughout the 
world, were specifically intended for Europe 
where Warsaw Pact troops were to be destroyed 
even before being brought in and while still in 
the distant rear areas of the pact countries. 
According to the handbook, nuclear and 
chemical weapons are very suitable for this type 
of in-depth attack. But the improvement of 
conventional weapons plays an important part 
in the new doctrine. In particular, it calls in 
sophisticated electronic equipment and so-called 
smart weapons. TRADOC explains that the 
United States army needs a new doctrine and 
new weapons systems because of the numerical 
superiority of Warsaw Pact conventional forces 
over those of NATO. Otherwise it would be 
necessary to resort more quickly to nuclear 
weapons in the event of Soviet attack. 
21. This doctrine has given rise to some 
concern in certain European countries. For 
instance, Mr. Hernu, French Minister of 
Defence, told the WEU Assembly on 30th 
November 1982 that "to emphasise a single 
aspect, namely conventional weapons... is ulti-
mately to cast doubt on the rest". In fact, 
certain observers feel that the corollary to this 
doctrine is the abandonment of all first use of 
tactical nuclear weapons or wonder whether it 
is compatible with the forward integrated 
defence concept. General Rogers himself in fact 
spoke of no early first use, which might seem to 
raise doubts about the American nuclear 
guarantee in Europe. But according to official 
American statements this guarantee is in no 
way at stake. 
22. This evolution has led to the progressive 
weakening of deterrence, which still plays a 
major role and largely guarantees peace in 
Europe. But this guarantee seems more and 
more precarious, which probably explains the 
pessimism of part of European public opinion in 
face of the risks of war and the conceivable 
effects of present tension in East-West relations. 
It ~herefore means not waiting for deterrence, 
mamly ensured by nuclear weapons, to have 
disappeared before negotiating disarmament 
and organising peace in Europe and throughout 
the world. 
23. However, this should certainly not be done 
by upsetting the international order prematurely 
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or unbalancing forces by raising doubts in the 
minds of possible aggressors about the people's 
will to defend themselves or by taking unilateral 
disarmament measures. The two steps would 
moreover probably be concomitant and any 
unilateral disarmament would be tantamount to 
political and military capitulation with incalcu-
lable consequences. In addition, is is very 
doubtful whether such action would avert 
hostilities. 
24. Particularly if, as is likely, they both 
occurred at once, either of these phenomena 
would most probably make disarmament nego-
tiations more difficult rather than easier because 
the potential enemy would no longer see any 
reason to yield ground if he could achieve his 
aims without concessions, i.e. obtain military 
superiority with all the inherent political 
advantages and thus be in a position to lay 
down the law throughout Europe. One has only 
to think back to the years just before the second 
world war to realise that peace based on such 
an imbalance would always be extremely 
precarious and the hope of the other party 
reducing its military effort merely because we 
showed no desire to defend ourselves would be 
little more than a pipe-dream. 
25. Consequently, whatever threats there may 
now be to deterrence and however urgent it 
may be to bring about true disarmament, 
deterrence is essential for Western Europe. 
American public opinion and leaders do not 
necessarily see the matter in this light and some 
of their reactions - the American bishops for 
instance - bear witness to this, as will be seen 
in Chapter Ill of this report. They may indeed 
consider that hostilities several thousands of 
kilometres from American soil are better than 
the risk of a nuclear strike against the American 
continent. The adoption by American military 
authorities of the air-land battle doctrine 
appears to indicate that this degradation of the 
notion of deterrence is already having repercus-
sions on American concepts. It is characteristic 
that this doctrine, which has been accepted by 
the United States, should have been refused by 
NATO, i.e. by the United States' European 
allies. 
26. This difference of view between Western 
Europe and the United States makes it essential 
for Europe to retain the wherewithal to act 
independently in the event of emergency, i.e. to 
continue to exercise some degree of deterrence 
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, even if the deterrent 
value of the American component is declining. 
In this respect the national character of the 
Frenc~ am~ British nuclear forces is particularly 
essential smce they at least leave the possible 
enemy uncertain about the type of reaction to 
aggression. The fact that the United Kingdom 
or France can decide that since its survival is at 
stake the use of these forces might be justified 
helps to strengthen the alliance's deterrent 
capability, particularly as any consequent 
weakening of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis the 
United States may make it hesitate about 
embarking upon any form of aggression on 
Western Europe. It is therefore essential for 
these forces not to be prematurely included in 
negotiations in which these two countries have 
not yet been invited to take part, nor should 
they do so until major cuts have been made by 
the two countries whose nuclear weapons are 
by far the most powerful. As stressed by 
President Mitterrand in his speech to the 
United Nations on 28th September 1983, the 
two great powers would have to accept very 
considerable reductions in the number of 
nuclear warheads they possess (between 8,000 
and 9,000) before the question of France's 
ninety-eight missiles could be raised. It should 
be added that the disappearance of French and 
British nuclear weapons would change practi-
cally nothing in the count of nuclear warheads 
but the political balance and the balance of 
nuclear deterrence throughout the world would 
thereby be radically changed. If it is borne in 
mind that a reduction in the number of French 
and British nuclear weapons would reduce these 
deterrent forces to nought, it will be seen that 
the problem is in fact not one of numbers. 
27. Here your Rapporteur wishes to refer to 
the interesting proposal for restoring deterrence 
made by General Copel in his very recent book 
Vaincre la guerre. His formula, which is 
reminiscent of General Rogers' no early first 
use, is not to pull the nuclear trigger away from 
home. It emphasises that nuclear armaments 
should remain purely defensive while strength-
ening their deterrent role since a conventional 
attack would be met by nuclear means. Such a 
strategy would imply the production and 
deployment of the enhanced radiation weapon, 
the so-called neutron bomb, which alone would 
be capable of making such retaliation credible 
because of the limited damage and losses it 
would cause in the zone in which it would be 
used. It would require close agreement between 
the European members of the Atlantic Alliance 
and is probably worthy of close consideration. 
28. But deterrence is not ensured only by 
missiles with nuclear warheads. It is also 
ensured by all the other arms which the 
Atlantic Alliance possesses because it is unlikely 
that nuclear weapons would be used in cases 
not considered to be large-scale attacks. To 
exercise true deterrence, it is essential for the 
alliance to have retaliatory capability equal to 
the challenge. Even under the massive retalia-
tion doctrine it was never considered that 
weapons of mass destruction should be the only 
ones used, particularly in the case of limited 
incidents. 
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29. But above all deterrence is also ensured 
by the potential aggressor's conviction that the 
West will actually use the weapons it has in 
response to aggression. This is one of the 
essential difficulties raised by any deterrent 
system: one must be determined to take action 
in order not to have to do so, and any hesitation 
increases the danger of actually having to use 
one's weapons. The psychological factor there-
fore plays an essential role in the success of a 
strategy of deterrence. But even though the 
ultimate decision on the use of nuclear weapons 
is in the hands of one man - the President of 
the Republic in the case of France - the 
potential aggressor's conviction that he will take 
such a decision depends on his assessment of 
the President's character and of the will of the 
people as a whole. Such an assessment is based 
on various factors and particularly how each 
nation accepts in advance the financial and 
other sacrifices necessary for maintaining its 
means of defence or retaliation. In this respect, 
the curve of military expenditure in western 
countries is an accurate thermometer of their 
deterrent capability because of the means made 
available and the will revealed. The inability of 
most of them to increase their defence budgets 
by 3% per year as they had agreed in the 
North Atlantic Council is cause for anxiety 
from this point of view. 
30. There are other means of assessing the 
will for defence: for instance, consideration can 
be given to the type of scenario envisaged by 
military headquarters in the event of war, the 
views of military circles as exposed in specialised 
revues, their circulation among the public and 
its reactions, the positions adopted by politicians 
and political parties and the response to them. 
In short, the effectiveness of deterrence is 
ensured by the overall attitude of each nation 
towards defence matters. 
31. For governments, this implies that a policy 
aimed at consolidating peace does not generally 
involve unilateral or spectacular pacifist-type 
measures, although there may be cases when 
such measures can help to end a stalemate and 
encourage the opening of negotiations on 
disarmament. But generally speaking for such 
negotiations to be successful they must be in 
the interest of each participant and none must 
hope to disarm the other without disarming 
himself. 
32. For all these reasons, insofar as the 
European nations' will to defend themselves is 
accompanied by no aggressive designs, it is a 
factor of security and of peace and any sign of 
this will weakening is a threat to peace. This is 
why the development of what is rightly or 
wrongly called "pacifist" agitation directed 
mainly at the deployment of American 
medium-range weapons in Western Europe in 
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response to Soviet SS-20s is a source of concern 
for those responsible for Europe's security, even 
if they consider that such security can be firmly 
established only on the basis of negotiated 
disarmament. The aim of participants in this 
undertaking was to stop the application of 
NATO's twofold decision of December 1979 
calling for negotiations with the Soviet Union 
to ban the deployment of medium-range nuclear 
weapons in Europe and fixing 1983 as the 
deadline for the deployment of such weapons in 
Western Europe if the Soviet Union did not 
agree to start such negotiations. One committee 
member underlined however that there was 
some credulity in pacifist movements and that 
in many cases they were taken in by Soviet 
propaganda, just as public opinion in many 
countries was once taken in by Hitlerian 
propaganda. 
33. Agitation did not prevent a start being 
made with the application of the decision at the 
beginning of 1984, when it became apparent 
that the Soviet Union was not prepared to make 
enough concessions to allow negotiations to be 
held. But it has already had the effect of 
seriously placing in doubt the will of the western 
nations to defend themselves, thus weakening 
the deterrent value of the West's armaments. It 
probably even allowed the Soviet Union to feel 
that, given enough time for agitation to spread, 
it would manage to paralyse the application of 
the NATO twofold decision and cause a serious 
split between the member countries of the 
Atlantic Alliance. This is why an attempt must 
be made to assess the reactions of western 
public opinion in this matter and probably to 
do more to give it the "defence spirit" which it 
now sorely lacks. 
34. Some members of the committee said they 
considered British and French nuclear weapons 
made no real contribution to Europe's security, 
as the North Atlantic Council had said at its 
meeting in Ottawa, and that the best way 
Europe could contribute to a deterrent policy 
was to develop its conventional capability. This 
is a perfectly rational view if it is felt that only 
the United States has to have nuclear weapons 
and can represent the interests of Europe and 
of its security vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. It is 
not so rational if account is taken of the 
considerations your Rapporteur has developed 
above. In any event, it is liable to make 
Europeans feel that they are no longer master 
of their fate and are but a toy in the relationship 
between the two great powers. This could but 
discourage them from any wish to defend 
themselves and hence deprive them of their 
deterrent ability. It seems wholly out of the 
question that any French Government would 
endorse such a point of view. 
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Ill. Western public opinion and the defence of 
Europe 
35. There has been a spectacular spread of 
pacifist and neutralist movements in recent 
years which has not failed to attract the 
attention of the press, government authorities, 
political parties and even Christian churches 
and scholars and research workers interested in 
defence matters and trends in public opinion. 
As a result, the subjects broached by these 
movements have played a large part in electoral 
campaigns, e.g. in the Netherlands in September 
1982, in the Federal Republic in March 1983 
and in the United Kingdom and Italy in June 
1983. They have also been the subject of 
statements by catholic and protestant church 
authorities in most western countries. Finally, 
they have been carefully studied and analysed 
in numerous press articles and national and 
international symposia. Thus, your Rapporteur 
has noted that in the French monthly Defense 
nationale alone, which as its name indicates 
specialises in defence questions, there were no 
less than eighteen major articles in 1983 on the 
Euromissile crisis and the ensuing discussion in 
the West whereas hitherto there had been very 
little reference to matters connected with 
pacifism. 
36. This means that your Rapporteur had a 
wealth of background information, too much 
even for him to be able to take full cognisance 
of it before tackling the subject. He believes at 
least that he has thus managed to obtain more 
accurate and deeper knowledge than in 1982 of 
the various aspects of pacifist preoccupations in 
the West, which was essential for examining 
their political implications for the Western 
European countries. 
I. Agitation against Euromissiles 
3 7. Since 1979, the prospect of the deployment 
of cruise and Pershing 11 missiles in Western 
Europe has been the hub of pacifist activity and 
propaganda in Europe. The subject seemed 
likely to mobilise a broad section of public 
opinion since nuclear war, a possibility to be 
feared but improbable as long as it was linked 
with an exchange of missiles with nuclear 
warheads between the United States and the 
Soviet Union, assumed an infinitely more 
impressive and more directly threatening shape 
from the moment missiles with nuclear war-
heads were to be deployed in a number of 
Western European countries. 
38. Moreover, for a time the prospect of 
deployment managed to bring pacifists and 
Soviets together in a joint stand against the 
NATO decision. Your Rapporteur does not 
mean that the pacifist movements were mere 
auxiliaries, more or less subsidised with Soviet 
funds, even if this seems, on occasion, to have 
been the case, but simply that they engaged in 
a joint struggle against western nuclear arma-
ments. This struggle, which sought to prevent 
the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe 
in implementation of the NATO twofold 
decision, advanced with renewed vigour after 
the election of President Reagan at the end of 
1980, probably because of the bellicose tone 
adopted by the new president and by his 
Secretary of Defence, Mr. Weinberger, which 
was certainly repugnant to a section of 
European public opinion. It first came to the 
fore in October 1981. It happened a second 
time in autumn 1983 over preparatory work for 
the deployment of Pershing 11 and cruise 
missiles on the territory of certain Western 
European countries, including the Federal 
Republic and the United Kingdom. The sites 
for the first American missiles became the 
centre of large-scale, impassioned demonstra-
tions, as emphasised by the press. Although one 
should be cautious about the figures mentioned 
for the number of demonstrators, it is clear that 
there were hundreds of thousands, if not 
millions, and they were extremely determined. 
39. The various participants in these demon-
strations put forward different kinds of argu-
ment which varied considerably from one 
country to another. Some purely and simply 
rejected all nuclear weapons. Others considered 
that the West had not tried hard enough to 
hold negotiations with the Soviet Union and 
called for a moratorium on further deployment 
to allow negotiations to be started on the basis 
of new concessions to the Soviet Union. These 
concessions would have involved a different way 
of calculating the balance of forces, including 
for instance French and British weapons in the 
negotiations. Yet others, particularly in the 
United Kingdom, asked their governments to 
make a unilateral gesture to start disarmament. 
40. In reality, these various arguments worked 
unilaterally against the West. Admittedly, 
demonstrators in western cities also clamoured 
for the dismantling of Soviet missiles. But they 
had even less chance of making themselves 
heard since information given by the eastern 
press made little reference to this aspect of the 
anti-nuclear demonstrations to which they 
nevertheless gave widespread coverage. The 
demonstrations which started in certain eastern 
countries, including Poland and the German 
Democratic Republic, were immediately 
repressed, thus practically reducing an emerging 
pacifist movement to silence. 
41. Moreover, a moratorium on the deploy-
ment of western weapons had serious drawbacks 
insofar as the Soviet Union continued to deploy 
its own weapons as described by Mr. Hernu, 
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French Minister of Defence, in a speech to the 
Institut des Hautes Etudes de Defense Nationale 
on 15th November 1983: 
"... in Europe and Asia, the continuous 
and unbalanced addition of new means of 
mass destruction is leading to a profound 
change in the international balance. More 
particularly, the number of SS-20 mobile 
missiles continues to rise: 135 at the time 
of the famous NATO twofold decision of 
December 1979 - and I point out that the 
Soviet authorities then said there was an 
approximate balance - 297 when President 
Brezhnev announced a unilateral morato-
rium on their deployment in March 1982, 
and 360 today. These 360 missiles carry 
1,080 warheads which can strike more 
than fifty-six European, Asian or North 
African states in some twelve minutes, 
including more than two-thirds of the 
world's population. A particularity of these 
weapons is that they are keeping the 
countries of the old world hostage, their 
security thus being cut off from that of the 
American continent, which is alone beyond 
their reach. This is a potentially dramfltic 
situation for those countries which depend 
entirely on the American guarantee for 
their security as is the case for instance of 
European or Asian countries which do not 
have a nuclear deterrent force. 
In face of this the United States and the 
member countries of the NATO integrated 
system have come up to the deadline laid 
down by their sovereign twofold decision of 
December 1979. After two years of 
discussions, the Geneva negotiations have 
produced no satisfactory results. Unless 
there is a last-minute surprise, Pershing 
and cruise missiles will therefore have to 
be deployed. We hope this first step 
towards correcting the imbalance will, in 
the long run, allow the negotiations to be 
based on more solid foundations and lead 
at some time to an agreement providing 
for the lowest possible level of armaments. 
A great country like the Soviet Union 
cannot avoid this, particularly as the 
deployment of American missiles would 
not be a reason for breaking off discussions. 
The continued deployment of SS-20s -
ninety-nine since the negotiations started 
-was not taken by the United States as a 
pretext for suspending the Geneva talks ... " 
42. Consequently, however well-intentioned 
pacifist agitation in autumn 1983 may have 
seemed, its military and political repercussions 
could have been more serious for Europe and 
for international peace if the governments had 
not shown considerable moderation in their 
reactions to the demonstrations and much 
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firmness in abiding by their December 1979 
commitments. However, the magnitude of the 
demonstrations might leave room for doubts 
about the will of the people of Western Europe 
to give their backing to their governments. In 
any event, the impression they gave American 
public opinion was that Europeans did not wish 
to be defended and isolationist trends in the 
United States were thus strengthened. They 
probably also convinced the Soviet authorities 
that a further propaganda effort on their part 
might swing the balance in their favour. We 
must therefore delve deeper into the analysis of 
European public opinion in order to assess its 
true reactions. 
2. Elections in 1982 and 1983 and tire defence of Europe 
43. The most usual and safest way to ascertain 
the opinion of the public in democratic countries 
is obviously to study the way it votes, 
particularly in general elections. Several of the 
WEU member countries most concerned by the 
deployment of Pershing 11 and cruise missiles 
and by pacifist agitation had general elections 
between summer 1982 and summer 1983: the 
Netherlands in October 1982, the Federal 
Republic of Germany in March 1983 and the 
United Kingdom and Italy in June 1983. 
44. Deployment of these new weapons played 
a prominent role in the electoral campaigns in 
these four countries, although it cannot be said 
to have overshadowed other topical questions 
including economic and social matters. This is 
already a sign of the importance public opinion 
attaches to this matter and of the limits of this 
importance; it cannot be said that this alone 
determined the choice of the electorate. 
45. Furthermore, in none of the four countries 
which held elections in 1982 and 1983 was 
there a shift in the vote to show a strong trend 
of public opinion. In the Netherlands, the 
Christian Democrat Party, which was then in 
favour of applying the NATO twofold decision, 
subject to the results of the Geneva negotiations 
but which still has to reconsider its position on 
the matter, obtained 29.34% of the votes in 
1983 compar~d with 30.8% in 1981 but the 
Liberal Party, which was also in favour, 
obtained 23.07% compared with 17.32% and 
replaced the Labour Party in the coalition 
government, although the latter obtained 
30.38% compared with 28.29%. It cannot 
therefore be said that the Netherlands elections 
showed that public opinion rejected the deploy-
ment of Pershing 11 and cruise missiles in spite 
of the magnitude of pacifist demonstrations in 
the country on that occasion. 
46. Nor can the elections in the Federal 
Republic on 6th March 1983 be interpreted as 
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repudiating the parties in government at the 
time, although they were in favour of applying 
NATO's 1979 twofold decision, since the 
number of votes for the CDU /CSU rose from 
44.5% in 1980 to 48.8% in 1983, those for the 
FOP falling from 10.6% to 7%. This coalition 
therefore remained in power while votes for the 
party which had demonstrated its hostility to 
the deployment of Euromissiles the most 
vigorously, Die Granen, rose from 1.5% to 5.6%, 
thus marking both the growth in and the limits 
of its audience among the German electorate. 
It should be noted, however, that the SPD, 
whose votes rose from 42.9% in 1979 to 38.2% 
in 1983, had been in favour of applying 
NATO's 1979 twofold decision, but had since 
changed its opinion and finally, at its congress 
in Cologne in November 1983, it rejected the 
twofold resolution adopted by NATO in 
December 1979. It is to re-examine its position 
on this matter in the coming months. 
47. In the United Kingdom, the Conservative 
Party, which had very clearly stated its intention 
to apply the NATO twofold decision, won the 
elections on 9th June 1983, still receiving 42.4% 
of the votes compared with 43.9% in 1979 and 
increasing its majority from 332 to 397 seats. 
Finally, in Italy the Christian Democrats 
certainly lost some votes, the percentage falling 
from 38.3% in 1979 to 32.9% on 27th June 
1983, but these losses were spread among 
several parties which did not all have the same 
position towards this matter. Moreover, none of 
the major Italian parties has officially rejected 
the deployment of Euromissiles outright, but 
none has given its unreserved agreement. It is 
therefore difficult to draw clear conclusions 
from the Italian elections on the trend of 
opinion towards that country's defence policy. 
48. Decisive conclusion obviously cannot be 
drawn from these elections regarding the impact 
of the deployment of Euromissiles on public 
opinion in these four countries, but it may be 
pointed out that in no case did opponents of 
deployment win elections in those two years 
and governments democratically formed after 
these elections consisted everywhere of parties 
in favour of implementing the twofold decision. 
We should not therefore be impressed by the 
scale of demonstrations against deployment in 
these four countries in autumn 1981 and 
autumn 1983. It undoubtedly shows the size of 
a determined minority but certainly does not 
show the existence of a hostile majority. 
However, the fact that a silent majority exists, 
even if it votes, and a zealous minority, indicates 
that a reversal of the situation is still possible, 
particularly if there are difficulties in operating 
the Atlantic Alliance. It is clear that the start 
in the deployment of Euromissiles on the date 
fixed by the North Atlantic Council after these 
elections represented an initial defeat for 
opponents of nuclear weapons. But there is no 
guarantee that this setback is final and the 
Soviet Union is making no secret of the fact 
that it is waiting for the right time to launch or 
foster further anti-nuclear action to improve its 
moral and political positions and divide the 
West. 
3. Opinion polls 
49. The spread of anti-nuclear agitation in 
Western Europe has led most organisations 
responsible for analysing the reactions of public 
opinion to conduct inquiries into the matter. 
They were urged to do so by requests from the 
press, governments or associations concerned 
with Europe's security. Your Rapporteur has 
been able to examine the results of a number 
of these inquiries, grouped inter alia by the 
Institut franr;ais des relations internationales in 
its publication Pacifisme et dissuasion, by the 
Atlantic Institute for a colloquy which it is to 
hold in spring 1984 and by the organisers of a 
meeting to study France's security and pacifism 
held in Paris on 14th and 15th September 1983 
under the title of Defense et recherche universi-
taire. He is not unaware of the difficulties of 
analysing and comparing polls carried out in 
different circumstances, on different dates, in 
different countries and with different question-
naires proposed to cross-sections of people which 
do not correspond. In particular, he knows how 
difficult it is to estimate the intensity of 
reactions on the basis of answers to questions 
which leave little room for the expression of 
more subtle views. He nevertheless thought it 
interesting to mention some of the results of 
these inquiries because they check out indica-
tions obtained by other means. 
50. Thus, a poll carried out in eight countries 
for the Atlantic Institute and the International 
Herald Tribune by the Louis Harris organisa-
tion asked: "Which of the following are your 
greatest concerns for yourself and your coun-
try?". Of ten possible answers "unemployment" 
came first in Italy, whereas "the threat of war" 
came only second in Spain, third in France, the 
United Kingdom and Norway, fourth in the 
Netherlands and Italy and seventh in the 
United States and the Federal Republic. 
"Nuclear weapons" came second in Norway, 
the Netherlands and the United States, third in 
the United Kingdom, fourth in the Federal 
Republic, sixth in Spain, seventh in France and 
eighth in Italy. "Inadequate defence" came 
tenth and last in all eight countries, the other 
concerns referred to relating to economic or 
social matters. Your Rapporteur will not give 
the percentages, which would be particularly 
difficult to interpret as totals are not the same 
in all countries in view of the fact that those 
questioned could give several answers. 
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51. Your Rapporteur considers it important, 
and it corroborates the various poll results that 
he has been able to consult, that international 
peace, defence, nuclear weapons and the 
balance of forces, although real and serious, are 
not the main preoccupation of the majority of 
Europeans. A pacifist campaign which has been 
going on for several years has admittedly 
managed to draw attention to the threats 
represented by nuclear weapons in several 
Western European countries. But the huge 
demonstrations which have taken place on this 
subject do not show so much anguish about 
such weapons as might have been thought. 
Conversely, the inadequacy of the West's means 
of defence, a fact stressed by all governments, 
does not seem very serious to a large majority 
of Europeans. 
52. Answers to a question in the same inquiry: 
"Which of the following are most responsible 
for international tension?" are also revealing. 
In six countries the Soviet military build-up 
came first, but it came only fourth in France 
and fifth in Spain, whereas the United States 
military build-up came second in the Federal 
Republic, Norway and the Netherlands, fourth 
in Spain and Italy, fifth in the United Kingdom, 
seventh in France (the only one of the eight 
countries to have communists in its government) 
and eighth in the United States. Among the 
other answers, it is interesting to note that in 
France American interest rates and the role of 
the dollar came first and that all countries 
except Norway attached great importance to 
insufficient European unity. All except the 
United States attached little importance to the 
overconciliatory attitude of European govern-
ments towards the Soviet Union, and hardly 
more to the rise of neutralism and pacifism in 
European public opinion. 
53. The question "Which of the following are 
most important to western security?" brought 
out three separate trends. In the answers from 
the United States, the Federal Republic and 
the United Kingdom first place was given to 
"effective United States-European co-opera-
tion", in the French, Spanish and Italian 
answers "strengthened economic unity in 
Europe" came first, and in the Norwegian and 
Netherlands answers "productive arms control 
talks". 
54. Another inquiry, based on answers to 786 
questionnaires sent to an "elite" in five countries 
by the Berlin International Institute for Com-
parative Social Research, the first results of 
which were published in August 1983, gave a 
number of interesting indications, although they 
are not comparable with those given by polls 
carried out on other bases. In response to the 
proposition "Deployment of NATO's 
intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF, i.e. 
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cruise missiles and Pershing 11) should proceed 
under all circumstances", 65% in France agreed, 
30% in the United States, 15% in the United 
Kingdom and 10% in the Netherlands and the 
Federal Republic, although the proportion of 
those who thought that "military strength 
should be a pre-condition for detente" ranged 
from 54% in the Federal Republic to 77% in 
France, i.e. a clear majority in the five countries 
covered by the inquiry. In any event, the 
proposition that "NATO INF deployment 
should proceed under no circumstances" 
obtained 40% support in the Federal Republic, 
30% in the United Kingdom and the Nether-
lands, 15% in the United States and 3% in 
France, i.e. nowhere did it obtain a majority. 
55. However, a number of polls carried out in 
France between 1980 and 1982 indicate that 
although a large section of French public 
opinion trusts the deterrent value of the French 
nuclear force to avoid a possible attack ( 62% as 
opposed to 32% according to a poll published in 
L'Express in May 1980), in November 1981, 
according to a SOFRES poll published by Le 
Figaro, only 15% of French public opinion 
considered that "if the Soviet Union were to 
threaten France directly, every means including 
nuclear weapons should be used to resist it", 
whereas 75% considered that an attempt should 
be made "to negotiate a compromise". In 
August 1982, a Louis Harris poll published by 
Ca m'interesse gave similar results: in the event 
of French territory being invaded by the Soviet 
army, 42% thought "France should try to 
negotiate", 39% that "it should defend itself by 
military means" and 10% that "it should use 
nuclear weapons". One-third (32%) of those 
questioned by IFRES for Le Quotidien in 
November 1981 said that if national territory 
were invaded they would "fight underground", 
11% would "adapt themselves to the regime of 
the invader" and 39% would "go into exile". 
56. Your Rapporteur does not know what 
answers would have been given to such questions 
in other countries but he feels the reactions of 
French public opinion somewhat compensate for 
the distortions which seem to emerge from 
comparative polls between France and the other 
western nations. 
57. There can be no question here of giving a 
larger number of poll results or a more 
elaborate interpretation. But these few indica-
tions allow several points to be clarified, the 
first being that western public opinion is only 
very partially and very imperfectly reflected by 
the mass movements which have been seen in 
recent years. Opinion seems deeply attached to 
peace but divided over the kind of danger 
threatening it and the means of countering it. 
Above all, people seem to be ill-informed about 
the political and military facts on which 
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Europe's security depends and fail to provide 
the basis the governments need for pursuing an 
effective security and peace policy. 
4. Positions adopted by Christian ch11rches 
58. On 7th June 1982, in a message to the 
second extraordinary session of the United 
Nations on disarmament, Pope John Paul 11, 
after noting that little progress had been made 
in· disarmament although the world wanted 
both peace and disarmament, gave some of his 
views on the matter. He said the catholic 
church deplored the armaments race and urged 
at least a progressive mutual and verifiable 
reduction, together with the greatest precautions 
against possible errors in the use of nuclear 
weapons. On peace movements, he said it was 
important to give due consideration, with the 
caution and objectivity they warranted, to all 
serious proposals aimed at contributing to real 
disarmament and improving the atmosphere. 
He said that in present circumstances deterrence 
based on balance could still be considered 
morally acceptable but reiterated his confidence 
in the force of loyal negotiations which should 
aim inter alia at a balanced, simultaneous and 
internationally-controlled reduction of arma-
ments. 
59. He then advocated a reduction in the 
production and sale of conventional weapons 
throughout the world, as well as of nuclear 
weapons, and said very particular attention 
should be paid to their improvement since this 
was one of the essential dimensions of the 
armaments race. He considered the work of 
experts on the link between disarmament and 
development deserved to be studied and followed 
up and added that the true cause of our 
insecurity stemmed from a deep-rooted crisis of 
mankind. It was no longer possible for rich and 
poor to live side by side without the emergence 
of resentment turning to violence. 
60. The churches have since made an unusual 
number of statements about peace in 1983: the 
catholic episcopate in the Federal Republic, the 
United States, the Netherlands, the German 
Democratic Republic, Austria, Hungary, Switz-
erland, Ireland, Belgium, Japan and France, 
and a number of protestant churches or 
ecclesiastical organisations. These statements 
were due to the apparent disarray of public 
opinion throughout the West, particularly 
following the discussion about the deployment 
of Euro-strategic missiles, and by the pastoral 
concerns of church leaders who are anxious to 
give their congregations guidance in a matter 
which is at one and the same time technical, 
political, military and moral. Generally speak-
ing, these statements avoided taking the easy 
way out, which would have been to adopt 
purely moral positions, and to varying degrees 
they showed a firm determination to respect 
ethical responsibility in the political and military 
order. 
61. An examination of the various texts 
emanating from catholic episcopates shows that 
they reflect two concerns. First, they mark their 
adhesion to a moral position of the catholic 
church towards war as defined on 11th June 
1982 in a speech by Pope John Paul 11 to the 
United Nations General Assembly. Second, 
they meet the specific preoccupations of the 
people to whom they are addressed. To refer 
only to the three texts of which your Rapporteur 
has direct knowledge, those by the German, 
American and French episcopates, he has noted 
a series of converging views, particularly about 
the following ideas: 
(i) recourse to force is acceptable only in 
a very limited number of cases, if it 
spares non~combatants and if it remains 
proportional to the aggression to which 
it is responding; 
(ii) nuclear weapons further increase the 
threat to humanity involved in recourse 
to force; 
(iii) the aim of any security policy must be 
the establishment of a system of inter-
state relations based on non-violence; 
(iv) deterrence, exercised in particular by 
nuclear weapons, may be a means of 
attaining this aim and its only justifi-
cation lies in the pursuit of action to 
replace the balance of terror by more 
just foundations for international peace. 
It may therefore be a guarantee of 
peace, albeit precarious, but cannot 
constitute its lasting basis; 
(v) on the contrary, lasting peace may be 
based on the promotion of greater 
political, economic and social justice; 
(vi) efforts must be made to work out non-
violent means of solving conflicts. 
62. Together with these principles, mention 
should be made of differences of tone between 
statements by national episcopates which take 
account of each country's specific problems. 
Thus, the American episcopate recommends 
support for immediate, bilateral and verifiable 
agreements to stop the testing, production and 
deployment of new nuclear weapons systems. 
But its statement draws a clear distinction 
between recourse to force in general and 
recourse to nuclear weapons in particular, the 
latter being justifiable only in response to the 
use of nuclear weapons by the enemy. This 
stipulation, which the American bishops explain 
is based on specific circumstances which may 
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change or be interpreted differently by people 
of good will, means condemning all first-use of 
nuclear weapons. 
63. The statement by German bishops of 15th 
April 1983 associates moral tolerance of 
deterrence with the following criteria: 
(i) the immunity of civilians; 
(ii) the means considered or used should 
not make war easier or more probable; 
(iii) the means should be limited to what is 
essential for effective deterrence; 
(iv) the means should be compatible with 
the aims of limiting or reducing 
armaments and effective, bilateral dis-
armament. 
64. The statement by French bishops certainly 
lays more stress on the fact that, on the one 
hand, possession of nuclear weapons may 
provide the Soviet Union, referred to by name, 
with means of blackmail whereby the advan-
tages of war may be gained without paying the 
price of launching it and, on the other, the 
chemical, bacteriological or even conventional 
forms of modern warfare are just as dangerous 
as the nuclear form, and a firm stand is taken 
against unilateral disarmament. 
65. The very nature of the protestant churches 
means that the very numerous statements about 
nuclear weapons which they have issued in 
recent years are far more difficult to examine 
and interpret overall. They of course include 
most of the points raised by the catholic 
authorities but are not unanimous on one 
essential point, i.e. the value of unilateral 
disarmament initiatives. For instance, on lOth 
February 1983 the Church of England General 
Synod negatived by only 275 votes to 222 a 
unilateralist proposal in a draft text on nuclear 
weapons prepared by its drafting committee. 
Conversely, in November 1983 the Gen(fral 
Assembly of French Protestants passed a 
resolution calling for a unilateral freeze of 
French nuclear weapons. Finally, German 
protestant& were extremely divided about the 
value to be attached to ecclesiastical statements 
about means of maintaining peace. 
66. This report is obviously not a suitable 
context for a close and critical examination of 
the positions adopted by the various Christian 
churches in this field. It can merely call 
attention to the importance all these churches 
attach to matters relating to security, deterrence 
and nuclear weapons and note that although 
their opinions may have sometimes diverged 
about how to achieve a peaceful international 
order, an area in which moreover they have no 
specific competence, their reactions closely 
resemble those of most western governments. 
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As they wish peace to. be based on respons!ble 
disarmament, i.e. leadmg to properly-orgamsed 
peace and international order, in most cases 
they have remained aloof from the paci!ist 
demonstrations which tried to shelter behmd 
their moral authority. 
* 
* * 
67. The various elements available for exam-
ining and assessing the reactions of European 
public opinion to security and defence matters 
at least allow the pacifist demonstrations in the 
western countries in recent years to be placed 
in their proper context. They undoubtedly 
reflect deep-rooted uneasiness and the reso~ve 
of certain groups to oppose the defence pohcy 
of the Atlantic Alliance, including the deploy-
ment of Euromissiles following the Soviet 
refusal to hold negotiations on an equitable 
basis for limiting their number. But they do not 
show a radical about-turn in regard to their 
governments' defence policies. Electio_ns in four 
of the countries where demonstrations were 
particularly widespread resulte~ in the electi~n 
or re-election of representatives of parties 
advocating those policies. What is known of the 
trend of public opinion in the l!nited. States 
indicates that NATO-related considerations are 
unlikely to decide the outcome of the elections 
to be held at the end of 1984. Non-political 
organisations dominated by ethical considera-
tions such as the Christian churches have not 
generally sided with the pacifist movements. In 
short movements of opinion in favour of 
pacifism seem unlikely, because of their intensity 
or extent, to change the facts of the situation. 
68. Nevertheless the deployment of Euromis-
siles has certainly revealed a feeling of 
uneasiness which it is politically impossible to 
ignore. It would certainly be a. mistake to 
consider deployment as the final victory of one 
side over another and, although it has led to 
some discouragement among pacifists, they have 
lost neither their motivation nor their influence 
over public opinion, which is quite obviou~ly 
inadequately informed of the facts of secunty 
and defence problems. Today's gains may slip 
away tomorrow if the governments fail to 
explain their decisions clearly enough and 
support them with arguments acceptable to the 
public. Those whos~ interes! is to und~rmine 
western cohesion will be quick to explOit any 
weakening of public opinion in each country in 
the will to resist any form of pressure or 
aggression and, if they succeed, they will 
weaken the deterrent value of the West's forces 
and consequently, instead of strengthening 
peace, they will make it more precarious. 
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IV. The will for defence 
69. The Soviet Union for its part seems to be 
showing a flawless will to do everything 
necessary to ensure its security, mai.ntain . its 
domination over Eastern Europe, mcludmg 
Afghanistan, and further improve its ~si!ion in 
the international balance of forces. It IS mdeed 
difficult to discern any real hesitation in Soviet 
opinion .towards this policy. A.d!D.ittedly there 
are dissidents who strongly cnticise the ever-
growing militarism in the Soviet U~ion, ~ut 
everything is done to control them, I~ Soviet 
society at least, and to keep them out either by 
imprisoning them .with or wi!hout ~rial. or ~y 
making them emigrate. Their a~t10n IS dis-
credited and presented to the Soviet people as 
pure and simple treason. 
70. In an article in u Monde on 3rd May 
1983, members of the Comite France-URSS 
who had been to Moscow reported on the 
activities of independent Soviet pacifists and the 
actions brought against them. Part of this 
report read as follows: 
"The Moscow group for the establishment 
of confidence between the United States 
and the Soviet Union, set up in June 1982 
... was in favour of disarmament based on 
detente from the base upwards, an essential 
condition for detente at the summit ... 
proposed to encourage the policy of detente 
... by pursuing educative action among the 
Soviet people to make them aware of the 
realities of the armaments race ... and, 
while seeking to establish a dialogue with 
the official peace movement in the Soviet 
Union, it proposed that citizens refle~t on 
the matter and take independent actiOn ... 
The initiatives taken by the group have 
drawn continual systematic insults and 
intimidatory measures by the authorities ... 
The authorities then moved on to open 
repression. Arrested on 6th October 1982, 
a member of the group, Oleg Radzinsky, 
was imprisoned, accused of anti-Soviet 
propaganda ... and condemned on 13th 
October 1982 to one year's prison and five 
years' deportation. To date, eight members 
have been condemned ... " 
Furthermore, the West German newspaper 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of 6th March 
1984 relates that five Dutch pacifists, members 
of the IKV, who visited Czechoslovakia at the 
beginning of the month to try to hold a 
symposium there, were expelled from the 
country, as was a French woman member of 
the CODEME. 
71. Furthermore, Soviet defence policy is 
presented as being solely to defend peac~ and 
the media depict the Soviet state as havmg a 
monopoly of pacifism at home and throughout 
the world. There are no true elections, public 
demonstrations of any size or opinion polls to 
show how far the Soviet public accepts 
government propaganda, but the reactions of 
the Russian orthodox church to matters relating 
to defence and peace conform to the official line 
in every respect, which allows it to be thought 
that the Soviet state has largely managed to 
convince the Soviet people of the soundness of 
its views or to impose a regime of terror and 
silence on such a scale that no criticism can be 
voiced. 
72. The situation is not quite the same in the 
people's democracies, where a few sporadic 
pacifist demonstrations against nuclear weapons, 
both Soviet and western, have been held, 
particularly in Poland and the German Demo-
cratic Republic. The catholic church and the 
Solidarity trade union in the former and the 
protestant churches in the latter have shown 
their independence of the political regime and 
at the same time their sympathy for the 
demonstrators. However, the official position 
has always been that, since the state was 
pursuing a true policy of peace, any demonstra-
tion against its defence policy was also against 
peace. The harsh measures taken against 
Solidarity by the Polish Government are no 
secret and it is clear that the catholic church 
used its influence and margin of freedom of 
expression to try to protect some degree of 
freedom in the country rather than endorse 
agitation whose effects would quite obviously 
have been nil and might have been further 
encouragement for the Soviet Union to inter-
vene. 
73. The East German protestant churches 
were associated, particularly in 1982, with the 
development of a pacifist movement which 
claimed to be christian. However, measures 
adopted by the state and the persecution of 
some of the movements' militants led church 
leaders to discourage demonstrations. Inter alia, 
they advised against wearing a badge represent-
ing a sword transformed into a ploughshare, 
inspired by a passage from the prophet Micah, 
because the badge exposed its wearers to harsh 
measures by the state. 
74. These two examples and other indications 
emanating from most of the people's democra-
cies clearly seem to mean that, contrary to 
what has sometimes been said, "pacifism is in 
the West but the arms are in the East". The 
deployment of SS-20s by the Soviet Union 
caused concern and discontent among public 
opinion in countries under Soviet domination. 
This discontent may be seen as a form of 
opposition to that domination since the local 
authorities firmly repress such reactions. 
75. However, at the meeting of the seven 
Warsaw Pact Ministers for Foreign Affairs 
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which ended on 14th October 1983, the 
Romanians refused to accept nuclear weapons 
and announced that they would refuse to 
endorse the deployment of such weapons in 
other allied countries of the Warsaw Pact as a 
retaliation to NATO's deployment of Pershing 
11 and cruise missiles. The reason they gave for 
refusing was that they could not hold weapons 
of mass destruction because their country had 
collaborated with Nazi Germany. But it is clear 
that there were other reasons too for this 
reaction. 
76. These various considerations make one 
question the solidarity of the eastern countries 
with the Soviet Union and the cohesion of the 
Warsaw Pact. But as there is nothing to prove 
that Soviet society proper has been affected by 
pacifist movements, one cannot deduce that 
there has been an actual weakening in the will 
of the Soviet people to defend themselves. The 
Eastern European regimes are such that the 
appearance of cracks in the people's allegiance 
to official policy, rather than auguring an early 
change in that policy, which is imposed by the 
Soviet Union, on the contrary forecasts a 
hardening of Soviet domination which will allow 
no criticism of the peace policy which the Soviet 
Union claims to pursue. 
77. It is evident that the western governments 
do not want to pursue a policy of repressing 
pacifism, nor can they do so moreover. Even if 
they have serious reason to think that pacifist 
demonstrations might undermine their defence 
policies and jeopardise their deterrent effect, 
they consider that the only legitimate and, in 
the end, effective way of combating such an 
outcome is to accept open discussion with those 
who do not share their views, provided the latter 
more or less respect the law which is, on the 
whole, quite liberal. Certain practices, such as 
bomb incidents or kidnappings, can never be 
tolerated, but it must be said that such incidents 
have been exceptional in pacifist campaigns in 
recent years. 
78. It is, on the contrary, through information 
and dialogue that the western governments can 
and must tackle the problem facing them 
through the spread of pacifist movements and 
it must be noted that, even if information and 
dialogue have not always been adequate, they 
exist in most Western European countries and 
in the United States. 
79. When your Rapporteur speaks of infor-
mation and dialogue, he does not mean that the 
European governments should merely uphold 
their views through the media, for instance, but 
he considers that many of the pacifists' 
arguments warrant detailed study and that 
some of their suggestions are particularly 
worthy of being followed up since they respond 
to the true concerns of public opinion. Your 
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Rapporteur will select three which he finds 
particularly legitimate and in conformity with 
the interests of peace: detente, negotiated 
disarmament and development of the North-
South dialogue. 
80. The word detente has often been misun-
derstood insofar as it has been assimilated with 
a policy of weakness towards the Soviet Union, 
particularly in the field of armaments and 
forces. On the contrary, according to your 
Rapporteur it implies the development of 
relations with the Soviet Union and its allies in 
all areas not relating to the balance of forces 
and is based on the conviction that western 
regimes have nothing to lose but everything to 
gain from· an increase in such exchanges and 
the removal of all obstacles. This was clear 
after the signing of the final act of the 
conference on security and co-operation in 
Europe in Helsinki on 1st August 1975: the West 
had hesitated for a long time before embarking 
upon these negotiations which might have been 
interpreted as implying the de facto abandon-
ment of some of its legitimate claims, particu-
larly the reunification of Germany, but which 
were beyond hope, in order to secure a number 
of undertakings from the Soviet Union and its 
allies in regard to human rights and freedoms, 
international trade and measures designed to 
restore mutual confidence. This led to a text in 
which the two sides' concessions were balanced 
but which the Soviet Union and its allies have 
been unable to apply because their internal 
regimes could not stand the introduction of 
certain forms of freedom. In the end, it was the 
opposition to Soviet domination in Eastern 
Europe that was thus highlighted. 
81. It is not therefore surprising that little 
valid progress could be made in the subsequent 
work of the CSCE. At least the Madrid 
conference which ended in autumn 1983 
managed to agree to hold a conference in 
Stockholm at the beginning of 1984 on 
disarmament in Europe and mutual 
confidence-building measures since only here 
could balanced concessions be expected. It is 
too early to assess the results of this conference 
but the very fact that it started at a time when 
deployment of the first Pershing 11 and cruise 
missiles had strained East-West relations and 
the Soviet Union had just announced its 
withdrawal from current negotiations on the 
limitation of nuclear weapons constitutes a 
factor of detente, as immediately demonstrated 
by a Soviet proposal to resume the MBFR talks 
on limiting the level of conventional forces in 
Europe. 
82. But detente is not merely a matter of 
multilateral negotiations. It is also practised by 
governments in their trade with the Soviet 
Union and its allies. Admittedly, as the General 
60 
Affairs Committee said in adopting Mr. Atkin-
son's report on East-West trade in November 
1983, such trade must not help to increase 
Soviet military strength, nor make the western 
countries over-dependent on supplies or pur-
chases from the Soviet Union, nor allow unduly 
advantageous trade conditions for the USSR. 
However, the development of trade is a good 
thing in itself: it encourages nations to be more 
open and, if conducted normally, is a token of 
peace. Western ·opinion polls on the interest 
accorded to this form of detente showed that 
large majorities were very much in favour of it. 
The desire to retain armaments at a level 
sufficient for maintaining balance and peace 
must not be linked with a refusal to practise 
detente lest opponents of the western armaments 
efforts be afforded arguments which might sway 
more public support to their side. 
83. Naturally, disarmament proper cannot 
and must not be neglected at any price. In no 
case is it by refusing to disarm that those in 
favour of unilateral measures can be mollified; 
on the contrary, by proving that progress can 
be made towards negotiated disarmament, 
public opinion can be convinced of the inherent 
dangers of unilateralism. There is certainly a 
suspicion, particularly among younger anti-
nuclear agitators, that the western governments 
do not really want disarmament and that the 
interminable negotiations which have now been 
going on for more than twenty years in various 
frameworks and with few results are but a 
screen to conceal their darker intentions. This 
idea can be usefully exploited in propaganda 
aimed at dividing the West and weakening its 
will to defend itself. The West must therefore 
make it quite clear that its firm rejection of any 
unilateral steps which would allow speculation 
about the weakness of its determination in no 
way means it rejects disarmament but, on the 
contrary, is intended to allow true negotiations 
to promote balanced, verifiable disarmament 
accepted by all. 
84. This can be done only if is quite clear that 
the nuclear weapons at the disposal of certain 
Western European countries, i.e. the United 
Kingdom and France: 
(i) contribute to the security of Western 
Europe as a whole; 
(ii) are the minimum credible for a strategy 
of deterrence and therefore cannot be 
reduced as long as the nuclear forces 
of the two great powers remain at their 
present levels; 
(iii) influence relations between Western 
European countries only insofar as the 
latter have never really concerted their 
views on defence policy; 
(iv) play a deterrent role and are used only 
for defensive purposes. 
85. Where nuclear and strategic nuclear 
bombers are concerned: 
- the United Kingdom has 64 sea-to-
surface strategic ballistic missiles with a 
range of 4,000 km, with three thermo-
nuclear warheads per missile, on board 
four nuclear-propelled submarines; 
- France has 80 sea-to-surface ballistic 
missiles with a range of 3,000 km, with 
one thermonuclear warhead per missile, 
on board five nuclear-propelled submar-
ines, 18 surface-to-surface strategic mis-
siles with a range of 3,500 km and 36 
Mirage IV strategic bombers. 
Where tactical nuclear forces are concerned: 
- NATO has 306 surface-to-surface mis-
siles with a range of between 40 and 
7 40 km, 1 ,910 guns and 603 aircraft 
whose range of action varies between 
950 and 2,500 km; 
- France has 42 Pluton surface-to-surface 
missiles with a range of 120 km and 
Mirage Ill, Super-Etendard and Jaguar 
bombers capable of transporting one 
nuclear warhead per aircraft with a 
range of action of 700 km. 
86. The means necessary for such government 
action can be combined only if there is close 
consultation between the Western European 
countries on all matters relating to their security 
and the use of their forces. This is one of the 
main reasons why, since May 1981, the French 
Government has been constantly proposing to 
its partners that new life be injected into WEU 
which associates seven of the countries most 
concerned by the security of the European 
continent and particularly the central area, 
since it is evident that neither the French and 
British nuclear weapons nor the conventional 
forces of the member countries of the organi-
sation could decisively guarantee security in the 
eastern Mediterranean and Scandinavia. 
87. In an address at the opening sitting of the 
thirty-sixth session of the lnstitut des Hautes 
Etudes de Defense Nationale on 20th September 
1983, Mr. Mauroy said: 
". .. I made a precise analysis of our links 
with our partners in the Atlantic Alliance 
since everyone can see they are decisive. 
But France endeavours to maintain other 
links, in Western European Union, for 
instance. This European organisation is the 
only one which can tackle matters relating 
to defence and security ... France considers 
that European solidarity enhances Atlantic 
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solidarity without being merged with it. 
The similarity of the geo-strategic problems 
facing the European countries should lead 
them to take specific common decisions. In 
this respect WEU can be a privileged 
forum for reflection ... " 
88. In an article in Le Monde on 23rd 
December 1983, Mr. Tindemans, Belgian Min-
ister for External Relations, said he placed 
some hope in the initiative aimed at making a 
renovated WEU the European pillar of NATO. 
He stressed that the notion of the defence of 
Europe should be replaced by that of European 
defence, but that United States disengagement 
from the European continent would raise a 
serious problem in view of the fact that western 
nuclear power was almost entirely in American 
hands. 
89. The wish in some quarters for rapid strides 
in disarmament one way or another might give 
the impression that now is not a very suitable 
time to reactivate an organisation responsible 
for Western European security. Your Rappor-
teur holds absolutely the opposite view, i.e. that 
real progress towards negotiated disarmament 
with the Soviet Union requires consultation 
between European partners to ensure that they 
reach prior agreement on the implications of 
their joint security so that it is not jeopardised 
by a disarmament policy. Talks have been 
started between France and the Federal Repub-
lic on this subject and they already seem to 
have borne fruit. It is for their partners to say 
whether they consider the framework of WEU 
to be really appropriate for developing such 
consultations. Conversely, a display of hostility 
in principle towards French and British nuclear 
weapons can but convince the United Kingdom 
and France that they must rely only on 
themselves for their security and it might deter 
them from playing a constructive part in global 
negotiations on the limitation of nuclear 
weapons. However, certain British members of 
the committee felt British deterrence was not in 
itself credible because it could not seriously be 
thought that it would be used. 
90. The third consideration arising from 
pacifist demonstrations in recent years relates 
less directly to WEU's responsibilities, although 
it is no less important. It stems from the 
irrefutable pacifist argument that expenditure 
on armaments is a waste of resources that is 
unacceptable in a world which is suffering from 
hunger and underdevelopment, particularly 
since the situation has been aggravated by an 
economic crisis which has lasted for more than 
ten years. Apart from the moral value of this 
consideration, it also implies that the West is 
digging its own grave by leaving the underdevel-
oped countries no choice other than the 
perpetuation of a situation which is intolerable 
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for them or to revolt against an international 
order which is unacceptable because it forces 
this situation upon them. The purpose of this 
report is obviously not to explore ways of 
helping the third world to transform its economy 
but merely to recall the urgent need for 
North-South co-operation which is also a token 
of peace. 
91. Your Rapporteur wishes to recall that, 
although military expenditure is an unaccept-
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able waste of resources and energy if security 
is assured, it becomes a prior condition for any 
other activity if security is not assured. 
Consequently, it is not by taking action liable 
to jeopardise Western Europe's security that 
the latter can seek to resolve the difficult 
political, economic, social and moral difficulties 
now facing it; only by ensuring security can it 
help to solve all these problems, including that 
of disarmament. 
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Amendment 1 
Deterrence and the will of the people 
AMENDMENT 11 
tabled by Mr. Freeson and others 
1. In paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out : 
"and that nuclear weapons are an essential part of that deterrence". 
18th June 1984 
Signed: Freeson, Miller, Stoffelen, Hardy 
1. See 3rd sitting, 19th June 1984 (amendment agreed to). 
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Amendments 2 and 3 
Deterrence and the will of the people 
AMENDMENTS 2 and 31 
tabled by Mr. Stoffelen and others 
18th June 1984 
2. In paragraph (vii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "Hoping that 
constructive proposals will" and insert "Emphasising that constructive proposals must". 
3. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, after "informed of" insert "the probable 
effects of armed conflict whether of nuclear or of conventional character as well as of'. 
Signed,· Stoffelen, Hardy, Freeson 
l. See 3rd sitting, 19th June 1984 (report referred back to committee). 
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Amendment 4 
Dete"ence and the will of the people 
AMENDMENT 41 
tabled by Mr. Antrener and others 
18th June 1984 
4. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "Continue to apply the NATO 
twofold decision of 1979 while seeking" and insert "Continue to seek". 
Signed: Antretter, Tummers, Worre/1, Neumann, Stoffelen 
1. See 3rd sitting, 19th June 1984 (report referred back to committee). 
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AmendmentS 
Deterrence and the will of the people 
AMENDMENT 51 
tabled by Mr. Lagorce 
18th June 1984 
5. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proj>er, after "balanced" insert, "simultaneous". 
Signed : Lagorce 
I. See 3rd sitting, 19th June 1984 (report referred back to committee). 
66 
Document 970 
Amendment 6 
Dete"ence and the will of the people 
AMENDMENT 61 
tabled by Mr. Ctwaliere 
19th June 1984 
6. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "of all kinds". 
I. See 3rd sitting, 19th June 1984 (report referred back to committee). 
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Amendment 7 
Deterrence and the will of the people 
AMENDMENT 71 
tabled by Mr. Gianotti 
19th June 1984 
7. After paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows: 
"Invite member governments to examine the possibility of introducing a moratorium on the 
deployment of Euromissiles and start making the necessary contacts for creating denuclearised 
zones in Europe;". 
Signed : Gianotti 
1. See 3rd sitting, 19th June 1984 (report referred back to committee). 
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Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments2 
by Sir Dudley Smith, Rapporteur 
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Introductory Note 
In preparing this report the Rapporteur had interviews as follows: 
6th February 1984 - Ministry of Defence, London: 
Mr. David Nichols, Assistant Under-Secretary of Defence 
19th & 20th March 1984 - Gibraltar: 
H.E. Admiral Sir David Williams, Governor and Fortress Commander 
Mr. John Bradley, Deputy Governor 
Sir Joshua Hassan, Chief Minister 
The Hon. Joe Bossano, Leader of the Opposition 
Rear Admiral George Vallings RN, Flag Officer, Gibraltar 
Brigadier John Pegg, Deputy Fortress Commander 
Air Commodore J.M. Pack, RAF, Air Commander, Gibraltar 
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11th April 1984 - Headquarters, Allied Air Forces Central Europe, Ramstein, Germany: 
Lt. General Fred Noack, German Air Force, Deputy Commander 
Air Vice Marshal Peter Ward, RAF, Deputy Chief-of-Staff, Operations 
The committee as a whole met in Madrid from 19th to 21st October. In the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs, the committee was briefed by Mr. Carlos Fernandez Espeso, Director General for Security 
Questions. It visited the CASA aircraft factory, where it was received by Mr. Fernando Caralt, 
Director General, and Mr. Carlos Navarro Cantero, Deputy Director, Programmes. The committee 
met with the bureaux and party spokesmen of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees of the 
Congress of Deputies, with Mr. Manuel Medina Ortega, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, 
in the chair. It then met to discuss the revised draft report. On 21st October the committee was 
received by General Santos Peralba, Secretary of State for Defence Policy, in the Spanish Ministry 
of Defence, and was briefed by Colonel Narciso Carreras Matas, Spanish Marines, on Spanish 
defence policy. 
The committee met subsequently at the se~t of the Assembly, Paris, on 14th February 1984, 
when Lt. General C.J. Dijkstra presented his study on collective logistical support, and the committee 
met subsequently with the WEU Standing Armaments Committee, attended by the following: 
Lt. Colonel de Winne (Belgium); Lt. Colonel Binet (Belgium); Mr. Marcoin (France); Mr. Schreiber 
(Germany); Colonel Pochesci (Italy); Mr. Zweerts (Netherlands); and Mr. Davies (United Kingdom). 
Subsequently, at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 8th and 9th March 1984 the committee 
met with members of the parliamentary defence committees of the European NATO countries: 
Belgium: Mr. Yves du Monceau de Bergendal, Second Vice-Chairman, National Defence Committee, 
the Senat; 
France: Mr. Louis Darinot, Chairman; MM. Robert Aumont and Jean Combasteil, Vice-Chairmen, 
Defence Committee, Assemblee Nationale; 
Germany: Dr. H. Schwarz, Vice-Chairman; MM. Karl-Eduard Claussen and Wolfgang Kahrs, 
Defence Committee, Bundesrat; 
Italy: MM. Stegagnini and Baracetti, Vice-Chairmen of the Defence Committee, Camera dei 
Deputati; 
Netherlands: Drs. Y.P.W. van der Werff, Chairman of the Defence Committee, First Chamber of 
the States-General; 
United Kingdom: Sir Humphrey Atkins KCMG, Chairman; MM. Douglas and Mates, Select 
Committee on Defence, House of Commons; 
Norway: MM. Ole Fr. Klemsdal and Bjorn Erling Ytterhorn, Defence Committee, Stortinget. 
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The meeting was briefed by Mr. Eric Da Rin, Deputy Secretary-General of NATO; Lt. General T. 
Huitfeldt, Norwegian Army, Director of the International Military Staff; Dr. Fredo Dannenbring, 
NATO Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs; and log. Gen. P. Naslin, Head of the 
Defence Research Section, NATO International Staff. The committee then discussed a draft of the 
present report. 
The committee met finally at the seat of the Assembly in Paris on 15th May 1984 when it 
adopted the present report. 
The committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the ministers, members of parliament, 
officials, senior officers and experts who received the Rapporteur or met the committee and replied 
to questions. · 
The views expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee. 
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Draft Recommendation 
011 tlu stau of E11ropea11 sec11rity 
The Assembly, 
(i) Reiterating its belief that a European view on defence policy should be formulated collectively 
in WEU and in close consultation with all other European allies; 
(ii) Paying real tribute to the vital contribution to the defence of Europe which the United States 
continues to make after forty years, and being convinced that collective defence should continue to 
be organised in NATO to which WEU is inextricably linked by the terms of the modified Brussels 
Treaty; 
(iii) Recognising however that the European allies today contribute 65 to 75% of the ready forces in 
Europe and believing that some adaptation of NATO is necessary for it properly to reflect the 
European view of defence requirements; 
(iv) Stressing the overriding importance of allied solidarity and the need for all countries, with due 
regard to their resources and geographical position, to accept their full responsibilities in the alliance; 
(v) Welcoming the perceptive study on collective logistical support by General C.J. Dijkstra, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
Urge member governments to recommend in NATO: 
1. That the structure of NATO be modified to reflect properly the European view of defence 
requirements, and to improve efficiency; in particular: 
(a) that the position of the Military Committee as the highest military authority under the 
Council and Defence Planning Committee should be clarified; 
(b) that the International Military Staff be fused with the Defence Planning and Policy Division 
of the international staff, and that defence and force planning matters be handled by the 
Defence Planning Committee and Military Committee in joint session; 
(c) that the prerogatives of the three major commanders be adjusted to place them on a more 
equal footing and to reflect the primacy of the Military Committee; 
(d) that a European officer should be appointed as Chief-of-Staff in SHAPE, and a European 
as Special Assistant to SACEUR for international affairs; 
2. That every effort be made to demonstrate the solidarity of the alliance, and to ensure that all 
members assume corresponding responsibilities; 
3. That the NATO authorities take note of and act on the study on collective logistical support, 
and in particular: 
(a) reaffirm the logistics authority of SACEUR under paragraph 9 of the North Atlantic 
Council Resolution of 22nd October 1954; 
(b) establish a communications zone command in the central region, under the command of 
Deputy CINCENT; 
(c) arrange common funding of sustaining stocks and greater use of NAMSA; 
(d) agree that essential logistics units would be mobilised at the earliest stage of the alert 
process; 
4. That, as a matter of urgency, a common IFF aircraft recognition system be introduced on all 
NATO aircraft. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Sir Dudley Smith, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1.1. The terms of reference for the present 
report which the committee included in its 
programme of work for the first half of 1984, 
duly approved by the Presidential Committee, 
are for it to examine the various aspects of 
relations between the member countries and 
NATO. It is to refer in particular to the 
committee's visit to Spain in October 1983, and 
to logistical support in the light of the special 
study undertaken by General Dijkstra, the 
expert appointed on the proposal of the 
committee. The report is to mention the present 
status of INF deployments and negotiations 
compared with the situation described in the 
previous report. 
1.2. The committee examines in another 
report' the future of WEU and its possible role 
as a forum for reflection between European 
governments on the problems of European 
security. The committee there points out that 
the effect of the London and Paris Agreements 
of October 1954 was to replace the rejected 
European Defence Community Treaty with a 
new allied defence structure, including in 
particular a German contribution, by incorpor-
ating many of the provisions of the EDC Treaty 
into a modified Brussels Treaty and its protocols 
on the one hand, and into the NATO Council 
Resolution of 22nd October 1954 on the other. 
NATO and WEU thereby became inextricably 
linked, the former in practice being designated 
the executive agent of the latter for the 
organisation of collective defence, through some 
twenty-eight references to NATO, its organs 
and procedures, which were written into the 
Brussels Treaty and its protocols in 1954. This 
report, which examines the obligations and 
activities of member countries in the framework 
of NATO and makes recommendations for its 
further "Europeanisation", is therefore the 
necessary counterpart of the other report which 
examines and makes recommendations on the 
scope for European discussion of defence 
questions in the WEU framework. 
1.3. At a time when NATO ministerial 
communiques have begun significantly to note 
reservations or particular positions of three or 
four member countries, and when renewed 
attention is being paid to the need for 
consultation on defence and security issues in a 
I. Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty, Rappor-
teur: Mr. De Decker, Document 973. 
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European framework, without removing mutual 
defence planning from the NATO framework, 
the committee felt that it was both useful and 
timely to analyse in some detail the implications 
of membership of NATO. The precise obliga-
tions and activities of member countries in the 
framework of the North Atlantic Treaty are 
not always as clearly understood as they should 
be. Misconceptions have arisen over the last 
decade and a half following the French decision 
of 1966 which left the impression in many 
quarters that France had withdrawn from 
NATO. In fact that country remains an active 
member of the organisation, having withdrawn 
only from its integrated military structure. The 
fact that French forces are not "under NATO 
command" has left the distinct impression that 
forces of the other allies are under NATO 
command - when in fact, with very few 
exceptions noted below, no country's forces are 
under NATO command in peacetime. The 
accession of Spain to NATO in 1982, followed 
at the end of that year by a freeze on 
negotiations concerning its integration into the 
military structure, has left that country tempor-
arily in a somewhat ill-defined position in 
NATO, although as the committee discovered 
during its visit to Spain in October 1983, and 
from other evidence available to it, Spain is an 
active participant in all NATO committees. For 
all these reasons a major part of this report is 
devoted to the implications of membership of 
NATO. 
1.4. In that context, this report discusses in 
part the situation concerning logistics supplies 
for forces committed to NATO, and examines 
in particular the important proposals made by 
Lieutenant General C.J. Dijkstra in his study 
on collective logistical support2 which the 
committee arranged in implementation of Order 
51 of the Assembly. 
1.5. Having visited Spain last autumn, the 
committee also reports in a little more detail on 
the situation concerning that country and its 
relationship with the alliance. This was the first 
occasion that the committee as a whole had 
had the opportunity of visiting that country and 
it wishes to record its appreciation for all the 
helpful arrangements made to receive it by 
members of the Spanish parliament and by 
senior Spanish officials and officers. 
1.6. Lastly, the report describes briefly the 
current situation concerning the deployment of 
2. Document 966, 20th December 1983. 
INF forces in Europe by both sides, and the 
status of negotiations on their possible reduction. 
This subject was examined in detail by the 
committee in its previous report which described 
the situation at the beginning of November 
1983 1• 
11. The implic11tions of membership of NA. TO 
(a) General 
2.1. The North Atlantic Treaty, to which 
today there are sixteen parties, is the same text 
as that signed by the original twelve parties on 
4th April 1949. In addition to the commitment 
in Article 5 to collective defence in the event of 
an armed attack: "the parties agree that an 
armed attack against one or more of them in 
Europe or North America shall be considered 
as an attack against them all ... "2, the treaty 
also provides in Article 3 that preparations for 
collective defence should be made beforehand: 
"in order more effectively to achieve the 
objectives of this treaty, the parties separately 
and jointly, by means of continuous and 
effective self help and mutual aid, will maintain 
and develop their individual and collective 
capacity to resist armed attack". 
2.2. Curiously, although the Brussels Treaty 
signed by its original five parties on 17th March 
1948 contains more binding language in the 
commitment to mutual defence in Article IV 
(Article V of the modified treaty of 1954): "If 
any of the . . . parties should be the object of an 
armed attack in Europe, the other ... parties 
will ... afford the party so attacked all the 
military and other aid and assistance in their 
power", that treaty contained no corresponding 
explicit provision for peacetime preparedness. 
The Brussels Treaty powers nevertheless had 
already created the Western Union Defence 
Organisation (WUDO) under the Western 
Union Defence Committee, composed of minis-
ters of defence, and the Western Union Military 
Committee, composed of national chiefs of 
defence staff, and comprising a field command 
established under the then General Montgomery 
in Fontainebleau, and an infrastructure pro-
gramme for the construction of airfields and 
other military facilities. 
2.3. NATO, from 1949 onwards, copied the 
WUDO model to some extent, as well as the 
joint command structure of world war 11, in 
I. European security and burden-sharing in the alliance, 
Document 959, 7th November 1983, Rapporteur: Mr. 
Wilkinson. 
2. Full text at Appendix I. 
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establishing its own civil and military organi-
sation. When the latter was in place, the 
Consultative Council of the Brussels Treaty 
Organisation on 20th December 1950 agreed 
that the continued existence of WUDO was no 
longer necessary. The Fontainebleau head-
quarters was transferred and became in effect 
part of the NATO military command structure. 
While the Brussels Treaty Council affirmed that 
the new arrangements did not affect the right 
of Western Union defence ministers and chiefs 
of staffs to meet "to consider matters of mutual 
concern to the Brussels Treaty powers"3, they 
have not in fact since met in the Brussels 
Treaty framework. When the Brussels Treaty 
was modified in 1954, at the time of the 
accession of Germany and Italy, the new 
arrangements were confirmed in the terms of a 
new Article IV whereby the parties and any 
organs established by them work in close co-
operation with NATO, and whereby the Council 
relies on "the appropriate military authorities of 
NATO for information and advice on military 
matters". The committee's continuing and close 
concern with mutual defence arrangements in 
NATO flows directly from these decisions and 
statutory provisions which, in effect, make 
NATO in part an executive agency for 
implementing the mutual defence obligations of 
the Brussels Treaty. 
2.4. The civil and military structure of NATO 
as it exists today was largely created in 1949 to 
1952, with some further modification when the 
headquarters moved from Paris to Brussels, 
following French withdrawal from the inte-
grated military sructure in 1966. The following 
sections describe NATO today, and the obli-
gations and activities of member countries in 
the framework of the treaty, which are designed 
in particular to "maintain and develop their 
individual and collective capacity to resist 
armed attack" under the terms of Article 11. 
(b) Cot~sultatioll ;, NATO 
2.5. Consultation between members is a pri-
mary function of any international organisation, 
and in NATO there is more continuous 
consultation and joint decision-making than in 
most. The North Atlantic Council at the level 
of the permanent representatives in Brussels, 
meets regularly at least once a week and more 
frequently when necessary. In addition to the 
provision in Article 3 for maintaining and 
developing collective capacity to resist armed 
attack, Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty 
provides specifically that "the parties will 
3. Brussels Treaty Consultative Council Resolution, 20th 
December 1950, paragraph 4. 
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consult together whenever, in the optmon of 
any of them, the territorial integrity, political 
independence or security of any of the parties 
is threatened". Unlike Article 5 providing for 
mutual defence in the event of an armed attack 
on one party, which is limited by the following 
Article 6 to cases of armed attack on the 
territory or armed forces of the parties in 
Europe, North America or the North Atlantic 
north of the Tropic of Cancer, provisions for 
consultations in Article 4 are not subject to 
explicit geographical restrictions. 
2.6. Although the corresponding paragraph 3 
of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty 
may appear more comprehensive, in providing 
that at the request of any party the Council 
shall be convened for consultation "with regard 
to any situation which may constitute a threat 
to peace, in whatever area this threat should 
arise, or a danger to economic stability", in 
practice consultation in the North Atlantic 
Council has progressively developed from the 
report of the "three wise men" (MM. Martino, 
Lange and Pearson, Foreign Ministers respec-
tively of Italy, Norway and Canada) on non-
military co-operation in NATO in 19 56, which 
led to the establishment of a Committee of 
Political Advisors "to assist the Permanent 
Representatives and the Secretary General in 
discharging their responsibilities for political 
consultation", through the report of Mr. Harmel 
(Foreign Minister of Belgium) in 1967 which 
specifically recognised the need to consult on 
"out-of-area" matters that might impair NATO 
security: 
"The North Atlantic Treaty area cannot 
be treated in isolation from the rest of the 
world. Crises and conflicts arising outside 
the area may impair its security either 
directly or by affecting the global balance. 
Allied countries contribute individually 
within the United Nations and other 
international organisations to the mainten-
ance of international peace and security 
and to the solution of important interna-
tional problems. In accordance with estab-
lished usage the allies, or such or them as 
wish to do so, will also continue to consult 
on such problems without commitment 
and as the case may demand." 
The usage concerning consultation on "out-of-
area" (i.e. out of the area defined in Article 6 
of the North Atlantic Treaty) matters, was 
clarified most recently in the communique 
adopted by all sixteen members of NATO at 
the Boon summit on lOth June 1982: 
"All of us have an interest in peace and 
security in other regions of the world. We 
will consult together as appropriate on 
events in these regions which mr.y have 
implications for our security, taking into 
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account our commonly-identified objectives. 
Those of us who are in a position to do so 
will endeavour to respond to requests for 
assistance from sovereign states whose 
security and independence is threatened." 
One positive consequence has since been seen in 
the co-operative deployment of French, British 
and United States naval forces in the Indian 
Ocean area 1• 
2. 7. Consultation and joint decision-making in 
NATO today cover a vast range of subjects, as 
the names of the sixteen principal committees 
established by the Council suggest2• If twelve of 
these are concerned with various aspects of the 
development of the collective capacity to resist 
armed attack, four at least have other functions. 
Close political co-operation takes place in the 
Council and the Political Committee where the 
allies inform each other as fully as possible on 
their respective policies and positions on specific 
questions arising in many parts of the world. 
Such consultations allow an exchange of views 
during the policy-making stage before govern-
mental decisions are taken. The machinery 
established for political consultation includes 
regional experts groups, ad hoc political working 
groups, and the Atlantic policy advisory group, 
producing working papers and reports based on 
information supplied by national delegations. 
Experts from capitals are associated with their 
work in many instances. The Economics 
Committee assesses economic conditions in the 
Warsaw Pact countries, and the economic 
aspects of East-West relations. The Science 
Committee, the Committee on the Challenges 
of Modern Society, and the Committee on 
Information and Cultural Relations provide for 
the exchange of information in other areas. 
2.8. What may be called the operational side 
of consultation in NATO has developed exten-
sively since the headquarters moved to Brussels 
in 1967. Major NATO command post exercises 
such as Wintex and Hilex are run from the 
headquarters, which is now equipped with a 
situation centre. During these exercises national 
representatives on the Defence Planning Com-
mittee and its supporting committees such as 
the Alert Committee, the Political Committee, 
and the Military Committee (with the national 
representatives in direct touch with their 
national capitals) can test NATO plans and 
procedures, and simulate crisis management 
during an imaginary period of growing inter-
national tension leading to a declaration of alert 
and hostilities. 
I. The committee has recently reported in detail on 
United States NATO discussions on out-of-area matters 
(Document 959, 7th November 1983). 
2. See principal Council committees at Appendix 11. 
(c) Defence and force planning in NATO 
2.9. One of the earliest steps taken by NATO 
to develop collective defence was the introduc-
tion of a review of national defence efforts. 
Under this system each country replies annually 
and in detail to a NATO questionnaire seeking 
information on the availability of forces and 
equipment for the following five years. Those 
resources reported as available for the first of 
the five years are considered to be firmly 
committed: the remaining four years provide 
indications of probable force availability. The 
questionnaire also contains a financial and 
economic section which seeks information on 
the resources constraints and availability within 
which national plans are formulated. 
2.1 0. In the light of country replies to the 
questionnaire, and the ministerial guidance, the 
major NATO commanders develop biennially 
force proposals, setting out country-by-country 
what the commanders propose should be the 
contribution and force improvements of each 
during the planning period. The proposals are 
examined by NATO's international staff in 
discussion with the nations to ensure compati-
bility with the military and resource guidance 
issued by ministers and to establish an element 
of reasonable and realistic challenge. In short, 
NATO's planning process attempts to determine 
the forces required for collective defence, to 
co-ordinate national defence plans in the 
collective interest, and to monitor nations' 
performance against plans. The two-year force 
planning cycle culminating in ministerial 
acceptance of the NATO force plans in the 
Defence Planning Committee is described in 
Appendix Ill. 
2.11. There are a number of obvious limita-
tions in the effectiveness of NATO's planning 
cycle as an instrument of centralised planning. 
Defence remains a national prerogative, and 
most NATO nations have strong planning 
staffs, whose programmes look beyond the five-
year NATO period, often earmarking resources 
for ten years or more. It is generally felt among 
NATO and national planners that resources are 
almost entirely committed in the short to 
medium term covered by a NATO cycle, 
leaving little room for collective NATO plan-
ning to exert much influence. However, this is 
not to say that NATO's planning mechanism 
has no effect or serves no useful purpose. The 
exchange of information and the exposure of 
national plans to alliance-wide scrutiny helps to 
build a consensus on military requirements and 
priorities, which might otherwise not exist. 
Nations have been persuaded to modify plans 
or defence reviews so as to minimise their 
adverse effects on collective security. More 
generally, nations have to conduct their national 
planning conscious of the commitments and 
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assurances they have made to NATO in the 
past. As an attempt to strengthen NATO's 
influence in the medium to long term, a system 
of long-term planning guidelines has been 
developed. 
(d) Military decision-making in NATO 
2.12. The North Atlantic Council is, of course, 
the supreme decision-making body in NATO. 
With the withdrawal of France from the 
integrated military structure in 1966, the 
Defence Planning Committee was established 
(composed of the Council, less France) as the 
decision-making body for those military matters 
in which France was no longer participating. 
Military matters in which France still chooses 
to participate - which include air defence and 
infrastructure, for example - are still referred 
for final decision to the North Atlantic Council. 
2.13. Immediately under the Defence Planning 
Committee comes the highest purely military 
authority in NATO- the Military Committee, 
composed in permanent session of the perma-
nent representatives of the national chiefs of 
defence staff under an elected permanent 
chairman who at the present time is 
General Cornelis De Jager of the Netherlands 
Army. By tradition the post is never held by a 
United States officer. In peacetime the Military 
Committee's task is to recommend those 
measures considered necessary for the common 
defence of the NATO area. It is the body to 
which the three major NATO commanders 
(MNCs, i.e. SACEUR, SACLANT and CIN-
CHAN) are responsible; it is also the main 
source of military advice to the Council and 
DPC. While the scope of the Military Commit-
tee's duties in themselves is clear enough, there 
does seem to be a degree of ambiguity in its 
relations with the MNCs, whose responsibilities 
include the organisation, training and equipping 
of forces assigned and earmarked to their 
command. They are also responsible for prepar-
ing and finalising defence plans. The MNCs 
must go through the Military Committee to the 
NATO Council and DPC for endorsement of 
military plans of any significance (the various 
versions of NATO strategy are issued as 
Military Committee documents (MC)), or to 
request resources, but there is scope for 
planning independent of the Military Commit-
tee. SACEUR and SACLANT have the right 
of direct access to the chiefs-of-staff of any of 
the NATO powers, to defence ministers and to 
heads of government. 
2.14. The Defence Planning Committee, and 
certain of its subordinate committees such as 
the Defence Review Committee, are serviced by 
the Defence Planning and Policy Division of 
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the (civilian) international staff, while the 
Military Committee is serviced by the interna-
tional military staff, composed of officers 
seconded from their national armed forces. 
Some observers believe that efficiency and 
clarity of authority would be greatly improved 
if the present international military staff were 
fused with the defence planning and policy 
staff, to serve both the Military Committee and 
Defence Planning Committee, and if these two 
bodies were to undertake more of their work on 
defence and force planning in joint session, 
thereby greatly speeding it up by eliminating 
several successive steps of the process. 
2.15. The authority of the Military Committee 
with respect to the three major commanders 
appears less clearly defined than would be 
expected in a military organisation. The matter 
is of concern to the Committee on Defence 
Questions ans Armaments in considering the 
extent to which the NATO structure permits 
European views to be given proper weight in 
defence planning - as the committee has 
pointed outt, the European countries today 
provide between 65% and 75% of the readily 
available ground and air forces in Europe. The 
Chairman of the Military Committee, by usage, 
is not a United States general; it is important 
that the proper authority of the Military 
Committee over the three major commanders 
should be clarified, and publicly emphasised. 
2.16. As far as these three major commanders 
- SACEUR, CINCHAN and SACLANT -
are concerned, SACEUR for various political 
reasons has acquired symbolic importance. At 
the request of the European partners this 
appointment has always been a senior American 
officer since General Eisenhower was first 
appointed in December 1950. SACEUR is 
simultaneously Commander-in-Chief of United 
States forces in Europe, a combination of 
responsibilities that provides important material 
assurance of the United States commitment to 
allied defence. The various commanders who 
have held the post of SACEUR have varied, 
however, in the extent to which in their NATO 
functions they have acquired a truly alliance 
view of their responsibilities. Certainly the 
structure of SACEUR's headquarters at the top 
leveF, where, for example, the key functional 
post of chief-of-staff is also held by a United 
States officer, does not appear to provide a 
proper balance of responsibility. The two posts 
of Deputy SACEUR, held by British and 
German officers, are not positions of such direct 
functional responsibility as that of chief-of-staff. 
1. Report on European securitY. and burden-sharing in 
the alliance, Rapporteur: Mr. Wlikinson, Document 959, 
7th November 1983. 
2. See Appendix VI. 
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There is a strong case for appointing a European 
chief-of-staff, and a European from the Political 
Affairs Division of the NATO international 
staff should be appointed to the post of special 
assistant to SACEUR for international affairs, 
as the Assembly has already recommended3• 
2.17. There are three major NATO comman-
ders. The two supreme commanders, for Europe 
and the Atlantic, are both United States 
officers, and have rights of direct access 
mentioned in paragraph 2.13 above. The third, 
Commander-in-Chief Channel, a British officer, 
does not officially enjoy the same status. The 
committee believes that if the authority of the 
Military Committee is clarified as proposed 
above, some of the prerogatives of the supreme 
commanders might be reduced, and the three 
major commanders placed on a more equal 
footing under the Military Committee, but with 
direct access to the Defence Planning Commit-
tee and Military Committee in joint session 
proposed in paragraph 2.14. This would further 
"Europeanise" the NATO structure, but the 
three major commanders should not become a 
substitute for the Standing Group of British, 
French and United States chiefs-of-staff, abol-
ished in 1966. 
(e) The NATO military command structure 
2.18. Under the supreme authorities described 
above, NATO maintains in peacetime an 
operational command structure with a chain of 
command running from the three major NATO 
commanders listed above, down to the level of 
the central army group command for land 
forces and tactical air force command for the 
air forces. This structure is shown diagrammat-
ically at Appendix V. The command level down 
to which integrated NATO military head-
quarters have been established varies in the 
different regions; the lowest level in each case 
is the level at which units under command in 
the event of hostilities are expected to be drawn 
from different countries of the alliance. Military 
headquarters which command forces of only 
one country remain purely national head-
quarters, and would pass under command of 
the superior NATO headquarters at an appro-
priate stage in a crisis. 
3. See Recommendation 278 on developments in the 
Iberian Peninsula and the Atlantic Alliance, adopted by the 
Assembly on 4th December 1975, and the corresponding 
report of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments, Document 682, Rapporteur: Mr. Critchley. 
The Rapporteur there su$8ested that the NATO 
Secretary-General should asstgn political advisers to all 
NATO military headquarters, and that administratively 
they should come under the Political Affairs Division of the 
NATO international staff. 
2.19. The various NATO headquarters have 
an essentially planning function in peacetime 
since, with the exceptions mentioned in para-
graph 2.14 the forces committed to NATO by 
the member countries do not come under 
command unless alert is declared by the North 
Atlantic Council. In addition to their planning 
functions, however, the NATO headquarters 
can function under operational conditions during 
exercises which they may conduct, often with 
forces under command for exercise purposes, 
and NATO commanders are also responsible as 
part of the NATO force planning system for 
inspecting the state of training and equipment 
of national forces committed to their command. 
It should be noted particularly that the logistics 
function of NATO military headquarters is very 
small compared with any corresponding national 
military headquarters, because the logistics 
function remains a purely national responsibility 
even when NATO headquarters assume opera-
tional command of committed forces. This very 
unsatisfactory situation is discussed in para-
graph 2.27 below, and the whole subject has 
been examined in significant detail by Gen-
eral Dijkstra in the study on collective logistical 
support arranged by the committee1• 
2.20. The principal exception to the rule that 
committed forces are not under NATO com-
mand in peacetime is that of the NATO air 
defence system, which in the European theatre 
is under operational control of the NATO 
military headquarters twenty-four hours a day. 
They control the early warning radars and 
communications systems, the Hawk and Nike 
air defence missile belts, and certain fighter 
interceptor squadrons assigned to an air defence 
role. The multinational AWACS force has 
recently come into service, operating exclusively 
under NATO command. The other exceptions 
are mentioned in paragraphs 2.23 and 2.24. 
2.21. The military staffs of the NATO military 
headquarters are officers seconded from the 
national armed forces, who continue to wear 
their national uniform and to be paid by their 
own governments. The NATO military budget 
covers the capital and operating costs of the 
NATO military headquarters, and the salaries 
of a number of civilian international staff 
employed there. 
(/)Forces committed to NATO 
2.22. In agreement with the NATO bodies 
described above, and stemming from the 
recommendations of NATO force planning 
procedures described above, member countries 
have agreed to commit specified forces to 
1. Document 966, 20th December 1983. 
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NATO in peacetime. As already pointed out, 
this does not imply that they are under NATO 
command in peacetime. Committed forces may 
be either assigned or earmarked. In the case of 
assigned forces, their peacetime location is 
agreed with the NATO commander concerned 
and such forces would pass under command 
when the appropriate alert measures are 
declared through the North Atlantic Council. 
Most land and air forces are assigned, and as 
mentioned above, elements of the air defence 
forces actually operate under NATO command 
in peacetime. 
2.23. Forces which are earmarked for NATO 
command have merely to be available to NATO 
commanders at a specified time after declaration 
of alert by the North Atlantic Council. The 
delay in availability may be anything from one 
or two days to several weeks, depending on the 
forces concerned. Most naval forces and reserves 
for air and land forces, are in the earmarked 
category. 
2.24. Since 1967 a Standing Naval Force 
Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) has been oper-
ating under SACLANT control in peacetime, 
chiefly as a flag showing operation and on-going 
exercise, to demonstrate the solidarity of the 
alliance. The force is composed of frigates or 
destroyers assigned to the force for a fixed 
period by most NATO countries with an 
Atlantic seaboard. The command rotates among 
contributing countries. Similarly, a Standing 
Naval Force Channel (STANAVFORCHAN) 
composed of mine-countermeasure vessels 
contributed by Belgium, Denmark, Germany 
and the United Kingdom and, occasionally, 
Norway and the United States, has been 
operating under Commander-in-Chief Channel 
since 1973. A naval on-call force in the 
Mediterranean (NAVOCFORMED) is acti-
vated from time to time and then operates 
under the control of CINCSOUTH and his 
subordinate COMNA VSOUTH - its most 
recent activation took place on 26th April 1984 
with vessels from Greece, Italy, Turkey, the 
United Kingdom and the United States under 
a Greek commander. 
2.25. The first multinational force to be 
constituted by NATO was ACE Mobile Force, 
first formed in 1960. It comprises a land 
element of approximately brigade size composed 
of several battalions, and an air element 
composed of several squadrons, all drawn from 
several different NATO countries. The units 
assigned to this force are specially trained and 
equipped to be rapidly air-transportable. With 
the prior agreement of the DPC this force is 
available to SACEUR for rapid deployment to 
certain areas, in particular the NATO flanks 
where it regularly exercises in Norway, Den-
mark, Greece and Turkey. There is a small 
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permanent headquarters staff for planning 
purposes in peacetime located near to Head-
quarters Central Army Group. 
(g) lnj(rastructure 
2.26. One of the most successful aspects of 
military co-operation in NATO has been the 
construction of common military infrastructure 
projects throughout the NATO countries which 
have been jointly financed according to agreed 
cost sharing formulae which take account of 
various factors such as the degree of utilisation 
by the forces of a member country, and possible 
benefit to a host country on whose territory a 
facility is constructed, etc. The total cost of 
NATO infrastructure to date amounts to 3.5 
billion infrastructure accounting units or more 
than $11 billion 1• Projects completed include: a 
communications network with land lines, sub-
marine cables, radio and satellite links; a fuel 
supply system with some 10,000 kms of 
pipelines and 2 million cubic metres of storage; 
naval facilities including moorings and ammu-
nition and equipment stores; radar systems and 
other elements of the air defence ground 
environments; storage sites for nuclear weapons; 
missile sites for Nike missiles, etc.; underground 
war headquarters, radio navigational aids and, 
the largest single item, some 220 airfields. 
(lr) Logistics 
2.27. In implementation of Order 51 of the 
Assembly2, the committee arranged for a study 
on collective logistical support to be undertaken 
by Lieutenant General C.J. Dijkstra3• This 
excellent and realistic study details the history 
of logistics in NATO and the present situation 
whereby despite considerable planning and 
consultation within the international framework, 
logistics - i.e. the supply of equipment to the 
armed forces right down to the point of 
utilisation in the field - remains essentially a 
national responsibility. Even when forces pass 
under NATO command after the alert has been 
ordered, the main logistics units, and all supply 
lines and stockpiles remain under purely 
national command. As long ago as 1960 the 
committee in an important report on logistics\ 
and the Assembly, in Recommendation 56 
adopted on the basis of the committee's report, 
l. Taking the IAU to be $3.159 according to the United 
States Secretary of Defence report to Congress on burden-
sharing, March 1983. 
2. Adopted by the Assembly on 20th June 1979. 
3. Document 966, 20th December 1983. 
4. State of European security - Logistics in Allied Forces 
Central Europe, Document 180, Rapporteur: Mr. Frans 
Goedhart, adopted on 25th October 1960. 
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noted then: " ... that while member governments, 
in assigning national forces to NATO command, 
have entrusted the lives of their soldiers to 
allied commanders, they have not transferred 
sufficient control over materials to enable these 
commanders to employ their forces effectively". 
As General Dijkstra points out, the situation 
has remained largely unchanged. In the penul-
timate Chapter 7 of his study, on "How to 
improve the logistic posture", he makes a 
number of realistic proposals to improve this 
very unsatisfactory situation. The most import-
ant of these, in the committee's view, are: 
(i) the creation of a multinational com-
munications zone on the central front, 
under command of the Deputy CIN-
CENT, who would be responsible for 
peacetime planning to co-ordinate logis-
tic supply in the whole region, and 
would assume command of the corres-
ponding national logistic resources in 
the event of hostilities. The territorial 
extent of such a communications zone 
would have to include not only the 
Benelux countries, but also in the event 
of hostilities, part of French territory, 
and would also require base facilities in 
the United Kingdom; 
(ii} agreement by member countries that 
those logistics units essential to the 
operation of forces assigned to NATO, 
but which themselves have only reserve 
status in peacetime, should be mobilised 
immediately when the NATO alert 
system begins to operate - General 
Dijkstra recommends that that should 
be at the earliest point when "military 
vigilance" is ordered by a NATO 
commander; 
(iii} the constitution of "sustaining stocks", 
in order to improve stocks of various 
supplies, especially ammunition of all 
types. Sustaining stocks would have to 
be drawn upon once basic stocks 
provided by nations to meet the first 
few days of hostilities have been 
consumed and would have to last until 
resupply could be arranged. They 
should be jointly financed by NATO, 
as infrastructure projects are at present, 
and should be located and controlled in 
accordance with NATO plans- on the 
central front they would of course be 
available to the proposed commander 
of the communications zone. 
2.28. The committee has no hesitation in 
recommending the foregoing proposals for 
immediate reference to NATO in the real hope 
that they may be implemented at an early date. 
As far as the proposed mobilisation of logistics 
units at an early stage of the NATO alert 
system is concerned, it might well be more 
realistic in practice to arrange for this to be 
linked to the declaration of "simple alert" by 
NATO, rather than "military vigilance" which 
can be ordered by NATO commanders in their 
own right, and which includes, for example, the 
manning of headquarters on a twenty-four hour 
basis. 
(i) Defence production 
2.29. For completeness in this survey of 
obligations and activities entered into in the 
framework of NATO, this report draws atten-
tion to the various attempts to achieve joint 
production of standardised defence equipment 
in the alliance which have been only partly 
successful. In NATO itself the Conference of 
National Armaments Directors is chiefly respon-
sible for attempting to co-ordinate production 
plans for future equipment, while the European 
NATO countries approach the same problem at 
the European level in the Independent European 
Programme Group and, for the seven WEU 
countries, have also available the Standing 
Armaments Committee although the latter has 
not in practice been used to consider actual 
production projects since about 1960. As many 
reports of Assembly committees have pointed 
out, progress in this area has been all too slow, 
resulting in too many different models of high-
cost non-standardised equipment being in ser-
vice with the armed forces of different member 
countries. It is disturbing to see that this 
situation shows insufficient sign of improvement. 
Ill. The status of individual countries 
(a) General 
3.1. The foregoing chapter describes in general 
terms the obligations and activities of the 
member countries in the framework of the 
North Atlantic Treaty. A closer look at the 
relationship of each country to the organisation 
will usually show some differences in the way 
each participates. 
3.2. Prior to 1966, communiques issued after 
NATO ministerial meetings did not reveal 
reservations or special positions of individual 
countries. Following the decision of France to 
withdraw from the integrated military structure 
in that year, however, sections of subsequent 
communiques have been qualified with phrases 
such as "countries participating in the integrated 
military structure", or "in the NATO defence 
programme" or "in the MBFR talks", to refer 
implicitly to all allies except France. Since May 
1967 separate communiques have also been 
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issued following ministerial meetings of the 
Defence Planning Committee, in which France 
does not participate. 
3.3. More recently, since the end of 1981, 
footnotes have begun to appear in NATO 
communiques explaining that certain individual 
countries - Denmark and Greece - have 
particular reservations on certain paragraphs, 
or that another - Spain - is in a particular 
position at present. 
3.4. These reservations in NATO commu-
niques, however, are only one, rather visible, 
aspect of differences in the way different 
countries participate in NATO - differences 
which have historical, geographical or demo-
graphic, as well as political causes. The 
following sections attempt to describe the 
relationship to NATO of each European NATO 
country, grouped in geographical regions. The 
report does not describe the force contribution 
of each country1• 
(b) ScandillllVia and Iceland 
Iceland 
3.5. Iceland is obviously in a very special 
position among NATO countries in that it 
possesses no armed forces. Iceland is neverthe-
less a very full participant in NATO in many 
senses. As a small country, Iceland's diplomatic 
representations abroad are limited in number, 
and its foreign policy is of course closely linked 
to its economic interests, in particular its fishing 
rights. Membership of NATO brings with it 
participation in meetings of the North Atlantic 
Council and its supporting committees, includ-
ing the Military Committee, although Iceland 
is understood not to exercise its rights in all 
these domains very frequently. Nevertheless, 
participation at will in selected NATO bodies 
provides Iceland with both a voice in allied 
councils and access to diplomatic information 
that might not otherwise be available to the 
country. In 1951, two years after the conclusion 
of the North Atlantic Treaty, Iceland concluded 
a bilateral agreement with the United States, 
which provided for the presence on the island 
of the Iceland defence force supplied by the 
United States. This now includes both F-4 
interceptor aircraft, AWACS E-3A early warn-
ing aircraft and Orlon maritime patrol aircraft, 
as well as ASW helicopters which can also 
provide air-sea rescue facilities. Collectively 
these forces provide long-range air defence 
cover around Iceland well into the Greenland-
l. See for a summary description of national forces the 
committee's previous report, European security and 
burden-sharing in the alliance, Rapporteur: Mr. Wilkinson, 
Document 959, 7th November 1983. 
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Iceland-United Kingdom gap. Together with 
radar and maritime surveillance facilities, 
Iceland, because of its vital geo-strategic 
situation, thus provides NATO with very 
important facilities for surveillance of Soviet 
aircraft as well as surface and submarine forces 
on passage between the Norwegian Sea and the 
North Atlantic. 
Norway and Denmark 
3.6. There are certain features common to the 
participation of both these Scandinavian coun-
tries in NATO. Neither permits the stationing 
of nuclear weapons or the permanent stationing 
of foreign troops on its territory in peacetime1 
both have small populations and rely on 
relatively small standing defence forces, but 
relatively large and rapidly mobilisable reserves 
and voluntary home guards; the air, water and 
underwater surveillance facilities installed on 
their metropolitan and distant island territories 
make a vital contribution to total NATO 
surveillance capabilities. 
3.7. Norway faces special problems with the 
vast extent of a sparsely populated territory 
extending northwards to the Soviet frontier, and 
the bulk of its 4.1 million population concen-
trated in the south. The 40,000 men in the 
armed forces represent 2.5% of the active 
population (compared with the mean of 2.3% 
for the WEU countries, or 2.8% for NATO 
countries as a whole) backed up by 122,000 
reserves and a home guard of 82,000. A 
significant proportion of the regular forces have 
to be stationed in north Norway, with greater 
reliance on the home guard in the more 
densely-populated southern area. In the event 
of hostilities Norway would rely heavily on 
reinforcements, chiefly from the United King-
dom and the United States; units from both 
countries and the Netherlands and Canada 
regularly exercise in Norway, and some of their 
equipment is now permanently stockpiled in the 
country. ACE Mobile Force, referred to in 
paragraph 2.25 above, also deploys on exercises 
to north Norway from time to time. The area 
of North Cape in the extreme north of Norway, 
linked by a SOSUS submarine detection system 
to the Norwegian territory of Bear Island some 
250 nautical miles to the north, provides sites 
which assist in the surveillance of Soviet 
northern fleet movements from its bases m 
Severomorsk, Polyanyi, and Arkhangel. 
I. Codified in part by Norway in its reply (to a Soviet 
note of 29th January 1949) assuring the Soviet Union that 
it would allow no foreign bases or stationing of foreign 
troops "as long as Norway is not attacked or exposed to 
threats of attack". Denmark originally stated nuclear 
weapons would not be stationed "under present conditions" 
in response to the United States' offer in the 1950s. 
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3.8. The NATO military headquarters for 
Allied Forces Northern Europe is located at 
Kolsas outside Oslo and is responsible for the 
area from the River Elbe in Germany to North 
Cape. There are NATO-financed infrastructure 
installations including radar, communications, 
three airfields and naval facilities in Norway 
and its air defence is under NATO command 
in peacetime. 
3.9 .. Denmark, with a larger population of 5.1 
million concentrated in a much smaller area, 
maintains standing armed forces of 31,000 
representing only 1.6% of the active population. 
They are backed up by 74,000 reserves and 
78,000 voluntary home guards. It may be said 
that Denmark's principal contribution to NATO 
lies in the continuous surveillance of the Danish 
straits and, with German forces, naval patrols 
into the Baltic to the west of the Danish island 
of Bornholm which also provides excellent radar 
and other surveillance facilities, located as it is 
off the Polish coast some 70 nautical miles to 
the east of Copenhagen. The Danish straits are 
recognised as international straits, but passage 
is regulated by national Danish regulations, and 
all transits of Soviet naval vessels, whether 
submarine or surface, are reported to NATO. 
Submerged passage of submarines is prohibited, 
and would be detected if attempted. 
3.10. Like Norway, Denmark might have to 
rely on reinforcements if its territory were 
attacked. There are regular NATO exercises 
including deployment of ACE Mobile Force 
and German forces on Danish territory to 
practise such arrangements. 
3.11. NATO Headquarters Baltic Approaches, 
subordinate to Allied Forces Northern Europe, 
is located at Karup on Jutland. Danish air 
defence, however, is not under NATO command 
in peacetime. 
3.12. A Danish air force base and a LORAN 
navigation aid on the Faroe Islands are 
strategically located in the Iceland-United 
Kingdom gap. There are two United States 
bases in north Greenland, the airbase at Thule, 
a ballistic missile early-warning radar 
(BMEWS) and an extention of the North 
American distant early-warning (DEW) air 
defence radar line across southern Greenland. 
3.13. Denmark, like all other NATO countries 
except France, participated in the December 
1979 dual decision on intermediate-range 
nuclear forces concerning negotiations with the 
Soviet Union and the conditions of deployment 
of such forces in five NATO countries. Although 
INF forces were not earmarked for deployment 
on Danish territory, Denmark is a contributor 
along with all other NATO countries to the 
infrastructure programme which INF deploy-
ment would involve. On 7th December 1982, 
however, the Danish parliament voted to 
suspend until further notice Danish contribution 
to INF infrastructure after funds already 
committed for 1983, and on lOth May 1984 
voted finally, by 49 to 11 with the 77 members 
of the government coalition parties abstaining, 
to withhold payment of the balance of $4.8 
million due on a total scheduled Danish 
contribution of $7.5 million. The $4.8 million 
was to be devoted instead to national defence 
projects. On 26th May 1983, the Danish 
parliament had adopted by 83 votes to 70 a 
motion tabled by the opposition Social Demo-
cratic Party calling for the INF negotiations to 
be continued into 1984 and for there to be no 
deployment of INF forces by NATO during 
that time and for the number of such forces to 
be frozen at present levels. Dating from the 
NATO Defence Planning Committee commu-
nique of 2nd June 1983, all references in 
NATO communiques to INF deployment have 
since contained a reservation by the Danish 
Government pointing out that the government 
supported the dual decision but at the same 
time drawing attention to the motion adopted 
by the Danish parliament. 
(c) The WEU countries 
3.14. The WEU countries, with the exception 
of France, may be seen as a coherent nucleus 
in European NATO, accepting comparable 
obligations and und~rtaking compara.b~e t~s~ 
which could be descnbed as "full partictpatton 
in NATO. Thus none of these countries is 
responsible for any reservations appended to 
recent NATO communiques; all have commit-
ted the greater part of their armed forces to 
NATO; all participate in ACE Mobile Force 
which may be deployed to Norway, Denmark, 
Greece or Turkey; all have nuclear weapons 
stationed on their territories and the forces of 
all these countries assume some nuclear roles, 
in the case of the non-nuclear countries through 
ownership of means of delivery (such as aircraft 
and the Lance surface-to-surface missile) for 
United States-owned warheads; all have 
accepted the principle of the basing of INF 
forces on their territory in the absence of any 
agreement in the INF . negotiations: Su.ch 
differences as there are m the relattonshtps 
between these six countries and NATO stem 
more from their size or geographical position, 
than from differences in policy. 
The central region 
3.15. The central region of NATO, which 
stretches from the River Elbe in Germany south 
to the Swiss and Austrian frontier, with forces 
from eight different NATO countries perma-
nently stationed there in peacetime, has the 
most integrated, most multinational structure 
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of any NATO command. Under Headquarters 
Allied Forces Central Europe at Brunssum in 
the Netherlands, there are five integrated 
subordinate headquarters. For the land forces 
these are Headquarters Northern Army Group 
(to which national corps from Belgium, Ger-
many, Netherlands and the United Kingdom 
are assigned) and Central Army Group (with 
national corps from Germany and the United 
States, and a Canadian brigade). 
Air forces in the central region 
3.16. The air force chain of command passes 
from the Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces 
Central Europe (CINCENT) first to Comman-
der Allied Air Forces Central Europe and then 
to Second ATAF in the north (with national 
squadrons from the United States and the same 
countries as those assigning army corps to 
NORTHAG) and to Fourth ATAF in the south 
(similarly with national squadrons from the 
three countries which assign land forces to 
CENTAG). 
3.17. CINCENT's (and hence AAFCE's) area 
of responsibility for air defence extends into the 
sea areas beyond the northern limit of the rand 
area of responsibility. The Bonn Convention of 
1952 as amended on 23rd October 1954, 
provided for special three-power responsibility 
to be exercised by France, the United Kingdom 
and the United States for peacetime security of 
German airspace. Because of this agreement 
only British or United States officers initiate 
orders for intercept missions in German airspace 
in peacetime. Officers from those two countries 
are permanently on duty in the sector operations 
centres - the air defence centres coming directly 
under Second A TAF and Fourth AT AF - and 
interception missions to challenge unidentified 
aircraft are first performed by aircraft of those 
two countries. France, despite its withdrawal 
from the integrated defence structure, is 
understood to have reserved its right to 
participate in this arrangement. At a specified 
state of the NATO alert procedure it is 
understood that the special provisions of the 
amended 1952 convention will cease to apply 
and air defence responsibility will be exercised 
normally by NATO command. The Nike and 
Hawk air defence missile belt which stretches 
across the whole central front is provided by 
German, Belgian, Netherlands and United 
States units. For offensive air operations CIN-
CENT's (and hence AAFCE's) area of responsi-
bility coincides with the area of CINCENT's 
land responsibility, extending north only as far 
as the Elbe. Under each of the two ATAFs 
there are two allied tactical operation centres 
(ATOCs), which task assigned wings in times 
of war. National commands in peacetime, they 
direct the operations and pilot training of 
national squadrons under command. 
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3.18. Headquarters AAFCE was established 
only in 1974 to centralise command of air 
forces operating in the central region. It is 
commanded by a United States air force 
general who holds simultaneously the national 
appointment of Commander-in-Chief United 
States Air Force Europe. Hitherto, the two 
A TAFs had developed as separate air forces 
under a British RAF commander in the north 
and a United States air force commander in 
the south. The committee last reported on the 
situation over eight years ago1 when the new 
command structure had not been finalised -
headquarters AAFCE was temporarily installed 
at the air force base at Ramstein in Germany 
but was originally due to be moved to be eo-
located with CINCENT in Brunssum. The 
committee then reported on several problems 
both of the command structure and with the 
equipment of the air forces assigned to it. 
3.19. Headquarters AAFCE has not in fact 
been moved from Ramstein. Your Rapporteur 
visited the headquarters in April and is able to 
report that the new command structure is now 
on the point of becoming much more effective, 
with arrangements for the subordinate ATOCs 
to be internationally manned. The equipment 
situation has improved considerably with the 
introduction of more modern aircraft such as 
the Tornado, Jaguar, Harrier and F-16 - the 
latter replacing three different aircraft - and 
the entry into service of the first ten E-3A 
surveillance aircraft of the NATO airborne 
early warning (NAEW) fleet which will 
comprise eighteen E-3As and eleven Nimrods 
when complete. Simultaneously, however, the 
quality of Warsaw Pact aircraft has also 
increased. Other equipment problems identified 
by the committee in 1975 however remain just 
as acute today. Perhaps the most serious 
shortcoming is the absence of a single standar-
dised IFF (identification friend or foe) device 
on all NATO aircraft. The United States has 
adopted an improved version of the sophisticated 
Mark XII whereas most other countries have 
an earlier NATO standard. As a consequence 
all NATO air defence systems- both landbased 
and airborne- would be considerably hampered 
by having to use longer procedural means to 
identify positively an aircraft as friend or foe 
before engaging it. In the words of General 
Billy M. Minter, Commander Allied Air Forces 
Central Europe, "Right now we can't take full 
advantage of the beyond-visual range capability 
that we have in the F-15 (aircraft) because we 
don't have a NATO IFF system."2 
1. Air forces on the central front, Rapporteur: Mr. Roper, 
Document 690, 1st December 1975. 
2. Reported in Armed Forces Journal International, 
January 1984. 
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3.20. Another major problem facing the air 
forces in Central Europe is the lack of space 
and the limited number of airfields available. 
Twenty-nine airfields in France, which had been 
financed through the NATO infrastructure 
programme or bilaterally by Canadian and 
United States forces, ceased to be available in 
1966. While much has been done to improve 
and harden NATO airfields in Germany, there 
is a backlog of maintenance work on other 
NATO airfields. With the arrival of reinforce-
ment squadrons from the United States there 
will be desperate overcrowding on the airfields 
available in the central region where several 
squadrons will have to share airfields - known 
as eo-located operating bases (COB). To quote 
General Minter again: "What I need is to get 
the seventy COBs that we have identified and 
have them equipped with adequate POL (petrol, 
oil and lubricants), munitions and dispersal 
parking ... We really need hardened aircraft 
shelters. We need munitions, bunkers, etc. We 
can do it for anywhere between $5 and $6 
million a copy."3 
Belgium and the Netherlands 
3.21. As both countries participate fully in 
NATO there are few particularities to report. 
Actual deployment , of INF forces on the 
territory of these two countries under the 1979 
dual decision, is not due until 1985; both 
countries in different ways have reserved their 
position concerning a final assessment of the 
progress of INF negotiations which remains a 
factor to be taken into account before deploy-
ment begins. The Belgian contribution to the 
Hawk and Nike air defence belts remains a 
subject of much speculation because the 
obsolescent Nike missiles are being phased out; 
Belgium has not undertaken to finance the 
replacement United States Patriot missile, and 
talks are being held concerning the possible 
provision of such missiles by the United States. 
Belgium's proposals to withdraw its Hawk units 
from the forward air defence screen to replace 
the Nike missiles have been energetically 
opposed in the NATO military command 
because it would leave a gap in the forward 
Hawk belt. 
3.22. Both countries' geographical situations 
provide important opportunities for the reception 
of external reinforcements. They both take part 
in NATO's integrated air defence system, 
provide land and air forces for the forward 
defence of the central region and devote their 
maritime forces to countering the submarine 
and mine threats in the Channel and Atlantic, 
thereby contributing to the maintenance of the 
sea lines of communication. Belgium maintains 
3. Op. cit. 
a large army contingent stationed in Germany. 
The Netherlands has a brigade deployed 
forward in Germany to be reinforced through 
the rapid mobilisation of active and reserve 
forces. Modernisation of both air forces is 
underway through the introduction of the F-16, 
the purchase of which has absorbed a consider-
able proportion of investment funds. 
Luxembourg 
3.23. With a population of only 366,000, 
Luxembourg obviously has a special position 
concerning its participation in NATO. The 
committee visited the country in 1981. Together 
with Canada, the United Kingdom and the 
United States, among the NATO countries, 
Luxembourg has purely voluntary military 
service which provides an army of 720 men 
representing only 0.9% of the active population. 
Luxembourg's contribution to NATO forces is 
one under-sized battalion assigned to ACE 
Mobile Force. The NATO supply depot 
NAMSA is located on its territory, as is a 
United States tank depot. Luxembourg's efforts 
in supporting reinforcements are important. 
Large storage sites are constructed there and 
the civil airport will be available for reception 
and onward movement of reinforcements. The 
government's offer to register all E-3A NATO 
AWACS aircraft in Luxembourg was also 
important. 
Germany 
3.24. Germany can be said to be the country 
whose armed forces are most integrated into 
the NATO military structure; to some extent 
this was a historical consequence of inheriting 
a pre-existing situation when the German armed 
forces were recreated following the 1954 
agreements. A feature of the German military 
staffs is the absence of an operational planning 
staff, the functions of which are left to NATO 
military headquarters. The most senior German 
officer has the title not of Chief of Defence 
Staff but of Inspekteur der Bundeswehr, imply-
ing that his responsibility is for ensuring that 
German forces are properly trained and 
equipped to fulfil the tasks assigned to them in 
NATO defence plans, rather than to exercise 
operational command over the forces. The 1983 
white paper states that "only in the Atlantic 
Alliance can ... (Germany) find protection and 
security." It is the only member of the alliance 
to have assigned all its combat forces (except 
the territorial army units) to NATO, thus 
contributing a large, well-equipped and 
readily-available contingent to the central 
region. Its maritime forces play a vital part, 
with those of Denmark, in protecting the Baltic 
Sea and its approaches. 
3.25. Germany supports a significant social 
burden because of the stationing on its territory 
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of the integrated forces of six NATO countries 
and, since 1966 on a bilateral basis, those of 
France, together with six NATO military 
headquarters. As well as the barracks, storage 
sites and airfields required for these forces 
provision has to be made as far as possible fo; 
trainin~ areas. The concentration of military 
force ts greater than anywhere else in the 
NATO area, and the airspace is particularly 
crowded with military traffic in addition to 
considerable civilian traffic - a situation made 
worse in 1966 when eleven airfields in France 
used by Canadian and United States air forces 
ceased to be available. 
3.26. The initial deployment of nine Pershing 
11 missiles in Germany under the 1979 dual 
decision was duly accomplished before the end 
of 1983. 
United Kingdom 
3.27. Although the United Kingdom has 
largely abandoned a worldwide "east of Suez" 
d~~e~ce pol~cy, it still retains defence responsi-
btltttes outstde the NATO area, as events in the 
South Atlantic in 1982 served to show. 
Nevertheless, British policy statements continue 
to state that: "the major threat to the security 
of the United Kingdom remains the Soviet 
Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, and that our 
membership of NATO provides the only 
realistic way of countering that threat" 1• The 
first defence policy statement of the present 
conservative government recognised "the pri-
macy of NATO in our defence policy"2• A 
major part of the British armed forces are 
assigned to NATO including the strategic and 
tactical nuclear forces, it is the only country 
contributing forces to all three major com-
mands, SACLANT, CINCHAN and SACEUR 
under which latter comes Commander United 
Kingdom Air Forces, although public state-
ments do not appear to have been made 
concerning the total proportion of forces 
committed to NATO. In the annual report of 
the WEU Council to the Assembly, Britain 
regularly reports however on its contribution to 
BAOR under the terms of Article VI of 
Protocol 11 of the modified Brussels Treaty- in 
1982 this contribution amounted to 59,567 men 
(of which 909 were temporarily serving in 
Northern Ireland) and some twelve squadrons 
of aircraft. In addition there is a brigade in 
Berlin. The United Kingdom is geographically 
and strategically important for the reinforce-
ment of continental Europe, redeployment of 
United States reinforcements and base for 
strategic air assets. 
1. Statement on the defence estimates 1983. 
2. The United Kingdom defence programme: "The way 
forward", June 1981, Cmnd. 8288. 
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3.28. One of the three major subordinate 
NATO commands Commander-in-Chief 
Channel- is located in the United Kingdom at 
Northwood, near London, the British comman-
der of which serves concurrently as Commander 
Eastern Atlantic - a subordinate command to 
SACLANT. 
3.29. Like Canada, Luxembourg and the 
United States, the United Kingdom relies on 
volunteer forces only, which represent 2.1% of 
the active labour force - the lowest percentage 
in WEU after Luxembourg - but defence 
expenditure at 5.6% of GDP is the highest 
percentage among the WEU countries where it 
averages 3.9%, compared with 5.4% for NATO 
as a whole. 
3.30. There are 27,000 United States military 
personnel stationed in the United Kingdom, 
mostly United States air force but including 
4,000 navy and 200 army, with 360 aircraft 
based on seven airfields including Mildenhall 
where HQ3 USAF is located, with a further 
three airfields in reserve. There is a United 
States nuclear submarine support facility at 
Holy Loch, and a number of other logistic, 
communications, intelligence and surveillance 
facilities including a BMEWs station', making 
a total of over fifty sites available to the United 
States in peacetime2• 
3.31. The United Kingdom as a full partici-
pant in the 1979 dual decision accepted 
deployment of the first sixteen cruise missiles at 
Greenham Common before the end of 1983, 
out of a total of 160 scheduled for the United 
Kingdom. 
Italy 
3.32. Separated from the other WEU coun-
tries by the neutral countries, Austria and 
Switzerland, and the chain of the Alps, Italian 
forces are committed to Allied Forces Southern 
Europe, the third subordinate command of 
SACEUR, the headquarters of which are 
located in Naples. The nature of the NATO 
southern region is quite different from that of 
the central region: NATO territory in the area 
comprises the four largely isolated landmasses 
of the Iberian peninsula, Italy, Greece and 
Turkey. The land and air threat to these 
countries, most acute in Turkey which has an 
extensive common frontier with the Soviet 
Union, is however less than on the central front 
and declines progressively with the countries 
further to the west. For these various reasons 
integration of forces from different nations is 
l. Statement on the defence estimates 1983 - 1, page 
19, Cmnd. 8951-1. 
2. The Times, 4th November 1983. 
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not practised to the same extent as on the 
central front. 
3.33. Italy's principal roles in ACE are the 
maintenance of a stabilising maritime presence 
in peace and tension, a contribution to the 
control of the air and sea in the Mediterranean 
during hostilities, and defence of the north-
eastern frontier. Given the strategic significance 
of the Mediterranean, the Italian navy is of 
particular importance. It has a wide variety of 
tasks to perform to maintain NATO's defence 
posture within the geographically disparate 
southern region. It is thus a comprehensive 
force which is currently undergoing an extensive 
programme of modernisation. In November 
1983 the Defence Minister announced a plan 
for restructuring and redeploying the Italian 
armed forces to take account of possible threats 
from areas in the Mediterranean other than the 
north-east where a possible land attack by 
Soviet forces has long been the major threat 
considered in defence plans. 
3.34. Italian forces are largely responsible for 
the defence of Italian territory with the 
assistance of the United States forces under the 
terms of the bilateral agreement of January 
1952 with various later editions. The United 
States army has about 1,000 men in the 
Southern European Task Force based in Livorno 
and Vicenza which provide some tactical 
nuclear fire power as well as basic logistics 
support facilities. The United States air force 
has an important base at Aviano in north-east 
Italy from which tactical United States squad-
rons operate on a rotational basis, and an 
airfield at Sigonella in Sicily from which it 
operates Orion maritime patrol aircraft. The 
United States Sixth Fleet has base facilities at 
Catania in Sicily, at Naples and Gaeta, a 
submarine tender to the north-east of Sardinia, 
and its shore headquarters near Naples; it 
would come under the command of AFSOUTH 
in the event of hostilities. Altogether, there are 
some fifty-eight United States military instal-
lations on Italian territory including several 
communications sites and an intelligence gather-
ing facility. 
3.35. In addition to United States support, 
Portugal provides an armoured brigade which 
could serve in north-east Italy in the event of 
hostilities. 
3.36. The NATO military headquarters 
located in Italy, subordinate to AFSOUTH 
already mentioned, are Headquarters Allied Air 
Forces Southern Europe and Headquarters 
Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe, both of 
which co-ordinate allied air and naval forces 
throughout the southern region. The subordinate 
air force headquarters Fifth ATAF located at 
Vicenza and Headquarters Allied Land Forces 
Southern Europe located at Verona are respon-
sible for the land and air defence of Italian 
territory. The NATO NADGE air defence 
radar chain continues down the line of the 
Italian east coast and with Italian air defence 
units provides an essential barrier to Soviet 
aircraft attempting to overfly Yugoslavia and 
Italy to reach the western Mediterranean. 
3.37. As a participant in the 1979 dual 
decision, Italy has already accepted the first 16 
out of the 112 cruise missiles scheduled for 
deployment in Sicily. 
France 
3.38. In 1966 France caused some consterna-
tion in the alliance in announcing its decision to 
withdraw from the integrated military structure; 
and in requiring NATO military headquarters, 
and all allied forces, to leave French territory. 
The North Atlantic Council with its attendant 
(civilian) international staff subsequently 
decided of its own accord to move from France 
to Belgium at the same time. Because the 
French decision gave the impression to the 
uninitiated that France in some way had "left 
NATO", whereas in practice the French 
withdrawal was stated to be only from the 
"integrated military structure" of NATO, this 
section describes in some detail the extent of 
French participation in NATO at the present 
time. The committee notes that, whereas official 
French statements often point out that French 
forces are not "under NATO command", and 
that there is no "automaticity" in any French 
decision to commit French forces to allied 
defence in the event of hostilities, the same in 
fact can be said for all other forces committed 
to NATO because, as pointed out above, they 
do not come under NATO command in 
peacetime and a decision to declare a state of 
alert under which forces would normally pass 
under NATO command requires the unanimous 
decision of the North Atlantic Council or 
Defence Planning Committee, and hence implies 
no "automaticity" for any country. Spain also 
does not participate as yet in the integrated 
military structure, but participates in all 
committees. 
3.39. France continues, of course, to be a full 
participant in the supreme decision-making 
body of NATO - the North Atlantic Council 
- and maintains a full civilian and military 
delegation at NATO headquarters in Brussels. 
It is not, however, a member of the Defence 
Planning Committee, i.e. sessions of the Council 
in which most, but not all, decisions on military 
matters are taken, nor of the Nuclear Planning 
Group or Defence Review Committee. Alto-
gether, France participates in fifteen of the 
eighteen principal committees of the North 
Atlantic Council shown at Appendix II, 
although it attends for only relevant business in 
the Council operations, and in the Military 
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Budget Committee. Although fewer than before 
1966, there are French nationals on the civilian 
international staff, including an Assistant Sec-
retary General and some staff in the Division of 
Defence Planning and Policy which includes 
civil defence. Spanish nationals have not yet 
joined. 
3.40. France continues to participate fully in 
political consultation in the North Atlantic 
Council and the groups of political advisers. 
One important function includes the drawing 
up of an allied position in the various East-
West disarmament negotiations (a subject also 
dealt with by the Ten in the framework of 
European political co-operation). France, how-
ever, has adopted a different attitude to its 
allies on many related issues; alone among 
NATO countries it is not a party to the partial 
test ban treaty, the non-proliferation treaty, and 
has only now decided to accede to the biological 
treaty. France made a comparable multilateral 
declaration in the second case and adopted 
national legislation to ban biological weapons. 
It does not participate in the MBFR negotia-
tions. The way in which NATO communiques 
provide for the special position of France has 
been described in paragraph 3.2 above. 
3.41. France, although technically not a 
member of the Military Committee, maintains 
a military mission to the chairman of that 
committee, headed by a major general who 
attends most meetings in a non-voting capacity. 
Similarly, there are no French officers serving 
on the international military staff or in the· 
various military headquarters of NATO, but 
there are French military missions attached to 
all major NATO headquarters. 
3.42. Although all NATO military head-
quarters were removed from France following 
the 1966 decision, three NATO military 
agencies have remained in the Paris area- the 
Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and 
Development; the Hawk Management Office; 
and the Central Europe Operating Agency 
which operates the NATO pipelines system 
bringing petroleum fuel from Le Havre and 
Marseille to airfields and filling points on the 
central front. Many of the system's fuel storage 
depots and pumping stations are on French 
territory1• 
3.43. While it is understood that France does 
not participate now in the NATO force planning 
review which has been described above, it 
continues to supply NATO statistics on its 
defence effort so that France appears in the 
table of comparative defence statistics published 
1. See the diagram at Annex B to Appendix VII of the 
study on collective logistical support by Lieutenant General 
C.J. Dijkstra (Document 966, 20th December 1983). 
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by NATO each year1• (Spain is not yet replying 
regularly to the questionnaire concerned and 
does not appear in this table.) 
3.44. In 1966 France announced its intention 
not to participate in future NATO infrastruc-
ture projects, but shortly thereafter reversed 
that decision in respect of specific projects that 
continued to be of interest. Accordingly it is 
still a partial participant in certain NATO 
infrastructure programmes, making a propor-
tional contribution to their cost - particularly 
as far as air defence and communications 
installations are concerned, where France par-
ticipates to the extent of receiving information 
but not contributing forces. Prior to 1966 
NATO, multilaterally, and the United States 
and Canada bilaterally, had financed the 
construction or improvement of twenty-nine 
airfields in France of which four are now 
unused and eight are standby fields only. Some 
others are in partial or civilian use. Many 
runways are in disrepair. 
3.45. France remains a full participant in 
certain important military functions in NATO 
including the Conference of National Arma-
ments Directors responsible for discussing the 
joint production of defence equipment, the Air 
Defence Committee, the Senior NATO Logis-
ticians Conference, and Civil Emergency Plan-
ning. When final decisions have to be taken on 
such questions they are therefore handled in 
the North Atlantic Council where France is 
present, rather than in the Defence Planning 
Committee. 
3.46. Although not now committed to NATO, 
France continues to station two divisions of its 
ground forces in Germany, in proximity to the 
French frontier, which do not have forward 
defence positions assigned to them like those 
assigned to the remaining NATO forces since 
"forward defence" was adopted. France, under 
the post-war agreements, maintains a brigade 
in Berlin and reserves the right to participate in 
the peacetime air defence arrangements for 
German airspace referred to in paragraph 3.20 
above. French forces, particularly naval forces, 
still participate selectively in certain NATO 
exercises from time to time, and bilateral 
agreements have been concluded with SACEUR 
and SACLANT concerning certain conditions 
under which French forces might co-operate 
with NATO forces. France is now negotiating 
with Germany concerning logistical support for 
the newly created Force d'action rapide of 
48,000 men which in one role could be rapidly 
deployed to Germany to counter, for example, 
an armoured breakthrough. 
1. See Appendix IV. 
88 
3.47. Like the United Kingdom, France 
retains defence commitments outside the NATO 
area, in particular on the African continent and 
in the Indian Ocean. 
3.48. In conclusion, it should be pointed out 
that although not a party to the 1979 dual 
decision, the present French Government has 
frequently supported the NATO INF decision 
in public, and even the principle of the 
integrated military structure of NATO as it 
applies to other NATO countries. If some 
French territory could again be made available 
for NATO purposes, such as the proposed 
communications zone command2 and the 
NATO-financed airfields, the committee 
believes that allied defences would be greatly 
strengthened. 
(d) Greece and Turkey 
3.49. The committee last visited Greece and 
Turkey in 1981 and reported on the defence 
situation and relations of those countries to 
NATO at the time3 • As in the case of Italy, in 
the defence of these two countries is primarily 
in the hands of their own forces, supplemented 
by United States air forces which operate in 
these countries, largely on a rotational basis 
from other United States bases in Spain, and 
offshore assistance from the United States Sixth 
Fleet. Both countries have bilateral defence 
agreements with the United States which has 
facilities in both countries which include 
airfields, naval bases, communications installa-
tions and intelligence gathering facilities. United 
States nuclear weapons, both for both United 
States forces and for Greek and Turkish forces, 
are stockpiled in each country. As relatively 
poor nations, Greece and Turkey devote 
disproportionately large amounts of their 
national resources to defence spending - 7% 
and 5.3% of their GDPs respectively. The 
Turkish army is the second largest in NATO. 
However, much of their equipment is obsolete 
and badly in need of modernisation. This 
modernisation, however, depends on assistance 
from the more wealthy allies - of whom only 
the United States and Germany provide 
assistance of any note. 
3.50. Greece and Turkey make a vital contri-
bution to the defence of the whole southern 
region in that they block Soviet naval and air 
access to the Mediterranean. The NATO 
NADGE air defence radar chain extends across 
both. Naval passage through the Turkish straits 
is regulated by the Montreux Convention which 
2. See paragraph 2.21 above and Document 966. 
3. European security and the Mediterranean, Rapporteur: 
Mr. Bozzi, Document 876, 4th May 1981. 
is operated by Turkey. The passage of submar-
ines is prohibited except for repair, and advance 
notice has to be given of passage of surface 
units. Thus there is complete NATO surveil-
lance of movements of the Soviet Black Sea 
Fleet into the Mediterranean, and Soviet 
submarines operating there have to come from 
the Soviet Northern or Baltic Fleets. 
3.51. There are two NATO military head-
quarters subordinate to AFSOUTH at Izmir in 
Turkey: Headquarters Allied Land Forces 
South-East Europe, and Headquarters Sixth 
Allied Tactical Air Force. These were originally 
intended for the co-ordination of the land and 
air defence of Greek and Turkish territory, but 
following the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 
1974, Greece withdrew participation. 
3.52. One proposal negotiated by General 
Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 
was for the establishment of separate NATO 
headquarters at Larissa in Greece, to be 
responsible for the co-ordination for air and 
land operations in that country, but as recently 
as February 1984, the great Prime Minister, 
Mr. Papandreo, has stated "we will not set up 
the Larissa headquarters because the danger to 
Greece does not come from the north but from 
the east" 1• 
3.53. The unsatisfactory state of relations 
between Greece and Turkey is a principal 
weakness of NATO arrangements in the area. 
Although withdrawing its forces from NATO 
command in 197 4, Greece returned then and 
resumed participation in NATO on 20th 
October 1980 under an agreement in principle 
which left many details to be settled. Between 
those years Greece and subsequently Turkey 
suspended reporting to NATO on defence 
planning, chiefly in order to prevent the 
information reaching the other country, 
although NATO commanders in person contin-
ued to have some access to Turkish forces. The 
extent of Greek participation in NATO defence 
planning at the present time remains unclear. 
3.54. Since the elections of October 1981 
which brought the Pasok Socialist Party to 
power with Mr. Papandreo as Prime Minister, 
Greece has adopted an individualistic and 
critical attitude in many NATO councils. 
Mr. Papandreo, in his capacity as Minister of 
Defence, attended the ministerial meeting of 
the NATO Defence Planning Committee in 
December 1981 in person; it did not prove 
possible to issue a communique at the end of 
that meeting in the course of which it is 
understood that Mr. Papandreo called for a 
declaration to the effect that NATO would 
I. Atlantic News No. 1598, 15th February 1984. 
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defend member countries in the event of attack 
by other members - a declaration which could 
only have been directed against Turkey. Since 
that date NATO communiques, whether of the 
North Atlantic Council, Defence Planning 
Committee or Nuclear Planning Group, have 
contained footnotes detailing reservations 
expressed by Greece. These have included some 
NATO criticism of Warsaw Pact regimes; 
allegations of the use of chemical weapons by 
the Soviet Union; recommendations concerning 
East-West trade, and energy supplies; and any 
NATO reference to INF negotiations and 
decisions on the deployment of these weapons. 
3.55. Most recently Greece has embarrassed 
NATO countries by calling jointly with 
Romania for a freeze on the deployment of 
nuclear weapons, and took the lead in convening 
the recent Balkans Conference in Athens with 
delegates from Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Romania, 
Greece and Turkey to discuss a nuclear-free 
zone in the Balkans. 
(e) The Iberian peninsula 
Portugal 
3.56. The committee visited Portugal in Octo-
ber 1982 and reported its conclusions at that 
time2. Portugal is in every sense a participant 
in NATO, but being the most remote of the 
European NATO countries from the Soviet 
Union, its contribution to collective defence is 
chiefly to naval operations in the Atlantic and 
the important staging facilities on the Azores in 
mid-Atlantic. Forces from other NATO coun-
tries are not stationed on Portuguese mainland 
territory, but there are United States air force 
detachments at the Lajes air base in the Azores. 
3.57. There is a NATO military headquarters, 
HQ IBERLANT, outside Lisbon which is a 
naval command subordinate to SACLANT, 
responsible for the co-ordination of na,val 
operations in the area off the Portuguese coast 
as far as longitude 22° West, and extending 
eastwards to a point just west of the Straits of 
Gibraltar. The Commander-in-Chief is a Portu-
guese admiral and the headquarters staff is 
provided by Portugal, the United Kingdom and 
the United States, and there is a French 
military mission attached to it. 
3.58. Located at the most westerly point of 
the European landmass, Portugal makes a vital 
contribution to naval operations and maritime 
air control in the area of the very busy north-
south maritime trade route in the Atlantic. 
N A TO-financed infrastructure in Portugal has 
2. Report on the state of European security, Rapporteur: 
Mr. Blaauw, Document 936, 8th November 1982. 
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provided two airfields for maritime patrol 
aircraft, important naval fuel and ammu!litions 
storage facilities, excellent anchorage m the 
large natural harbour at Lisbon, and major 
NATO communications facilities including a 
satellite terminal. The air base at Porto Santo 
in the Madeira Islands is the most southerly 
available to NATO at the present time. 
3.59. The United States has had a basing 
agreement with Portugal, modified in various 
ways since the original executive agreement of 
September 1951, which provides both naval ~nd 
air bases in the Azores, as well as commumca-
tion facilities, radio relays and navigational 
aids. The submarine surveillance facilities 
installed in the Azores are reported to be 
capable of tracking Soviet submarines within a 
thousand mile radius, which includes all 
approaches to the Straits of Gibraltar1• 
3.60. The Portuguese armed forces have 
undergone considerable reorganisation in the 
last eight years. Portugal now provides a mobile 
armoured brigade which can be deployed to 
north-east Italy and has once contributed an 
artillery battery to ACE Mobile Force. Like 
Greece and Turkey, the chief problem facing 
Portugal is that of modernising its equipment, 
and some military assistance is provided by 
other NATO countries. 
3.61. When the committee visited Portugal in 
1982, the formalities of Spanish accession to 
the North Atlantic Treaty had just been 
completed, and discussion had begun on the 
means of incorporating Spain into the integrated 
military structure. The Portuguese authorities, 
both military and political, made it clear that 
they foresaw some difficult problems with any 
reorganisation of the NATO military command 
structure in the area of the Iberian peninsula. 
It was held that Portugal should remain part of 
the SACLANT area, and that Portuguese land 
and air forces should remain under Portuguese 
command, and not form part of any integrated 
command for the Iberian peninsula. It was 
suggested that Spain was essentially a Mediter-
ranean country and should form part of 
SACEUR's area of responsibility. 
Spain 
(i) General 
3.62. Following its first visit to Madrid in 
October 1983, and in view of Spain's recent 
accession to NATO, the committee reports on 
that country in some detail. During its visit, the 
1. Report prepared for the United States House of 
Representatives Sub-Committee on Europe and the Middle 
East "United States military installations and objectives in 
the 'Mediterranean", Congressional Research Service, 
27th March 1977, page 12. 
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committee was fully briefed by senior officials 
of the Foreign Ministry and by senior officers 
of the Defence Policy Staff; it held an 
interesting discussion with members of the 
Foreign Affairs and Defence committees of the 
Congress of Deputies. It did not prove possible 
to meet any ministers, a situation which no 
doubt reflected the difficulty of the Spanish 
Government's present position of having joined 
NATO but not yet having joined the integrated 
military structure, and being committed even-
tually to holding a referendum on continued 
membership. 
3.63. By the time General Franco died in 
November 1975, Spain had become an ally of 
the United States . and had a preferential 
agreement with the EEC but had been refused 
accession. With democracy and King Juan 
Carlos I's liberal monarchy, during the period 
of centrist governments, the general lines of 
Spain's previous external policy were pursued, 
with renewed approaches to the European 
Community. Even before the restoration of 
democracy the defence agreement with the 
United States had been replaced in January 
1976 with a full treaty of friendship and co-
operation, which inter alia required the removal 
of nuclear weapons and the nuclear submarine 
base from Spanish territory. 
(ii) External priorities of the socialist govern-
ment 
3.64. Following the November elections, Mr. 
Felipe Gonzalez, leader of the Spanish Socialist 
Party, was elected Prime Minister by the 
Congress of Deputies on 1st December 1982 by 
207 votes to 116 with 21 abstentions. 
3.65. Accession to the European Community 
remains a priority of the Gonzalez government, 
but it is pursuing active policies in many fields. 
Relations with the Maghreb and Latin America 
remain important. On 20th April 1983 his 
government ratified the bilateral defence agree-
ment with the United States2 negotiated by the 
previous government with an additional protocol 
providing that Spain's membership of NATO, 
referred to in the agreement, must be taken as 
meaning adherence to the Washington Treaty 
but not to the military structure. Any change 
in Spain's status vis-a-vis NATO would be a 
reason for revising the agreement. According to 
the protocol, either of the parties may ask for 
the agreement to be revised whenever it wishes. 
In Bonn on 3rd May 1983, Mr. Gonzalez for 
the first time expressed his support for the 
NATO twofold decision on Euromissiles. 
(iii) Accession to the North Atlantic Treaty 
2. Described in paragraph 3.94 below. 
3.66. As soon as he came to office in February 
1981, but particularly after an attempted putsch 
in June 1981, the then Prime Minister, 
Mr. Calvo Sotelo (UCD - Union del Centro 
Democratico), showed his desire to speed up the 
process of Spain's accession to NATO which 
had hitherto been linked to the negotiations 
with the United Kingdom on Gibraltar and 
Spain's entry to the EEC. He ran into opposition 
from the socialist and communist parties, which 
called for a referendum on the subject. 
3.67. On 30th August 1981 the Spanish 
Government set in motion parliamentary pro-
cedure for obtaining permission to join NATO. 
The then Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Mr. Jose Perez Llorca, said in an interview in 
the daily newspaper Diario 16 that accession, 
"crowning the process of democratic transition", 
could be effected in two stages, the first being 
Spain's accession to NATO as a member and 
the second the integration of Spanish armed 
forces into the military co-operation system. 
The minister also underlined that Spain's 
Atlantic commitment would in no way change 
its position towards Israel or the Arab countries 
and that it did not imply acceptance of the 
deployment of nuclear weapons on Spanish 
territory (a prior condition which removed a 
major argument of those who were against 
accession). 
3.68. For the socialists, Mr. Felipe Gonzalez 
said in an interview in Politique Etrangere (No. 
3, October 1982): 
"Let us be clear: we wish to encourage the 
proposal for joint European defence. This 
trend already exists in all Spanish 
political and social forces as it does in all 
the other western countries. It is admittedly 
difficult to bring about in the immediate 
future but it is an aim which must be 
attained. We are convinced that it is 
perfectly compatible with an external 
policy in which top priority is given to the 
defence of our frontiers against any 
aggression from without. Spanish socialists 
are true Europeans . .. In parallel, if the 
contents of the bilateral agreements 
between Spain and the United States in 
the future meet the criteria of equality 
which should govern all relations between 
sovereign states, the Spanish socialist party 
will maintain Spain's military alliance with 
the United States while obviously seeking 
the conclusion of defence agreements with 
its neighbours in Western Europe. Our 
accession to the treaty will therefore be 
submitted to the people by referendum for 
its approval ... " 
3.69. On 29th October 1981, the Spanish 
Congress of Deputies voted in favour of Spain's 
accession to NATO by 186 votes to 146 (there 
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being 350 seats in the Congress). The UCD 
deputies in power and the conservative and 
regional parties voted for and the socialists, 
communists and independents against. The 
Senate approved the proposed accession of 
Spain to the North Atlantic Treaty in Novem-
ber 1981. 
3.70. Ratification by NATO countries was 
completed on 29th May 1982. The last 
signature was that of the President of Portugal, 
Mr. Eanes. Portuguese deputies' fears that 
Portugal might lose its role in Allied Command 
Atlantic (ACLANT) to Spain had been allayed 
by the fact that the Portuguese ratification law 
authorised only accession to the North Atlantic 
Treaty. Spain's integration into the NATO 
military structure cannot fail to raise questions 
about Portugal's place in the NATO command 
structure, etc. 
(iv) The extent of Spanish participation in 
NATO 
3.71. Since 30th May 1982, Spain has been a 
full party to the North Atlantic Treaty. It 
attends meetings of the North Atlantic Council, 
the Defence Planning Committee, the Military 
Committee and, as an observer, the Nuclear 
Planning Group. Generally speaking, Spain also 
takes part in meetings of all the many Council 
committees. It is also a full member of the 
non-NATO bodies IEPG (by decision of 
Mr. Gonzalez' government) and Eurogroup (of 
which France is not a member). Since 
May 1983, Spanish deputies have been attend-
ing the North Atlantic Assembly. 
3.72. The progress of discussions from July to 
October 1982 on the integration of Spain into 
the NATO military structure has not been 
made public. According to the Spanish daily 
paper, El Pais', Spain and NATO had reached 
agreement on the military status of Gibraltar. 
Spain was believed to have obtained responsi-
bility for commanding a strategic area stretch-
ing from the Canaries to the Balearics, of which 
Gibraltar would be the central point. In this 
framework, NATO would create a new regional 
command, entrusted to Spain. The Gibraltar 
naval command would remain wholly British or 
become a joint Spanish-British command, but 
be subject to the new Spanish regional 
command. NATO was believed to have refused 
a Spanish request for a new major NATO 
command for Spain, additional to the three 
existing commands (SACEUR, SACLANT, 
CINCHAN). 
3.73. The Spanish Government announced in 
parliament that membership of NATO would 
not require nuclear weapons to be stationed on 
1. October 1983. 
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its territory in peacetime. The position of 
Denmark and Norway on this subject has been 
described above. 
3.74. As soon as the socialist government took 
office on 1st December 1982, the negotiations 
on Spain's integration into the NATO military 
structure were frozen, but Spain's full partici-
pation in the various NATO organs has not 
changed. Spain's special position has however 
been specified in NATO communiques since 
then. For instance, in the communique issued 
after the Defence Planning Committee's minis-
terial meeting on 2nd June 1983: 
"The Spanish Minister of Defence informed 
the Defence Planning Committee of the 
present state of the review that the Spanish 
Government is undertaking, regarding its 
participation in the alliance, pending which 
he reserved his government's position on 
the communique. At the same time, 
however, the Spanish Minister stated that 
his government shares in the communique 
insofar as it may reflect positions in the 
relations of Spain with the member 
countries of the alliance." 
3.75. It remains to determine what responsi-
bilities Spain will assume in NATO, in 
exchange for advantages enjoyed by it through 
its participation in all N A TO's steering bodies. 
(v) Will.there be a referendum? 
3.76. Before the October 1982 elections the 
Spanish socialist party committed itself to the 
principle of a referendum on Spain's continued 
membership of NATO. In his speech of 
investiture as Prime Minister on 
2nd December 1982, Mr. Gonzalez said Spain 
had suspended all discussions about military 
integration in NATO. At a press conference on 
16th March 1983, moreover, he said it would 
be inappropriate at the present time to hold a 
referendum on Spain's membership of NATO 
and that Spain would not change its attitude 
towards NATO or upset the balance as long as 
the atmosphere of international tension per-
sisted. According to a statement from a Spanish 
diplomatic source on 29th December 1983, the 
referendum promised during the socialist elec-
toral campaign is to be held before the end of 
the current legislature, i.e. before the end of 
19861• 
3. 77. Opinion polls conducted in Spain to date 
show there is still very strong hostility towards 
NATO, for three reasons: 
(i) Spain's traditional · isolationism, the 
country having remained neutral in two 
I. Atlantic News No. 1586, 29th December 1983. 
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world wars; this political and geograph-
ical isolationism is illustrated by hostil-
ity towards accession to the military 
alliance, although all Spaniards feel 
very close to the western world; 
(ii) the problem of Spain's accession to the 
Common Market. It is very difficult to 
ask the Spaniards to join an alliance 
they do not like while keeping them 
out of th.e group of European countries 
which ·they have been wanting to join 
for a long time. The Spanish Govern-
ment was very disappointed by the 
ten-power summit meeting in Athens; 
(iii) the question of Gibraltar, which is 
regarded by most Spaniards as Spanish 
territory. 
3.78. From its visit to Spain, the committee 
gathered the impression that the present 
Spanish Government did not regard either 
accession to the European Community or a 
solution to the Gibraltar problem to be prior 
conditions for continued membership of NATO, 
which would be judged solely in terms of its 
benefits for Spanish defence. The two questions, 
however, would be bound to have a major 
impact on a referendum. The present timetable 
for negotiations should permit agreements on 
Spanish accession to the European Community 
to take effect on 1st January 1986. One 
possibility is that a referendum on membership 
of NATO would then be organised later that 
year, possibly in association with parliamentary 
elections that autumn. 
3.79. Since October 1982, it is understood that 
a small Spanish team has continued to discuss 
with the NATO secretariat and the other 
countries possible terms of participation. It is 
believed that Spain is not considering a non-
integrated status such as that of France. On 
the other hand, there is a Spanish view that the 
present NATO military structure is outdated, 
and in any case unsuited to the special needs of 
Spain, which is far removed from immediate 
Soviet threat; on this view some quite special 
arrangement for participation should be made 
to suit the circumstances of the country. This 
approach however is not acceptable in NATO 
circles, which point out that the NATO 
structure and procedures have been constantly 
modified to meet changing circumstances, and 
that Spain can certainly be accommodated 
within them. 
3.80. In February 1984, the press carried 
some details of a report on the attitude of the 
Spanish armed forces towards the expediency 
of a referendum and, above all, on Spain's 
integration in NAT02• The report prepared by 
2. The Times, 9th February 1984. 
General Eduardo Munilla, head of the Minis-
try's defence planning unit, brought out the 
advantages of Spain's presence as an observer 
on the NATO Military Committee in Brussels: 
"If we withdrew from NATO, the lost benefits 
in information and planning ... would create a 
void for the armed forces impossible to fill." 
This report also specified that the other NATO 
countries: "do not appear disposed to substitute 
the multilateral treaty with a series of bilateral 
agreements with Spain if our full integration 
has not been achieved beforehand." In view of 
world and European problems, the report 
therefore suggested postponing the referendum. 
(vi) The Spanish armed forces 
3.81. The Spanish armed forces are equipped 
largely with United States, French and locally 
produced equipment, some under licence. Con-
siderable modernisation remains necessary and 
Spain, like Greece, Portugal and Turkey, 
continues to need some allied assistance, 
although its GDP per capita ($4,620) is higher 
than those countries ($3,640, $2,361 and $1,170 
respectively). 
3.82. Improvements have been made in the 
last five years with a larger proportion of the 
defence budget devoted to equipment and 
operations, less to personnel as the dispropor-
tionate size of the army is reduced. The number 
of exercises has been increased. 
3.83. The navy is generally considered to be 
the most modem of the three Spanish services 
and would be the most valuable addition to 
NATO forces in the event of integration in 
NATO. It has adopted standard NATO 
procedure, signals and codes and taken part in 
numerous exercises with the fleets of NATO 
countries (United States, France and Italy). 
There are 54,000 personnel including marines. 
Vessels include one ASM aircraft-carrier (the 
Dedalo) laid down in October 1979 and 
commissioned in 1982-83, eight submarines: 
one of the Agosta class {1973-81), two of the 
Daphne class (the first, laid down in 1968, was 
commissioned in 1971 and the last, laid down 
in 1971, was commissioned in 1975) and three 
of the Guppy-H-A class (which date back to 
the forties); twelve destroyers: two Roger de 
Lauria class (1951-69/1951-70), five Fletcher 
class and five Gearing class (dating back to the 
forties), twenty frigates, of which those of the 
Descubierta and Baleares classes are relatively 
more modem than those of the Audaz, Atrevida, 
Pizzaro and Alava classes. 
3.84. The army numbers 260,000 including 
190,000 conscripts. Its equipment, apart from 
some 500 largely obsolete M-47E and M-48 
tanks, comprises 210 AMX-30 tanks assembled 
in Spain under French licence. 
93 
DOCUMENT 971 
3.85. The air force, with 33,000 personnel, has 
been undergoing modernisation which should be 
completed in the eighties, by which time it 
should have 144 aircraft: seventy-two Mirage 
F-1, which entered service in 1975, plus 
seventy-two F-18A and eight Orion maritime 
patrol. There are at present thirty-six F-4s, 
twenty-one Mirage Ills and thirty-five F-5s in 
service with the Mirage F-1 and two Orions. 
3.86. The socialist government seems prepared 
to make a considerable effort by relaunching 
investment in public firms in the armaments 
sector and by procuring modem equipment. 
Mr. Felipe Gonzalez has said Spain's security 
and independence were worth more than the 
2% of GNP now being spent on defence. 
(vii) Military reforms 
3.87. Under General Franco the three Spanish 
armed services were organised in separate 
departments each under a chief-of-staff, co-
ordinated through the Alto Estado Mayor, but 
with no central ministry of defence. The army 
was deployed largely with a view to internal 
security, and defence of Spanish territory in 
Africa. 
3.88. Limited reforms were introduced by the 
first democratic governments including the 
creation of a Ministry of Defence, first under 
General Gutierrez Mellado, who was appointed 
Deputy Prime Minister in charge of military 
affairs, and subsequently under civilian minis-
ters of defence, but the independent authority 
of the three service chiefs-of-staff did not 
appear to have been greatly reduced. A law of 
1980 instituted a National Defence Council 
under the chairmanship of the King, of which 
the members were the Prime Minister and eight 
other ministers, the chairman of the joint 
chiefs-of-staff and the three service chiefs-of-
staff, empowered to advise the government on 
defence matters; command was still exercised 
by the Chiefs-of-Staff Committee (JUJEM), 
directly responsible to the King. The plan 
"META" would have reduced somewhat the 
size of the army and redeployed forces in 
accordance with a joint services defence plan. 
3.89. The present Minister of Defence, 
Mr. Narcis Serra, presented plans for reform to 
the Congress of Deputies on 17th November 
1983, making the JUJEM directly responsible 
to the government through a chief-of-defence 
staff (JEMAD), created in place of the 
President of the Chiefs-of-Staff Committee, as 
the direct link between the Minister of Defence 
and the chiefs-of-staff. The changes received 
broad political support in parliament and were 
commended by the King in his traditional 
Epiphany address to the armed forces on 
6th January 1984. They were implemented on 
11th January with the appointment of 
DOCUMENT 971 
Admiral Lucini as Chief of Defence Staff - the 
first time a naval officer has held the most 
senior appointment in the armed forces - and 
three new service chiefs-of-staff including Lt. 
General Jose Santos Peralba as chief-of-staff of 
the Air Force. General Peralba is expected to 
succeed to the top post in a year's time when 
Admiral Lucini retires; in his former capacity 
as head of the recently-created Defence Policy 
Division of the Ministry of Defence, he received 
the committee during its visit to Madrid. 
3.90. On 24th February 1983, Mr. Narcis 
Serra had already announced modernisation 
plans for the armed forces, more far-reaching 
than those of his predecessors, which include a 
reduction in the size of the army by 90,000 
men, a reduction of military service from fifteen 
to twelve months (approved by parliament on 
27th March), a new territorial organisation with 
redeployment of military units, and a reduction 
of military regions from nine to six, improved 
pay, training and equipment, with the emphasis 
on more production of equipment by Spanish 
industry. 
(viii) The new Spanish-United States agreement 
3.91. One month after Spain's accession to 
the North Atlantic Treaty, a new agreement of 
friendship, defence and co-operation was signed 
in Madrid on 2nd July 1982 by the then 
Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs and the 
United States Ambassador in Spain. This 
agreement replaced the earlier 1976 agreement 
which had expired on 21st September 1981 and 
had been prolonged for eight months. The 
socialist government ratified it in April 1983 
with the addition of a protocol described in 
paragraph 3.62 above. 
3.92. The agreement was negotiated in the 
light of the consolidation of the democratic 
regime in Spain, and the accession of Spain to 
the North Atlantic Treaty with a view to 
integration in NATO. As specified in the 
agreement proper, Spanish-United States co-
operation is based on common views on the 
democratic system, the defence of human rights, 
justice and social progress. It hinges on respect 
for the sovereignty of each party in a 
relationship of equality between the two 
countries and within a multilateral alliance. The 
preamble also underlines that the full territorial 
integrity of Spain and the United States is 
linked with western security. 
3.93. The new agreement abolishes the com-
bined United States-Spanish command head-
quarters (which included areas of NATO 
commands in the western Mediterranean 
(SACEUR) and the Atlantic (SACLANT 
provided for in the earlier one, because these 
functions were thenceforth to be performed by 
the integrated NATO command structure. 
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3.94. Annex 2 provides that the United States 
continue to use support installations on Spanish 
territory, consisting of the Rota naval base (on 
the south coast), the air bases at Torrejon (in 
the centre), Saragossa (north-east of Madrid) 
and Moron (in the south) and nine other 
smaller communications and navigation instal-
lations scattered throughout the country. For 
the first time in bilateral relations, arrangements 
for overftying and using Spanish airspace is 
covered by a guarantee of Spanish control. The 
new agreement maintains Spanish policy of 
excluding nuclear weapons for Spanish territory. 
3.95. The new agreement pays attention to 
the need to maintain an advanced technological 
capacity for the North Atlantic Alliance, 
particularly in respect of the parties to this 
agreement and to reinforcing competition on a 
reciprocal basis and facilitating interoperability 
between items manufactured in Spain and those 
originating in the United States and other 
NATO countries, thanks to defence production 
plans which can be carried out unilaterally by 
Spain or jointly with the United States or 
multilaterally with one or more alliance coun-
tries. For the first year, $400 million of United 
States aid was allocated by an exchange of 
notes (an increase of 234% as compared with 
the earlier treaty) and $3 million for military 
training (an increase of 50%). 
(ix) Agreement with France 
3.96. The Spanish Minister of Defence signed 
a military co-operation agreement in Paris on 
7th October 1983 providing for joint develop-
ment and production of defence equipment, and 
for the exchange of military personnel and joint 
training. 
(x) Agreement on the European combat aircraft 
3.97. On 16th December 1983, the Spanish, 
French, Italian, United Kingdom and Federal 
German chiefs-of-staff signed an agreement on 
the preliminary plans for a European combat 
aircraft for the nineties, to be built jointly at an 
estimated unit cost of about $22 million. 
(j) Gibraltar 
3.98. The committee has reported on the 
stategic importance of Gibraltar from time to 
time, in its various reports on the Mediterranean 
- most recently in 1981 1• Gibraltar is a rocky 
peninsula attached to the Spanish mainland, 
located just east of the narrowest point of the 
Straits of Gibraltar. It lies within 18 nautical 
miles of the Moroccan coast. Less than 6 
1. European security and the Mediterranean, Rapporteur: 
Mr. Bozzi, Document 876, 4th May 1981. 
square kilometres in area, mostly steep rock, 
Gibraltar has a civilian population of some 
30,500 comprising 20,000 native-born Gibral-
tarians and over 7,000 other British subjects. It 
was the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht that ceded to 
Britain "the town and castle of Gibraltar, 
together with the port, fortifications and forts". 
The territory was declared a British Crown 
Colony in 1830 and became an important naval 
base in the two world wars. From 1950 onwards 
a series of constitutional reforms were made, 
leading to internal self-government. The present 
constitution of 1969 reserves to the Governor, 
as personal representative of the Queen, direct 
responsibility for defence, external affairs, 
internal security and ultimate responsibility for 
financial and economic stability. In the 1984 
elections, the "Gibraltar Labour Party and 
Association for Advancement of Civil Rights" 
party of Sir Joshua Hassan, who has been Chief 
Minister with one three-year interuption since 
1964, was returned to power, but the former 
opposition party, favouring integration with the 
United Kingdom, was replaced as opposition 
party by the Gibraltar Socialist Labour Party 
which is trade union based. About 60 to 65% of 
the Gibraltar GNP of £65 million is accounted 
for by British Government defence and other 
spending, but the naval dockyard is being closed 
at the end of 1984. The yard's continued 
operation as a private commercial yard with 
some initial British assistance is important for 
the future economy of Gibraltar. 
3.99. While Spain does not apparently chal-
lenge the validity of the Treaty of Utrecht, 
successive governments have campaigned to 
"re-establish the territorial integrity of Spain" 
through the return of Gibraltar to Spanish 
sovereignty. In December 1965 the United 
Nations General Assembly called upon Britain 
and Spain to begin talks which duly began in 
1966 but made little progress. A referendum in 
Gibraltar in 1967, with 96% of the electorate 
voting, showed 12,138 in favour of retaining the 
link with Britain and 44 in favour of a change 
to Spanish sovereignty. Successive British 
governments have undertaken not to transfer 
sovereignty over Gibraltar against the freely-
expressed wishes of the inhabitants. After a 
series of restrictions the Spanish authorities 
completely closed the frontier with Gibraltar in 
1969. According to the Anglo-Spanish joint 
statement issued in Lisbon on 1Oth April 1982, 
both governments then agreed inter alia on "the 
re-establishment of direct communications in 
the area" and that "future co-operation should 
be on the basis of reciprocity and full equality 
of rights". The frontier was reopened in 
December 1982 only for Gibraltar residents and 
Spanish nationals, and only for pedestrians. The 
airfield, mentioned in paragraph 3.100 below, is 
operated by the RAF but is used as a vital link 
by civilian airlines. It has suffered from severe 
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airspace restrictions affecting take-off and 
landing since Spanish airspace was closed to 
aircraft entering or leaving Gibraltar. 
3.100. Gibraltar, as a dependent European 
territory of the United Kingdom, has automat-
ically been a member of the European 
Community since 1973, although the common 
tariff, CAP and VAT, do not apply. If the 
accession of Spain to the European Community 
takes effect as planned at the beginning of 
1986, Gibraltar's economic interests will need 
to be taken into account under the terms of the 
seven-year interim period, chiefly because the 
cost of living in Gibraltar is very much higher 
than in the immediately contiguous area of 
Spain, and Gibraltar could not, for economic 
reasons, grant immediately full mobility to daily 
migrant labour from Spain. Equal rights for 
Spaniards in Gibraltar remain, however, one of 
the prior claims of the Spanish Government in 
its negotiations with the United Kingdom; the 
transfer of sovereignty itself being now a less 
immediate issue, in part because of the 
implications that would have for the Spanish 
enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla on the North 
African coast, where Spain h,as garrisons of 
some 8,000 and 11,000 respectively. Both of 
these are claimed by Morocco. 
3.101. The United Kingdom maintains one 
infantry battalion and some artillery in Gibral-
tar, supported by the locally-raised volunteer 
Gibraltar regiment. The historical role of this 
force, to defend the territory against any threat 
from Spain, is becoming anomalous now that 
Spain is a democracy, has acceded to NATO, 
and is negotiating its accession to the European 
Community. 
3.102. Britian also maintains a naval base and 
headquarters in Gibraltar under an admiral, 
Flag Officer Gibraltar, which has been kept 
busy during the last two years as a popular and 
convenient port of call for vessels of the Royal 
Navy en route particularly to the South 
Atlantic, or the Far East, but the guard ship 
previously based in Gibraltar has been with-
drawn to the United Kingdom where it is 
available at short notice. This national naval 
headquarters becomes a NATO naval command 
when activated during exercises or an emerg-
ency, when the British admiral assumes the 
functions of Commander Gibraltar Mediterra-
nean, immediately under Commander Naval 
Forces Mediterranean in Naples who in turn 
comes under Commander-in-Chief Southern 
Europe, also based in Naples. Some infrastruc-
ture in Gibraltar has been financed by NATO, 
including a satellite terminal and other import-
ant communications facilities and the part 
funding of an oil fuel jetty. The wartime 
fortifications have been adapted by the United 
Kingdom and provide a strongly-protected 
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operations room, as well as fuel storage and 
ammunition magazines. Gibraltar makes an 
important contribution to NATO through 
continuous surveillance of all shipping passing 
the straits, which are an important natural 
choke point, but underwater surveillance of 
submarines is supplemented from other more 
distant installations available to NATO because 
the water in the straits themselves are "noisy" 
to sonar. 
3.103. The Royal Air Force maintains the 
airfield in Gibraltar which is built on the 
isthmus connecting the rock to the mainland, 
on the Gibraltar side of the boundary fence, 
but on what Spain claims is "neutral ground" 
not covered by the Treaty of Utrecht. The 
station commander is, unusually, an air com-
modore who, when Gibraltar is activated as a 
NATO command, becomes Commander Mari-
time Air Forces Gibraltar, reflecting the 
contribution the airfield makes to maritime air 
surveillance of the Mediterranean. The com-
mand comes immediately under the maritime 
air command subordinate to COMARSOUTH 
in Naples. It has been suggested that the 
Gibraltar title should be changed to Comman-
der Air Gibraltar to reflect also an air defence 
role. The United Kingdom does not maintain a 
permanent squadron in Gibraltar, but there are 
usually two Jaguar fighter aircraft on rotation 
from the United Kingdom, largely for the same 
deterrent purposes as the ground forces main-
tained in Gibraltar. They also provide useful 
close photographic surveillance of Soviet naval 
ships passing through the straits. British 
maritime air surveillance Nimrods also operate 
out of Gibraltar from time to time. 
3.104. Ships and aircraft from various other 
NATO countries including Canada, the Neth-
erlands and the United States operate out of 
Gibraltar during NATO exercises, and vessels 
from Italy, the United Kingdom and the United 
States are earmarked for the command in the 
event of hostilities. 
3.105. The future military role of Gibraltar in 
NATO will obviously be affected if and when 
the Spanish forces are integrated into NATO, 
but the importance of Gibraltar itself will 
remain. The nearest Spanish naval base is some 
60 miles from the straits themselves at Cadiz, 
in close proximity to the United States naval 
and air base at Rota. One possibility is that a 
Spanish admiral might be responsible for a 
NATO western Mediterranean command with 
a subordinate British admiral retaining the 
Gibraltar command with its western boundary 
moved somewhat further west in the Atlantic to 
the line of the Portuguese frontier. But the 
military position of Gibraltar cannot be isolated 
from the political and economic situation of the 
territory. 
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IV. Intermediate-range nuclear forces 
4.1. The committee reported in detail on the 
status of the INF question in its last report 
adopted on 7th November 1983 1• The following 
paragraphs bring that information up to date. 
The committee intends to report fully on this 
issue for the second part of the session. 
4.2. The week before the committee's previous 
report was adopted, the NATO Nuclear 
Planning Group had announced its decision 
taken at Montebello in Canada to withdraw 
I ,400 nuclear warheads during the next few 
years. Taken together with the withdrawal of 
I ,000 warheads announced in connection with 
the 1979 dual decision, this made a total 
reduction of 2,400 to be effected over several 
years, a reduction which would not be affected 
by the forthcoming deployment of Pershing 11 
and cruise missiles in Europe in respect of 
which one further warhead would be withdrawn 
for each new one deployed. 
4.3. In an important vote in the United 
Kingdom House of Commons on 31st October 
1983, the government policy to deploy cruise 
missiles in the United Kingdom was approved 
by 362 votes to 218, and the first cruise missiles 
arrived at the Greenham Common base in the 
United Kingdom on 14th November. The press 
has reported a total of sixteen arriving in the 
United Kingdom out of the total of 160 to be 
deployed there under the 1979 decision. On 
22nd November the Bundestag voted in favour 
of deployment of missiles in Germany by 286 
votes to 226 with I abstention. 
4.4. On 14th November, Mr. Nitze, the 
United States representative to the INF talks 
in Geneva, had made a final offer to accept a 
global ceiling on nuclear warheads on 
intermediate-range missiles of 420 - which 
would have limited the Soviet Union to 140 
SS-20 missiles with three warheads each, and 
reduced planned NATO INF deployment from 
572 to 420. The previous day, the Soviet 
Delegate, Mr. Kvitsinsky, is reported to have 
proposed informally that a proposal for "equal 
reductions of 572" warheads on each side in 
range of Europe would be acceptable to the 
Soviet Union - this would have permitted the 
Soviet Union to retain 120 SS-20s in range of 
Europe as well as others in the Far East. 
Following deployment of missiles in the United 
Kingdom, Mr. Kvitsinsky walked out of the 
INF negotiations on 23rd November, stating 
"the present round of negotiations has been 
discontinued and no date has been set for a 
resumption". 
1. European security and burden-sharing in the alliance, 
Document 959, Rapporteur: Mr. Wilkinson. 
4.5. On 23rd November, Pershing 11 missiles 
began to arrive at the Ramstein airbase in 
Germany and were taken to their deployment 
place at Mutlangen, near Stuttgart. On 
27th November, the Italian Foreign Minister 
announced the arrival of the first cruise missiles 
at the Sigonella air base in Sicily from which 
they were transferred to their permanent base 
at Comiso in March 1984 when they were 
declared operational. Altogether, it was under-
stood that by the end of 1983, sixteen cruise 
missiles had been deployed in both Italy and 
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the United Kingdom, and nine Pershing lis in 
Germany. 
4.6. The press reported further arrivals of 
cruise missiles at Greenham Common in the 
United Kingdom on 5th April 19841 and the 
total deployment schedule under the 1979 
decision is understood to be as follows2: 
l. The Guardian, 6th April 1984. 
2. Based on an article in the International Herald 
Tribune, 24th November 1983. 
NATO INF deployment schedule 
Country Base Pershing 11 Cruise missiles Dates 
Belgium Florennes -
Germany Mutlangen 36 
Heilbronn 36 
Neu Ulm 36 
Bitburg -
Italy Comiso -
Netherlands Woensdrecht -
United Kingdom Greenham 
Common -
Molesworth -
Totals 108 
4.7. Since the NATO deployment of missiles 
began, the Soviet Union has abandoned the 
moratorium on the construction of new bases 
for SS-20 missiles in range of Europe announced 
by Mr. Brezhnev in March 1982. The NATO 
Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) communiques 
of 23rd March and 28th October 1983 both 
referred to a total of 351 SS-20 missiles 
deployed with 1,053 warheads. Of these missiles, 
243 were reported to be within range of Europe. 
The NPG communique of 7th April 1984 
reports a total of 378 SS-20 launchers, 
comprising 1,134 warheads, with more bases, 
east and west of the Ural mountains, under 
construction, adding: "There are indications 
that the Soviet Union, for the first time, has 
taken steps to deploy forward SS-12/22 missiles 
in the German Democratic Republic and 
Czechoslovakia". The official ministerial figures 
for numbers of SS-20 warheads deployed do 
not confirm the claim made by SACEUR when 
addressing the Assembly on 7th June 1983 
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when he said: "There are over 2,100 SS-20 
warheads deployed ... There is a second missile 
deployed at the launcher site ... There is some 
uncertainty whether there may be three missiles 
deployed at each launcher ... ". SACEUR's 
figures prompted written question 235 put to 
the Council on 13th September 1983 which 
elicited the reply from the Council, communi-
cated to the Assembly only on 7th February 
1984: "The figures of SS-20 warheads given by 
NATO normally encompass only warheads on 
launchers, if not specifically stated as being 
otherwise. However, SS-20 launchers can be 
reloaded and the systems operational concept 
envisages reload missiles in its operational 
units". The Council's reply did not confirm the 
existence of a second missile at a launcher site. 
4.8. As a basis for resuming INF discussions, 
the Soviet Union has continued to demand 
withdrawal of the NATO missiles already 
deployed. This was most recently confirmed by 
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the new Soviet leader, Mr. Chernenko in an 
interview published in Pravda on 9th April: 
"There is no need to convince us about the 
usefulness of dialogue, the usefulness of talks. 
The moment the United States and the other 
NATO countries who are acting at one with it 
take measures to restore the situation that had 
existed before the deployment of the new 
American missiles in Western Europe was 
started, the Soviet Union will not be found 
wanting. Such is the real road to negotiations." 
The statement was regarded as moderate in 
that it did not repeat statements made by his 
predecessor, Mr. Andropov, such as that read 
on Soviet television on 24th November, to the 
effect that in response to the NATO deploy-
ments the Soviet Union would deploy "corre-
sponding" systems in "oceans and seas" and 
take "further measures". The official NATO 
position, reaffirmed in the NPG communique of 
7th April, remains the same: "Ministers ... 
emphasised NATO's determination to continue 
the deployment of LRINF missiles as scheduled. 
At the same time, they repeated their willing-
ness to reverse, halt or modify deployment -
including the removal and dismantling of 
missiles already deployed - upon the achieve-
ment of a balanced, equitable and verifiable 
agreement calling for such actions." 
4.9. Mr. Vreven, Belgian Minister of Defence, 
reported to parliament on 4th May 1984 that 
United States technicians had begun prepara-
tions for deployment of cruise missiles at the 
Florennes site in Belgium. The Netherlands 
parliament is due to vote on the situation 
probably in June before construction begins at 
the Woensdrecht base in the Netherlands, 
where deployment is scheduled for 1986. 
V. Conclusions 
5.1. The committee's chief conclusions are set 
forth in the draft recommendation which 
reiterates the need for collective formulation of 
defence policy by the European allies. The 
committee deals in another report with defence 
consultation in WEU, but here stresses the vital 
importance of close consultation with all the 
European allies especially those of the flanks. 
5.2. The Soviet Union held the largest yet 
naval exercise off the Norwegian coast at the 
end of March. On 26th March Denmark 
reported the first movement of vessels from the 
Baltic fleet; on 28th March aircraft from 
Norway sighte~ vessels west of the Lofoten 
islands. NATO sources reported some fifty 
aircraft and one hundred vessels altogether 
from the Northern and Baltic fleets, including 
more than twenty submarines and thirty combat 
vessels led by the nuclear-powered cruiser 
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Kirov. While SACLANT claimed to be sur-
prised at the size of the exercise, British 
ministers pointed out that NATO systems had 
provided full warning of the movements. This 
illustrates the extreme importance of the flank 
countries Denmark and Norway from where 
first observations came. NATO could report the 
numbers of submarines taking part thanks to 
the submarine surveillance networks operating 
from these two countries, mentioned in Chapter 
Ill. ·It should be pointed out, in passing, that 
the Soviet exercise, albeit the largest yet, was 
smaller than the NATO naval exercise "Team-
work 84" held off the Norwegian coast from 
28th February to 22nd March this year. Under 
the command of SACLANT it involved 400,000 
men, 160 ships and submarines, and 300 
aircraft from nine countries; members of the 
committee were invited to observe it; the Soviet 
Union under the terms of the Helsinki 
confidence-building measures, was invited to 
observe the land phase of the exercise. 
5.3. The report describes the structure of 
NATO in some detail in Chapter 11, and in 
paragraphs 2.12 et seq. makes detailed proposals 
both for improving efficiency and for "Euro-
peanising" NATO, so that its civil and military 
institutions and its policy and strategy, more 
properly reflect the European view of defence 
requirements. It is pointed out that European 
countries now contribute 65 to 75% of the 
NATO ready forces in Europe. These practical 
proposals are set forth in paragraph 1 of the 
recommendation. The committee does not 
endorse the proposals recently put forward by 
Mr. Henry Kissinger, the former United States 
Secretary of State1, for SACEUR to be a 
European and for the Secretary-General of 
NATO to be an American. The last thing 
Europeans would welcome would be for consul-
tation in NATO to be thought to lead to an 
automatic endorsement of United States foreign 
policy. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
remains a most important symbol of the United 
States commitment to Europe, to which the 
recommendation pays tribute. The committee's 
proposals, it believes, are more practical. 
5.4. Paragraph 2 of the recommendation is 
more generally worded. The committee intends 
to stress here the need, once NATO has come 
to reflect European views more effectively, for 
a greater solidarity to be expressed in NATO 
communiques. In particular, there are too many 
expressions of dissent on the part of several 
countries as pointed out in paragraphs 3.2 and 
3.3 above. Spain is in a special position 
described in Chapter Ill (e), which the 
committee believes should be clarified by the 
l. A plan to reshape NATO, article in Time, 5th March 
1984, and widely publicised in the press. 
assumption of the full responsibilities of NATO 
membership by that country, once the problem 
of accession to the European Community has 
been overcome. 
5.5. Paragraph 3 of the recommendation 
draws attention to the important and critical 
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study on logistics described in Chapter 11 (b) 
above. 
5.6. Lastly, in paragraph 4 of the recommen-
dation the committee calls for urgent remedial 
action concerning the aircraft identification 
problem described in the section on air forces 
in the central region in Chapter Ill above. 
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Comparison of certain articles of the North Atlantic and modified Brussels Treaties 
(headings added) 
North Atlantic Treaty 
Collective defence capacity 
ARTICLE 3 
In order more effectively to achieve the 
objectives of this treaty, the parties, separately 
and jointly, by means of continuous and 
effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain 
and develop their individual and collective 
capacity to resist armed attack. 
Casus fcederis 
ARTICLE 5 
The parties agree that an armed attack 
against one or more of them in Europe or North 
America shall be considered an attack against 
them all, and consequently they agree that, if 
such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in 
exercise of the right of individual or collective 
self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the 
Charter of the United Nations, will assist the 
party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, 
individually, and in concert with the other 
parties, such action as it deems necessary, 
including the use of armed force, to restore and 
maintain the security of the North Atlantic 
area ... 
ARTICLE 61 
For the purpose of Article 5, an armed 
attack on one or more of the parties is deemed 
to include an armed attack 
- on the territory of any of the parties in 
Europe or North America, on the Alge-
rian Departments of France2, on the 
territory of Turkey or on the islands 
under the jurisdiction of any of the parties 
in the North Atlantic area north of the 
Tropic of Cancer ; 
1. As amended by Article 2 of the Protocol to the North 
Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey 
2. On 16th January 1963, the French Representative 
made a statement to the North Atlantic Council on the 
effects of the independence of Algeria on certain aspects of 
the North Atlantic Treaty. The Council noted that insofar 
as the former Algerian Departments of France were 
concerned the relevant clauses of this treaty had become 
inapplicable as from 3rd July 1962. 
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Modified Brussels Treaty 
No specific provision. 
ARTICLE V 
If any of the high contracting parties should 
be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the 
other high contracting parties will, in accor-
dance with the provisions of Article 51 of the 
Charter of the United Nations, afford the party 
so attacked all the military and other aid and 
assistance in their power. 
APPENDIX I 
- on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of 
the parties, when in or over these 
territories or any area in Europe in which 
occupation forces of any of the parties 
were stationed on the date when the 
treaty entered into force or the Mediter-
ranean Sea or the North Atlantic area 
north of the Tropic of Cancer. 
Consultation 
ARTICLE 4 
The parties will consult together whenever, 
in the opinion of any of them, the territorial 
integrity, political independence or security of 
any of the parties is threatened. 
Co-operation between the organisations 
Reference in paragraphs 3 and 14 of the 
Resolution of the North Atlantic Council of 
22nd October 1954. 
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ARTICLE VIII 
3. At the request of any of the high 
contracting parties the Council shall be imme-
diately convened in order to permit them to 
consult with regard to any situation which may 
constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area 
this threat should arise, or a danger to economic 
stability. 
ARTICLE IV 
In the execution of the treaty, the h,igh 
contracting parties and any organs established 
by them under the treaty shall work in close 
co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation. 
Recognising the undesirability of duplicating 
the military staffs of NATO, the Council and 
its Agency will rely on the appropriate military 
authorities of NATO for information and advice 
on military matters. 
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Principal committees of the North Atlantic Council 
NUCLEAR DEFENCE 
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE ~ NUCLEAR PLANNING 
DEFENCE PLANNING COMMITTEE GROUP 
I I I I I I 
POLITICAL CONFERENCE 
COMMITTEES OF NATIONAL SENIOR NATO" 
(AT SENIOR AND ECONOMICS DEFENCE REVIEW ARMAMENTS LOGISTICIANS SECURITY 
REGULAR LEVELS) COMMITTEE COMMITTEE DIRECTORS CONFERENCE COMMITTEE 
I I I 1 J I 
SENIOR CIVIL NATO JOINT COMMITTEE COMMITTEE 
EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS ON THE CHALLENGES ON INFORMA TlON 
PLANNING ELECTRONICS INFRASTRUCTURE SCIENCE OF MODERN AND CULTURAL 
COMMITTEE COMMITTEE COMMITTEE COMMITTEE SOCIETY RELATIONS 
I l I 1 
COMMITTEE FOR COUNCIL 
NATO EUROPEAN OPERATIONS CIVIL AND 
AIR DEFENCE C.C.I.S. AND A.D.P.- AIRSPACE AND EXERCISES MIUTARY BUDGET 
COMMITTEE COORDINATION COMMITTEE 
• The SNLC os a joint civllfmllrtary commonee which repons both to the Council or Defence Plannong Commmee and to the Military Commmee. 
•• Command, Control and lnformatoon Systems and Automatic Oata-Processong Commmee 
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APPENDIX Ill 
APPENDIX Ill 
NATO two-year force planning cycle 
Military Committee appreciation of situation 
facing alliance over next five years 
~ 
Ministers assess economic and political 
factors and issue guidance 
~ 
Major NATO commanders then prepare 
force proposals for each country 
~ 
Examined by Military Committee and 
Defence Review Committee 
~ 
Defence Planning Committee approves 
force goals for each country 
~ 
Countries formulate country force and financial plans 
~ 
Reconciliation of goals and plans by international 
staffs and Defence Review Committee 
~ 
Defence Planning Committee recommends 
NATO force plans 
~ 
Adopted by ministers, the NATO force plan 
is the basis for national de~nce planning for 
five-year period, and is a firm commitment of forces 
for first year 
In 1980s, a longer-term defence planning procedure 
was to be introduced. 
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Country 
(0) 
-
Belgium . . . . ............ . .. 
France (c) ... . . . . . . . - ...... 
Germany .................. 
Italy ...... ' ............... 
Luxembourg .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
United Kingdom ............ 
TOTAL WEU . . . . . . . . . . 
Canada .................... 
Denmark ...... . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Greece . . . . ... . .. . . . . . . . . 
Norway ....... ..... . . . . . . . 
Portugal ....... . . . . ' ....... 
Turkey ........ . . . . ' ... . . . . 
United States .. ... . . . . . . . ... 
TOTAL NON-WEU ..... 
TOTAL NATO (d) ...... 
COMPARATIVE TABLE OF DEFENCE EFFORT 1979-1983 
A. FINANCIAL EFFORT 
APPENDIX IV 
National currency unit Defence expenditure (national currency, Defence expenditure GDP in purchasers' values Population (thousand) Defence expenditure as % of Defence expenditure ~r head Defence expenditure as % of total WEU current prices) (current prices - US $ million) a (current prices - US $ million) a b GDP in purchasers' values (current prices - U $) a 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 f 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 f 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 e 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 e 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 f 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 f 1979 1980 
(I) (- 5) (- 4) (- 3) (- 2) (- I} (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) ( 15) ( 16) (17) (18) ( 19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) 
Million B. Frs. 106,472 115,754 125,689 132,127 137,163 3,632 3,958 3,385 2,892 2,829 111,125 119,325 97,369 84,745 83,905 9,837 9,847 9,852 9,856 9,870 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.4 3.4 369 402 344 293 287 4.37 4.01 
Million F. Frs. 96,439 111,672 129,708 148,021 164,248 22,668 26,425 23,867 22,522 22,880 574,053 654,345 571,537 540,090 541,203 53,478 53,714 53,963 54,219 54,382 3.9 4.0 4.2 4.2 4.2 424 492 442 415 421 27.28 26.76 
Million DM 45,415 48,518 52,193 54,234 57,131 24,778 26,692 23,094 22,350 23,354 759,715 814,805 683,159 660,372 680,737 59,454 59,667 59,790 59,753 59,538 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.4 417 447 386 374 392 29.82 27.03 
Milliard Lire 6,468 8,203 9,868 12,294 14,729 7,785 9,578 8,681 9,090 10,239 325,187 395,497 350,215 347,355 371,724 56,292 56,416 56,502 56,639 56,843 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.8 138 170 154 160 180 9.37 9.70 
Million L. Frs. 1,242 1,534 1,715 1,893 2,100 42 52 46 41 43 4,211 4,630 3,887 3,310 3,319 364 365 366 366 366 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 115 142 126 112 117 0.05 0.05 
Million Guilders 10,106 10,476 11,296 11,921 12,302 5,038 5,269 4,527 4,464 4,510 157,507 169,358 141,592 137,593 137,025 14,038 14,150 14,247 14,310 14,344 3.2 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.3 359 372 318 312 314 6.06 5.34 
Million £ Sterling 9,029 11.510 12,144 13,849 16,090 19,155 26,776 24,627 24,242 24,841 409,354 524,671 502,349 472,182 446,022 55,946 56,010 56,020 56,010 56,021 4.7 5.1 4.9 5.1 5.6 342 478 440 433 443 23.05 27.11 
83,098 98,750 88,227 85,601 88,696 2,341,152 2,682,631 2,350,108 2,245,647 2,263,940 249,409 250,169 250,740 251,153 251,364 3.5 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.9 333 395 352 341 353 100.00 100.00 
Million C.$ 4,825 5,499 6,289 7,655 8,388 4,119 4,703 5,245 6,205 6,824 228,146 254,946 284,289 290,884 321,065 23,791 24,086 24,365 24,625 24,982 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.1 2.1 173 195 215 252 273 4.96 4.76 
Million D. Kr. 7,990 9,117 10,301 11,669 - 1,519 1,618 1,446 1,400 - 65,937 66,490 58,234 56,380 58,671 5,117 5,125 5,122 5,119 5,119 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.5 - 297 316 282 273 - 1.83 1.64 
Million Drachmas 89,791 96,975 142,865 176,270 212,768 2,424 2,276 2,578 2,639 2,541 38,575 40,127 36,875 37,691 35,958 9,548 9,642 9,730 9,792 9,862 6.3 5.7 7.0 7.0 7.1 254 236 265 270 258 2.92 2.30 
Million N. Kr. 7,362 8,242 9,468 10,956 12,078 1,454 1,669 1,650 1,698 1,692 47.129 57,711 57,244 56,176 54,979 4,073 4,087 4,100 4,116 4,123 3.1 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.1 357 408 402 413 410 1.75 1.69 
Million Escudos 34,343 43,440 51.917 63,817 79,021 702 868 844 803 817 20,262 24,757 24,312 23,716 23,894 9,863 9,905 9,970 10,030 10,158 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.4 71 88 85 80 80 0.84 0.88 
Million L. 93,268 185,656 313,067 447,790 556,738 3,001 2,442 2,815 2,755 2,761 69,366 56,918 57,683 52,472 56,177 43,741 44,737 45,747 46,788 47,859 4.3 4.3 4.9 5.3 4.9 69 55 62 59 58 3.61 2.47 
Million US$ 122,279 143,981 169,888 196,345 225,345 122,279 143,981 169,888 196,345 225,345 2,382,221 2,598,960 2,906,265 3,025,422 3,271,994 225,055 227,704 229,849 232,057 234,262 5.1 5.5 5.8 6.5 6.9 543 632 739 846 962 147.15 145.80 
135,498 157,556 184,466 211,845 241,380(e) 2,851,636 3,099,909 3,424,902 3,542,741 3,822,738 321,188 325,286 328,883 332,527 336,365 4.8 5.1 5.4 6.0 6.3 (e) 422 484 561 637 718 (e) 163.06 159.55 
218,596 256,306 272,693 297,446 330,076(e) 5,192,788 5,782,540 5,775,010 5,788,388 6,086,678 570,597 575,455 579,623 583,680 587,729 4.2 4.4 4.7 5.1 5.4 (e) 383 445 470 510 562 (e) 263.06 259.55 
Note a: GDP and defence expenditures are calculated in national currency and converted to United States $ at the rates shown below. Figures in columns (I) to (10) and (21) to (30) are affected by change in exchange rates and are not therefore always comparable between countries, whereas figures of defence expenditures as% of GDP in columns ( 16) to (20) 
do not invol•·e currencyconversion. 
For the period 1979-1983 the following rates of exchange have been applied: 
Country Unit US$ per unit Units per US $ Country 
Belgium and Luxem- Franc 
bourg Fed. Rep. of Germany 
- 1979 0.03411 29.31898 - 1979 
- 1980 0.03420 29.24302 - 1980 
- 1981 0.02693 37.13096 - 1981 
- 1982 0.02189 45.69110 - 1982 
- 1983 0.02063 48.47897 - 1983 
Canada Canadian Dollar Greece 
- 1979 0.85368 1.17140 - 1979 
- 1980 0.85521 1.16930 - 1980 
- 1981 0.83410 1.19890 - 1981 
- 1982 0.81057 1.23370 - 1982 
- 1983 0.81356 1.22917 - 1983 
Denmark D. Krone Italy 
- 1979 0.19008 5.26100 - 1979 
- 1980 0.17743 5.63590 - 1980 
- 1981 0.14038 7.12342 - 1981 
- 1982 0.12001 8.33243 - 1982 
- 1983 0.11498 8.69724 - 1983 
France Franc Netherlands 
- 1979 0.23505 4.25450 - 1979 
- 1980 0.23663 - 4.22601 - 1980 
- 1981 0.18401 5.43461 - 1981 
- 1982 0.15215 6.57242 - 1982 
- 1983 0.13930 7.17865 - 1983 
Note b: GDP (p.v.) = Gross domestic product in purchasers' values, current prices. 
Note c: France is a· member of the alliance without belonging to the integrated military structure; the relevant figures are indicative only. 
Note d: The corresponding statistical data for Spain are not available. 
e = Preliminary estimate. 
f = Forecast. 
Source: Defence expenditures (NATO definition), from NATO press release M-DPC-2(83)28. 
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Unit 
Deutschmark 
Drachma 
1.000 Lire 
Guilder 
US$ per unit Units per US $ Country Unit US$ per unit Units per US $ 
Norway N. Krone 
0.54558 1.83290 - 1979 0.19747 5.06411 
0.55015 1.81770 - 1980 0.20246 4.93920 
0.44248 2.26000 - 1981 0.17423 5.73951 
0.41210 2.42660 - 1982 0.15494 6.45399 
0.40878 2.44629 - 1983 0.14006 7.13980 
Portugal Escudo 
0.02700 37.03800 - 1979 0.02044 48.92296 
0.02346 42.61703 - 1980 0.01998 50.06208 
0.01805 55.40811 - 1981 0.01625 61.54604 
0.01497 66.80294 - 1982 0.01258 79.47294 
0.01194 83.72475 - 1983 0.01035 96.66319 
Turkey T. Lira 
1.20351 0.83090 
- 1979 0.03218 31.08003 
1.16754 0.85650 - 1980 0.01315 76.03984 
0.87966 1.13680 - 1981 0.00899 111.21998 
0.73937 1.35250 
- 1982 0.00615 162.55009 
0.69519 1.43847 - 1983 0.00496 201.62998 
United Kingdom £ 
0.49850 2.00600 - 1979 2.12160 0.47134 
0.50299 1.98810 
- 1980 2.32630 0.42987 
0.40077 2.49520 - 1981 2.02790 0.49312 
0.37450 2.67020 - 1982 1.75050 0.57127 
0.36657 2.72797 - 1983 1.54390 0.64771 
1981 1982 1983 f 
(28) (29) (30) 
3.84 3.38 3.19 
27.05 26.31 25.80 
26.18 26.11 26.33 
9.84 10.62 11.54 
0.05 0.05 0.05 
5.13 5.21 5.08 
27.91 28.32 28.01 
100.00 100.00 100.00 
5.94 7.25 7.69 
1.64 1.64 -
2.92 3.08 2.86 
1.87 1.98 1.91 
0.96 0.94 0.92 
3.19 3.22 3.11 
192.56 229.37 254.06 
209.08 247.48 272.14 (e) 
309.08 347.48 372.14 (e, 
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B. MANPOWER EFFORT - 1983 
Period of compulsory' Total in armed forces2 Total armed forces
2 
military service 
military personnel (military and civilian) (months) (thousands) as percentage 
(e) of active population Army Navy Air force (e) 
Belgium 103 103 103 111 2.7 
France 124 124 124 585 3.1 
Germany 15 15 15 515 2.4 
Italy 12 18 12 580 2.4 
Luxembourg voluntary 1 0.9 
Netherlands 14-16 14-17 14-17 112 2.4 
United Kingdom voluntary 321 2.1 
ToTAL WEU 2,225 2.3 
Canada voluntary 84 1.0 
Denmark 9 9 9 31 1.6 
Greece 22 26 24 214 5.7 
Norway 12 15 15 43 2.5 
Portugal 16 24 21-24 103 2.2 
Turkey 20 20 20 694 4.6 
United States voluntary 2,294 2.9 
TOTAL NON-WEU 3,463 2.9 
TOTAL NATO 5,688 2.6 
Sources: 
1. IISS, Military Balance, 1983-84. 
2. NATO press release M-DPC-2(83)28. 
3. Eight months if served in Germany. 
4. Eighteen months for overseas. 
e =estimate 
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APPENDIX V 
NATO military command structure 
(showing detail of Allied Command Europe only) 
Brussels 
MILITARY COMMITTEE 
MC 
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY STAFF 
IMS 
I 
I 
SUPREME ALLIED 
COMMANDER 
ATLANTIC 
(SACLANT) 
Norfolk USA 
r~ 
SHAPE TECHNICAL Shape 
SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE 
(SACEUR) 
SACLANT 
ANTI-SUBMARINE 
WARFARE 
RESEARCH CENTRE 
(SACLANTCEN) 
CENTRE - CssteBu BB/g1um (STC) 1-----------------=---1 
The Hague DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE LB Spszla ltBiy 
.----------------------
1 
I 
I 
COMMANDER" 
NAEW 
FORCE 
SHAPE 
CIIStBBu Belgwm 
COMMANDER-
IN-CHIEF 
ALLIED FORCES 
NORTHERN EUROPE 
Ko/sAs Norway 
COMMANDER 
ALLIED FORCES 
SOUTH NORWAY 
COMMANDER 
ALLIED FORCES 
NORTH NORWAY 
Oslo Norway Bodo Norway 
COMMANDER 
ALLIED FORCES 
BALTIC 
APPROACHES 
Ksrup Denmark 
I 
COMMANDER-
IN-CHIEF 
ALLIED FORCES 
CENTRAL EUROPE 
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I 
COMMANDER 
NORTHERN 
ARMY GROUP 
COMMANDER 
ALLIED AIR FORCES 
CENTRAL EUROPE 
COMMANDER 
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gledbiJch of Germany 
Fed Rep 
Ramstem of Germany 
Secken- Fed Rep 
he1m of Germany 
r 
COMMANDER 
2nd ALLIED 
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AIR FORCE 
Mdnchen- Fed Rep 
gledbiJch of Germany 
I 
COMMANDER 
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AIR FORCE 
Fed Rep 
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I 
ALLIED 
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I 
CANADA US 
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Arlington USA 
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ALLIED FORCES 
SOUTHERN EUROPE 
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COMMANDER 
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FORCES SOUTHERN 
EUROPE 
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Senior staff of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) by rank, nationality and service 
SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE (SACEUR) 
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SACEUR 
Supreme Allied Commander General USA 
Executive to SACEUR Brig General USA International Affairs 
Asst Exec, Analysis, Lt Col USA Minister-Counsellor USCV 
Research & Co-ordination Major UKA Deputy Lt Col US AF 
Capt US A Admin asst SFC USA 
Asst Exec, Scheduling Major US AF Secretary Mrs uscv 
Aide de Camp Major USA 
Admin Asst to SACEUR CW3 USA 
Secretary Mrs BE CIV 
Admin Section SFC USA 
DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER 
(DSACEUR) (DSACEUR) 
Deputy Supreme Air Chief Deputy Supreme General 
Allied Commander (UK) Marshal UKAF Allied Commander (GE) (DR) GEA 
Principal staff officer Gp Cpt UKAF Principal staff officer Capt GEN 
Executive officer Lt Col UKA Special asst Lt Col USAF 
Aide de camp FltLt UKAF Special asst Major GEAF 
Staff asst (Programme) WOI UKA Aide de camp CPT GEAF 
Personal Asst Sgt UKAF Chief admin clerk Sgm GEA 
11 .. 
SACEUR'S REPRESENTATIVE 
TO MC (SACEUREP) 
OFFICE OF THE LEGAL CHIEF-OF-STAFF (COFS) PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE (PlO) 
ADVISOR SACEUR rep to MC Maj NLA 
Chief-of-Staff General US AF Chief Col USA Gen 
Leg adv Or BECV Prin Staff Officer /Exec Colonel US AF Deputy Col BEA Deputy SACEUREP Col UKA 
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ACE 
AFCENT 
AFNORTH 
AFSOUTH 
ASG 
CEOA 
CEPS 
CINCENT 
CINCH AN 
CINCNORTH 
CINCSOUTH 
CNAD 
COMCENTAG 
COMMZ 
COMNORTHAG 
COSCOM 
DPC 
EUROCOM 
EUROGROUP 
EUROLAND 
EUROLOG 
FASCOM 
FIN A BEL 
FSS 
IAU 
IFF 
IMS 
LAND JUT 
LCB 
LCC 
LOC 
MAS 
MC 
MNC 
APPENDIX VII 
List of acronyms 
Allied Command Europe 
Allied Forces Central Europe 
Allied Forces Northern Europe 
Allied Forces Southern Europe 
Assistant Secretary-General 
Central Europe Operating Agency 
Central Europe Pipeline System 
Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Europe 
Commander-in-Chief Channel 
Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Northern Europe 
Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe 
Conference of National Armaments Directors 
Commander Central Army Group 
Communications Zone 
Commander Northern Army Group 
Corps Support Command 
Defence Planning Committee 
Eurogroup subgroup on battlefield communications 
APPENDIX VII 
Title given to meetings of defence ministers of European allied countries 
(minus France) 
Eurogroup subgroup on co-operation on aircraft approach and landing systems 
Subgroup on co-operation in providing logistic support for NATO-declared 
European forces 
Field Army Support Command 
France, Italy, Netherlands, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg (and now the 
United Kingdom) conference of chiefs of army staff to discuss materiel and 
logistics 
Forward Storage Sites 
Infrastructure Accounting Unit 
Identification Friend or Foe 
International Military Staff 
Allied Land Forces Jutland 
Logistics Control Board 
Logistic Co-ordinating Centre 
Lines of Communication 
Military Agency for Standardisation 
Military Committee· (of NATO) 
Major NATO Commander (SACEUR ; SACLANT ; CINCHAN) 
108 
APPENDIX VII DOCUMENT 971 
--- --------------------------------------------------------------------
MNCC 
NAC 
NADGE 
NAMSA 
NAMSO 
NAMSS 
NATO 
NICS 
NLSC 
PAPS 
PSC 
RCA 
SAC 
SACEUR 
SACLANT 
SATCOM 
SCE PC 
SHAPE 
SNLC 
STANAG 
WEU 
Multinational Co-ordinating Centre 
North Atlantic Council 
NATO Air Defence Ground Environment 
NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency 
NATO Maintenance and Supply Organisation 
NATO Maintenance Supply Services System 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NATO Integrated Communications System 
National Logistic Support Command 
Periodic Armaments Planning System 
Principal Subordinate Commander (COMNORTHAG, etc.) 
Rear Combat Zone 
(WEU) Standing Armaments Committee 
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe 
Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic 
Satellite Communications 
Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee 
Supreme J-Ieadquarters Allied Powers Europe 
Senior NATO Logisticians Conference 
Standardisation Agreement 
Western European Union 
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Introductory Note 
In preparing this report the Rapporteur had interviews as follows: 
14th-17th March 1984 
Conference on Disarmament in Europe, Stockholm: 
H.E. Mr. Aleksander Bozovic, Ambassador, Head of the Yugoslav Delegation; 
H.E. Mr. Petrus Buwalda, Ambassador, Head of the Netherlands Delegation; 
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Mr. B.S. Ivanov, Member of the Soviet Union Delegation, and Mr. E.S. Yolk, Expert; 
H.E. Mr. J.M. Edes, Ambassador, Head of the United Kingdom Delegation; 
H.E. Dr. Klaus Citron, Ambassador, Head of the Federal Republic of Germany Delegation; 
H.E. Mr. Wlodzimierz Konarski, Ambassador, Head of the Polish Delegation, and Dr. Andrzej 
Towpik; 
H.E. Mr. Curt Lidgard, Ambassador, Head of the Swedish Delegation; 
H.E. Mr. Jan af Sillen, Ambassador, Executive Secretary to the Conference; 
H.E. Mr. Jacques Lecompt, Ambassador, Head of the French Delegation; 
H.E. Mr. Constantin Ene, Ambassador, Head of the Romanian Delegation; 
H.E. Mr. James Goodby, Ambassador, Chairman of the United States Delegation, and Dr. Lynn 
Hansen, Deputy Chairman. 
The committee as a whole met at the seat of the Assembly, Paris, on 14th February 1984, when 
Lt. General C.J. Dijkstra presented his study on collective logistical support, and the committee met 
subsequently with the WEU Standing Armaments Committee, attended by: Lt. Colonel de Winne 
(Belgium); Lt. Colonel Binet (Belgium); Mr. Marcoin (France); Mr. Schreiber (Germany); 
Colonel Pochesci (Italy); Mr. Zweerts (Netherlands); and Mr. Davies (United Kingdom). 
Subsequently, at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 8th and 9th March 1984 the committee 
met with members of the parliamentary defence committees of the European NATO countries: 
Belgium: Mr. Yves du Monceau de Bergendal, Second Vice-Chairman, National Defence Committee, 
the Senat; 
France: Mr. Louis Darinot, Chairman, MM. Robert Aumont and Jean Combasteil, Vice-Chairmen, 
Defence Committee, Assemblee Nationale; 
Germany: Dr. H. Schwarz, Vice-Chairman, MM. Karl-Eduard Claussen and Wolfgang Kahrs, 
Defence Committee, Bundesrat; 
Italy: MM. Steganini and Baracetti, Vice-Chairmen, Defence Committee, Camera dei Deputati; 
Netherlands: Drs. Y.P.W. van der Werff, Chairman, Defence Committee, First Chamber of the 
States-General; 
United Kingdom: Sir Humphrey Atkins, KCMG, Chairman, MM. Douglas and Mates, Select 
Committee on Defence, House of Commons; 
Norway: MM. Ole Fr. Klemsdal and Bjorn Erling Ytterhorn, Defence Committee, Stortinget. 
The meeting was briefed by: Mr. Eric Da Rin, Deputy Secretary-General of NATO; Lt. 
General T. Huitfeldt, Norwegian Army, Director of the International Military Staff; Dr. Fredo 
Dannenbring, NATO Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs; and Ing. Gen. P. Naslin, 
Head of the Defence Research Section, NATO International Staff. 
The committee met finally at the seat of the Assembly in Paris on 15th May 1984 when it 
adopted the present report. 
The committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the ministers, members of parliament, 
officials, senior officers and experts who received the Rapporteur or met the committee and replied 
to questions. 
The views expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee. 
111 
DOCUMENT 972 
Draft Recommendation 
on the control of arlllllments and disarlllllment 
The Assembly," 
(i) Concerned at the deterioration in the atmosphere of East-West relations, aggravated by the lack 
of personal contact between the superpowers at a time of change or prospective change in the 
leadership, and at the suspension of negotiations in three fields of arms control: a comprehensive 
nuclear test ban, INF, and START; 
(ii) Believing that all the more importance now attaches to the three remaining disarmament 
conferences in Geneva, Stockholm and Vienna, in all of which there is prospect of agreement in due 
course; 
(iii) Calling on member governments to take the initiative in these fields of primary interest to 
Europe by injecting a sense of urgency into the negotiations, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Urge upon member governments the need: 
1. To draft a joint, solemn declaration setting out their aims in the control of armaments and 
disarmament and to call on the superpowers to resume without delay negotiations which have been 
interrupted or to stimulate discussion when they take place; 
2. To take every initiative in seeking to restore confidence in East-West relations, as a precondition 
of any arms control agreement, by promoting personal contact at the highest level between member 
governments and the new Soviet and other eastern bloc leaderships; 
3. To study the possibility of concluding interim agreements this year in the conference on 
disarmament in Europe and mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations based on the common 
elements in present eastern and western proposals and taking account of the importance of 
verification measures. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(sllbmined by Mr. de Vries, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1.1. In adopting its programme of work on 
30th November 1983, since approved by the 
Presidential Committee, the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments decided 
that the present report should deal first with 
the conference on security and co-operation in 
Europe, and the current conference on 
confidence- and security-building measures and 
disarmament in Europe, known more briefly in 
the West as the conference on disarmament in 
Europe (CDE) which held its first session in 
Stockholm from 17th January to 16th March 
this year. The report is to deal secondly with 
the mutual and balanced force reduction 
negotiations in Geneva, which are now in their 
tenth year. 
1.2. Other topical aspects of arms control 
negotiations are for the most part dealt with by 
the committee in other reports. In particular 
the present status of the INF talks is dealt with 
in the report on the state of European security', 
while the committee has it in mind to prepare 
a further report on the control of armaments 
and disarmament for the second part of the 
session in December, which would deal in 
particular with the control of nuclear weapons, 
the INF and START negotiations, and other 
negotiations in the United Nations disarmament 
conference framework such as the prohibition 
of chemical weapons; the suspension of nuclear 
tests; and a ban on weapons in space, etc. 
11. General situation 
2.1. The general atmosphere of East-West 
relations has deteriorated since the active period 
of detente in the 1970s, which saw the 
conclusion of a number of arms control 
agreements, both bilateral between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, and multilateral 
agreements such as the biological weapons 
convention. The reasons for this deterioration, 
in the western view, include: the unabated 
increase in the Soviet defence effort, particularly 
weapons systems; the invasion of Mganistan; 
and the indirect suppression of basic human 
rights in Poland. 
2.2. At the same time, the Soviet Union 
perceives a lack of any genuine desire in the 
l. Rapporteur: Sir Dudley Smith, Document 971. 
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West, or at least on the part of the present 
United States administration, to conclude 
further agreements on arms controls. As 
evidence, the Soviet Union can point to the fact 
that the United States has failed to ratify the 
last three bilateral arms control agreements 
signed by Mr. Brezhnev with three successive 
United States presidents, both republicans and 
democrats. These agreements are: the threshold 
test ban treaty, signed by Presidents Nixon and 
Brezhnev on 3rd July 1974; the peaceful nuclear 
explosions treaty, signed by Presidents Ford and 
Brezhnev on 28th May 1976; and SALT 11, 
signed by Presidents Carter and Brezhnev on 
18th June 1979. The United States has decided 
that it will not resume the trilateral negotiations 
(Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States) 
on a comprehensive nuclear test ban, suspended 
since the last year of the Carter administration. 
While the United States has hitherto stated 
that although it will not ratify the SALT 11 
agreement, it will continue, for the time being, 
to respect the SALT limits, provided the Soviet 
Union does the same, it has now stated that it 
will decide in 1985 whether to cease to observe 
the two SALT treaties and possibly to withdraw 
from the ABM treaty; it is not prepared to 
consider arms control measures to prohibit 
weapons in space. 
2.3. This is an unpropitious background for 
current negotiations. The situation is further 
complicated by the two successive changes at 
short interval in the leadership of the Soviet 
Union, and the presidential election year in the 
United States. Indeed, in retrospect it appears 
that the minimum mutual confidence between 
the United States and Soviet leadership that is 
needed for any far-reaching agreements has not 
been re-established since the period of Presi-
dents Nixon and Brezhnev, which ended with 
the former's resignation from office on 
8th August 1974. 
2.4. The suspension of the bilateral INF and 
START talks, largely a consequence of the lack 
of East-West confidence, make all the more 
important the only three conferences where 
today representatives of both NATO and 
Warsaw Pact countries meet to discuss various 
aspects of arms control. These conferences are 
the CDE in Stockholm, the MBFR in Vienna, 
both of which are discussed in the present 
report, and the conference on disarmament in 
Geneva, which the committee will discuss in a 
future report. 
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Ill. The conference on disarmament in Europe 
(a) Background 
3.1. Under the final act of the Helsinki 
conference signed on 1st August 1975, partici-
pating countries agreed on certain confidence-
building measures which included: prior notifi-
cation of major military manoeuvres exceeding 
25,000 troops taking place on their territory in 
Europe or - in the case of the Soviet Union and 
Turkey - within 250 km of frontiers common to 
other participants. Notification was to be 
twenty-one days in advance, or at the earliest 
opportunity in the case of manoeuvres arranged 
at short notice. Countries "may also notify 
smaller-scale military manoeuvres to other 
participating states, with special regard for 
those near the area of such manoeuvres". In 
addition, "the participating states will invite 
other participating states, voluntarily and on a 
bilateral basis ... to send observers to attend 
military manoeuvres". Lastly, countries "recog-
nise that they may, at their own discretion ... 
notify their major military movements". 
3.2. The Helsinki final act is to be regarded 
more as a declaration of intent than a binding 
international agreement such as would be 
incorporated in a treaty or convention. More-
over, the language in which these various 
confidence-building measures are formulated 
deliberately expresses varying degrees of obli-
gation ranging from "will notify" major military 
manoeuvres, through "may also notify" smaller 
manoeuvres, and "voluntarily and on a bilateral 
basis" for the invitation to observers, to 
"recognise that they may, at their own 
discretion" notify major military movements. 
3.3. The record of implementation of these 
confidence-building measures so far is shown in 
the tables at Appendix I. This record shows a 
clear pattern. Both Warsaw Pact and NATO 
countries have duly notified their major man-
oeuvres ("major" is here used to denote a 
category of manoeuvres involving more than 
25,000 men), the greater frequency of notifi-
cation by NATO countries reflects only the 
larger number of manoeuvres conducted by 
them. On the other hand, NATO countries 
have been far more generous in inviting 
observers to nineteen out of twenty-two major 
exercises, than has the Warsaw Pact inviting 
observers to only eight out of seventeen major 
exercises, and not inviting observers from 
NATO countries to any exercises since 1979. 
Moreover, invitations from Warsaw Pact coun-
tries have mostly been extended to neighbouring 
countries only, whereas NATO and neutral or 
non-aligned countries have tended to address 
invitations to all participants. Observers from 
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NATO countries have found the facilities 
provided for observation to be largely inade-
quate. No country has provided any notification 
of major military movements. 
3.4. Within the rather severe limitations of 
the Helsinki final act, it can be said that the 
confidence-building measures have been 
respected, more in the letter than in the spirit, 
all major military manoeuvres having been duly 
reported with the possible exception of the 
Soviet Zapad-81 exercise, notification of which 
by the Soviet Union did not apparently include 
notification of its size. It was the largest exercise 
conducted by any Warsaw Pact country since 
1975 - 100,000 men was later reported by 
Tass1• 
French proposals of 1978 
3.5. In May 1978 at the special session on 
disarmament of the United Nations General 
Assembly, President Giscard d'Estaing of 
France presented a number of disarmament 
proposals, including one for a conference on 
disarmament in Europe. The French proposals 
were for the conference to deal with the 
geographical area extending from the Atlantic 
to the Urals; to exclude nuclear and naval 
forces; and to proceed in two phases - the first 
to deal with confidence-building measures, the 
second with force reductions. It was later agreed 
that a mandate for a CDE should be sought in 
the Madrid CSCE follow-up conference which 
opened on 22nd November 1980. The French 
proposals met with some scepticism at first, 
both from NATO countries, particularly the 
active participants in the Vienna MBFR 
negotiations, and inevitably from the Warsaw 
Pact countries. Subsequently, however, agree-
ment has been reached within NATO on a 
collective approach to the proposed conference, 
open to all thirty-five participants in the CSCE, 
which does not conflict with the MBFR 
negotiations seeking actual force reductions on 
the territory of only some seven countries. 
(b) Mandate for the conference 
3.6. In the CSCE framework, at the Madrid 
review conference, agreement was finally 
reached between the participating NATO, 
Warsaw Pact and neutral and non-aligned 
1. For a careful examination of implementation of 
confidence-building measures under the Helsinki final act 
see "Confidence-building measures: a conceptual frame-
work", J.J. Hoist in "Confidence-building measures and 
East-West relations", The Laxenburg Papers, published by 
the Austrian Institute for International Affairs, Karl 
Birnbaum Editor, March 1983, and "European security and 
confidence-building measures", J.J. Hoist and K.A. Melan-
der in Survival, July/ August 1977. 
countries on a mandate for a conference on 
confidence- and security-building measures and 
disarmament in Europe, the text of which was 
incorporated in the concluding document agreed 
in Madrid on 6th September 1983 1• 
3.7. This mandate provides for a conference 
"to undertake in stages new effective and 
concrete actions designed to make progress in 
strengthening confidence and security and in 
achieving disarmament ... " but is specific only 
as regards a first stage which "will be devoted 
to the negotiation and adoption of a set of 
mutually complementary confidence- and 
security-building measures designed to reduce 
the risk of military confrontation in Europe". 
These measures "will cover the whole of Europe 
as well as the adjoining sea area* and airspace. 
They will be of military significance and 
politically binding and will be provided with 
adequate forms of verification which correspond 
to their content. As far as the adjoining sea 
area* and airspace is concerned, the measures 
will be applicable to the military activities of all 
participating states taking place there whenever 
these activities affect security in Europe, as well 
as constitute a part of activities taking place 
within the whole of Europe, as referred to 
above, which they will agree to notify". The 
footnote states that "in this context, the notion 
of adjoining sea area is understood to refer also 
to ocean areas adjoining Europe". The next 
CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna from 
4th November 1986 is to assess the progress of 
the first stage of the conference, and a future 
follow-up meeting is to consider supplementing 
the mandate for the next stage of the 
conference. 
3.8. A preparatory meeting was held in 
Helsinki from 25th October to 11th November 
1983, which agreed that the conference should 
hold four sessions a year: 17th January to 
16th March; 8th May to 6th July; 11th Septem-
ber to 12th October; and 6th November to 
14th December 1984. 
(c) Ope11i11g positio11s ;, Stoclclwlm 
3.9. The opening week of the first session of 
the conference, from 17th January 1984, was 
attended by the foreign ministers of a majority 
of the participants, including Mr. Gromyko and 
Mr. Shultz, and afforded opportunity for 
informal bilateral meetings undoubtedly going 
beyond the framework of the conference. With 
the departure of the ministers, the conference 
got down to practical business, conducted by 
the heads of the permanent delegations. The 
sixteen NATO nations collectively submitted a 
l. Text at Appendix II. 
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paper on confidence- and security-building 
measures on 24th January. While the Soviet 
Union has failed to table a paper, the 
Perma!lent Head of the Delegation, Ambassa-
dor c;;nnevsky, nevertheless made a fairly 
detailed statement of the Soviet position in his 
speech on 31st January. The eight neutral and 
non-aligned delegations (Austria, Cyprus, Fin-
land, Malta, San Marino, Sweden, Switzerland 
and Yugoslavia) similarly tabled a paper on 
9th March, while Romania had done likewise 
on its own account on 25th January. 
NATO countries' proposals 
3.10. The paper tabled collectively by the 
NATO countries on 24th January is obviously 
a fairly general description of a number of 
proposals on which it is presumed NATO has 
already worked out its negotiating position in 
rather more detail. The main thrust of the 
NATO position is to call for greater openness 
about military activities to reduce the risk of 
surprise attack, reduce the possibility of acci-
dental conflict through misunderstanding, and 
to inhibit the use of force for political 
intimidation. The need is for "transparency" in 
the words of Mr. Shultz, the emphasis is on 
concrete measures. 
3.11. Specific measures proposed in the NATO 
paper are: 
(i) annual exchange of information on the 
structure of ground forces and land-
based air forces in the area of 
application, and on regulations for 
accredited military personnel, with the 
possibility of a request for clarification; 
(ii) an exchange of annual forecasts of all 
notifiable military activities in the zone. 
Specific notification forty-five days in 
advance of out-of-garrison activities 
involving 6,000 or more ground troops 
or large numbers of tanks, etc.; mobi-
lisation involving 25,000 or more troops; 
amphibious activities involving 3,000 or 
more troops. Alert activities carried out 
with less than forty-five days' prepara-
tion would be notified at the time 
orders were issued. Verification meas-
ures would include the invitation of 
observers and inspection; 
(iii) the invitation of observers from all 
other CSCE states to all notified 
activities of an agreed duration. Observ-
ers would be enabled to judge the 
routine nature of activities by direct 
observation; 
(iv) non-interference with verification by 
national technical means, (implying in 
particular satellite, radar and other 
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electronic observation) and the right 
for CSCE states to request inspection 
subject to limitations to be agreed; 
(v) improvement in the means of com-
munication between the CSCE states 
which, it is understood from press 
reports, could include a telex network 
between all CSCE foreign ministries 
which would be used both for all 
notifications of activities and for extend-
ing invitations to observers. 
Soviet proposals 
3.12. The main thrust of Soviet and Warsaw 
Pact proposals has been to call for measures 
which the NATO countries view as declaratory, 
rather than concrete, and to reject specifically 
Mr. Shultz's call for "transparency". The 
Permanent Head of the Soviet Delegation, 
Ambassador Grinevsky, on 31st January then 
made the following specific proposals: 
(i) CSCE states in possession of nuclear 
weapons to assume a no-first-use obli-
gation, either through formal agree-
ment or by unilateral declaration; 
(ii) a treaty on the non-use of force and 
the maintenance of peaceful relations 
among states to be concluded by all 
CSCE countries. 
Significantly, Mr. Gromyko, in his speech on 
18th January, said of these two measures: 
"while the implementation of just one of those 
measures would signify a tremendous move 
forward, we are proposing both of them" -
implying to many observers that the Soviet 
Union would not insist on both. 
(iii) an agreement by all CSCE states with 
major military potential on the non-
increase and subsequent reduction of 
military expenditure in percentage and 
absolute terms- the resources released 
being devoted to economic and social 
development and assistance to devel-
oping countries in the CSCE area; 
(iv) the banning of weapons of mass 
destruction, such as chemical weapons 
and, in the first place, the non-
stationing of such weapons where they 
are not at present stationed; 
(v) the Soviet Union favours proposals for 
nuclear-free zones in various parts of 
Europe; 
(vi) significant confidence- and security-
building measures, covering both limi-
tation and notification, including limits 
on the scale of military manoeuvres; 
notification of major land and air force 
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manoeuvres; notification of major troop 
movements - to cover the whole of 
Europe as well as the adjoining sea 
and ocean area and airspace. 
Neutral and non-aligned proposals 
3.13. The neutral and non-aligned countries 
took longer than anticipated to agree the terms 
of their paper, eventually submitted on 
9th March. Mtet a preambular list of consider-
ations governing the aims and proceedings of 
the conference, calling for concrete measures so 
as to give effect to the duty of states to refrain 
from the threat for use of force, they contained 
a list of concrete measures: 
(i) prior notification of major military 
manoeuvres- earlier and more detailed 
than in the Helsinki final act; 
(ii) prior notification of smaller-scale mili-
tary manoeuvres if several cumulatively 
exceed the totals qualifying for notifi-
cation for major manoeuvres; 
(iii) prior notification of amphibious or 
airborne manoeuvres on a smaller scale; 
(iv) prior notification of major military 
movements with detailed information; 
(v) prior notification of major military 
activities in adjoining sea area and 
airspace which affect security in Europe 
when they constitute part of other 
notifiable activities; 
(vi) invitation of observers to notifiable 
manoeuvres and movements with 
improved standardised conditions for 
- observers; 
(vii) annual exchange of information on 
major military activities planned in 
advance; 
(viii) upper ceilings on the size of major 
military manoeuvres and separate lower 
ceiling on amphibious or airborne 
manoeuvres; 
(ix) constraints on the deployment in spe-
cified areas of equipment for sustained 
offensive operations. 
3.14. Other suggestions in the paper included 
arrangements for rapid exchange of information 
and notification and the use by CSCE countries 
of the United Nations standardised reporting 
system for military expenditure. 
(d) Allied consultation 
3.15. Consultation between the NATO coun-
tries on a common position to be taken in the 
conference appears to have worked well in 
NATO headquarters, although there is some 
feeling that the agreed proposals that have 
emerged are too restrictive for the negotiators 
in Stockholm. There is frequent further consul-
tation within a caucus meeting of the NATO 
delegations in Stockholm. Unlike the CSCE 
negotiations, on the other hand, which of course 
included economic and social questions, consul-
tations among the Ten in the framework of 
European political co-operation has been less 
important in the largely military area of 
confidence-building measures. The chief role of 
the ten-country caucus that occasionally meets 
in Stockholm appears to be to maintain links 
with Ireland, the only non-NATO member 
country of the European Community, but which 
has not joined the neutral and non-aligned 
countries' caucus. 
(e) Prospects 
3.16. Given the deterioration in the state of 
East-West relations, it can be said that the 
atmosphere in the conference has been 
business-like rather than vituperative; neither 
side appears to have excluded the possibility of 
agreement on the minimum requirements of the 
other. This would include some reference to the 
non-use of force to which the Warsaw Pact 
countries attach great importance, but whether 
this should be a formal treaty as Mr. Grinevsky, 
leader of the Soviet Delegation, proposed in his 
31st January speech, or a "code of conduct" as 
suggested by Mr. Citron, leader of the Federal 
German Delegation, is a matter for negotiation. 
Agreement could not for the foreseeable future 
include a no-first-use of nuclear weapons 
undertaking by the NATO countries, although 
the possibility of adopting such a declaratory 
policy is now being discussed in certain western 
quarters, as the committee has noted in earlier 
reports; it is the position of most countries 
concerning chemical weapons under the terms 
of the 1925 Geneva Convention. An agreement 
will have to contain a number of the concrete 
confidence-building measures proposed by the 
West, the detailed parameters of which will 
inevitably involve hard bargaining. There is 
certainly interest among both NATO and 
Warsaw Pact countries in reaching agreement, 
not least on the part of those Warsaw Pact 
countries such as East Germany and Czecho-
slovakia in which shorter-range Soviet nuclear 
weapons are now being deployed. Mr. Fischer, 
Foreign Minister of the German Democratic 
Republic, said in the conference on 
17th January "with regard to the Swedish 
Government's widely-known proposal to estab-
lish a corridor free of battlefield and nuclear 
weapons in Central Europe, that the German 
Democratic Republic is prepared to make 
available its entire territory ... ". 
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3.17. For two reasons, however, it is clear to 
your Rapporteur that there is little or no 
prospect of any early agreement emerging from 
Stockholm. Firstly, procedural considerations 
impose no urgency on the negotiations - the 
conference has to report only to the Vienna 
review conference on 4th November 1986, and 
the resumed session on 8th May 1984 will turn 
its attention only to procedural wrangles over 
the numbers ~nd names of working committees 
which might be set up - procedural wrangles 
behind which lie significant points of principle 
concerning the priority of declaratory agree-
ments sought by the Soviet Union or concrete 
measures sought by the NATO countries. 
Secondly, the present deteriorated state of 
East-West relations, coupled with the two 
recent changes in the leadership of the Soviet 
Union, its suspicion of the Reagan administra-
tion and obvious intention to await the outcome 
of the presidential elections, all make early 
agreement unlikely. The real intentions of the 
Reagan administration itself remain unclear. 
Mr. Goodby, the Ambassador leading the 
United States Permanent Delegation to the 
conference, alone among all delegation leaders, 
has the title of "Chairman" rather than Head 
of the United States Delegation, which is 
composed of officials from ACDA and the State 
Department, from the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff, and 
the Office of the Secretary of Defence where 
Mr. Richard Perle is reported in the press to be 
resisting any arms control agreements during 
the presidential election year. 
(j) Concl11sions of the committee 
3.18. The committee is aware that agreement 
in negotiations such as the conference on 
disarmament in Europe is of vital importance 
to the European countries, who are much more 
closely concerned than the transatlantic part-
ners. The committee therefore calls for a sense 
of urgency to be injected into the negotiations 
and proposes steps which the WEU countries 
themselves can take to achieve this: 
(i) a declaration setting out their aims on 
arms control and disarmament; 
(ii) member governments should be urged 
to promote personal contacts at the 
highest level with the new Soviet 
leadership, and with the eastern bloc 
leadership in general, with a view to 
establishing sufficient confidence to 
permit early agreement; 
(iii) by calling for every effort to be made 
to secure an interim agreement in the 
CDE in 1984, based on the common 
elements that can already be perceived 
in the present NATO and Warsaw 
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Pact proposals, and taking account of 
the·importance of verification measures. 
IV. Mutual and balanced force reductions 
(a) Background 
4.1. On 18th April 1984, the NATO countries 
participating in the MBFR talks in Vienna 
introduced a major new proposal. These talks, 
officially styled in the agreed East-West termi-
nology "mutual reduction of forces and arma-
ments and associated measures in Central 
Europe" have been in progress since October 
1973 without even an interim agreement on 
initial troop reductions. The origins of these 
talks lay in NATO proposals in the early 1970s 
for MBFR negotiations - made largely as a 
counter to Warsaw Pact proposals for a 
European security conference. Agreement to 
hold the talks in the first place was seen as a 
Soviet concession in exchange for agreement of 
the NATO countries to the original convening 
of the CSCE conference in Helsinki. 
4.2. It is common ground that the aim of the 
talks is to seek reductions in forces and 
armaments within the area comprising the 
territory of Belgium, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherl3:nds on 
the NATO side, and of Czechoslovakia, the 
German Democratic Republic and Poland on 
the Warsaw Pact side. The status of Hungary 
in this context is not determined, the West 
originally having called for .. it. to be in<:l~ded i~ 
the reductions area. The dtrect part1c1pants 
in the talks are the foregoingcountries whose 
territories comprise the reductions area, and 
other countries having forces stationed within 
their area. Thus on the NATO side the direct 
participants are: Belgium, Canada, Federal 
Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands, the United Kingdom and the United 
States. "Indirect" participants are contiguous 
countries with an interest in the negotiations; 
on the NATO side they comprise Denmark, 
Greece, Italy, Norway and Turkey. France, 
although a contiguous country, declined to take 
part in the talks in 1973 because it opposed t_he 
principle of negotiations between countnes 
drawn solely from the two military blocs of 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Iceland and 
Portugal have not participated in the talks, 
being too far removed to be directly interested; 
Spain acceded to NATO only in 1982. On the 
Warsaw Pact side, the direct participants in the 
talks are: Czechoslovakia, the Democratic 
Republic of Germany, Poland and the Soviet 
Union. The indirect participants are Bulgaria 
and Romania, while the status of Hungary, as 
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mentioned above, is officially said to be 
"undetermined". 
4.3. Despite the failure to sign a treaty on 
mutuai reduction of forces, agreement has been 
reached in the course of the negotiations on 
many of the fundamental objectives: 
(i) reductions should lead to "common 
collective ceilings" on forces in the area 
of 900,000 men, including not more 
than 700,000 ground forces (the 
remainder being air forces); 
(ii) reductions would be in phases: in phase 
1 only United States and Soviet forces 
would be withdrawn; 
(iii) reductions could affect armaments as 
well as numbers of forces; 
(iv) "associated measures" (including 
means of verification) would accom-
pany an agreement on force reductions. 
(b) Warslllll Pact positions 
4.4. The most recent comprehensive Warsaw 
Pact proposals are those submitted by Poland 
on 18th February 1982 for a phase 1 agreement: 
- reductions of 13,000 United States 
troops and 20,000 Soviet troops, each 
including a complete division and sub-
units equivalent to an armoured brigade, 
together with all their armaments and 
combat equipment. The reductions would 
be completed within one year and the 
troops withdrawn to their own countries, 
located so as not to threaten the security 
of the other (indirect) participants; 
- a freeze on all the other forces in the 
reduction area for the duration of phase 
1; 
- duration of phase 1 agreement - three 
years; 
- in a subsequent phase 2 agreement there 
would be "proportionate reductions of 
forces of all direct participants to 
common collective ceilings of 900,000, 
reductions of each country to be propor-
tionate to the country's proportionate 
contribution to the total forces in the 
area at the outset; the forces of no 
participant ever to exceed 50% of the 
900,000 ceiling; 
- associated measures to be "commensur-
ate with the volume of the reductions", 
monitoring posts would be established at 
exit points during the actual period of 
reductions, comprising one representative 
from each of the United States, the 
Soviet Union, and the country from 
which the forces were being withdrawn. 
There would be notification of troop 
movement and exercises and prohibition 
of exercises in excess of 50,000 men; 
- the ceiling of 900,000 never to be 
exceeded even during exercises or rota-
tion of troops. 
(c) NATO position 
4.5. Prior to the 19th April 1984 proposals, 
the NATO delegations on 8th July 1982 
submitted a new draft treaty which was a more 
comprehensive document covering four stages 
of the reductions over seven years: 
- reductio, 'S to achieve common collective 
ceilings on each side of 900,000 men 
including not more than 700,000 ground 
troops; 
- reductions to be achieved in four stages 
within seven years, each stage to be fully 
verifiable; 
- levels of forces agreed to be within the 
reductions area at the outset to be 
specified in the treaty; 
- first stage withdrawals of 13,000 United 
States ground forces and 30,000 Soviet 
ground forces within twelve months; 
- in a second phase lasting two years, a 
further reduction of 31,000 NATO 
forces and 93,000 Warsaw Pact forces, 
to include 33,000 Soviet forces; 
- stages 3 and 4, over a total of four years, 
to bring levels down to the agreed 
collective ceilings. 
The associated measures linked to the treaty, 
tabled by the NATO countries on 
18th November 1982, provided for: 
- prenotification for out-of-garrison activi-
ties by one or more divisions; 
- observers to be invited to out-of-garrison 
activities; 
- prior notification of major troop move-
ments within the reductions area; 
- an annual quota of eighteen ground or 
air inspections, or both; 
- permanent exit/entry points with per-
manent observers, through which all 
forces entering or leaving the reductions 
area would be required to pass; 
- exchange of information on forces to be 
withdrawn and continuing exchange of 
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information on strength and organisation 
of remaining forces; 
- no interference with national technical 
means of verification. 
(d) Differences 
4.6. The remaining points of disagreement 
between East and West at that stage can be 
summarised as follows: 
- the eastern participants have demanded 
some form of separate ceiling on the 
forces of each country - or at least the 
assurance that no single country should 
provide more than 50% of common 
collective ceilings; 
- the eastern countries have called for a 
separate ceiling on air force personnel as 
well as on ground forces; 
- the eastern countries have demanded 
more specific agreements about the 
withdrawal of armaments from the area, 
as well as a withdrawal of forces; 
- the western countries have demanded 
more specific arrangements for verifica-
tion including the permanent presence of 
observers at exit/entry points, and in 
addition the right to a defined annual 
quota of inspections; the maximum 
eastern concession so far was for fixed 
observer points during the actual period 
of withdrawals; 
- the western countries have called for 
prior agreement on "data" - the number 
of forces agreed to be present in the 
reductions area at the outset. The 
eastern countries have implied that final 
agreement on data would be reached 
only after reductions have been made. 
4.7. Data and verification have long been held 
by the western powers to be the major 
stumbling block to agreement although, as the 
committee has pointed out in a previous report 1, 
if agreement can be reached on effective 
monitoring of a phase 1 agreement, with 
permanent observers for the entire duration of 
the agreement to ensure against the surrepti-
tious return of withdrawn forces, agreement on 
disputed data could be postponed until phase 2. 
Documents tabled by East and West in the 
Vienna negotiations, including various figures 
submitted by each side, concerning existing 
levels of forces, have not been made public -
one sign at least that each side continues to 
1. Disarmament, Document 909, Rapporteur: Mr. Voh-
rer, 20th Aprill982. 
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take the negotiations seriously. The following 
table of NATO and Warsaw Pact estimates of 
present force levels compiled from various 
sources, provides a general indication of remain-
ing discrepancies: 
Prese11t lnels of forces ;, MBFR red~~etions tuetl 
NATO Warsaw Pact Warsaw Pact superiority 
Ground Air Total Ground Air Total Ground Air Total defence force defence {orce defence force 
NATO est. 790,000 203,000 993,000 960,000 220,000 1,180,000 170,000 17,000 187,000 
(iv) 805,000 200,000 1,005,000 200,000 
(iv) 
Warsaw not disputed by W.P. 800,000 200,000 1,000,000 nil nil nil 
Pact 815,000 182,000 997,000 25,000 
est. 
Discrepancy nil 145,000 nil (iv) 183,000 145,000 38,000 
Sources: 
(i) "East-West troop reductions in Europe: Is agreement possible?", report for United States House Sub-Committee on 
International Security and Scientific Affairs by the Foreign Affairs and National Defence Division, Congressional 
Research Service, Library of Congress, 21st April 1983. 
(ii) Keesings Volume XXIX, page 31990. 
(iii) Previous report of the committee, Document 909, op. cit. pp. 5-48. 
(iv) International Herald Tribune, 20th and 23rd April 1984. 
(e) Tll4 wester11 propostlls of 19tiiA.pril 1984 
4.8. The major new proposal introduced by 
the NATO countries on 19th April, the last day 
before the Easter recess, goes a long way to 
meeting the eastern position of 18th February 
1982 ; the new proposal is known to have been 
under discussion in NATO headquarters for 
many months; agreement there appears to have 
taken longer than usual. 
4.9. From the description given at a press 
conference the same day by the Head of the 
Canadian Delegation on behalf of the NATO 
countries, the main points in the new proposal 
are: 
- prior exchange of data would relate only 
to ground combat and combat support 
forces; such data would be for newly 
defined categories of forces and therefore 
not directly related with data exchanged 
so far; moreover, the West would accept 
eastern figures if they were within "an 
acceptable range" (5 to 10% was 
mentioned by officials) of western esti-
mates; 
- in a first phase reductions would com-
prise 13,000 United States and 30,000 
Soviet combat and combat support 
forces, to leave an overall ceiling on 
United States and Soviet ground forces; 
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- these withdrawals would be mainly m 
complete units, with up to 10% as 
individuals; 
- immediately after the first phase there 
would be a verifiable no-increase com-
mitment covering the overall level of 
ground forces of all direct participants; 
- during the second year of the term of a 
treaty information would be exchanged 
and verified on the overall forces of all 
participants to determine the collective 
reductions in levels of ground forces to 
be effected by each alliance in the third 
and fifth year in order to reach the 
agreed objective of 700,000 ground 
forces and 900,000 ground and air forces 
by the end of the fifth year; 
- improved verification measures would be 
required including an exchange of more 
detailed information on forces in the 
area and improved co-operative obser-
vation and inspection measures, but it is 
understood that NATO has not com-
pleted its own discussion of the more 
stringent verification measures now pro-
posed - the details will not be tabled in 
Vienna until after the resumption of the 
negotiations on 24th May. 
(/) Prospects for agreement 
4.1 0. This new western proposal goes a 
considerable way towards meeting the eastern 
proposal in easing the data problem, chiefly by 
excluding service support forces from the 
mutual count, by accepting the withdrawal of 
complete military units and by shortening the 
total reductions period to five years from seven. 
At the same time, however, it requires more 
stringent verification measures than before and 
still calls for the withdrawal of 30,000 Soviet 
forces in a first phase compared with 20,000 so 
far offered by the Warsaw Pact. 
V. Chemical weapons 
5.1. The committee is to report to the second 
part of the session on discussions in the 
Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. The 
committee takes note, however, of recent very 
important developments in the area of chemical 
weapons, and negotiations on a possible world-
wide ban on their use, production or storage. 
5.2. The annual report of the Council of WEU 
to the Assembly states in its Chapter Ill on the 
Agency for the Control of Armaments that all 
member countries, in reply to an Agency 
questionnaire, have reported that they possess 
no stocks of chemical weapons. The United 
States has not manufactured such weapons 
since 1969, but retains a large stockpile, in 
particular of nerve gas, mostly in the United 
States but with some weapons stockpiled in 
Germany, as the committee has earlier 
reported 1• In 1983, President Reagan requested 
funds for the resumed production of chemical 
weapons - of a new "binary" type - but the 
request was refused by Congress on a narrow 
vote, although finance for the plant now under 
construction had been authorised earlier. 
5.3. The Soviet Union is known to possess 
considerable stockpiles of chemical weapons, 
but western governments have not provided 
quantitative estimates, nor is it clear whether 
they are claimed to exceed United States' 
stockpiles or not. It is, however, generally 
assumed that there has been continual produc-
tion by the Soviet Union since 1969, whereas 
United States' stockpiles are all at least fifteen 
years old. 
5.4. While the United States has alleged that 
the Soviet Union or its allies have made use of 
various forms of chemical weapons, both in 
Mganistan and in South-East Asia, these 
1. Nuclear, biological and chemical production, Docu-
ment 838, Rapporteur: Mr. Banks, 29th April 1980. 
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reports have been neither substantiated nor 
flatly refuted by independent United Nations 
investigators. Now, however, the use of chemical 
weapons, probably including both mustard gas 
and nerve gas by Iraqi forces against Iran, has 
been established by United Nations observers, 
leading to renewed international appeals for a 
complete ban on such weapons. 
5.5. Negotiations on a chemical weapons ban 
have been proceeding in the framework of the 
Committee on Disarmament in Geneva for 
some two years. The United Kingdom, on 
14th February 1984, tabled a paper on verifi-
cation and compliance, dealing with the right 
of on-site inspection by challenge, which should 
be incorporated in any treaty. The Netherlands, 
on 7th March, similarly tabled a paper on the 
size and structure of the chemical disarmament 
inspectorate. The Soviet Union, in a recent 
development, has indicated readiness to accept 
on-site verification of the actual destruction of 
chemical weapons, but has not conceded the 
necessary right to inspection by challenge of 
suspected clandestine production facilities. 
5.6. Finally, on 19th April 1984, Vice-Presi-
dent Bush of the United States travelled' to 
Geneva to present a draft treaty on a chemical 
weapons ban which contained "bold" verifica-
tion provisions, especially those concerning 
inspection by challenge of suspected violations 
which, Mr. Bush admitted at a subsequent 
press conference, were more far-reaching than 
any in earlier United States proposals, and 
which had been criticised by some allies. The 
Soviet delegate, on 26th April, termed these 
proposals deliberately unacceptable to the 
Soviet Union, submitted only to cover a United 
States chemical rearmament programme. "Now 
he offers a treaty banning chemical weapons 
that makes such intrusive verification demands 
that the Russians do not take it seriously", 
wrote one distinguished American columnist2• 
VI. Conclusions 
6.1. The committee's principal conclusions, 
described in paragraph 3.18, are set forth in the 
draft recommendation, the main thrust of which 
is the need to inject urgency into the search for 
at least interim agreements in the CDE and 
MBFR talks and, as a precondition, the need 
for member governments to take the initiative 
in seeking to restore mutual confidence in 
East-West relations. 
2. Flora Lewis, New York Times, 30th April 1984 
(quoted here from the International Herald Tribune). 
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APPENDIX I 
Implementation of confidence-building measures 1 
1. Notification of military manoeuvres under the CSCE regime by NATO countries 
Sponsoring Name of Size of Notification Observers Date manoeuvre given (no. of country manoeuvre (no. of men) days) invited 
1975 
September FRG Grosse 68 000 23 -
Roe ha de 
October USA Certain Trek 57 000 34 Yes 
OctfNov USA Reforger 75 53 000 21 -
September Turkey Deep Express 18 000 21 -
October Norway Batten Bolt 8 000 24 -
OctfNov Netherlands Pantsersprong 10000 14 -
1976 
September FRG Grosser Ba:r 50 000 21 Yes 
September USA Gordian Shield 30 000 21 -
September USA Lares Team 44 000 21 Yes 
FebfMar Norway Atlas Express 17 000 21 -
September Norway Teamwork 13 500 21 Yes 
October Denmark/FRG Bonded Item 11000 21 -
November Britain Spearpoint 18 000 23 Yes 
1977 
September USA Carbon Edge 58 700 21 Yes 
September FRG Standhafte 38 000 21 Yes 
Schatten 
May USA Certain 24 000 23 -
Fighter 
September Denmark Arrow Express 16 000 21 Yes 
September Belgium Blue Fox 24 500 21 -
SepfOct Netherlands Interaction 12 000 21 Yes 
October Turkey Tayfun 77 15 000 30 Yes 
1978 
September FRG Blaue Donau 46 000 24 Yes 
September USA Certain Shield 56 000 24 Yes 
September Netherlands Saxon Drive 32 500 24 Yes 
September FRG Bold Guard 65 000 24 -
March Norway Arctic Express 15 300 30 Yes 
September Norway Black Bear 8 200 30 -
1979 
JanfFeb USA Certain 66 000 25 Yes 
Sentinal 
September USA Constant 29 000 21 Yes 
Enforcer 
1. Source: J.J. Hoist, op. cit. in footnote to paragraph 3.4 of explanatory memorandum, supplemented for 1983 by the 
United States President's semi-annual reports to the Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe on the 
implementation of the Helsinki final act. 
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Sponsoring Name of Size of Notification Observers Date manoeuvre given (no. of country manoeuvre (no. of men) days) invited 
September FRG Harte Faust 60 000 21 Yes 
March Norway Cold Winter 79 10000 30 -
SepfOct Turkey Display Determina- 18 000 32 -
tion 79 
October France Saone 79 16 000 21 Yes 
October Britain Keystone 18 000 21 -
1980 
September FRG St. Georg 44 000 24 Yes 
September USA Certain Rampart 40 000 21 Yes 
September Britain Spearpoint 90 000 24 Yes 
March Norway Anorak Express 80 18 200 31 -
September Norway Teamwork 80 16 800 28 Yes 
October France Marne 80 17 000 10 -
I 
1981 
September USA/FRG Certain 45 600 24 Yes 
Encounter 
September FRG Scharfe Klinge 48 000 21 Yes 
October Britain Red Claymore 23 000 21 -
March Norway Cold Winter 11000 21 -
September Norway Barfrost 9 000 21 -
SepfOct Denmark Amber Express 15 000 21 Yes 
October BelgiumfFRG Cross Fire 21 000 21 -
October France Farfadet 4 000* 14 -
1982 
March Norway Alloy Express 14 200 30 -
SepfOct DenmarkfFRG Bold Guard 82 47 200 24 Yes 
September USA/FRG Carbine Fortress 82 73 000 24 Yes 
September FRG Starke Wehr 35 000 21 Yes 
September France Langres 82 17 000 4 -
1983 
Norway Cold Winter 83 10 000 -
USA/FRG Confident Express >25 000 Yes 
FRG Wehrhafte Loewen >25 000 Yes 
September FRGfNeth. Atlantic Lion >25 000 Yes 
Britain Eternal Triangle >25 000 -
September Denmark Ample Express <25 000 -
France Moselle 83 -
*To Mediterranean CSCE countries only. 
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2. Notification of military manoeuvres under the CSCE regime by Warsaw Pact countries 
Sponsoring Name of Date country manoeuvre 
1975 
None 
1976 
JanfFeb USSR Kavkaz 
June USSR Sever 
April Hungary -
October Hungary -
September Poland Tarcza 76 
1977 
MarJApr USSR -
July USSR Karpatia 
1978 
February USSR Berezhina 
July USSR Tarcza 78 
September USSR Kavkaz 11 
1979 
February USSRJCSSR Druzhba 
April USSR -
July USSR Neman 
mid-May Hungary Shield 79 
1980 
July USSR -
September GDR Brotherhood in Arms 
August Hungary Dyna80 
1981 
September USSR Zapad 81 
1982 
January USSRJCSSR Druzhba 82 
September Bulgaria Shield 82 
1983 
January Hungary Danube 83 
June Hungary Kunsag 83 
July USSR 
July USSR 
September USSR 
• Verbal notification on 3rd May 1979. 
•• According to T ASS on 5th September 1981. 
*** Only from Warsaw Pact countries. 
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Size of Notification 
manoeuvre given (no. of 
(no. of men) days) 
25 000 21 
25 000 21 
10 000 l 
15 000 0 
35 000 21 
25 000 21 
27 000 21 
25 000 21 
30 000 21 
25 000 21 
26 000 21 
25 000 21 
25 000 21 
25 000 • 
30 000 21 
40000 21 
18 000 l 
100 ooo•• 21 
25 000 21 
60000 21 
over few days 
20 000 
14 000 6 
50 000 21 
26 000 21 
23 000 21 
APPENDIX I 
Observers 
invited 
Yes 
Yes 
-
-
Yes 
-
Yes 
Yes 
-
-
-
-
Yes 
Yes 
-
-
-
Yes*** 
-
-
-
-
-
-
Yes 
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3. Notification of military manoeuvres under tlte CSCE regime by neutral and non-aligned countries 
Sponsoring Name of Size of Notification Observers Date manoeuvre given (no. of 
country manoeuvre (no. of men) days) invited 
1975 
October Yugoslavia - 18 ()()() 25 -
November Switzerland - 40 ()()() 31 -
1976 
October Yugoslavia Golilja 24 ()()() 24 Yes 
November Sweden Poseidon 12 ()()() 30 -
1977 
March Sweden Yl!nn 77 10 ()()() 21 Yes 
October Spain Podenco 8 ()()() 53 Yes 
November Austria HerbstUbung 12 ()()() 37 
-
1978 
November Austria (Command Post 5 ()()() 20 -
Exercise) 
1979 
March Switzerland N ussknacker 34 ()()() 28 Yes 
October Switzerland Forte 27 ()()() 33 Yes 
November Austria Area Defence Exer- 27 500 45 Yes 
cise 79 
1980 
None 
1981 
OctfNov Spain Crisex 81 32 200 25 Yes 
October Switzerland Cresta 25 ()()() 33 -
1982 
March Sweden Nomken 23 ()()() 30 Yes 
' 
September Sweden Sydfront 25 ()()() 30 -
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APPENDIX 11 
Mandate approved in Madrid on 6th September 1983 for the conference on confidence- and 
security-building measures and disarmament in Europe 
The participating states, 
Recalling the provisions of the final act 
according to which they recognise the interest 
of all of them in eff arts aimed at lessening 
military confrontation and promoting disarma-
ment, 
Have agreed to convene a conference on 
confidence- and security-building measures and 
disarmament in Europe. 
The aim of the conference is, as a substantial 
and integral part of the multilateral process 
initiated by the conference on security and co-
operation in Europe, with the participation of 
all the states signatories of the final act, to 
undertake, in stages, new, effective, and concrete 
actions designed to make progress in strength-
ening confidence and security and in achieving 
disarmament, so as to give effect and expression 
to the duty of states to refrain from the threat 
or use of force in their mutual relations. 
Thus the conference will begin a process of 
which the first stage will be devoted to the 
negotiation and adoption of a set of mutually 
complementary confidence- and security-build-
ing measures designed to reduce the risk of 
military confrontation in Europe. 
The first stage of the conference will be held 
in Stockholm commencing on 17th January 
1984. 
On the basis of equality of rights, balance 
and reciprocity, equal respect for the security 
interests of all CSCE participating states, ana 
of their respective obligations concerning 
confidence- and security-building measures and 
disarmament in Europe, these confidence- and 
security-building measures will cover the whole 
of Europe as well as the adjoining sea area 1 
and air space. They will be of military 
significance and politically binding and will be 
provided with adequate forms of verification 
which correspond to their content. 
As far as the adjoining sea area 1 and air-
space is concerned, the measures will be 
applicable to the military activities of all the 
participating states taking place there whenever 
.. these activities affect security in Europe as well 
as constitute a part of activities taking place 
within the whole of Europe as referred to above, 
which they will agree to notify. Necessary 
specifications will be made through the negoti-
ations on the confidence- and security-building 
measures at the conference. 
I. In this context, the notion of adjoining sea area is 
understood to refer also to ocean areas adjoining Europe. 
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Nothing in the definition of the zone given 
above will diminish obligations already under-
taken under the final act. The confidence- and 
security-building measures to be agreed upon 
at the conference will also be applicable in all 
areas covered by any of the provisions in the 
final act relating to confidence-building meas-
ures and certain aspects of security and 
disarmament. 
The provisions established by the negotiat?rs 
will come into force in the forms and accordmg 
to the procedure to be agreed upon by the 
conference. 
Taking into account the abovementioned 
aim of the conference, the next follow-up 
meeting of the participating states of the CSCE, 
to be held in Vienna, commencing on 
4th November 1986, will assess the progress 
achieved during the first stage of the conference. 
Taking into account the relevant provisions 
of the final act, and having reviewed the results 
achieved by the first stage of the conference, 
and also in the light of other relevant 
negotiations on security and disarmament 
affecting Europe, a future CSCE follo~-up 
meeting will consider ways and appropnate 
means for the participating states to continue 
their efforts for security and disarmament in 
Europe, including the question of supplementing 
the present mandate for the next stage of the 
conference on confidence- and security-building 
measures and disarmament in Europe. 
A preparatory meeting, charged with esta~­
lishing the agenda, timetable and other orgam-
sational modalities for the first stage of the 
conference, will be held in Helsinki, c?mmenc-
ing on 25th October 1983. Its duration shall 
not exceed three weeks. 
The rules of procedure, the working methods 
and the scale of distribution for the expenses 
valid for the CSCE will, mutatis mutandis, be 
applied to the conference and to the preparatory 
meeting referred to in the preceding paragraph. 
The services of a technical secretariat will be 
provided by the host country. 
(Madrid, 6th September 1983) 
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Mr. Philippe Guelluy, Conseiller, Sous Direction Affaires Strategiques et Pactes 
24th April 1984- Ministry for ForeignAffairs, Bonn: 
Dr. Andreas Meyer-Landruth, State Secretary 
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8th May 1984 - Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London: 
Mr. Brian Cartledge, Assistant Under-Secretary of State 
12th May 1984 
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Mr. Leo Tindemans, Minister for External Relations 
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Baron Thierry de Grubben, Counsellor, Ministry for External Relations and is to meet Mr. 
Willem van Eekelen, Netherlands Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 
The committee as a whole met at the seat of the Assembly, Paris, on 14th February 1984, when 
Lt. General C.J. Dijkstra presented his study on collective logistical support, and the committee met 
subsequently with the WEU Standing Armaments Committee, attended by: Lt. Colonel de Winne 
(Belgium); Lt. Colonel Binet (Belgium); Mr. Marcoin (France); Mr. Schreiber (Germany); Colonel 
Pochesci (Italy); Mr. Zweerts (Netherlands); Mr. Davies (United Kingdom). 
Subsequently at NATO Headquarters, Brussels on 8th and 9th March 1984 the committee met 
with members of the parliamentary defence committees of the European NATO countries: 
Belgium: Mr. Yves du Monceau de Bergendal, Second Vice-Chairman, National Defence Committee, 
Le Senat; 
France: Mr. Louis Darinot, Chairman, MM. Robert Aumont and Jean Combasteil, Vice-Chairmen, 
Defence Committee, Assemblee Nationale; 
Germany: Dr. H. Schwarz, Vice-Chairman, MM. Karl-Eduard Claussen and Wolfgang Kahrs, 
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Netherlands: Drs: Y.P.W. van der Werff, Chairman, Defence Committee, First Chamber of the 
States-General; 
United Kingdom: Sir Humphrey Atkins, KCMG, Chairman, MM. D. Douglas and Mates, Select 
Committee on Defence, House of Commons; 
Norway: MM. Ole Fr. Klemsdal and Bjorn Erling Ytterhorn, Defence Committee, Stortinget. 
The meeting was briefed by: Mr. Eric Da Rin, Deputy Secretary-General of NATO; Lt. 
General T. Huitfeldt, Norwegian Army, Director of the International Military Staff; Dr. Fredo 
Dannenbring, NATO Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs; and lng. Gen. P. Naslin, 
Head of the Defence Research Section, NATO International Staff. 
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The committee met finally at the seat of the Assembly in Paris on 15th May 1984 when it 
adopted the present report. 
The committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the ministers, members of parliament, 
officials, senior officers and experts who received the Rapporteur or met the committee and replied 
to questions. 
The views expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee. 
130 
The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on thirty years of the 11Wdijied Brussels Treaty -
reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council 
DOCUMENT 973 
(i) Believing it to be urgent to reinforce deterrence and safeguard peace, to organise within the 
Atlantic Alliance a politically credible and militarily effective European pillar; 
(ii) Considering that setting up a European pillar of the alliance should in particular serve the 
object of strengthening the partnership with our American allies, while giving a more European 
dimension to the discussion of questions touching the security of our continent; 
(iii) Believing that WEU should be used fully by the member states as a forum for analysis, debate 
and concerted action on the requirements of European defence, and that the other European allies, 
and other partners in the Ten should be kept fully informed; 
(iv) Recalling its Recommendation 380 and reiterating its belief that WEU should be adapted to 
meet the requirements of the 1980s, in particular through the abolition of controls on conventional 
weapons; 
(v) Aware that the controls on atomic and biological weapons provided for in the modified Brussels 
Treaty have never been applied, but considering that in present circumstances it is no longer 
appropriate to apply them, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Examine and redefine the problems of European security and, to this end, 
(a) meet regularly at a high level; 
(b) hold at least two ministerial Council meetings a year, in particular to prepare NATO 
ministerial meetings, with the participation of defence ministers at at least one of these 
meetings; and 
(c) keep the Assembly informed of these proceedings; 
2. Strengthen the Permanent Council through the attendance as required of the senior officials 
concerned from the ministries for foreign affairs and defence and of the chiefs of defence staff; 
3. Be assisted in its work by the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control 
of Armaments, instructing: 
(a) the Standing Armaments Committee to assist the Council in preparing a European policy in 
new conventional armaments, with particular regard to problems raised by emerging 
technologies; and to help the Council lay the foundations of a policy on the defensive use of 
space technology; 
(b) the Agency for the Control of Armaments to undertake, on behalf of the Council or the 
Assembly, studies and analyses of problems related to disarmament, the limitation of 
armaments and the problems of verification of disarmament agreements; 
4. Pursue the adaptation of WEU to the needs of the 1980s by: 
(a) abolishing the controls on conventional weapons set out in Annexes Ill and IV to Protocol 
No. Ill; 
(b) reorganising the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments to enable them to accomplish their new tasks; 
(c) making the necessary arrangements to eo-locate the ministerial bodies of WEU in a single 
place; 
5. Establish appropriate procedure for informing European and Atlantic bodies about the 
conclusions of ministerial meetings. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(s11bmitted by Mr. De Declu!r, Rapporte11r) 
I. Introduction 
1.1. The present statutory report, presented in 
accordance with the Charter of the Assembly, 
replies to the chapters of the annual report of 
the Council referred to the committee by the 
Presidential Committee under rule 27.2 of the 
Rules of Procedure. These are Chapter liB: 
Activities of the Council - Defence questions; 
Chapter Ill: Agency for the Control of 
Armaments; Chapter IV: Standing Armaments 
Committee. 
1.2. When deciding upon the terms of refer-
ence for the present report in the framework of 
its future programme of work, approved by the 
Presidential Committee, the committee pro-
posed that for the thirtieth anniversary of the 
1954 Paris Agreements it should, where defence 
questions are concerned, review the achieve-
ments and and examine the future of WEU. 
The future of WEU is particularly important at 
a time when widespread attention has been 
attracted to proposals from several member 
governments to make fuller use of WEU as a 
forum for European consultation on defence 
matters, without however the Atlantic Alliance 
being "supplanted"1 by a European alliance. 
These proposals are therefore examined with 
particular attention in Chapter V of the present 
explanatory memorandum, while the committee 
examines in a separate report the necessary 
counterpart to European consultation on defence 
matters - the organisation of collective defence 
in the framework of NAT02• 
1.3. In preparing this report, the Rapporteur 
bore in mind the requirements of a wider 
audience than that of the representatives to the 
Assembly - ministries and chancelleries and 
certain sectors of the public - likely to wish to 
be informed about WEU on the occasion of this 
thirtieth anniversary. The report therefore 
repeats certain information already given to 
representatives in earlier reports. 
11. The Brussels Treaty and the 1954 
modification 
(a) Backgro11nd 
2.1. The Brussels Treaty of 17th March 1948 
extended the defence alliance signed by France 
I. Expression used by the President of France, Mr. 
Mitterrand, in his speech in The Hague on 7th February 
1984. 
2. State of European security, Rapporteur: Sir Dudley 
Smith, Document 971. 
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and the United Kingdom at Dunkirk on 
4th March to Belgium, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands. Although the 1948 text referred 
to the possibility of a renewal by Germany of 
a policy of aggression, it was in reality the 
Soviet threat demonstrated in the coup d'etat in 
Czechoslovakia· in 1947 which led to the 
conclusion of the treaty. The text of the mutual 
and collective defence undertaking in Article V 
of the present modified Brussels Treaty was 
already in Article IV of the 1948 treaty. While 
the treaty, in 1948 as in 1954, was entitled 
"Treaty of economic, social and cultural 
collaboration and collective self-defence", it was 
already stipulated in the text that the economic 
activities should not duplicate those of other 
international bodies, and they were in fact left 
to the OEEC. 
2.2. After the treaty was signed, the Brussels 
Treaty Organisation, as WEU was then called, 
set up its own Western Union Defence 
Organisation (WUDO) to implement the policy 
of mutual defence. According to the Council: 
"Therefore the Council, set up by the 
treaty, at once established (17th April 
1948) a Western Union Defence Commit-
tee, consisting of the defence ministers of 
the governments concerned. Under the 
auspices of this committee, a permanent 
organisation was set up in September 1948 
to work out the joint defence policy which 
was to be applied by the general staff in 
each country. 
Shortly afterwards (October 1948), a 
Committee of Finance Ministers was 
formed to consider the financial and 
economic aspects of problems arising from 
the organisation of joint defence. 
During the first year of its existence, the 
defence organisation of the five powers 
studied a plan for their common defence, 
including an integrated air defence plan, 
based on the use of radar. It made 
suggestions for the production of arms and 
equipment which involved large-scale appli-
cation of the principle of mutual aid. It set 
up the nucleus of a joint command 
organisation, agreed upon measures for 
training and organised a number of 
combined exercises of land, sea and atr 
forces. 
This 'spade-work' done by the five powers 
was of great assistance, not only in creating 
the atmosphere which made the conclusion 
of the North Atlantic Treaty possible, but 
also in shaping the character of the 
organisation set up under that treaty." 1 
2.3. WUDO in fact created the nucleus of the 
integrated military structure of the future 
NATO with a Military Committee consisting 
of representatives of chiefs of defence staff of 
member countries (with Field-Marshal Mont-
gomery of the United Kingdom as permanent 
chairman, designated senior commander in the 
event of war), with a headquarters at Fontai-
nebleau, and a military infrastructure pro-
gramme with joint financing amounting to £32 
million, including aerodromes and telecom-
munications in France and the Netherlands. By 
decision of the WEU Council, the BTO's 
military archives for the highly innovative 
period 1948-50 were released on 1st March 
1984 for the use of research workers and may 
be consulted at the United Kingdom Public 
Record Office at Kew, near London, in 
accordance with regulations approved by the 
CounciF. 
2.4. Shortly after the North Atlantic Treaty 
was signed on 4th April 1949, the Brussels 
Treaty Organisation decided in its resolution of 
20th December 1950 to transfer the exercise of 
its defence responsibilities to NATO, while 
specifying in paragraph 4 that "these new 
arrangements will in no way affect the 
obligations assumed towards each other by the 
signatory powers under the Brussels Treaty", 
and reserving "the right of the Western Union 
defence ministers and chiefs-of-staff to meet as 
they please to consider matters of mutual 
concern". 
2.5. In view of its importance, it is worth 
quoting the resolution of 20th September 1950: 
"Resolution by the Consultative Council of 
the Brussels Treaty Organisation of 20th 
December 1950 on the future of the 
organisation of western defence in the light 
of the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation military structure 
1. The Consultative Council have con-
sidered the suggestion of the North 
Atlantic Council that the Brussels Treaty 
powers should review the status of the 
Western Union Defence Organisation in 
the light of the establishment of an overall 
North Atlantic Treaty Command Organi-
sation. 
2. The Consultative Council have noted: 
1. Document 17, Reply of the Council to the supplemen-
tary questions in the report of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments, lOth July 1956. 
2. Text at Appendix I. 
133 
DOCUMENT 973 
(i) that it has been decided to dissolve 
the existing European Regional 
Planning Groups with their 
Regional Chiefs-of-Staff and prin-
cipal Staff Officers Committees; 
(ii) the view of the North Atlantic 
Council that, when the new NATO 
Command Organisation is estab-
lished, it will be unnecessary and 
undesirable to have a parallel West-
ern Union Command and that the 
new headquarters suggested for 
Western Europe should be directly 
under SHAPE and should not be 
responsible to the Western Union 
Defence Committee. 
3. The Council agree that, in the light of 
this reorganisation, the continued existence 
of the Western Union Defence Organisa-
tion in its present form is no longer 
necessary. They accordingly instruct the 
Permanent Commission to consider in 
consultation with the Western Union 
Military Committee, acting on the instruc-
tions of the Defence Ministers, how the 
proposed reorganisation 'can best be 
effected and what military machinery, if 
any, needs to be retained under the 
Brussels Treaty. 
4. The Council affirm that these new 
arrangements will in no way affect the 
obligations assumed towards each other by 
the signatory powers under the Brussels 
Treaty. In particular, the Consultative 
Council established under Article VII, 
including the non-military organs set up 
under the Council, will continue to func-
tion, and the reorganisation of the military 
machinery shall not affect the right of the 
Western Union Defence Ministers and 
Chiefs-of-Staff to meet as they please to 
consider matters of mutual concern to the 
Brussels Treaty powers. "3 
2.6. In spite of the provisions of paragraph 4 
of the resolution, the ministers of defence and 
chiefs-of-staff have not since had occasion to 
meet in the framework of the Brussels Treaty. 
(b) Tire 1954 modification 
2.7. In October 1950 Mr. Rene Pleven, the 
then French Prime Minister, proposed the 
creation of a "European army" - a proposal 
addressed in the first place to the six parties to 
the European Coal and Steel Community, and 
seen as a further step on the road to European 
3. Published originally in the committee's report "State 
of European defence", Document 29, 3rd October 1956. 
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integration associated in particular with Mr. 
Jean Monnet, Mr. Robert Schuman, Foreign 
Minister of France, Mr. Alcide de Gasperi of 
Italy and Chancellor Adenauer of Germany. 
Other preoccupations of the time combined to 
make a defence community a logical step along 
the "functional" road to European integration. 
The force goals agreed in the NATO frame-
work, particularly on the central front, could 
not be met by the then 14 members of NATO; 
there was a growing demand for a German 
defence contribution, particularly from the 
United States. In the absence of agreement 
with the Soviet Union on a German peace 
treaty, and reunification of the two parts of 
Germany under democratically elected institu-
tions, there was growing pressure for the 
restauration of full sovereignty to the Federal 
Republic. A European defence community was 
seen as the best framework in which a sovereign 
Federal Republic could make a defence contri-
bution which would be integrated in both the 
European community and the NATO military 
structure. 
2.8. The treaty of the European Defence 
Community, signed by the six parties to the 
Coal and Steel Community on 27th May 1952, 
was accompanied by a treaty between the six 
signatories and the United Kingdom and by a 
protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty signed by 
the then 14 parties to the latter, both of which 
contained mutual defence guarantees. The 
military provisions of the EDC Treaty itself 
provided that homogenous national units would 
not exceed in size a division of 15,000 men, or 
equivalent for air force and navy, and that the 
various divisions within an army corps would be 
of different nationality; all the community 
forces were committed to NATO. Separate 
national forces could be raised only for the 
defence of any overseas territories or for United 
Nations and similar international missions. 
Article 107 on the production of military 
equipment provided at Annex I a list of ABC 
weapons and virtually all conventional military 
equipment which could be manufactured only 
under the direct authority of the commissariat 
established by the treaty. Appendix 11 to that 
article comprised a list of ABC weapons and 
certain major conventional weapons which 
would not be manufactured in "strategically 
exposed areas" which it was agreed the territory 
of Germany constituted. An unpublished special 
agreement annexed to the treaty was said to 
limit the future forces of the Republic of 
Germany to an army of 12 divisions, a tactical 
air force of about 1,350 aircraft, and a navy of 
light, coastal defence and escort vessels. 
2.9. Following the failure of the French 
National Assembly to ratify the EDC Treaty 
on 30th August 1954, a nine-power conference 
of the six parties to the treaty, Canada, the 
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United Kingdom and the United States was 
convened in London from 28th September to 
3rd October that year to deal with "the most 
important issues facing the western world, 
security and European integration within the 
framework of a developing Atlantic community 
dedicated to peace and freedom. In this 
connection, the conference considered how to 
ensure the full association of the Federal 
Republic of Germany with the West and the 
German defence contribution". The London 
conference agreed: 
(i) on the termination of the occupation 
regime in the Federal Republic of 
Germany; 
(ii) that the Federal Republic and Italy 
would accede to the Brussels Treaty 
which would be strengthened and 
extended and would provide both for 
limitations on the forces of member 
countries similar to those of the EDC, 
and include an agency for the control 
of armaments to apply controls based 
on those of the annexes to Article 1 07 
of the EDC Treaty; 
(iii) the United States, the United Kingdom 
and Canada gave assurances concern-
ing their intention to maintain forces in 
Europe; 
(iv) the participants recommended that the 
Federal Republic be invited to accede 
to the North Atlantic Treaty and that 
NATO be reinforced, in particular by 
placing all forces of NATO countries 
on the continent of Europe under the 
authority of SACEUR with the excep-
tion of those which NATO recognised 
as suitable to remain under national 
control. 
2.1 0. The nine-power conference reconvened 
in Paris in October, where the North Atlantic 
Council also met. The work of the London 
conference was concluded in the following 
agreements: 
- protocol on the termination of the 
occupational regime in the Federal 
Republic; 
- convention on the presence of foreign 
forces in the German Federal Repu-
blic; 
- Protocols Nos. I, 11, Ill and IV 
modifying and extending the Brussels 
Treaty; 
- resolution of the North Atlantic 
Council to implement Section 4 of 
the final act of the London confe-
rence. 
(c) Tire scope of tire 1954 revision 
2.11. The outcome of the 1954 conferences 
was to replace the failed EDC Treaty with a 
new European defence structure whereby cer-
tain key provisions of that treaty, with 
modifications, were incorporated in the modified 
Brussels Treaty signed on 23rd October, and 
others in the North Atlantic Council resolution 
adopted the previous day. The "supranational" 
provisions of the EDC Treaty, however, largely 
disappeared, although traces of them can still 
be found in the modified Brussels Treaty which 
provides, in some cases, for Council decisions to 
be taken by majority vote. In particular, the 
limits on force levels and the internal arms 
controls provisions of the EDC Treaty were 
largely incorporated in the modified Brussels 
Treaty; provision for the integration of units of 
different natio1 .alities - at army corps level 
rather than the divisional level prescribed in the 
EDC Treaty - and the obligation to commit all 
forces 1 to the integrated command were incor-
porated in the North Atlantic Council resolu-
tion. 
(d) Tire modified Brussels Treaty 
2.12. The effects of the 1954 modifications to 
the Brussels Treaty can be summarised as 
follows: 
(i) the Federal Republic of Germany and 
Italy acceded to the Brussels Treaty; 
(ii) the references to the possibility of a 
renewal by Germany of a policy of 
aggression was replaced by a passage 
in the preamble expressing the resolu-
tion of the parties: "to promote the 
unity and to encourage the progressive 
integration of Europe"; 
(iii) a new Article IV was inserted making 
the links with NATO clear: 
"In the execution of the treaty, the 
high contracting parties and any organs 
established by them under the treaty 
shall work in close co-operation with 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisa-
tion. 
Recognising the undesirability of dupli-
cating the military staffs of NATO, the 
Council and its Agency will rely on the 
l. "With the exception of those forces intended for the 
defence of overseas territories and other forces which the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation has recognised or will 
recognise as suitable to remain under national command" 
(North Atlantic Council resolution to implement Section IV 
of the Final Act of the London Conference adopted in 
London on 22nd October 1954). 
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appropriate military authorities of 
NATO for information and advice on 
military matters." 
Throughout the treaty and its protocols 
some 30 references to NATO, its 
commanders and institutions, provide 
for NATO to be an agent of execution 
for military matters referred to in the 
treaty, especially as far as force levels 
and arms controls are concerned; 
(iv) the mutual defence obligations of the 
original treaty are maintained unmo-
dified, becoming Article V of the new 
treaty: 
"If any of the high contracting parties 
should be the object of an armed attack 
in Europe, the other high contracting 
parties will, in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 51 of the Charter 
of the United Nations, afford the party 
so attacked all the military and other 
aid and assistance in their power." 
While mutual defence obligations are 
geographically restricted to the case 
"of an armed attack in Europe", the 
corresponding provisions for consulta-
tion retained from the original treaty 
in the renumbered Article VIII are not 
so restricted: 
"At the request of any of the high 
contracting parties the Council shall be 
immediately convened in order to 
permit them to consult with regard to 
any situation which may constitute a 
threat to peace, in whatever area this 
threat should arise, or a danger to 
economic stability."; 
(v) the "Consultative Council" of the 
original treaty becomes known as the 
"Council of Western European Union", 
intended now as an organ of execution. 
The enlarged article, now number VIII, 
provides specifically that the Council 
"shall set up such subsidiary bodies as 
may be considered necessary" and 
paragraph 4 of that article recalls the 
various majority voting procedures for 
cases provided for in the protocols to 
the treaty: 
"The Council shall decide by unani-
mous vote questions for which no other 
voting procedure has been or may be 
agreed. In the cases provided for in 
Protocols Nos. 11, Ill and IV it will 
follow the various voting procedures, 
unanimity, two-thirds majority, simple 
majority, laid down therein. It will 
decide by simple majority questions 
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submitted to it by the Agency for the 
Control of Armaments."; 
(vi) A new and laconic Article IX estab-
lished the WEU Assembly for the first 
time which, in the mind of the 
ministers, authors of the modifications, 
was designed chiefly as an extra 
safeguard in the arms controls proce-
dures: 
"The Council of Western European 
Union shall make an annual report on 
its activities and in particular concern-
ing the control of armaments to an 
Assembly composed of representatives 
of the Brussels Treaty powers to the 
Consultative Assembly of the Council 
of Europe."; 
(vii) A new Protocol No. 11 to the treaty, on 
forces of Western European Union, 
lays down in particular maximum levels 
of ground and air forces on the 
mainland of Europe, and of naval 
forces, which the parties may commit 
to NATO -levels which may be varied 
only by the WEU Council or by the 
North Atlantic Council. The protocol 
was to be supplemented by a subse-
quent agreement on force levels. 
In addition, Protocol No. 11 contains i11 
its Article VI the important undertak-
ing by the United Kingdom whereby 
that country "will continue to maintain 
on the mainland of Europe, including 
Germany, the effective strength of the 
United Kingdom forces which are now 
assigned to the Supreme Allied Com-
mander Europe, that is to say four 
divisions and the tactical air force, or 
such other forces as the Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe regards as having 
equivalent fighting capacity. She under-
takes not to withdraw these forces 
against the wishes of the majority of 
the high contracting parties . . . This 
undertaking shall not however bind her 
in the event of an acute overseas 
emergency. If the maintenance of the 
United Kingdom forces on the main-
land of'Europe throws at any time too 
great a strain on the external finances 
of the United Kingdom, she will ... 
invite the North Atlantic Council to 
review the financial conditions on which 
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the United Kingdom formations are 
maintained" 1; 
(viii) Protocol No. Ill on the control of 
armaments and Protocol No. IV estab-
lishing the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments formed the bases of the 
arms control regime established in the 
framework of the Brussels Treaty, 
largely taken from corresponding pro-
visions in the EDC Treaty. The scope 
of these provisions is described below. 
2.13. Explicit in the text of the modified 
Brussels Treaty was the requirement for the 
seven parties to agree a number of subsidiary 
measures, by Council resolution and by the 
conclusion of further agreements, to provide in 
more detail for the implementation of the force 
level provisions of Protocol No. 11 and the arms 
control provisions of Protocols Nos. Ill and IV. 
There was a further undertaking by the seven 
governments in the framework of the nine-
power conference to set up a working group to 
study French proposals on the production and 
standardisation of armaments which led even-
tually to the establishment of the WEU 
Standing Armaments Committee. 
(e) United States message to WEU 
2.14. A final component of the 1954 agree-
ments was the message, foreshadowed in the 
final act of the London conference, addressed 
by the United States President to the seven 
parties to the modified Brussels Treaty on 1Oth 
March 1955, before ratification of the modifi-
cations to the Brussels Treaty had been 
completed - they entered into force on 6th 
l. This undertaking, supranational in character, since the 
forces will not be withdrawn "against the wishes of the 
majority of the high contracting parties" should be 
compared with the much less far-reaching unilateral 
declaration of British policy made on the occasion of the 
signature of the convention between the United Kingdom 
and the parties to the European Defence Community on 
13th April 1954. That unilateral declaration of policy 
provided in particular: 
"(b) The United Kingdom will continue to maintain on the 
mainland of Europe, including Germany, such units of its 
armed forces as may be necessary and appropriate to 
contribute its fair share of the forces needed for the joint 
defence of the North Atlantic area, and will continue to 
deploy such forces in accordance with agreed North 
Atlantic Treaty strategy for the defence of this area. H.M. 
Government have no intention of withdrawing from the 
continent of Europe so long as the threat exists to the 
security of Western Europe and of the EDC. 
(d) In order to promote the integration of the armed forces 
placed under the command of the supreme Allied 
Commander, Europe, the UK agrees to the inclusion, if the 
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, so requests, of British 
army formations and air force units in European formations, 
and vice versa, where military considerations make this 
desirable and logistic considerations make it practicable." 
May 1955. The message affirmed inter alia that 
when the Paris Agreements entered into force 
it would be the policy of the United States: ' 
(i) to continue to be active in NATO and 
to consult on questions of force levels; 
(ii) to consult with the WEU Arms Control 
Agency to assist in preventing unjusti-
fied military preparations; 
(iii) to continue to maintain armed forces 
in Europe, including Germany "while 
a threat to that area exists"; 
(iv) to co-operate in developing the closest 
possible integration among the forces 
assigned to NATO; 
(v) to continue to share information on 
new weapons as authorised by Con-
gress; 
(vi) to regard any action threatening West-
ern Europe as a threat to the North 
Atlantic Treaty parties calling for 
consultation under Article IV of the 
North Atlantic Treaty. 
The message concluded by recalling that the 
North Atlantic Treaty was regarded as of 
indefinite duration. 
(/) The North Atlantic Council resolution 
2.15. The North Atlantic Council "resolution 
to implement Section IV of the final act of the 
London conference"' adopted in Paris on 22nd 
October 1954, the day before the signature of 
the _Protocols modifying the Brussels Treaty, 
provided the NATO counterpart to Article IV 
and other provisions of the modified Brussels 
Treaty, which made NATO an agent of 
execution for military matters, especially as far 
as force levels and arms controls were con-
cerned. Paragraphs 3, 6 and 14 of the resolution 
provide for NATO authorities to take the 
necessary action to implement those Brussels 
Treaty provisions. 
2.16. The North Atlantic Council resolution 
further incorporates undertakings on the inte-
gration of forces modelled on, but less far-
reaching than those of the EDC Treaty. In 
particular, paragraph 4 provides that all forces 
of member nations shall be placed under the 
authority of an appropriate NATO commander 
with the exception of forces for the defence of 
overseas territories "and other forces which the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation has recog-
1. Text reproduced in the Assembly's edition of the 
Brussels Treaty: "the texts of the treaty, the protocols and 
ot~~r documents concerning WEU", page 156 of latest 
ed1t10n. 
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nised or will recognise as suitable to remain 
under national command". Paragraph 7 of the 
resolution provides that forces under SACEUR 
shall be deployed in accordance with NATO 
strategy; s~all be loca~ed a~ determined by 
SACEUR m consultatiOn with the national 
a~thorities, and shall not be redeployed without 
~Is consent. Paragraph 8 provides that integra-
tion of forces at army group and tactical air 
force level shall be maintained but that 
integration at lower levels shall be' achieved to 
the maximum extent possible. The increased 
logistic responsibilities to be conferred on 
SACEUR by paragraphs 9 and 10 of the 
resolution are referred to in a separate study 
arranged by the committee2• Finally, paragraph 
13 of the resolution confirms that the powers of 
SACEUR in peacetime "extend not only to the 
organisation into an effective integrated force 
of the forces based under him, but also to their 
training ... ". SACEUR has "direct control over 
the higher training of all national forces 
assigned to his command ... It should be 
recalled that none of these provisions applies to 
French forces since France's withdrawal from 
the NATO integrated military bodies in 1966. 
French forces are therefore supervised only• by 
WEU officials." 
(g) The arms control provisions of the modified Brussels 
Treaty 
2.17. The arms control provisions of the 
modified Brussels Treaty were at the centre of 
the 1954 discussions and, if only for historical 
reasons, are worth describing - especially as 
the Assembly was set up by the ministers 
chiefly with a view to supervising the application 
of the controls. There does not appear to have 
been an historical precedent or an arms control 
arrangement within the alliance to ensure 
against militarism on the part of any member. 
2.18. The official texts incorporating the arms 
control provisions are: Protocol No. Ill on the 
control of armaments; Protocol No. IV on the 
Agency of Western European Union for the 
Control of Armaments; the regulations drawn 
up in execution of Article XI of Protocol No. 
IV, approved by resolution of the Council on 
3rd May 1956; the resolution of the Council to 
implement Article XXI of Protocol No. IV 
adopted by the Council on 18th September 
1957; and the "Convention concerning measures 
to be taken by member states of Western 
European Union in order to enable the Agency 
for the Contr?l of Armaments to carry out its 
control effectively, and making provision for 
due process of law in accordance with Protocol 
2 .. Study on collective logistical support, Document 966, 
by Lieutenant General C.J. Dijkstra. 
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No. IV of the Brussels Treaty ... ", signed by 
the seven parties in Paris on 14th December 
1957. In addition, the Council on 24th May 
1963, in reply to Written Question 56 put by a 
representative to the Assembly, clarified the 
definition of atomic weapon as used in Protocol 
No. Ill. 
2.19. It should be noted that the convention 
" ... to enable the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments to carry out its control effectively 
... " has not entered into force because it has 
been ratified only by Belgium, Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom. Successive annual reports of the 
Council have drawn the attention of the 
Assembly to the shortcomings that result from 
the non-entry into force of that convention, and 
to the fact that the Council has never authorised 
the Agency for the Control of Armaments to 
apply controls to nuclear weapons or biological 
weapons. 
2.20. The arms control arrangements pre-
scribed by the foregoing texts can be summar-
ised as follows: 
(i) Germany has given a unilateral under-
taking not to manufacture atomic, 
biological or chemical weapons on its 
territory; 
(ii) Germany has given a further unilateral 
undertaking not to manufacture on its 
territory certain conventional weapons 
specified in the list at Annex Ill to 
Protocol No. Ill. That list, however, 
may be amended or cancelled by the 
Council if, "in accordance with the 
needs of the armed forces" a recom-
mendation is made by SACEUR and 
a request submitted by Germany. That 
list has, in fact, been reduced by the 
Council on ten occasions between 1958 
and 1980; 
(iii) the Council is to determine the level of 
stocks of atomic, biological and chem-
ical weapons which countries may hold 
on the mainland of Europe when 
"effective production" has started; 
(iv) atomic, biological and chemical 
weapons, and significant conventional 
weapons, all specified in the list at 
Annex IV to Protocol No. Ill, held by 
members of WEU on the mainland of 
Europe, are subject to control. That list 
may be varied by the Council by 
unanimous decision, but has not yet 
been modified since the list was 
originally agreed in 19541• 
l. The Council is still considering the Assembly's 
proposal in Recommendation 380, adopted on 15th June 
1982, that it should "vary by reducing" that list. 
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2.21. Protocol No. IV of the modified Brussels 
Treaty provides for the application of controls 
through various procedures. First, governments 
submit to the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments a statement of their requirements, 
holdings and procurement programmes in 
respect of the armaments subject to control 
specified at Annex IV to Protocol No. Ill, 
together with the names and locations of the 
depots and manufacturing plants concerned. 
Apart from atomic, biological and chemical 
weapons, of which the Council alone determines 
by majority vote the level of stocks the parties 
may hold on the mainland of Europe, the 
"appropriate levels" of armaments subject to 
control are then agreed or accepted by the 
Agency .in accordance with various procedures 
laid down in Protocol No. IV. "Appropriate 
levels" for equipment for forces committed to 
NATO are determined chiefly through the 
NATO annual review process. 
2.22. Controls are then carried out to ensure 
that "appropriate levels" of armaments are not 
exceeded. The Agency examines budgetary and 
other statistical information from governments 
and from NATO to ensure that there are no 
discrepancies with levels of stocks reported by 
member governments. NATO carries out test 
checks, visits and inspections with respect to 
forces and depots under NATO authority. The 
Agency carries out similar test checks, visits 
and inspections at other depots and forces, and 
at production plants. It also carries out non-
production controls at plants in Germany which 
might be capable of producing armaments 
which that country has undertaken not to 
produce on its territory. 
Limitations 
2.23. The controls provided for in the modified 
Brussels Treaty are extensive; however, they 
have been applied only to a limited extent. As 
the convention for the due process of law 
referred to in paragraph 2.18 has not entered 
into force, the control measures carried out by 
the Agency at private concerns take the form 
of "agreed control measures". "One consequence 
of this situation is that, in order to obtain the 
agreement of the firms concerned, the Agency 
has to give a few weeks' notice"2• This limitation 
applies to any visits to private production plants, 
including the agreed control measures carried 
out in certain chemical plants in Germany to 
verify the non-production of chemical weapons. 
It is understood that, in the absence of other 
guarantees provided in the convention, the 
Agency's inspectors are not able to take samples 
of materials during such visits. The Agency has 
2. Annual report of the Council, 1980, Document 833. 
never been authorised by the Council to carry 
out any controls on atomic or biological 
weapons. The committee's understanding of the 
extent to which controls are applied in practice 
is mentioned in paragraph 3.11. 
2.24. It is important to understand the scope 
of the controls agreed in 1954 in the context of 
the political compromise reached at that time, 
designed chiefly to reduce the discrimination 
against Germany which alone renounced the 
right to produce on its territory atomic, 
biological and chemical weapons, and the 
conventional weapons specified in Annex Ill to 
Protocol No. Ill. Quantitative controls on the 
levels of weapons specified in Annex IV to 
Protocol No. Ill- ABC weapons and the larger 
conventional weapons - were to be controlled 
on the territory of all member countries "on the 
mainland of Europe"- a proviso that exempted 
the territory of the United Kingdom from the 
application of controls. That country, however, 
is the only country which undertakes, in 
Article VI of Protocol No. 11, to maintain on 
the mainland of Europe, including Germany, 
specified minimum forces which were assigned 
to SACEUR. While this minimum has been 
successively reduced by Council decision from 
the original four divisions and the second 
tactical air force, to the present 55,000 men for 
the ground forces and the same tactical air 
force, the United Kingdom remains the only 
country to be committed under the Brussels 
Treaty to maintaining minimum force levels. 
(h) The Standing Armaments Committee 
2.25. The last item in the modification of the 
Brussels Treaty, inherent in the London confer-
ence undertaking to study a French draft 
directive submitted on 1st October 1954, was 
the decision taken by the Council on 7th May 
1955 - the day after the modifications to the 
treaty entered into force - establishing a 
Standing Armaments Committee. According to 
paragraph 10 of that decision, this committee 
"shall, in close relation with the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation, seek to improve consulta-
tion and co-operation in the sphere of arma-
ments with a view to finding joint solutions 
which would assist governments of member 
countries in meeting their equipment require-
ments. To that end it shall encourage, on a case 
by case basis, agreements or arrangements on 
such subjects as the development, standardisa-
tion, production and procurement of armaments 
... ". Paragraph 1 provided that "in order that 
the closest contact may be maintained with the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation the Stand-
ing Armaments Committee's seat shall be in 
Paris" and paragraph 2 that "in order to ensure 
continuity, member countries will maintain 
permanent delegates at the seat of the commit-
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tee, who may also be members of their 
delegation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organ-
isation". 
Ill. The nolution of WEU 1954-82 
(a) CollectiPe defence 
3.1. Following the transformation of the 
original Brussels Treaty Organisation into 
Western European Union in 1954, the inter-
governmental organisation had a number of 
functions in the non-military field, the most 
important of which was that the Council served 
as the chief point of contact between the six 
original members of the European Community 
and the United Kingdom, prior to the accession 
of the latter to the Community in January 
1973. As far as defence questions are concerned, 
however, it is not an exaggeration to say that 
the Council's view as to the desirable extent of 
its activities has been influenced to a large 
extent by the Assembly. 
3.2. Established, almost casually, by the 
laconic Article IX of the modified treaty, 
composed of representatives to the Consultative 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, receiving 
an annual report from the Council on its 
activities, and in particular concerning the 
control of armaments, the Assembly had been 
viewed by the ministers who created it as a 
part-time appendage to the Council of Europe's 
Assembly, to be used as a public parliamentary 
forum through which it would be seen that the 
arms control provisions of the Brussels Treaty 
were duly implemented by the Council. The 
first annual report of the Council to the 
Assembly1 had sections on cultural and social 
problems, on the Saar, brief sections on the 
Agency for the Control of Armaments and the 
Standing Armaments Committee, but contained 
no reference to the collective defence provisions 
of the modified Brussels Treaty or to any 
Council activity in this field. The Council held 
that such responsibilities had been transferred 
to NATO by its decision of 1950. 
3.3. The Assembly, when set up, from the 
outset took a different view of its responsibilities. 
It was first convened at the seat of the Council 
of Europe in Strasbourg on 5th July 1955 and 
decided early on, in discussing its Charter and 
Rules of Procedure, to establish the Committee 
on Defence Questions and Armaments which, 
in its first report on the activity of Western 
European Union in the sphere of security and 
1. Document 3, 22nd October 1955. 
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the production and control of armaments 1 
asserted "36. One of the purposes of this report 
is to stimulate discussion in the Assembly 
concerning the role of WEU in the field of 
security". The committee was dissatisfied with 
the attitude of the Council in replying to 34 
questions the committee had earlier put to the 
Council. While the first 32 dealt with the 
activities of the Standing Armaments Commit-
tee and the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments, the last under the heading of 
"General questions concerning the progress 
made in the sphere of European defence and 
security" dealt with the development by the 
Soviet Union of an ICBM with a thermonuclear 
warhead. The only response to that question 
was: "The Council is unable to answer this 
question". In its reply to supplementary ques-
tions in the committee's report, the Council 
subsequently asserted that: 
"4. At present, WEU should be regarded 
only as the repositary of the solemn 
undertaking to afford mutual assistance 
embodied in Article V of the revised 
Brussels Treaty and the guardian of the 
procedure laid down in Article VIII. ... 
Therefore all questions relating to the 
maintenance and the defence of peace in 
Western Europe are, and in the present 
circumstances should remain, the responsi-
bility of NATO ... The Council ... consider 
the Assembly as a part - though an 
independent part - of WEU as a whole 
and its very useful function of debating 
WEU activities could, in the opinion of the 
Council, only be weakened if the Assembly 
were to take up the problems which are 
not dealt with by the Council and which 
therefore could not be the subject of 
exchanges of views between the Assembly 
and the Council. This applies notably to 
the activities of the member states within 
NATO. Giving information on these activ-
ities would mean that the Council would 
have to discuss them first which, ... they 
are not in a position to do. The governments 
of member states within NATO act not as 
WEU members but as individual govern-
ments which are responsible only to their 
national parliaments. "2 
3.4. Within a year, however, at the urging of 
the committee, endorsed by the Assembly, the 
Council had changed its mind: "the Council 
appreciate the Assembly's desire to consider 
broader aspects of defence than those to which 
the Council must limit themselves, and to 
I. Rapporteur Mr. Fens, Document 12, 17th April 1956. 
2. Reply of the Council to the supplementary questions 
in the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments, Document 17, lOth July 1956. 
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debate these activities against the background 
of a general policy"3• The Council at that time 
made arrangements for NATO to supply 
information to the Council on defence matters 
to enable the latter to reply to recommendations 
from the Assembly. At the same time, in the 
longest annual report (180 pages) ever submit-
ted to the Assembly, the Council considered 
" ... that the activities of the Council in the field 
of defence questions and armaments relate to: 
(a) matters which the contracting parties 
wish to raise, especially under Article 
VIII; 
(b) the level of forces of member states 
(Protocol No. II); 
(c) the maintenance of certain United 
Kingdom forces on the continent; 
(d) the Agency for the Control of Arma-
ments; 
(e) the Standing Armaments Committee." 
3.5. Despite opposition from the Council, 
which had sought to ensure that only an 
authorised spokesman conveying the agreed 
collective views of the Council could give 
evidence to it, the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments soon established its 
right to be addressed by ministers of national 
governments and by senior officers of the armed 
services of the member countries or of NATO. 
The Assembly transferred the Office of the 
Clerk from Strasbourg to Paris where the 
Agency for the Control of Armaments and the 
secretariat of the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee had already been established, at that 
time occupying premises in the same temporary 
building as that of NATO Headquarters. The 
Assembly shortly afterwards abandoned the 
practice of meeting in the premises of the 
Council of Europe, and formally amended its 
Charter to state that its seat was in Paris. 
3.6. In the following years since 1957 the 
committee has reported on every aspect of 
collective defence. While the activities of the 
Council in the sphere of defence have remained 
unchanged since the 1957 decision, the Council 
in recent years has nevertheless engaged in a 
full dialogue with the Assembly through its 
written replies to Assembly recommendations 
and written questions on all aspects of collective 
defence even if these replies have not always 
been found satisfactory. 
(b) Arms control and the Brussels Treaty 
3.7. The attitude of the Assembly, on reports 
from the Committee on Defence Questions and 
3. Second annual report of the Council, Document 37, 
25th February 1957. 
Armaments, to the application of the arms 
control provisions of the modified Brussels 
Treaty has changed considerably since the 
earlier years. 
3.8. At the outset it appeared to the Assembly 
that the Council was being dilatory in applying 
the full provisions of the treaty concerning 
levels of forces and arms controls. Recommen-
dations adopted on reports from the committee 
called for urgent action by the Council to apply 
the provisions of the treaty. Typical is Recom-
mendation 29 1: 
"Considering that the activities of the 
Agency for the Control of Armaments in 
1957 must be examined with the reserva-
tion that some of the legal instruments 
called for in the protocols to the modified 
Brussels Treaty are not yet in force; 
Considering that by virtue of its duties and 
the most encouraging results already 
achieved the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments constitutes a most valuable 
experiment with a view to the future 
controlled limitation or reduction of arma-
ments on a wider scale, in territories 
outside the WEU countries, 
EXPRESSES THE OPINION 
That the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments carried out its functions satis-
factorily during 1957, 
RECOMMENDS TO THE COUNCIL 
1. That by May 1959 it should fix, in 
accordance with Article V of Protocol No. 
11 of the modified Brussels Treaty, the 
strengths and armaments of the internal 
defence and police forces on the mainland 
of Europe; 
2. That it should now apply Article Ill of 
Protocol No. Ill as far as possible so that 
levels of stocks of any atomic, biological or 
chemical weapons produced by the conti-
nental members may be duly controlled by 
the Agency immediately effective produc-
tion commences; 
" 
3.9. By the mid-1960s it was becoming clear 
that the policy of at least certain member 
governments did not permit the Council to 
apply the arms control provisions as provided 
for in the treaty. The Assembly fulfilled the 
role foreseen for it in Article IX of the treaty 
I. Adopted on 18th December 1958 on the report from 
the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on 
the activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments 
and the Standing Armaments Committee. 
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in drawing public attention to these shortcom-
ings, calling for the full application of the 
provisions of the treaty, but at the same time in 
making constructive suggestions to alleviate 
certain of the discriminations inherent in the 
treaty, with a view to making the application of 
the controls politically acceptable to all member 
states. Recommendation 93 is representative of 
the committee's thinking at that time2: 
"Reviewing the application of the amended 
Brussels Treaty in the light of the eighth 
annual report of the Council; 
Aware that one of its tasks, stemming from 
the treaty itself, is to ensure the application 
of the treaty, in particular concerning the 
control of armaments; 
Deeply concerned to note that the pro-
visions of the treaty regarding the levels of 
forces and the control of armaments, 
particularly nuclear weapons, are still not 
applied in accordance with the treaty which 
has been in force for more than eight 
years; 
Noting that the Government of the United 
Kingdom has recognised that it has not 
maintained the level of British forces on 
the continent at the minimum of 55,000 
men fixed by the Council, and has 
undertaken to bring these forces up to 
strength; 
Noting that the convention making pro-
vision for due process of law, signed in 
Paris on 14th December 1957, has still not 
been ratified by France and Italy3, and 
that until it enters into force the Agency 
for the Control of Armaments cannot fulfil 
its duties in the manner prescribed by the 
treaty; 
Further noting that the obligation imposed 
on the Council under Article Ill of Protocol 
No. Ill of the treaty to decide the level of 
stocks of atomic weapons that a member 
country will be allowed to hold when 
effective production has started on its 
territory is not subject to notification of 
production by the country concerned, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. With a view to eliminating cases of 
non-application of the treaty noted by the 
Assembly in the field of armaments control: 
2. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th June 1963 on the 
report of the committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments "Application of the Brussels Treaty ... ", Rap-
porteur Mr. Housiaux, Document 267. 
3. Italy ratified the convention on 22nd September 1966. 
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(a) urge the governments of France and 
Italy to accelerate the procedure for 
ratification of the convention of 
14th December 1957; 
(b) authorise forthwith the abovementioned 
Agency to recruit atomic experts and 
to prepare the visits and controls 
necessary for the verification of levels 
of stocks and non-production of atomic 
weapons laid down in the treaty; 
2. With a view to removing the political 
obstacles to the application of the treaty 
arising from the discrimination contained 
therein, study the possibility of amending 
the treaty: 
(a) by extending armaments control mea-
sures to the territories of all member 
countries; 
(b) by making it compulsory for all 
member countries to maintain on the 
continent at the disposal of SACEUR, 
minimum force levels calculated to 
make a fair contribution to the force 
levels to be maintained on the central 
front." 
At the same time, the Assembly supported the 
various amendments being made by the Council 
from time to time to the list at Annex Ill to 
Protocol No. Ill to the treaty, with a view to 
permitting Germany to manufacture various 
categories of conventional weapons necessary 
for collective defence. 
3.10. By the late 1970s, however, the commit-
tee had come to doubt the usefulness of the 
controls. A draft recommendation submitted tG 
the Assembly in 1978 read: "Noting that the 
armaments control provisions of the Brussels 
Treaty are incompletely applied and that the 
usefulness of those that are applied is con-
tested"1 although the Assembly deleted the 
proviso "that the usefulness of those that are 
applied is contested" in adopting the text as 
Recommendation 320. The committee, at the 
same time, was calling for the levels of United 
Kingdom forces maintained on the continent 
under the terms of Article VI of Protocol No. 
II to be published in Council reports, a request 
to which the Council acceded fully for the first 
time in its twenty-fifth annual report for the 
year 1979 communicated to the Assembly on 
28th March 1980. 
3.11. The committee has summarised from 
time to time its understanding of the extent to 
I. See the report on the application of the Brussels 
Treaty, Rapporteur Mr. Tanghe, Document 777, 31st May 
1978. 
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which controls were applied. In 1979, for 
example, it reported that: 
"22. In conclusion, the committee believes 
it may be asserted that the controls 
provided for in the modified Brussels 
Treaty are being applied on the mainland 
in respect of aircraft and non-strategic 
missiles capable of carrying nuclear bombs 
and warheads. No controls are applied in 
. respect of the French strategic forces and 
the other European mainland countries 
have no strategic forces. Nuclear bombs 
and warheads in United States custody are 
not subject to control by the Agency."2 
The annual report of the Council the following 
year stated as usual that: 
"The activities of the Agency do not extend 
to nuclear weapons. The non-nuclear 
components of such weapons (namely the 
missiles themselves and other specially 
designed equipment) are subject to control 
except as regards the weapons qualified as 
'strategic' by one member state. Further-
more, as this state has declared that its 
nuclear capability as a whole is directed to 
one and the same objective of deterrence, 
its missiles with nuclear capability and its 
tract launches are no longer subject to 
control."3 
The committee commented: 
"3.2. The Assembly was thus informed 
for the first time that French Pluton 
tactical nuclear missiles had just been 
withdrawn from Agency control. Hitherto 
these missiles (but not their nuclear 
warheads) were controlled by the Agency 
as is still the case for Lance missiles and 
other similar missiles equipping Belgian, 
German, Italian, Netherlands, and United 
Kingdom forces on the mainland of Europe. 
(Nuclear warheads for these missiles, 
which are American property held in 
American depots, are not subject to the 
controls provided for in the treaty.)"4 
3.12. The draft recommendation attached to 
that report recommended that the Council 
"delete paragraph 5 of Annex Ill to Protocol 
No. Ill of the modified Brussels Treaty" - the 
effect of that recommendation was to remove 
the remaining restrictions on the production of 
naval vessels by Germany, and such an 
2. Report on the application of the Brussels Treaty, 
Rapporteur Mr. Tanghe, Document 808, 22nd May 1979. 
3. Twenty-fifth annual report of the Council (for 1979), 
Document 833, 28th March 1980. 
4. Report on the application of the Brussels Treaty, 
Rapporteur Mr. Tanghe, Document 836, 29th April 1980. 
amendment was indeed made by the Council 
on 21st July 1980. 
3.13. Finally, in the historical Recommenda-
tion 380 adopted by the Assembly on 15th 
June 1982, on a report from the committee!, 
the Assembly took a clear stand in favour of 
the removal of controls: 
"(iii) Believing that several arms control 
provisions of the modified Brussels 
Treaty no longer serve any useful 
purpose, and noting the Council's view 
that 'in applying the provisions of 
Protocol No. Ill and its annexes, 
account should be taken, to the fullest 
extent possible, of the evolution of the 
situation in Europe'; 
(iv) Believing therefore that WEU should 
be adapted to meet the requirements of 
the 1980s, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. In application of Article 11 of Protocol 
No. Ill of the modified Brussels Treaty, 
cancel paragraphs IV and VI of the list at 
Annex Ill to Protocol No. Ill; 
2. In application of Article V of Protocol 
No. Ill of the modified Brussels Treaty, 
vary by reducing the list at Annex IV to 
Protocol No. Ill." 
The effect of these recommendations, as far as 
Annex Ill was concerned, was to remove the 
final restrictions on the production of conven-
tional weapons by Germany and, as far as 
Annex IV was concerned, the effect would be 
to reduce the list of weapons of all member 
countries subject to control on the mainland of 
Europe. The restrictions on the production of 
conventional weapons in Germany had already 
been considerably reduced by the Council by 
1980, leaving in effect only long-range missiles 
and bomber aircraft for strategic purposes on 
the prohibited list2• Recommendation 380 is 
still under consideration by the Council; it was 
finally reconfirmed by the Assembly on 
29th November 1983 in Recommendation 397 
which recommended that the Council, in 
considering the list at Annex IV to Protocol 
No. Ill, should take into consideration "the 
possibility of deleting the list concerned except 
for atomic, biological and chemical weapons3", 
l. Application of the Brussels Treaty, Rapporteur Mr. 
Prussen, Document 908, 20th April 1982. 
2. The original list of prohibitions as agreed in 1954, 
compared with the list as it exists today, is attached at 
Appendix 11. 
3. Adopted on the report on the application of the 
Brussels Treaty, Rapporteur Mr. Prussen, Document 948, 
18th May 1983. 
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although the preamble read: "Aware that the 
controls on atomic and biological weapons ... 
have never been applied, but considering in 
present circumstances that it is no longer 
appropriate to apply them". 
(c) The Standing Armaments Committee 
3.14. In 1955 the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee at first discussed very actively the chief 
task it had been set up to perform: " .. .it shall 
encourage ... agreements or arrangements on 
such subjects as the development, standardisa-
tion, production and procurement of armaments. 
These ... would remain open to participation by 
other countries of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation". 
3.15. The Council's annual report for 19574 
showed the Standing Armaments Committee 
had worked chiefly on (i) an exchange of 
information on existing equipment and (ii) the 
definition, production and development of new 
equipment. It was already clear under (i) that 
"there is little chance of arriving at efficacious 
joint production of existing eqqipment". There 
was hope, however, for the joint production of 
standardised new e~uipment, and the report for 
the following year mentioned "two lists of 
equipment submitted by the United Kingdom 
on the one hand and by France, Italy and 
Germany on the other" which "were allocated, 
in accordance with their nature, between the 
appropriate WEU and NATO organisations." 
These lists became known as the "shopping 
lists". 
3.16. Already, however, from the latter report 
it was seen that proposals for the joint 
production of air and naval and some ground 
armaments had been referred to NATO. But 
for some time WEU studied the prospects of 
joint production of : surface-to-surface missiles 
(long-, medium-, and short-range); surface-to-
air weapons; anti-tank weapons; mine detection 
and clearance equipment. In the event progress 
on these items did not go beyond agreement on 
the military characteristics of some of them; 
none reached the stage of joint development, let 
alone production. Nor did many of the items of 
the 1958 "shopping lists" referred to NATO 
fare much better. Actual joint production, when 
agreed, remained largely an ad hoc bi- or 
trilateral affair. 
3.17. During the 1960s the Standing Arma-
ments Committee continued work on agreeing 
the characteristics for various items of army 
equipment, but it is not clear whether any such 
4. Document 79, 21st February 1958. 
5. Document 119, 16th March 1959. 
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agreed characteristics were applied to equip-
ment in production. By the 1970s the activities 
of the Standing Armaments Committee were 
largely those described in the Council's latest 
report discussed in paragraph 4.19. 
IV. The present activities of WEU- the 
annual report of the Council for 1983 
4.1. This chapter discusses the present activi-
ties of the Council as described in the chapters 
of the annual report for 1983 which have been 
referred to the committee: Chapter 11. The 
activities of the Council (B) Defence questions; 
Chapter Ill. The Agency for the Control of 
Armaments; and Chapter IV. The Standing 
Armaments Committee. 
(a) Activities of the Council 
4.2. In the introduction to Chapter 11 the 
Council reports that during 1983 it "ensured 
that the provisions of the modified Brussels 
Treaty and its protocols were applied and 
observed, taking care to avoid- as required by 
the treaty - duplication of work with that in 
which WEU member states participate in other 
international fora". The extent of the Council's 
activity was typical of that in recent years; it 
held one meeting at ministerial level and twelve 
at the level of permanent representatives. 
4.3. At the ministerial meeting there was the 
now customary exchange of views on East-West 
relations and a discussion of the situation in the 
Mediterranean. The ministers also discussed 
proposals concerning the future work of the 
Standing Armaments Committee. At permanent 
level, the Council dealt with more detailed and 
procedural matters concerning the application 
of the Brussels Treaty. It continued its 
examination of modifying the list of types of 
armaments to be controlled at Annex IV to 
Protocol No. Ill- the question had been under 
discussion by the Council since the spring of 
1982 when the Assembly adopted Recommen-
dation 3801• 
Levels of forces 
4.4. During the year the Council went through 
the various procedures now in force to ensure 
that the force ceilings provided for in Protocol 
No. 11 to the Brussels Treaty were not exceeded. 
Under the terms of that protocol and the 
subsequent agreement on the level of forces 
signed on 14th December 1957, the maximum 
I. See paragraph 3.13. 
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levels of forces to be maintained by member 
countries on the mainland are those laid down 
in the unpublished special agreement annexed 
to the unratified EDC Treaty of 27th May 
1952. Under the terms of Protocol No. 11 of the 
Brussels Treaty and the corresponding resolu-
tion of the North Atlantic Council of 22nd 
October 1954, national forces are assigned to 
NATO except those which NATO recognises 
as suitable for remaining under national 
command. The levels of internal defence and 
police forces remaining under national com-
mand are then approved by the WEU Council, 
while SACEUR reports to the WEU Council 
on the level of forces under his command, and 
a meeting in NATO of the representatives of 
the seven WEU countries certifies that the 
NATO annual review does not involve propo-
sals for exceeding the Brussels Treaty force 
limits. The Council reports that "by means of 
the methods set out ... above, the Council have 
been able, in 1983, to carry out their obligations 
under Protocol No. 11 to the modified Brussels 
Treaty concerning levels of forces". The only 
anomaly since 1966 appears to be that France 
does not take part in the meeting at NATO 
Headquarters of the WEU permanent represen-
tatives to NATO, but makes a subsequent 
statement to the WEU Council about French 
forces. The present status of French forces, 
especially those in Germany, is clearly not 
provided for under the terms of the Brussels 
Treaty and North Atlantic Council resolution 
of 1954. Certainly since the withdrawal of 
French forces from NATO command, the WEU 
Council does not appear to have treated them 
as "internal defence and police forces" under 
the terms of Protocol No. 11 and subsequent 
agreements. 
United Kingdom forces on the continent of 
Europe 
4.5. Under Article VI of Protocol No. 11 the 
United Kingdom initially undertook "to main-
tain on the mainland of Europe ... the effective 
strength of the United Kingdom forces which 
are now assigned to the Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe, that is to say four divisions 
and the Second Tactical Air Force, or such 
other forces as the Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe, regards as having equivalent fighting 
capacity ... not to withdraw these forces against 
the wishes of the majority of the high 
contracting parties ... ". Following successive 
decisions of the Council, the level of this 
commitment is now down to 55,000 men plus 
the Second Tactical Air Force. 
4.6. The committee again notes with satisfac-
tion that the information concerning this 
commitment given in the Council's annual 
report for 1983 meets the wishes as expressed 
inter alia in Recommendations 331 and 348. 
The report states in fact that the average 
number of British land forces stationed on the 
mainland of Europe in 1982 in accordance with 
Article VI of Protocol No. 11 was 58,420. 
However, it continues: "The continued need for 
the presence of troops in Northern Ireland 
made it necessary for units of the British Army 
of the Rhine to be redeployed for short tours of 
duty there. In 1983 there were on average 995 
men in Northern Ireland. As has been previously 
stated, these units would be speedily returned 
to their duty station in an emergency affecting 
NATO." It may be deduced that the average 
number of British troops actually stationed in 
Germany was 57,425 men, whereas the com-
mitment is for 55,000. In the previous year, 
59,567 were declared for Germany and 909 for 
Northern Ireland, making an average of 58,885 
actually on the spot. 
4. 7. The annual report again gives details on 
the strength of the United Kingdom's Second 
Tactical Air Force: 
"Furthermore, in accordance with the 
Council's reply to Assembly Recommen-
dation 348, the Government of the United 
Kingdom have informed the Council that 
the strength of the United Kingdom's 
contribution to the Second Tactical Air 
Force in 1983 was: 
Role Aircraft/ Squadrons 
equipment 
Strike/ Attack Buccaneer 1 
Jaguar 4 
Tornado 1 
Offensive 
support Harrier 2 
Reconnaissance Jaguar 1 
Air defence Phantom 2 
Rapier surface-
to-air missiles 4 
Air transport Puma 1 
Chinook 1 
Ground defence RAF regiment 1" 
Compared with 1982, these figures reveal the 
replacement of one Buccaneer squadron by one 
new Tornado squadron, the removal of a 
Bloodhound missile squadron, and the arrival of 
the Chinook helicopters. 
4.8. Although the foregoing statements on 
United Kingdom force levels on the continent 
show that the United Kingdom has more than 
met the current Brussels Treaty commitment of 
55,000 men plus the second TAF in 1981, 1982 
and 1983, the June 1981 white paper "The way 
forward" announced that "(17) BAOR's man-
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power which had been planned to continue to 
increase beyond the 55,000 level, will be held 
at that level". Planned reorganisation of BAOR 
over the period 1983 to April 1984 involves 
both some strenthening of units in Germany 
with armed regiments and Rapier missile units, 
but also net reductions of about 2,000 men 
with one divisional headquarters and an infantry 
battalion being withdrawn to the United 
Kingdom. The committee will wish to be 
assured in future years that the level of 55,000 
men is met, irrespective of any temporary 
deployments to Northern Ireland or elsewhere. 
4.9. The committee recalls that publication in 
the Council's annual reports of the level of 
British forces assigned under Article VI of 
Protocol No. 11 is in no way a requirement 
imposed by the treaty. The United Kingdom 
agreed to include these figures in the annual 
report only in response to Assembly Recom-
mendations 331 and 348, and only after 
repeated requests by the Assembly in several 
consecutive years. The committee sees no reason 
why the other six member countries should not 
agree to include in the annual report similar 
declarations concerning the forces which they 
assign to NATO command or, in the case of 
France, the forces which they maintain in 
Germany and which, according to the Council's 
annual report, are treated by the latter, as far 
as approval of their levels is concerned, in the 
same way as forces under NATO command. 
The committee therefore repeats this proposal 
in the draft recommendation. 
(b) Tire Agency for the Control of Armaments 
4.10. Chapter Ill of the Council's annual 
report on the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments follows, with small differences, 
mentioned below, those of recent years. The 
situation described in the previous chapter 
remains unchanged - the Agency is allowed to 
apply controls only very partially. 
4.11. Like earlier reports, the Council's present 
report refers to fields where the Agency does 
not exercise its activities: 
"B. Situation concerning the control of 
atomic, chemical and biological weapons 
1. Atomic weapons 
Since the situation has remained the same 
as in previous years, the Agency did not 
exercise any control in the field of atomic 
weapons. 
2. Biological weapons 
All the member countries again gave their 
agreement, for 1983, on the renewal of the 
list of biological weapons subject to control 
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as accepted by the Council in 1981. The 
Council noted the fact. 
As in previous years, however, the Agency 
did not exercise any control in the field of 
biological weapons." 
Previous Council reports have included a 
statement to the effect that: 
"The non-nuclear components of such 
(nuclear) weapons (namely the missiles 
themselves and other specially designed 
equipment) are subject to control except as 
regards the weapons qualified as 'strategic' 
by one member state. Furthermore, as this 
state has declared that its nuclear capa-
bility as a whole is directed to one and the 
same objective of deterrence, its missiles 
with nuclear capability and traced laun-
chers are no longer subject to control." 1 
The committee has noted2 that the state in 
question was France and that Pluton tactical 
nuclear missiles had been withdrawn from 
Agency control as from 1979. 
4.12. As far as chemical weapons are con-
cerned, the report shows that quantitative 
controls are not applicable because all countries 
have reported that they hold no stock: 
"In addition, the Agency asked the member 
states, in the covering letter to its question-
naire, to declare any chemical weapons 
that they might hold, whatever their origin. 
Since all the member states replied in the 
negative, the Agency carried out no 
quantitative controls of chemical weapons 
in 1983." 
However, the report for 1983 regrettably omits 
the very important reservation contained in all 
recent annual reports: 
"As the convention for the due process of 
law3 has not yet entered into force, the 
control measures carried out by the Agency 
at private concerns had, in 1982, as in 
previous years, to take the form of 'agreed 
control measures'. 
One consequence of this situation is that, 
in order to obtain the agreement of the 
firms concerned, the Agency has to give a 
few weeks' notice. Since this agreement 
I. Document 833, 28th March 1980. 
2. Document 875, 4th May 1981. 
3. Convention concerning measures to be taken by 
member states of Western European Union in order to 
enable the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry 
out its control effectively and making provision for due 
process of law, in accordance with Protocol No. IV of the 
Brussels Treaty, as modified by the Protocols signed in 
Paris on 23rd October 1954 (signed in Paris on 14th 
December 1957). 
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has never been withheld, the 1982 pro-
gramme of control measures at privately-
owned plants was therefore drawn up with 
full confidence that it could be implemented 
as in previous years." 
With that severe limitation, the Agency con-
ducted an "agreed verification visit" to a 
chemical manufacturing plant in Germany. 
4.13. The annual report points out that 
(although no qt,la'ntitative biological or chemical 
weapons controls are carried out) the lists of 
biological and chemical weapons subject to 
control, agreed and amended by the Council in 
earlier years, were renewed for 1983. The 
original versions of these lists were reported to 
the Assembly in earlier years, and the amended 
list of chemicals has been communicated to and 
published by SIPRI\ these amended lists have 
not been communicated to the Assembly, 
despite the reiterated requests of the Assembly. 
Activities of the Agency 
4.14. Although the WEU controls have lost 
their usefulness, and the Agency's true areas of 
activity remain limited solely to conventional 
weapons, the number of inspections carried out 
by the Agency each year shows that generally 
speaking there has been no reduction in its 
activities, as may be seen from the following 
table. 
4.15. The committee has found particularly 
useful the lists of armaments currently being 
produced, set out in Section E "State and 
problems of control in certain particular fields" 
in earlier reports which gave a summary of 
current armaments production programmes in 
member countries. However, the Council cut 
down this section considerably in last year's 
report. The present report retains the informa-
tion in respect of land forces armaments, naval 
armaments and air force armaments, but omits 
entirely the useful section on missiles found in 
earlier reports. The committee asks the Council 
to retain in future reports all the useful 
information which the Agency for the Control 
of Armaments can provide. 
Conclusion on the control of armaments 
4.16. The annual report of the Council stresses 
the limited nature of the field control pro-
gramme, particularly visits to private firms, but 
it is clear that the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments performs its tasks efficiently in 
4. The list of chemical agents subject to control, approved 
by the WEU Council, was published by SIPRI in 1973 in 
"The problem of chemical and biological warfare", Volume 
11, "CB weapons today", page 217. 
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Numbers and types of inspections carried out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments - 1983 
Quantitative control measures 
Non-production 
control 
measures 
Total 
control 
at units (of which measures (all 
at under at at non- categories) 
depots national production Sub-total production production 
command plants plants of chemical 
weapons) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1961 29 15 12 66 7 (2) 63 
2 26 20 11 57 7 (2) 65 
3 35 13 13 61 10 (4) 74 
4 39 19 13 71 9 (4) 80 
5 26 16 11 53 7 n.a . 60 
6 • • • • • n.a . 78 
7 • • • • • n.a . 70 
8 • • • • • n.a . 79 
9 • • • • • (3) 77 
a b a b a b a b a b a b 
1970 • • • • • • • • • • n.a . 82 72 
1 • • • • • • • • • • n.a . 82 72 
2 • • • • • n.a . 66 
3 • • • • • n.a . 66 
4 • • • • • n.a . 71 
5 • • • • • n.a . 72 
6 • • • • • n.a . 71 
7 • • • • • n.a . 70 
8 • • • • • n.a . 68 
9 • • • • • n.a . 70 
1980 • • • • • n.a . 70 
1 • • • • • n.a . 70 
2 • • • • • n.a . 70 
3 • • • • • n.a. 72 
Notes a, b: From 1971 onwards the Agency adopted a new system of presenting its summary table of inspections, 
thenceforth counting inspections of several small grouped ammunition depots as a single inspection. An apparent reduction in 
numbers of inspections in fact reflects no reduction in the activities of the Agency. For comparison, the Council reported both 
sets of figures (old and new style- a and b) for the years 1970 and 1971. 
n.a. : Information not available. 
Sources: Figures for total control measures (all categories) given in column 7 are derived from published annual reports of 
the Council. With regard to the various categories of controls (columns 1 to 6), figures for 1961-65 are also derived from the 
published annual reports of the Council. Those for 1966 to 1969 have never been made available to the Committee. Those for 
1970 to 1983 have been communicated to the Assembly by the Council in response to Recommendation 213, but permission 
to publish them has been withheld. Minor discrepancies in some totals result from differences of definition of visit and are 
without significance. 
• Confidential information available to the Committee deleted from the published report. 
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those fields which are open to it - i.e. 
quantitative control of certain conventional 
weapons for forces not committed to NATO, 
while NATO checks these weapons in respect 
of committee forces. 
4.17. The Council's report in its general 
conclusions on the Agency states: 
"As required by Article XX of Protocol 
No. IV, the Agency confirmed that, in the 
course of field control measures carried out 
at force units and military depots and 
during agreed control measures at produc-
tion plants, it did not detect for the 
categories of armaments which it controls, 
- either the manufacture of a category of 
armaments that the government of the 
member state concerned had undertaken 
not to manufacture (Annexes 11 and Ill 
of Protocol No. Ill), 
- or the existence, on the mainland of 
Europe, of stocks of armaments in excess 
of the appropriate levels (Article XIX of 
Protocol No. IV) or not justified by 
export requirements (Article XXII of 
Protocol No. IV). 
In 1983, the Agency again applied controls 
in those fields which are open to it in an 
effective, simple and inexpensive manner. 
As in the past, the help and co-operation 
of national and NATO authorities, and of 
heads of staff of both the private firms and 
the military establishments visited played 
an important part in the accomplishment 
of its mission." 
The emphasis has been added by the Rappor-
teur, and the significance of these limitations on 
the Agency's activities are explained above. 
Studies by the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments 
4.18. The Agency for the Control of Arma-
ments conducts important studies on the 
principles of arms control, sometimes in tech-
nical fields. Its experts are in contact with 
various outside bodies. In the following chapter 
on the future of WEU the committee calls for 
considerable expansion of this constructive 
activity. 
(c) The Standing Armaments Committee 
4.19. The Council's report states that the 
Standing Armaments Committee met three 
times in 1983. The Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments held a joint meeting 
with it on 14th February 1984. The Standing 
Armaments Committee's chief activity being 
148 
concentrated on its study of the armaments 
industry of member countries which so far, to 
avoid duplication with the IEPG or NATO 
bodies has covered only legal aspects and part 
(expenditure and production by value) of the 
economic aspects. Unclassified versions of these 
parts have been communicated to the Assembly 
in 1981 and 1982. In 1983, the SAC completed 
an updating for the period 1972-81 of the first 
part of the economic study and presented it to 
the Council in April 1983. The Council has not 
authorised the "SAC to prepare an unclassified 
version of this updating for the Assembly. 
4.20. For the future the head of the SAC 
international secretariat submitted a number of 
proposals for future SAC studies, but the 
Council has authorised the SAC only to 
undertake a simplified annual updating of the 
economic part of its industry study and to study 
the future position of Japan in the armaments 
market, but not to undertake the second part 
(analytical description of the armaments indus-
try based on data from the industry) of the 
economic study. 
4.21. The remaining items on the SAC's 
agenda cannot be said to have been very active 
in 1983. A WEU agreement 4.FT.6 on 
standardised trial methods for wheeled vehicles 
was communicated to the United States for 
comment at the latter's request in 1979 with a 
view to harmonising testing methods. The 
United States has not offered comments but 
NATO is now to prepare a standardisation 
agreement on vehicles trials. A working group 
on operational research is responsible for 
arranging exchanges of information between 
WEU countries on OR, to organise symposia 
on the_ subject and to arrange visits to national 
OR centres. This work continued in 1983 and 
a symposium on "operator/computer interface 
and related subjects" is being organised in 
spring 1984. The working group on obstacles 
and hindrances to enemy action is not being 
convened at present. 
4.22. The committee's proposals for the future 
of the SAC are set forth in the next chapter. 
V. Proposals for the future of WEU 
(a) General 
5.1. World history reminds us that each time 
a nation has relied on another to ensure its 
defence it has finished by disappearing. Hence, 
Europe must shoulder the major part of its own 
security. Europe, a human community with 
more than 270 million inhabitants and the 
world's leading commercial power, is also- and 
Europeans should remember this - the land 
where democracy was borne and still survives. 
It is therefore in itself a treasure which we 
must have the will to protect and to defend. It 
should not be forgotten that ten-power Europe 
is wealthier than the Soviet Union, more 
populated than the United States and has all 
the knowledge necessary for acquiring the 
means of ensuring its security. In order to 
recover its dignity, it is therefore essential for 
Europe to set up within the Atlantic Alliance, 
which is more than ever indispensable, a more 
effective and credible European pillar. There is 
no denying that for several months the problem 
of Europe's security has again been arousing 
the interest of political leaders and observers. 
5.2. There are various reasons for this pheno-
menon: 
(i) The impressive military potential of the 
Soviet Union, which has unceasingly pur-
sued its armaments effort, even during the 
period of so-called detente, whether in the 
field of conventional, nuclear or chemical 
weapons. As Mr. Tindemans, the Belgian 
Minister for External Relations, recently 
recalled: 
"The necessity and the urgency for the 
strengthening of a European pillar comes 
from the fact that the USSR, after 
reassuring itself about strategic parity with 
the United States, has acquired regional 
superiority, as much with regard to Europe 
as to other regions of the world. This 
regional superiority - of which the massive 
deployment of SS-20s is only one fact -
threatens us directly, us Europeans, to the 
extent that 'the balance of terror' existing 
between the two superpowers could dis-
suade American intervention and thus 
make a limited conflict on our continent 
possible. 
It is therefore essential for us not only to 
strengthen the coupling which links us to 
our American allies but also to demonstrate 
to the USSR that a limited attack against 
Europe would come up against a deter-
mined and efficient reply." 1 
(ii) Difficulties of understanding between 
American and European partners 
Another reason for the revival of interest 
in European discussion of security problems 
certainly stems from the difficulties felt by 
Europeans in understanding the policy 
pursued by the United States. On this side 
l. Opening speech by Mr. Tindemans, Belgian Minister 
for External Relations, at the eighth annual conference of 
European and American journalists, Knokke, 5th April 
1984. 
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of the Atlantic, it seems increasingly 
evident that European and American 
interests are not always identical. The 
monetary policy pursued by the United 
States Government, and even its agricul-
tural policy, show to what extent the 
United States and the EEC have become 
rival commercial entities. Furthermore, 
Europeans are finding it difficult to under-
stand the "great power" requirements of 
the United States. Moreover, they are 
feeling rather concerned at the United 
States turning towards the Pacific world. 
(iii) Difficulties with the political integration 
of Europe in the framework of the 
responsibilities and institutions provided for 
in the Rome Treaty and the failure of the 
Athens and Brussels summit meetings give 
a vague feeling that it would perhaps be 
useful, if there is to be progress towards 
European political co-operation, to turn 
again to the question of Europe's defence 
which in any event must be re-examined in 
depth. 
(iv) The growing cost of armaments, which 
means that in the future obly an economic 
and technological entity of the size of 
Europe will still be able to design and 
produce the means needed for ensuring its 
security and defence. In the absence of 
European armaments co-operation, the day 
will come when only the United States will 
be able to produce the systems needed for 
defending the free world. 
(v) The necessary updating of strategic 
concepts for the defence of the European 
continent 
Recent Soviet superiority in the field of 
operational theatre nuclear forces, coupled 
with conventional superiority over and 
strategic parity with the United States, 
makes it necessary to re-examine ,the 
credibility of the flexible response strategy 
now in force in the alliance. Similarly, a 
study must be made of the consequences 
for Europe of the development by both the 
Soviet Union and the United States of 
anti-ballistic defence systems stationed in 
space. 
5.3. The new but obvious interest shown by 
various governments in "relaunching" WEU, 
springs in part from dissatisfaction with the 
progress of discussions on matters relating to 
European defence in other frameworks. Euro-
pean political co-operation among the Ten, 
despite last year's Stuttgart declaration to the 
effect that "political and economic aspects of 
security" could be discussed by the Ten, is not 
at present progressing as rapidly as some 
participants would wish. The attitude of the 
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present Danish and Greek Governments is cited 
as a factor, as is the neutrality of Ireland, 
which, however, may be less permanent than 
has been thought1• The most recent declaration 
on East-West relations issued by the Ten on 
30th March 19842 shows nevertheless a con-
certed policy to arms control and disarmament 
negotiations. 
5.4. The Independent European Programme 
Group which is concerned with the joint 
production of armaments has shown some signs 
of new activity having for the first time issued 
a press communique and resolution at the 
conclusion of a meeting in The Hague on 2nd 
and 3rd April at the level of secretaries of 
state3• The resolution in paragraph 1 stresses 
the importance of a search for European 
solutions in national armaments planning. 
5.5. Proposals for "relaunching" WEU have 
been associated in particular with the French 
and Italian Governments for a number of years, 
but recently Belgian and German ministers 
have commented favourably on the idea. The 
French and Belgian Governments have put their 
views on the future of WEU into concrete and 
precise form in memoranda addressed to the 
governments of member countries. 
5.6. President Mitterrand of France, without 
expressly mentioning WEU, has on a number 
of recent occasions referred to defence problems 
in a European context. On French television on 
16th November 1983, he said: 
"(Europe) must overcome some important 
obstacles born from the second world war 
which have left Germany with a particular 
status forbidding it certain military devel-
opments, especially in the nuclear field. 
That is the consequence of the war. The 
Soviet Union is very vigilant in this context; 
it is not the only one. I understand the 
strength of the idea of European defence, 
praiseworthy in itself and which should be 
an important objective of all those with 
political responsibility in Western Europe, 
provided ... the final division of Europe (is 
avoided)." 
5. 7. In The Hague on 7th February 1984, 
President Mitterrand said: 
"There are many voices raised almost 
everywhere today in favour of European 
l. See "Irish neutrality - a policy in course of 
evolution?", TrevorC. Salmon, NATO Review Volume 32, 
No. 1, March 1984, and "Irish neutrality: ideology or 
pragmatism?", Raymond J. Raymond, International Affairs, 
Volume 60, No. l, Winter 1983-84 - Royal Institute of 
International Affairs (United Kingdom). 
2. Appendix Ill. 
3. Appendix IV. 
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defence. The excessive strength of the two 
superpowers, the setback in their disarma-
ment negotiations, the tensions that result, 
the possession of nuclear weapons by five 
states, the effacement of Europe as a force 
capable of having its own plans, have 
aroused nostalgia and created a need which 
should not be underestimated. 
But an honest examination of the question 
leads to the following considerations: in the 
present state of affairs, Europe remains 
divided between the security that exists 
and the security that it hopes for. There is 
no doubt it would choose the first, the 
Atlantic AllianCe which is not near to 
seeing itself supplanted by a European 
alliance. This comes from the fact that no 
military force is in a position to replace the 
American arsenal. France, in any case, will 
not use its nuclear capacity otherwise than 
for its own strategy of deterrence and 
Europe as a whole will not run the risk of 
finding itself exposed. 
France has not hidden from its allies that, 
apart from the protection of its national 
sanctuary and vital interests connected 
with it, it could not assume responsibility 
for the security of Europe. For strategic 
reasons and for reasons of international 
policy which follow, the decision on the use 
of the French nuclear weapon cannot be 
shared. There remains a vast field however 
where we can organise our security, not 
only with conventional weapons but also 
through the new possibilities that are going 
to burst upon the world scene." 
President Mitterrand went on to propose that 
Europe should be able to launch an inhabited 
space station for military observation purposes. 
5.8. Addressing the Institut des hautes etudes 
de defense nationale on 20th September 1983, 
Mr. Mauroy, French Prime Minister, said: 
"On several occasions, the President of the 
Republic, the members of the government 
and I have had occasion to express the 
wish that Europe assert itself more and to 
underline the interests of an independent 
Europe in face of the dangers inherent in 
a world which is just bipolar. 
We have also confirmed France's position: 
independent but solidarity with the Atlantic 
community. 
At the beginning of this address, I made a 
precise analysis of our links with our 
partners in the Atlantic Alliance since 
everyone can see they are decisive. But 
France endeavours to maintain other links, 
in Western European Union, for instance. 
This European organisation is the only one 
which can tackle matters relating to 
defence and security. 
WEU has a unique structure for concerting 
views. Moreover, this structure is coherent 
with our more general commitments since 
all members of WEU are also members of 
the Atlantic Alliance and of the European 
Community, and only European states are 
members of it. 
France considers that European solidarity 
enhances Atlantic solidarity without being 
merged with it. The similarity of the geo-
strategic problems facing the European 
countries should lead them to take specific 
common decisions. In this respect WEU 
can be a privileged forum for reflection. 
I would also recall that that organisation 
is the only European body with defence 
responsibilities where members of parlia-
ment can discuss problems affecting Eur-
ope's security. We wish members of 
parliament, and hence public opinion, to 
be associated with thinking about and then 
taking decisions on everything that con-
cerns the security of each man and each 
woman in our country and our continent. 
In the years to come, we must devote our 
efforts to developing the means of Europe's 
independence without sacrificing what has, 
for the past thirty years, been the indepen-
dent guarantees of our security." 
5.9. Mr. Tindemans, Belgian Minister for 
External Relations, in a much noted article in 
Le Monde of 23rd December 1983, wrote: 
"For various reasons and particularly the 
better to oppose neutralist tendencies, I 
believe it is necessary to seek increased 
'Europeanisation' of defence problems. I 
agree with Mr. Mauroy when he asserts 
that nothing at present can replace the 
American nuclear systems which guarantee 
the security of the European states, 
especially those which do not possess a 
national nuclear force. I think like him 
that reflection between our governments on 
the strategic concepts and certain forms of 
defence co-operation are today possible and 
desirable. Not everyone in the Community 
is of that opinion. We cannot therefore use 
the structures of political co-operation, 
which are the natural extension of this 
Community. There remains WEU, an old 
organisation, the structures and possibilities 
of which are largely unused. Personally, I 
see no reason why we should not try to use 
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it to develop a sort of co-operation on 
politico-military problems, provided that 
the organisation itself is open to all the 
members of the Community who accept its 
rules. A development of this sort would at 
least provisionally introduce the notion of 
a 'differentiated' Europe in the security 
field, similar to that which the European 
monetary system established in the mon-
etary field. This notion obviously carries 
certain dangers for the cohesion of the 
whole. But provided that only those who 
exclude themselves are excluded, and 
provided that a serious attempt is made to 
bring the various structures together as far 
as possible, in practice, this way seems to 
me a lesser evil." 
5.10. Addressing the eighth annual conference 
of European and American journalists in 
Knokke on 5th April 1984, Mr. Tindemans 
specified that: 
"In second place, confidence in our solida-
rity must be re-established as regards 
security and defence. The Atlantic Alliance 
is coming up against a growing disenchant-
ment in public opinion in the very least, as 
we have seen in certain European countries. 
In addition, I am afraid that the gap 
between us is tending to widen. It is in fact 
at the very time when ideas about 
pacificism, neutralism, Finlandisation and 
denuclearisation are multiplying in Europe, 
without however a very clear distinction 
being made most of the time between each 
of these notions, that the United States 
expects Europe to make a keen effort in 
the matter of defence of its own territory, 
so as to enable the United States to take 
on the growing responsibilities which are 
theirs on the world level. 
I personally believe that the solution must 
now be taken up again and applied, a 
solution which is by no means new, which 
is to set up a 'European pillar' within 
NATO. The defence of Europe is not only 
the business of Europeans. But a clearer 
confirmation of the European identity with 
regard to security and defence would 
respond to the development of European 
integration and would make it possible -
without guarantee however - to make an 
extra European effort in the area of 
defence. Certainly, such a development 
would assume acceptance by the United 
States as a 'full partner'. 
It also implies, on the part of the European 
countries, the will to give a European 
dimension to their security. It also implies 
that the efforts to be undertaken on one 
side and the other should be with common 
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agreement and according to a common 
strategy. 
The objective of such a 'European pillar' is 
to reinforce the 'partnership' within the 
alliance, thus making it once again more 
in line with public opinion and better able 
to safeguard our common security in 
Europe. 
The European pillar must have credibility 
and a political structure, without which we 
shall never be able to mobilise the degree 
of solidarity necessarily required in a 
common action in the matter of defence. 
Public opinion cannot be motivated without 
an ideal or a common heritage to defend, 
and a political concept as its expression. 
What is more, the responsibility for actions 
to be implemented, must be situated on a 
political level with true democratic control. 
These conditions are obviously best met 
within the framework of European integra-
tion of the Ten, always bearing in mind, 
however, that it will be fitting to reinforce, 
when the time comes, the political institu-
tional facet. 
Secondly, the action undertaken on the 
European front, should at least represent a 
reinforcement or, in any case, the mainten-
ance of the present degree of security, this 
being as much for Europe as for America. 
It would be crazy indeed to want to enter 
upon a path which would lead to the 
weakening of the free world. This condition, 
in my eyes, means that the European pillar 
cannot damage the cohesion and credibility 
of the alliance. 
And finally, a sufficiently realistic approach 
must be adopted so that the suggestions 
put forward have some chance of being 
achieved. It cannot indeed be forgotten 
that the failure of the European community 
on defence still remains fresh in the mind. 
Any project which is too ambitious, risks 
since then being seen as utopic and being 
therefore thrown out before an examination 
of its own merits is made. 
A progressive approach strictly connected 
to the alliance but based on political co-
operation between the Ten is certainly the 
best course. However, we know that certain 
member states are not in any case presently 
disposed to committing themselves in this 
direction. · 
And so it has been thought - and the 
French presidency has put out a memor-
andum about this - to have recourse in the 
first instance to WEU, which brings 
together those from amongst the ten 
European countries who advocated a 
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clearer confirmation of the European 
identity with regard to defence. But from 
the beginning, 'decoupling' must be 
avoided, as much in relation to the Ten as 
to NATO, an action linked on three levels, 
WEU, the Ten and NATO would doubtless 
be the best answer at this stage. 
The interest of this approach linked to the 
WEU, the Ten and within NATO lies in 
.clearly stating from the very beginning, 
that the WEU exercise cannot be a 
substitute for a development to be carried 
out by the Ten, nor can it be conceived or 
undertaken outside of NATO. 
And so, Belgium, persuaded on the one 
hand by the need to rapidly reinforce 
European defence and mindful on the other 
hand of the limitations inherent in the 
operation, has put forward the following 
proposals: 
It would be appropriate to reshape the 
WEU into the suitable framework for a 
common effort of reflection and co-ordina-
tion of policies of the Seven in matters of 
security and defence. This common think-
ing could then be proposed to NATO with 
increased political weight. 
So that each member might make a 
balanced contribution to the common 
efforts in defence, it would be necessary to 
adapt existing measures as regards produc-
tion and control of armaments. 
In addition, within the WEU, the Seven 
should try on the one hand to promote a 
strict co-ordination of their policies with 
regard to conception, production and acqui-
sition of armaments, and on the other hand 
to set up a forum on co-operation and 
analysis of disarmament questions. 
It will probably be necessary, for the 
success of the envisaged reform, to adapt 
the different organs of the WEU, among 
others the Assembly and the Council, to 
the new tasks of discussion and initiative-
taking which will be given over to them. 
To this effect, we have submitted to our 
partners in the WEU a few concrete 
suggestions concerning the modifications 
we envisage. Our proposals are, at the 
moment, the object of thorough consulta-
tions, both with our Atlantic allies and 
with our partners from the Ten and from 
the Seven. 
We have recalled, on each occasion, our 
deep attachment to the reinforcement of 
the European union and the maintenance 
of Atlantic solidarity, the only effective 
and credible guarantee of security in 
Europe. The strengthening of the WEU 
and the development of its activities seem 
to us to be such that they will be able to 
contribute to these two objectives which 
are fundamental to our diplomacy. 
I am already able to tell you that first 
reactions to our proposals have been largely 
favourable." 
5.11. The press has reported the Netherlands 
Foreign Minister, Mr. van den Broek, as saying 
that Europe might play a greater part in 
security policy, but only as the partner of the 
United States and in the NATO context. The 
Netherlands was not in favour of the creation 
of alternative structures like a nuclear Europe 
or a European bloc in NATO. French insistence 
on revitalising WEU raised doubts and problems 
in relation to the non-nuclear countries and 
member countries of the Community or the 
alliance, which were not members of WEU, 
and in relation to European political co-
operation. Mr. van den Broek felt that it would 
be better to consolidate Eurogroup and to 
exploit all the potential of the IEPG in which 
France was represented 1• 
5.12. The United Kingdom Minister for 
Defence, Mr. Michael Heseltine, in a recent 
interview in the French press2, said, "Britain 
considers NATO to be the most important 
guarantee for the security of Europe. There is 
no question therefore of putting it in doubt in 
any way." Asked about French proposals for 
relaunching WEU, he replied: "It is of course 
important for the Europeans to improve their 
defence co-operation, in WEU, but also in other 
forums linked to NATO such as the Eurogroup 
of which I am at present chairman .... We 
British are as attached as anyone to the 
European idea." 
5.13. Speaking in Bremen on lOth April 1984, 
Mr. Genscher, the German Foreign Minister, 
said: 
" .. .It must be recognised that America 
does not want a weak partner but a sound 
European pillar in the Atlantic Alliance. 
Instead of complaining that the Americans 
are abandoning Europe, we should do our 
utmost to make Europe a united, sound 
partner of the United States, aware of its 
worth. 
It is not the Americans who are refusing to 
allow us more weight in the alliance, it is 
the Europeans who, through weakness and 
lack of determination, are willingly taking 
a back seat to the Americans ... 
l. Atlantic News, 4th April 1984. 
2. Le Point, No. 602, 2nd April 1984. 
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Strengthening the European pillar of the 
alliance means above all attending to the 
strengthening of European co-operation in 
the security field. There is a framework for 
this: Western European Union, in which 
France, the Benelux countries and Britain 
were first allied, to be joined in 1954 by 
Italy and the Federal Republic of Ger-
many. 
This association for common defence should 
be relaunched to ensure that there is 
greater awareness of common interests 
with regard to security policy and the 
contributions made by Europeans in the 
framework of NATO. Europe should 
increasingly speak with a single voice in 
the alliance and define its security interests 
collectively. Where its defence is concerned, 
it should also become more closely united 
and pool its forces. It must stop being the 
'ward' of American strength and see that 
its security is more surely guaranteed 
thanks to its own efforts." 
(b) Specific proposals 
5.14. The view of the Assembly "that WEU 
should be adapted to meet the requirements of 
the 1980s" and its specific recommendations 
concerning amendments to the arms control 
provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty, 
contained in the historical Recommendations 
380 and 397, have been quoted in paragraph 
3.13 above. In the first of these recommenda-
tions, the Assembly identified the abiding 
features of the modified Brussels Treaty, which 
do not call for amendment: 
"(ii) Noting that the Council and the 
Assembly alike recognise that fundamental 
provisions of the Brussels Treaty, particu-
larly the mutual security provisions of 
Articles IV, V and VIII.3, retain their full 
value, and that there is interest in making 
greater use of Western European Union as 
an instrument of European security ; " 
Recommendation 397 expressed the Assembly's 
views: 
"that the fullest use should be made of the 
qualified staffs of the Standing Armaments 
Committee and of the Agency for the 
Control of Armaments, both for the study 
of problems within their respective com-
petence for the benefit of the alliance as a 
whole, and to assist the Assembly in the 
preparation of its reports ... " 
5.15. Specific proposals can now be made in 
the context of these recommendations, and the 
speech by Mr. Hernu, French Minister of 
Defence, in the Assembly on 1st December 
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1983 took up these specific proposals of the 
committee: 
"Because the WEU Assembly is the only 
parliamentary body authorised by treaty to 
study and debate problems concerning the 
defence of the states of Western Europe, 
and because, under the modified treaty of 
1954, the WEU member states solemnly 
undertook to afford assistance in the event 
of aggression against any one of them, I 
wish here to reaffirm how irreplaceable and 
indispensable we consider the set of 
institutions comprising Western European 
Union - the Council, the Assembly, the 
Standing Armaments Committee and the 
Agency for the Control of Armaments -
for strengthening the security of our 
countries. 
As your debates have shown, we are all 
aware of the need to develop, among 
Europeans, our thinking on defence. I 
repeat that this in no way conflicts with 
the development of relations between the 
Western European states and the United 
States of America. Our determination to 
see the balance of forces maintained in 
Europe rests precisely on the conviction 
that for a long time to come the security 
of our closest partners, those with whom 
we are associated on the economic level 
within the European Community, cannot 
be ensured without the guarantee of the 
United States and the latter's presence in 
Europe. 
That, however, neither conflicts with nor 
excludes the development of links between 
Europeans. On the contrary, in view of the 
new challenges facing us, the Europeans -
with WEU taking a leading role - must 
formulate their own demands, that is to 
say, their own priorities. 
In my view, the thirtieth anniversary of the 
Paris treaty should affirm and demonstrate 
the ability of Europeans to advance along 
the path of common security. 
France has made proposals for further 
increasing the role of this (Standing 
Armaments) Committee. I know that the 
Secretary-General, for his part, has sug-
gested initiatives which I can only support. 
WEU should be the vehicle for the 
expression of common European priorities 
and convergent options. There can be no 
effective common policy without close co-
operation over armaments. 
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It is a good thing that, in regard to the 
Conference on Disarmament in Europe of 
the negotiation of other treaties such as 
the ban on the production and stockpiling 
of chemical weapons, the WEU states 
should be able, within the framework of 
WEU where they have technical expertise 
available, to add to their knowledge and 
develop their joint thinking on arms 
limitations, in accordance with their own 
security concepts. This dimension, already 
present in certain of the reports which your 
Assembly has examined, could, it seems to 
me, be made more systematic and thus 
help to enlighten the Council. 
There can be no question of intervening in 
the negotiation processes or of questioning 
the existing consultation machinery. On 
the other hand - and that might be a new 
dimension for the Agency for the Control 
of Armaments - it would be very useful 
for the European states to conduct studies, 
discussions and technical investigations in 
the field of arms limitation." 
5.16. The proposals to make the Agency for 
the Control of Armaments responsible for 
conducting studies and technical investigations 
in the field of arms limitation directly reflect 
the committee's own proposals in the last 
report1• 
(c) The committee's recommendations 
5.17. In the view of the committee, the time 
has now come to give concrete form to some of 
the proposals for relaunching WEU. 
WEU as a forum for the discussion of defence 
problems 
5.18. Developments in the international situa-
tion require a firmer European presence in the 
Atlantic Alliance to which the WEU member 
countries are indefectibly attached. WEU, 
which groups countries belonging both to the 
Atlantic Alliance and to the EEC, is thus a 
privileged forum for in-depth reflection on the 
needs of Europe's security. Giving new life to 
WEU also implies greater awareness on the 
part of the seven member countries of the close 
commitments which bind them within the 
collective security system which is WEU. 
Strengthening the European pillar of the 
1. Document 948, Application of the Brussels Treaty, 
Rapporteur Mr. Prussen, explanatory memorandum, para-
graph 3.12., 18th May 1983. 
alli~nce necessarily implies improved co-ordi-
nation of member countries' defence policies 
and armaments programmes. In this context 
the work of the Council and of the Standing 
Armaments Committee should lead to better 
co-ordination of the positions of the Seven in 
the Independent European Programme Group 
(IEPG). As Mr. Mauroy underlined, WEU also 
~as. th~ advantage of possessing a complete 
mst1tut10nal structure - Council, Assembly and 
technical bodies- allowing those who have been 
elect_ed, i.~. _parliamentarians, and through them 
pubhc optmon, t? _be associated . with working 
out and then dectdmg on everythmg relating to 
the security of our continent. 
The Assembly 
5.19. It is clear therefore that in view of the 
questions whi~h pub~ic ?Pinion is rightly asking, 
any worthwhtle revttahsation of WEU neces-
sarily involves a greater role for the Assembly 
and the deepening of the dialogue between the 
Assembly and the Council. The parliaments of 
member countries and the Assembly itself 
should therefore ensure that parliamentarians 
particularly alive to defence and security 
problems are appointed members of the WEU 
Assembly. The Assembly should at last obtain 
the financial means necessary for fulfilling its 
task. 
The Council 
5.20. Since both the revitalisation of WEU 
and th~ strengthening of the European pillar of 
the alhance depend above all on the political 
will expressed by the governments of member 
countries in the Council, the future of this 
twofold project will depend essentially on the 
work of the ministers meeting in Council. The 
committee therefore considers it essential that 
in futl:'r~ th~ Council mee~ at least twice a year 
at f!llmstenal level (Mmisters for Foreign 
Affatr~ and/or Defence). In this respect, the 
commtttee welcomes the fact that the ministers 
of defence of the Seven are to meet in Rome 
next October on the occasion of the commem-
oration of the thirtieth anniversary of the 
modification of the treaty. 
5.21. Moreover, the committee considers that 
when the Council meets at permanent level 
seni?r officials of the ministries for foreig~ 
affatrs concerned, plus representatives of the 
ministries of defence and military headquaters 
might be associated with the work of th~ 
ambassadors. 
5.22. As for the contents of the agenda of 
these meeti~g~, the following might be included, 
although thts ts not an exhaustive list: 
- European defence policy priorities; 
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- European defence strategy; 
- studies on and joint production of 
armaments and re-equipment pro-
grammes and the logistic support of 
forces; 
- the. military aspects of European space 
proJects; 
- the harmonisation of military service; 
- threat assessment; 
- the European position in negotiations on 
the control of armaments; 
- etc. 
5.23. To safeguard the links with the other 
European allies and with NATO, the committee 
proposes: 
(i) that the agenda proposed above for 
ministerial meetings be communicated 
to the other European members of 
NATO in advance; 
(ii) that the Chairman-in-Office of the 
WEU Council be instructed to report 
the conclusions of such meetings on the 
one hand to the Ten and on the other 
to Eurogroup and to NATO ministerial 
bodies and, where arms production 
matters are concerned, to the IEPG. 
The Standing Armaments Committee 
5.24. As the committee has recommended in 
the past, more use should be made of the 
Stand~~~ Armaments Committee to study the 
capabtlthes of the European armaments indus-
try, for the use both of governments and of 
committees of the Assembly when reporting on 
releva~t topics. But the Standing Armaments 
Commtttee should also play a more effective 
role _with regard _to co-operation. Its role might 
con~t~t of preparmg and implementing political 
dectstons reached by the Seven with regard to 
armaments. The committee also proposes that 
the SAC ensure seven-power co-ordination in 
the Independent European Programme Group 
(IEPG). It suggests that the head of the SAC 
international secretariat might attend meetings 
of the IEPG. 
Arms control provisions of the treaty 
5.2~. The committee naturally reiterates its 
earher proposals, which it understands have 
now been put formally to the Council by 
France, that the remaining restrictions on the 
production of conventional weapons in Germany 
be removed through the deletion of the 
remaining items on the list at Annex Ill to 
Protocol No. Ill of the modified Brussels 
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Treaty, and that quantitative controls on 
·conventional weapons of all member countries 
on the mainland of Europe be abolished, by the 
Council varying the list at Annex IV to Protocol 
No. Ill by the deletion of all paragraphs other 
than paragraph 1 (which covers atomic, bio-
logical and chemical weapons). The Council is 
empowered to modify the two lists in question 
under Articles 11 and V of Protocol No. Ill 
itself by a two-thirds majority in the first case 
and unanimously in the second. 
5.26. The fact that the controls relating to 
atomic and biological weapons have never been 
applied and that the controls on chemical 
weapons are only very partially applied is 
explained in Chapter IV, paragraph 4.11, above. 
The preamble to Recommendation 397, adopted 
by the Assembly last year on the basis of the 
committee's report, states in this connection: 
"Aware that the controls on atomic and 
biological weapons provided for in the 
modified Brussels Treaty have never been 
applied, but considering in the present 
circumstances that it is no longer appro-
priate to apply them;". 
The Agency for the Control of Armaments 
5.27. The committee considers that the 
Agency for the Control of Armaments, which 
has carried out important work in the past but 
will be relieved of the application of certain 
control measures, might in future turn its 
experience to good use by considering the 
problems of verifications linked with disarma-
ment agreements. The Agency might become a 
forum for consultation on and analysis of all 
matters relating to the limitation of armaments 
in Europe. In this connection the Agency might 
take as a model the work carried out by the 
United States Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency (ACDA) which has conducted extensive 
studies into all aspects of arms control and 
disarmament. The United States ACDA is cited 
here as a model because it appears to be the 
most important example of a governmental 
institution, having direct links with both the 
parliament and the government of its country. 
The WEU Agency for the Control of Arma-
ments should be at the disposal of the Council 
and the governments as well as ofthe Assembly. 
5.28. It might for instance study the facilities 
required by observers for effective observation 
of manoeuvres and troop movements under the 
CSCE confidence-building measures, or conduct 
similar studies concerning verification measures 
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that might be involved when troops are 
withdrawn under the MBFR negotiations; the 
implications for arms control negotiations the 
introduction of new weapons systems; or the 
military budgets of the NATO and Warsaw 
Pact countries, etc. 
5.29. The committee finally stresses the 
importance of such fundamental changes in the 
role of the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments being introduced gradually as and 
when it is relieved of its other tasks. 
(d) In concl11sion 
5.30. WEU is the only European body with 
defence responsibilities. It groups countries 
which, over and beyond the economic solidarity 
of the Common Market, wish to assert their 
solidarity in the security field. This solidarity is 
expressed in undertakings and institutions. Full 
means are available for taking action. The 
mutual commitments entered into by the 
signatory countries of the modified Brussels 
Treaty are an undertaking to afford military 
assistance in the event of aggression (Article V) 
and an undertaking to consult each other, 
particularly in the case of a threat to peace 
(Article VIII). For the implementation of the 
treaty, Article IV provides for close co-operation 
with NATO. 
5.31. An affirmation of European solidarity 
covering security matters, the modified Brussels 
Treaty is therefore also an appeal to Atlantic 
solidarity. In the framework of mutual assist-
ance, it is easier to defend those who show the 
wish to defend themselves. To strengthen the 
European pillar of the alliance in no way means 
slackening links; it facilitates the operation of 
the alliance by establishing a better balance 
between North America and the hard core of 
Western European countries. 
5.32. To allow member countries to fulfil their 
commitments, the modified Brussels Treaty set 
up a Council "so organised as to be able to 
exercise its functions continuously" (Article 
VIII). If it is recalled that WEU has a 
parliamentary assembly, an intergovernmental 
body for co-operation, the SAC, and a technical 
agency, the ACA, it can be seen that WEU has 
all the legal instruments and institutional means 
for taking continuous action to promote joint 
defence interests and assert a political will. Its 
potentialities measure up to the hopes of those 
in favour of a Europe capable of asserting its 
personality. 
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Rules of access to the BTO archives1 
The Council of Western European Union 
have agreed to the release for research purposes 
of the political and military archives of the 
Brussels Treaty Organisation covering the 
period April 1948 to December 1950 on the 
following conditions : 
1. The original archives shall be retained at 
the offices of Western European Union and 
shall not be accessible. Copies of an inventory 
can be provided on application to the 
Secretary-General. 
2. One microfilmed copy of the releasable 
archives will be available for study at the Public 
Record Office, Ruskin Avenue, Kew, Richmond, 
Surrey TW9 4DU, subject to the conditions 
stated below. 
3. Applications from bona fide researchers 
must be accompanied by letters of recommen-
dation from their organisation, university or 
embassy in London ; they should be made in 
writing to the Secretary-General of WEU and 
NOT to the Public Record Office. The subject 
and purpose of the research work must be 
clearly indicated. 
I. The Council of Western European Union approved 
rules of access to the political archives on 11th February 
1981, and to the military archives on 1st February 1984. 
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4. The Secretary-General may reject an 
application. In assessing the latter he will take 
into consideration, inter alia, the rule of 
reciprocity whereby similar diplomatic archives 
shall normally be available for research purposes 
in the country of the applicant, andjor at the 
seat of a multilateral treaty organisation of 
which that country is a member. 
5. The Secretary-General of WEU shall give 
written permission to the applicant, and written 
notification of this to the Public Record Office. 
6. On receipt of the written permission 
mentioned in Article 5 above, the applicant 
should, at his convenience, present himself at 
the Public Record Office taking with him the 
Secretary-General's note of authorisation. A 
reader's ticket will then be issued to him. 
7. A copy of any publication based on the 
study of the microfilmed archives, as well as 
transcripts of any public presentation, shall be 
supplied without charge to the Secretary-
General as soon as possible. 
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Public Record Office, Kew, Richmond, Surrey 
List of political files deposited by Western European Union 
DG 1 
1 
2 
3 
Date 
1948 July-
1949 March 
1949 June-
1950 December 
1948 April-Dec. 
1949 Jan.-May 
1949 May 
1949 June-Dec. 
1950 Jan.-Dec. 
1949-1950 
1948-1950 
1949-1951 
1949-1952 
1950-1952 
1950-1952 
1948 July-
1949 February 
Description 
BRUSSELS TREATY ORGANISATION 
Records of sessions of th~ Consultative Council 
Vol. I: 2nd-5th sessions 
(indexed in DGl/3 file 8) 
Vol. 11 : 6th-1Oth sessions 
(sessions 6-9 indexed in DG1j3 file 8) 
Minutes of meetings of the Permanent Commis-
sion 
Vol. I : 1st-46th meetings 
Vol. 11 (part 1): 47th-69th* meetings 
Vol. 11 (part 2) : 69th*-71 st meetings 
Vol. Ill: 72nd-95th meetings 
Vol. IV : 96th-128th meetings 
Subject files 
China : recognition of communist government : 
extracts from minutes 
Consultative Council : index to the first nine 
sessions 
Conventions : Correspondence and other papers 
concerning ratification procedures: 
Social and medical assistance between the 
Brussels Treaty Powers (signed 7th Nov. 1949) 
Social security schemes : extension and co-
ordination (signed 7th Nov. 1949) 
Frontier workers (signed 17th April 1950) 
Student employees (signed 17th April 1950) 
Council of Europe : extracts from minutes and 
other papers (folios 1-108) 
• The English minutes of the 69th meeting are in piece I ; the French minutes are in piece 2. 
158 
APPENDIX I 
File ref. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
APPENDIX I 
DG 1 Date 
4 1949 Feb.-
1950 March 
1948 
1949-1950 
1949-1950 
1948-1949 
1948-1949 
1950 
1948 
1948 
1948 
1948-1950 
1948-1949 
1950 
1949 
1948 
1948-1950 
Description 
Council of Europe : extracts from minutes and 
other papers (folios 109-229) 
Discriminatory treatment amongst the Five: 
Secretary-General's note 
Relations with East Germany : extracts from 
minutes and other papers 
Relations with West Germany: extracts from 
minutes 
Relations with Israel: extracts from minutes 
and other papers 
Italy and the Brussels Treaty : extracts from 
minutes and other papers 
Korea : extracts from minutes and other papers 
Overseas territories : extracts from minutes and 
other papers 
Permanent Commission: composition and rela-
tions with other bodies 
Ditto : progress report 
Terms of reference of the Permanent Commis-
sion, the Consultative Council and various 
committees 
Press issues: communiques and reports released 
by the Permanent Commission 
Ditto 
Soviet-Yugoslav relations : Secretary-General's 
notes and extract from minutes 
Relations with Spain : extract from minutes and 
other papers 
United Nations General Assembly: records of 
meetings of experts prior to United Nations 
sessions 
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13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
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List of military files deposited by Western European Union 
DG 1 Date Description 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
1948 
1948 
1949 
1949 
1949 
1949 
1950 
1948-1950 
1948 
1949 
1949 
1949 
1950 
1950 
1948-1950 
1948-1949 
1949 
1950 
1949-1950 
1949-1950 
1950 
1949 
1950 
BRUSSELS TREATY ORGANISATION 
Conference of five defence ministers and chiefs-
of- staff of Brussels Treaty powers : minutes of 
meeting 30th April 1948 
Ditto : minutes of meeting 27th September 
1948 
Ditto: minutes of meeting 14th January 1949 
Ditto : minutes of meeting 7th April 194'9 
Ditto: minutes of meeting 15th-16th July 1949 
Ditto : minutes of meeting 23rd November 1949 
Ditto : minutes of meeting 5th September 1950 
Chiefs-of-Staff Committee : minutes of meetings 
August 1948-June 1950 
Military Committee : minutes of meetings 
August-December 
Ditto : minutes of meetings January-April 
Ditto : minutes of meetings May-August 
Ditto: minutes of meetings September-Decem-
ber 
Ditto: minutes of meetings January-April 
Ditto : minutes of meetings May-July 
Ministers of Finance meetings April-October 
1948 and January 1950: reports 
Finance and Economic Committee : minutes of 
meetings November 1948 - May 1949 
Ditto: minutes of meetings June-December 
1949 
Ditto : minutes of meetings February-December 
1950 
Ditto : reports 
Ditto : documents 
Western Union Supply Board, Supply Executive 
Committee : minutes 
Ditto : reports 
Ditto: reports 
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29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
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DG 1 Date Description File ref. 
Subject files 
9 1948 
cont'd 
Military questions, Military Committee papers, 52 
progress reports and correspondence: April-
September 
10 1948 Ditto : October-December 53 
1949 Ditto: January-March 54 
1949 Ditto : April-December 55 
11 1950 Ditto : January-December 56 
1948-1950 Defence co-operation 57 
1948-1949 Financing of military costs 58 
12 1950 Ditto : January-April 59 
13 1950 Ditto: May-December 60 
1950 Financing of infrastructure programme 61 
1949 Request to United States Government for 62 
military assistance 
1949 Bilateral agreement for distribution of military 63 
aid 
14 1949-1951 Additional production programme 64 
1949 Status of members of armed forces 65 
1949-1950 Ditto 66 
15 1949-1951 Expenditure on headquarters 67 
1949-1951 Supply of RAF equipment to Western Union 68 
air forces 
1948 Utilisation of certain armaments 69 
1949 Control of exports of strategic materials 70 
1950 Vulnerable key points that need protection 71 
1948 Ideological aspect of defence : note by 72 
Secretary-General and extract from minutes of 
Permanent Commission 
1949-1951 Non-warlike stores: Report and minutes of 73 
sub-committee 
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Weapons which the Federal Republic of Germany further undertakes not to manufacture on its 
territory 
Annex Ill to Protocol No. Ill of the modified Brussels Treaty 
A. Original (1954) text 
This list comprises the weapons defined in 
paragraphs IV to VI and the factories earmar-
ked solely for their production. All apparatus, 
parts, equipment, installations, substances and 
organisms, which are used for civilian purposes 
or for scientific, medical and industrial research 
in the fields of pure and applied science shall be 
excluded from this definition. 
IV. LONG-RANGE MISSILES, GUIDED MISSILES 
AND INFLUENCE MINES 
(a) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (d), 
long-range missiles, and guided missiles are 
defined as missiles such that the speed or 
direction of motion can be influenced after the 
instant of launching by a device or mechanism 
inside or outside the missile, including V-type 
weapons developed in the recent war and 
subsequent modifications thereof. Combustion is 
considered as a mechanism which may influence 
the speed. 
(b) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (d), 
influence mines are defined as naval mines 
which can be exploded automatically by 
influences which emanate solely from external 
sources, including influence mines developed in 
the recent war and subsequent modifications 
thereof. 
(c) Parts, devices or assemblies specially 
designed for use in or with the weapons referred 
to in paragraphs (a) and (b) shall be deemed to 
be included in this definition. 
(d) Proximity fuses, and short-range guided 
missiles for anti-aircraft defence with the 
following maximum characteristics are regarded 
as excluded from this definition : 
- Length, 2 metres ; 
- Diameter, 30 centimetres; 
- Speed, 660 metres per second ; 
- Ground range, 32 kilometres; 
- Weight of warhead, 22.5 kilogrammes. 
V. WARSHIPS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF 
SMALLER SHIPS FOR DEFENCE PURPOSES 
"Warships, with the exception of smaller 
ships for defence purposes" are: 
(a) Warships of more than 3,000 tons 
displacement ; 
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(b) Submarines of more than 350 tons 
displacement ; 
(c) All warships which are driven by means 
other than steam, diesel or petrol engines 
or by gas turbines or by jet engines ; 
VI. BOMBER AIRCRAFT FOR STRATEGIC 
PURPOSES 
B. Text following the most recent amendment 
of 21st July 19801 
This list comprises the weapons defined in 
paragraphs IV to VI and the factories earmar-
ked solely for their production. All apparatus, 
parts, equipment, installations, substances and 
organisms, which are used for civilian purposes 
or for scientific, medical and industrial research 
in the fields of pure and applied science shall be 
excluded from this definition. 
IV. LONG-RANGE MISSILES AND GUIDED 
MISSILES 
(a) Subject to the provisions of paragraphs (c) 
and (d), long-range missiles and guided missiles 
are defined as missiles such that the speed or 
direction of motion can be influenced after the 
instant of launching by a device or mechanism 
inside or outside the missile, including V-type 
weapons developed in the recent war and 
subsequent modifications thereof. Combustion is 
considered as a mechanism which may influence 
the speed. 
(b) Parts, devices or assemblies specially 
designed for use in or with the weapons referred 
to in paragraph (a) shall be deemed to be 
included in this definition. 
(c) Proximity fuses, surface-to-air and air-to-
air guided missiles for anti-aircraft defence, 
air-to-surface guided missiles for tactical 
defence, and surface-to-surface guided missiles 
for naval tactical defence equipped with non-
nuclear warheads and of a range not exceeding 
70 km, are regarded as excluded from this 
definition. 
(d) Guided anti-tank missiles are also regarded 
as excluded from this definition. 
VI. BOMBER AIRCRAFT FOR STRATEGIC 
PURPOSES 
I. The 1954 text has been amended by the Council on 
the ten following occasions: 9th May 1958; 16th October 
1958; 21st October 1959; 24th May 1961; 19th October 
1962 ; 9th October 1963 ; 2nd October 1968 ; 15th 
September 1971; 26th September 1973; 21st July 1980. 
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Declaration on East-West relations issued by the Ten on 27th March 1984 
The Ten have a responsibility in regard to 
peace and stability in Europe and to the 
security of their populations. They consider that 
the process of European integration which they 
have launched and which they intend to pursue 
resolutely is of primary importance in this 
regard. They declare their determination to 
maintain and intensify their contribution to the 
improvement of relations between East and 
West. They appeal to the Soviet Union to co-
operate in progress towards genuine detente on 
the basis of a balance of forces, of respect for 
the interests of all states, of the faithful 
implementation of the Helsinki final act in all 
its aspects and of the renunciation of the use 
and threat of force. In this connection, the Ten 
recall their position on the question of Mgha-
nistan. 
The Ten emphasise the particular impor-
tance of the implementation of the Helinski 
final act for peace and security in Europe. 
Having made a decisive contribution to the 
creation of the CSCE process, which seeks to 
overcome the division of Europe, they will 
pursue their efforts aimed at conducting a 
constructive dialogue with the Soviet Union and 
its allies in Central and Eastern Europe. They 
hope to develop co-operation with each of them 
on a stable and realistic basis in all concrete 
fields. They consider that, if it is to have its full 
significance, co-operation between states must 
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benefit the individual citizen. They favour freer 
contact between people in both parts of Europe, 
in particular between those of the two German 
states. 
The Ten wish to see the success of arms 
control and disarmament negotiations and the 
resumption of those which have been broken 
off. For their part, they are determined to make 
every effort required in order to ensure progress 
in the negotiations in which they are taking 
part, in particular the Conference in Stockholm 
on Disarmament in Europe where they consider 
that positive results can be attained. 
They set as their objective the establishment 
of a state of peace and security in Europe in 
which man's right to unrestricted self-fulfilment 
and the right of peoples to self-determination 
will be recognised and respected. They assert 
that it is possible to make progress towards this 
objective by peaceful evolution. Convinced that 
all the European peoples wish to live in peace, 
they appeal to the Governments of the Soviet 
Union and its allies in Central and Eastern 
Europe to work for more constructive East-
West relations in a spirit of equality and of 
respect for the legitimate security interests of 
all concerned. The Ten, for their part, are 
determined to make their own contribution, in 
the interests of Europe and of peace in the 
world. 
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Resolution on European collaboration in the fields of defence equipment adopted by the state 
secretaries of IEPG, 3rd A.pril1984 
State Secretaries of the Independent Euro-
pean Programme Group (IEPG) assembled in 
The Hague on the 2nd and 3rd of April 1984, 
recalling the 1976 Rome resolution setting 
out the aims of the IEPG ; 
recalling in particular the 1982 Bonn 
declaration of the heads of state and government 
seeking "to achieve greater effectiveness in the 
application of national resources to defence, 
giving due attention to possibilities for develo-
ping areas of practical co-operation"; 
considering the necessity of improving 
conventional defence in Europe, the adverse 
effects of the economic recession on the 
European defence effort and the need for 
greater co-operation in the weapon procurement 
field, which is now even more pressing than it 
was in 1976; 
considering that the political will to co-
operate is increasing and should now be 
transformed into concrete action : 
1. agree that the spirit of solidarity and the 
search for European solutions must constitute 
a very important factor in the national 
armaments planning and decision-making pro-
cess, thus enhancing the European contribution 
to the common defence effort ; 
2. agree to widen the search for long-term 
collaborative opportunities, inter alia by a more 
effective and conscious use of IEPG equipment 
replacement schedules and by actively harmo-
nising national operational requirements and 
timetables ; 
3. agree to the importance of improving the 
capabilities of nations with less developed 
defence industries and of adequate compensa-
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tion should these nations opt for European 
products; 
4. acknowledge the European Defence Indus-
trial Group (EDIG) as the designated forum to 
advise the IEPG .on industrial matters; 
5. agree to pursue, together with EDIG, a 
more rational production of defence equipment, 
operating in a less fragmentary way, improving 
cost-effectiveness and enhancing technological 
capabilities in selected key areas ; 
6. recognising the need to avoid unnecessary 
duplication of R & D, agree to bring about a 
greater co-ordination of research and develop-
ment leading to more co-operation within 
Europe; 
7. stress the vital importance of the trans-
atlantic dialogue and a more balanced two-way 
street; 
8. agree to seek to exploit in an agreed 
conceptual framework of the alliance, newly 
available and emerging technology, which can 
enhance the performance of our conventional 
forces; 
9. agree to give due attention to the question 
of the transfer of militarily relevant technology, 
both to enhance and to safeguard the techno-
logical base of the alliance ; 
10. stress that government-to-government co-
operation is an essential prerequisite to both 
industry-to-industry co-operation and a more 
balanced two-way street ; 
State Secretaries invited the Chairman of 
the IEPG to bring this resolution to the notice 
of the Governments of the United States and 
Canada. 
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Amendment 1 
Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty -
reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENT 11 
tabled by Mr. Hardy 
1. At the end of sub-paragraph 3 (a) of the draft recommendation proper, add: 
18th June 1984 
"and to secure international agreement to ensure that such developments are adequately and 
effectively controlled". 
1. See 5th sitting, 20th June 1984 (amendment agreed to). 
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Signed: Hardy 
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Amendment 2 
Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty -
reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENT 21 
tabled by Mr. Dejardin and others 
19th June 1984 
2. Leave out sub-paragraph 4 (a) of the draft recommendation proper and insert: 
"assessing the consequences for the Agency for the Control of Armaments of the possible 
abolition of Annex Ill to Protocol No. Ill and any changes which might be made to Annex 
IV". 
Signed: Dejardin, Stoffelen, Dreyfus-Schmidt 
l. See 5th sitting, 20th June 1984 (amendment negatived). 
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Amendment 3 
Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty -
reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENT 31 
tabled by Mr. Pignion 
19th June 1984 
3. In paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "the partnership" and 
insert "co-operation". 
Signed : Pignion 
l. See 5th sitting, 20th June 1984 (amendment agreed to). 
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AWACS and Nimrod aircraft 
REPORT' 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions2 
by Mr. Spies von Biillesheim, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAfT RECOMMENDATION 
on AWACS and Nimrod aircraft 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Spies von Bullesheim, Rapporteur 
1. Introductory remarks 
2. Purpose of the United States AWACS 
3. NATO requirements 
4. Operational characteristics 
5. Coverage 
6. Interoperability 
7. The chain of command 
8. NADGE 
9. NAPMO 
10. NAPMA 
11. Finance and production 
12. Military or air crew personnel 
13. United Kingdom participation 
14. France 
15. Other countries 
16. Summing up 
1. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
15th May 1984 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Lenzer (Chairman); MM. Wilkinson, Bassinet (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts, Adriaensens 
(Alternate: De Bondt), Amadei (Alternate: Cavaliere), Antoni, BI:Jhm, Fiandrotti, Fourre (Alternate: Lagorce), Garrett, Sir 
Paul Hawkins, MM. McGuire, Prussen, Schmidt, Souvet, Spies von Bal/esheim, Mrs. Staels-Dompas, MM. Valleix, Worrell. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
o11AWACS a11d Nimrod aircraft 
DOCUMENT 974 
(i) Following with great interest the build-up of the NATO Airborne Early Warning Mixed Force 
composed of the NATO Airborne Early Warning Force E-3A component at Geilenkirchen in the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the Nimrod component at Waddington in the United Kingdom; 
(ii) Welcoming the integrated nature of the NATO AWACS force's E-3A component in which 
airmen of nine continental European forces as well as from the United States and Canada participate 
and considering it to be an example for future schemes for multilateral units; 
(iii) Aware also that this NATO force is directed politically by the North Atlantic Council as such 
and militarily by SACEUR and his subordinate commander, the Commander of the NATO 
Airborne Early Warning Mixed Force; 
(iv) Noting with satisfaction that this important force is being set up speedily in accordance with the 
plans agreed to at the outset; 
(v) Welcoming the fact that France might also associate its air defence more closely with that of 
NATO by ordering the same type of AWACS aircraft and thus reinforce the common defence 
potential; 
(vi) Considering that the British decision on the Nimrod component might benefit the other member 
countries as well because of its maritime capability, but only provided its eleven aircraft are 
operational by 1986, ' 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
I. Promote within NATO 
(a) Organisational structures to ensure that the national American AWACS force, the NATO E-
3A component, the Nimrod component and any future French AWACS force will be equipped with 
the same type of hard- and software and with harmonised procedures so as to derive the maximum 
effectiveness from allied defence efforts and expenditure; 
(b) The improvement of the NATO E-3A component by providing its aircraft with airborne 
refuelling capabilities involving financially-acceptable modifications and appropriate training for its 
crews, taking into account the existence of American and British tanker aircraft; 
(c) Training for the necessary number of air staff officers in order to use the NATO E-3A aircraft 
as command and control aircraft in emergencies; 
(d) A set of rules which can be applied in the event of more multilateral military units being set up 
for common defence purposes thus codifying the lessons learned from the formation of the NATO 
AWACS force E-3A; 
11. Remind the French Government of the importance it attaches to an early decision being taken 
on the procurement of its AWACS force. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Spies von Billlesheim, Rapporteur) 
1. Introductory remarks 
1. The airborne radar system AWACS -
airborne warning and control system - is most 
important for the defence of Western Europe. 
For this reason, NATO has decided to adopt 
this system notwithstanding its financial con-
straints and the fact that it is very expensive to 
acquire and maintain. The NATO E-3A 
command is still in the process of formation. 
2. Public opinion has become aware of the 
importance of airborne radar stations in recent 
years since United States AWACS aircraft are 
being sent for given periods wherever there are 
crises in the world. Only recently, in mid-
March 1984, the United States Government 
assigned two AWACS aircraft to Egypt to 
bolster the capability of Egyptian and Sudanese 
air defence systems against further attacks by 
Libyan forces. Saudi Arabia has procured its 
own AWACS aircraft for its air defence. 
3. The Soviet Union has also developed such 
airborne radar stations, some of which are 
already operational. 
4. With its Nimrod aircraft, the United 
Kingdom is developing its own airborne radar 
stations which will be assigned to NATO and 
integrated in the NATO airborne early warning 
force. 
5. However, it is not only the military 
significance of AWACS and Nimrod that has 
prompted the committee to examine this 
airborne early warning system. The NATO E-
3A force is in fact the first and only NATO 
unit. It is directed under NATO's sole 
responsibility and is not under the command of 
any single member country. In the NATO E-
3A unit, soldiers of nearly all NATO nations 
work together fully-integrated. This is an 
important aspect which might set an example 
for other developments in other areas. 
6. The NATO E-3A unit's main base is at the 
Teveren air base near Geilenkirchen in the 
extreme western part of the Federal Republic 
not far from Aachen, in your Rapporteur's 
constituency. For this reason he was involved in 
the political aspects of establishing the unit 
from the very start and this is an additional 
reason for your Rapporteur agreeing with 
pleasure to write this report. 
7. In the preparatory phase, your Rapporteur 
had a series of discussions at the air base as 
well as in Bonn, Brussels and Mons. He wishes 
to express his gratitude to all the authorities for 
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the information obtained and the assistance 
given. 
8. Your Rapporteur well realises that much 
detailed information on a system so important 
for our defence as AWACS is of a confidential 
nature. For that reason much important data 
could not be obtained or even, if obtained, could 
not be revealed in the report. 
9. The AWACS unit is still being built up; 
the first two Nimrod prototype aircraft are at 
the moment being tested. It might therefore be 
advisable to allow for a follow-up report in a 
few years' time when the complete system has 
been established. 
2. Purpose of the United States AWACS 
10. The E-3A airborne warning and control 
system (AWACS) is an air defence system 
which can conduct permanent surveillance of 
aircraft and ships on a wide scale. AWACS is 
the United States air force designation also 
called "sentry". The NATO designation is: 
NATO airborne early warning and control 
(NAEWAC). 
11. Production of the first six operational E-
3A aircraft was authorised in the United States 
in early 1975, and the first system was delivered 
to the United States air force in early 1977. 
The air force originally required a fleet of 
twenty-three aircraft to replace its fleet of 
ageing Lockheed EC-121 surveillance and 
control aircraft. 
12. Essentially, the E-3A is a modified Boeing 
707, long-range jet aircraft equipped with 
communications, navigation, data-processing 
and display equipment to serve as a flying air 
surveillance and weapon control system. The 
key to the E-3A is its radar which is capable of 
"looking down" and separating targets from the 
ground clutter which confuses many existing 
radar systems. Antenna for this new radar is 
carried in a radome mounted above the rear 
fuselage of the aircraft. 
13. The radar surveillance capability was 
proved during the first phase of the programme 
which ended in late 1972. Two testbed aircraft, 
each equipped with a competing radar, were 
used to conduct a radar test programme. The 
surveillance radar design of the W estinghouse 
Electric Corporation was selected for the E-3A 
role. 
14. Boeing's E-3A design utilises the 707-
320B intercontinental airframe, the largest of 
Boeing's 707 series aircraft, and four Pratt and 
Whitney TF-33 turbofan engines, each deliver-
ing 21,000 pounds (9,526 kg) of thrust. The 
United States air force uses a similar airframe 
with the General Electric-Snecma CFM-56 
engine as an airborne tanker for the AWACS 
aircraft. 
15. This combination provides an airborne, 
more survivable, warning control, and com-
munications centre. The long-range and in-
flight refuelling capabilities of the United States 
AWACS permit their political leaders and 
military commanders to deploy the system to 
distant regions of high interest. 
16. In March 1977, the first American aircraft 
became operational and began to assume a role 
in the United States continental air defence. 
Overseas detachments of the American conti-
nental air defence were based at Keflavik, 
Iceland, and Okinawa, Japan. 
17. The United States AWACS fleet has been 
programmed at thirty-four aircraft with the last 
production aircraft delivery in 1984. The 
Department of Defence has stated its intention 
to add twelve more aircraft to the force, the 
first three of which might be acquired in 
1985-86. However, this proposal for twelve 
more aircraft has not yet been approved. 
3. NATO requirements 
18. The inadequacy of a radar cover at low 
level over NATO territory and the approaches 
to it was recognised long ago, but could not be 
rectified since no suitable system was available. 
In 1971, a NATO document on air defence 
problems emphasised the need for improved 
intelligence for low-flying aircraft (below 2,000 
ft.). In 1975, a NATO document stated the 
military operational requirement and concept of 
operations for a land-based airborne early 
warning system. It mentioned the need to detect 
low-flying targets beyond the horizons of surface 
air defence radars. There was also a NATO 
requirement for detecting targets at least 200 
km beyond NATO airspace in order to react 
promptly and adequately to possible violations 
of NATO airspace. Existing surface military 
radars were inadequate, had only limited 
detection capabilities for low-flying targets and 
were to some extent susceptible to electronic 
countermeasures which could significantly 
degrade their capabilities. The Warsaw Pact air 
threat has increased regularly with second and 
third generation aircraft which have enhanced 
capabilities, greater penetration depth and 
speed, weapons effectiveness and electronic 
countermeasures. 
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19. With regard to satellites, their information 
could be useful in detecting large-scale move-
ments of troops and materiel. In detecting 
individual aircraft they are not yet sufficiently 
sophisticated. Satellites are either in a high 
geostatic orbit or in a low non-geostatic orbit. 
In both cases, means of detecting enemy air 
traffic are insufficient and hampered to a degree 
by weather uncertainties. 
20. By the mid-1970s, it was evident that a 
new NATO system had to be introduced; the 
situation was further influenced by the decision 
of the United States in 1973 to start building 
a national AWACS fleet which, as such, was 
completely separate from NATO forces. In 
April 1976, the North Atlantic Council started 
to prepare for the NATO E-3A co-operative 
programme based on a multilateral memor-
andum of understanding to acquire a NATO-
owned airborne early warning and control 
system. 
21. Several possible solutions were considered 
by NATO prior to the decision to acquire the 
Boeing aircraft which was found to provide the 
best system. The American full-scale develop-
ment test programme of the E-3A was 
completed in 1976. 
22. The AWACS force also represents a 
political element; it is important as a means of 
surveillance and therefore is part of the alliance 
deterrent. A major reason for starting the 
development of AWACS was the lack of 
detailed knowledge of unfriendly air activity, 
for example that associated with the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968. 
4. Operational characteristics 
23. The NATO airborne early warning and 
control (NAEWAC) will provide: 
- detection of aircraft and intercept control 
at all altitudes from lowest level to high 
altitude; 
- detection of ships; 
- information exchange with other early-
warning aircraft, NATO air defence 
systems, maritime units and other suit-
ably equipped tactical systems; 
- increased warning time; 
- a capacity to fill surveillance gaps when 
ground radars are unavailable or dis-
abled; 
- a capacity to reinforce surveillance and 
control facilities where and when 
required. 
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24. The aims of both the United States and 
NATO AWACS programmes should be to 
achieve and maintain a maximum degree of 
interoperability. One should, however, be aware 
that the European aircraft is not intended to 
have a command and control capability and is, 
in fact, a flying surveillance radar. The 
American AWACS have a self-contained com-
mand and control capability. Nevertheless, the 
European and American aircraft could fulfil the 
same functions if identical onboard equipment 
and personnel were installed. 
25. The American AWACS can be refuelled 
in the air but not the E-3A component of the 
NATO force. This in-flight refuelling could be 
achieved with small modifications to the 
aircraft. The Americans and the British have a 
tanker air fleet; no special tanker aircraft would 
have to be bought. This refuelling capability is 
separate from the command and control aspect. 
The difference here between the American and 
NATO aircraft is due to the different perception 
of the operation of the force. European 
governments wish the command and control 
function to remain firmly on the ground close 
to the political leadership. Should the European 
perception change, the aircraft is large enough 
and has enough equipment on board to 
accommodate a high-ranking officer with a 
small staff. 
5. Coverage 
26. With the AWACS operating at an altitude 
of 30,000 ft. ( 10,000 m), detection of low-flying 
and sea-surface targets is extended beyond the 
horizon of the transponder-equipped friendly 
ground units. A high-flying aircraft target 
would also be seen beyond the horizon. 
27. Air defence operations are assisted by 
providing early warning time of intrusion by 
hostile forces using "deep-look" tracking behind 
hostile borders, and continued tracking of low-
level targets, and the ability of the NATO 
AWACS to fill gaps caused by coverage 
limitations of the ground radars. Close control 
of low-level interceptions is possible. By provid-
ing additional track data with air defence 
ground environment and their surface-to-air 
missile systems, these systems can be better 
prepared for action, thus improving weapon 
efficiency and survivability. 
28. Maritime operations are concerned with 
defence of naval forces. The AWACS is 
designed to simultaneously detect, track and 
identify ships, hostile aircraft and control 
friendly missions. As a result of the extended 
ranges for these operations, AWACS provides 
a significantly longer warning time than the 
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ship-based sensors also limited to the horizon, 
thus enabling early defence measures to be 
taken. 
29. Threat assessment will be aided by using 
the AWACS airborne platform and its capa-
bility for extended range surveillance of hostile 
aircraft and maritime targets. Data from 
regions of interest can be communicated to 
surface commanders for integration with data 
supplied from other sources to improve intelli-
gence analysis of hostile forces 
30. Although essentially conceived as a major 
contribution to improving NATO's air defence 
capabilities, tactical air operations could be 
improved through assistance to offensive aircraft 
at low altitudes beyond ranges of ground control 
sites. AWACS can also provide flight-path 
information to friendly aircraft operating over 
hostile areas to help avoid hostile surface-to-air 
missile defence systems and to warn of 
imminent interceptor attack. Also it enables 
early identification of returning aircraft and 
control and co-ordination of in-flight refuelling. 
31. Tactical ground force operations could be 
aided by AWACS providing status and precise 
location of transponder-equipped mobile friendly 
forces and relaying tactical communications to 
and from control centres. 
6. lnteroperability 
32. The AWACS will enable NATO comman-
ders to operate with improved force effectiveness 
and provide better surveillance and control 
flexibility. The system will normally be used to 
transmit track and other data to ground or 
maritime command and control centres and act 
as a communication relay for these centres, 
where actual deployment defence measure 
decisions will be made. However, the AWACS 
can function as a control and reporting centre 
to some extent in the event that the ground 
control centres are disabled. 
7. The chain of command 
33. Under the NATO Military Committee the 
three major NATO commanders are the highest 
authorities. SACEUR at Mons in Belgium is 
the acting commander and co-ordinator of the 
NATO AWACS force. The other two are the 
Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic in Nor-
folk, Virginia, and the Commander-in-Chief of 
the Channel Command, Northwood, Middlesex, 
United Kingdom. 
34. Thirteen countries participate in the 
NATO mixed force, Luxembourg participating 
only financially. Moreover, the aircraft are 
registered as Luxembourg aircraft for reasons 
of international law. The other participating 
countries are Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Norway, PortugaP, Turkey, the United King-
dom and the United States. The United 
Kingdom provides Nimrod aircraft as a contri-
bution to a mixed force and participates 
financially in the ground-to-air interface. 
35. An American general, at present Major 
General Leighton R. Palmerton, is Commander 
of the NATO Airborne Early Warning Mixed 
Force. The operational elements of the com-
mand are to comprise eighteen Boeing 707 E-
3A aircraft and eleven Nimrod AEW Mk 3 
aircraft. The United Kingdom has six staff 
officers in the NAEW force command and has 
placed an exchange officer at the NATO air 
base. 
36. A German general, Brigadier General 
Rimmek, is the present commander of the E-
3A component. This E-3A component is 
stationed at the NATO air base at Geilen-
kirchen in Germany. Up to six aircraft will 
rotate between this main base and the compo-
nent's forward operating bases located in 
Greece, Italy, Turkey and the forward operating 
location in Norway where they may be deployed 
for about a week at a time. The main operating 
base for the eleven Nimrods is at Waddington 
in the United Kingdom, but there are also two 
forward operating bases in the United Kingdom. 
8. NADGE 
37. The NATO air defence ground environ-
ment system has radar and computer centres 
deployed from Norway to Turkey. The intro-
duction of the AEW ground integration segment 
(AEGIS) has resulted in the replacement of the 
central computer of the data handling system, 
and provided new peripheral equipment such as 
the computer operations stations and other 
units. Several projects are currently being 
implemented for the upgrading of the system 
throughout NATO. 
38. The NATO NADGE system is operated 
by NATO nations, assigned to SACEUR, and 
partly owned by the national governments while 
at the same time forming part of the integrated 
common infrastructure programme in which 
NATO has invested heavily. Since 1968 
NADGE has been steadily improved and 
brought up to date. 
1. Portugal has a limited part in the NATO AWACS 
E-3A component. 
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39. The cost of the integrated segment of the 
air defence ground environment system, 
NADGE- made necessary by the introduction 
of the AWACS - is about 450 million in 
today's dollars. Thirty-four NADGE ground 
sites are being upgraded with improved equip-
ment in order to make maximum use of the 
AWACS aircraft. The modification programme 
will continue to the end of 1985. 
40. The military radars involved in the 
NADGE have not the capability to detect and 
to track low-flying aircraft over land and sea 
and their radar horizons are limited. A 
possibility for overcoming these inadequacies, 
which seriously handicap air defence operations, 
can only be provided by utilising elevated radar 
platforms such as the E-3A. 
41. NADGE is linked with the national radar 
systems, military as well as civil. 
9. NAPMO 
42. In December 1978, the NATO AEWAC 
Programme Management Office (NAPMO) 
was established on the basis of a multilateral 
memorandum of understanding signed by twelve 
nations. Belgium became a signatory at a later 
date. It is run by a board of directors which 
meets every three or four months and in which 
all participating countries have a seat. Under 
the authority of the board is the NATO 
AEW AC Programme Management Agency 
(NAPMA). In accordance with normal NATO 
practice, decisions have to be taken unanimously 
as each country has a veto. NAPMO reports to 
the North Atlantic Council. 
43. Three countries, the United States, the 
Federal Republic of Germany and Canada are 
so-called major share nations and therefore 
have more industrial advantages. The others are 
minor share nations with no formal claim to 
major industrial participation in the acquisition 
phase of the force. 
10. NAPMA 
44. The NAPMA, NATO AEWAC Pro-
gramme Management Agency, actually handles 
procurement activities; it has a German general 
manager and a United States deputy general 
manager and is divided into five divisions. The 
senior NAPMA representative in the United 
States is in charge of co-ordinating the 
programme in North America. Then there are 
the offices of the legal adviser and of the 
financial controller, the programme evaluation 
and co-ordination office and the testing depart-
ment. Furthermore, the organisation is divided 
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into three divisions - the military factors 
division, systems engineering and integration 
division and the procurement, configuration and 
administration division which all have subdivi-
sions. One subdivision of the military factors 
division is the office for Nimrod liaison. 
45. At its peak NAPMA had a staff of about 
190 but it is already in the process of decreasing 
as the procurement programme progresses 
towards its conclusion. 
11. Finance and production 
46. Total programme cost was agreed at 
$1,826 million in 1977; production costs could 
be divided as follows: aircraft $1,479 million; 
ground integration $225 million; bases $72 
million; management $50 million {1977 dollars). 
All this is laid down in the multilateral 
memorandum of understanding. 
47. All countries have to pay their share on 
1st April and 1st October. The United States 
pays 42%, the Federal Republic 30. 7%, Canada 
10% and the minor share nations - Belgium, 
Denmark, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal and Turkey - together pay 
17.3%. The total sum involved is $1,826 million 
at the 1977 value. Except for an escalation 
utilising a 9% inflation factor, the total budget 
has not increased at all in real terms. Every 
nation pays its share in cash but the Federal 
Republic has paid also in kind by providing, for 
instance, the land for the base in Geilenkirchen. 
48. AWACS has brought important advan-
tages in high technology for European subcon-
tractors such as Dornier, Telefunken, Siemens 
and its subcontractor, Italtel. 
49. There are more than eighty subcontracting 
firms in the United States and Canada; the 
most important are Hughes Aerospace Systems, 
Westinghouse, IBM and Bendix and, in Canada, 
Canadian Aerospace Electronics. 
50. Dornier's role is to install the mission 
avionics and to carry out the flight testing: 
from four to six flight tests and ground tests. 
Dornier, together with Boeing and the military 
authorities, has to take decisions regarding 
acceptance of the aircraft. NAPMA has to take 
decisions regarding acceptance of the aircraft 
from Dornier. 
51. The financial contribution of the minor 
share countries was derived by taking account 
of their gross national product and their lack of 
participation iri the production of equipment. 
There will be more involvement of European 
industry during the support phase, whereas 
American participation will be gradually min-
imised. 
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52. For development and production costs, the 
AWACS programme is one of NATO's most 
successful as there is no cost escalation in 
constant dollar terms and it is anticipated that 
the programme expenditures in total will remain 
within the original cost ceiling. 
53. The AWACS programme cannot be 
compared financially to the Tornado pro-
gramme, the former having a $2 billion budget 
and the second $8 billion. One main difference 
is;. however, that development costs for AWACS 
have to a large extent been borne by the United 
States, as it was selected by NATO after being 
developed; the Tornado programme began with 
the development phase. Secondly, although of 
lesser importance, inflation and currency fluc-
tuation have been able to be discounted. 
12. Military or air crew personnel 
54. The air crew is composed of a flight crew 
and a mission crew. The flight crew consists of 
four members - two pilots, one navigator and 
one flight engineer. The mission crew comprises 
thirteen members -the tactical director, the air 
surveillance section (five), a weapons control 
section (three), a communications section (two), 
one radar technician and one computer display 
technician. 
55. All personnel involved in the NATO 
AWACS Training Centre and Operations Wing 
are integrated into the organisation of the E-3A 
component. The training centre provides basic 
qualifications for air crews, maintenance, 
software support personnel - a total of some 
150 persons. The operations wing comprises 
some 600 personnel. Thirty multinational air 
crews are to be assigned to the component's 
operations wing which is divided into three 
flying squadrons, each with ten multinational 
air crews. 
56. The initial cadre of instructor and opera-
tional personnel was trained in the United 
States, mainly with the United States Air Force 
AWACS wing. All training is now conducted 
in Europe apart from the very few highly 
specialised personnel; the cost of their training 
would be too high in Europe and this is 
therefore carried out in the United States. 
57. As the American participation in the 
acquisition phase was 42% and the German 
participation 30%, the Americans are to provide 
the force commander and the Germans the 
component commander or vice versa. Since the 
United Kingdom contributes Nimrod to the 
mixed force, the deputy force commander is 
British. 
58. The training of the integrated international 
crews is still continuing and experience so far 
is very good. However, as only eleven aircraft 
are operating, there is as yet insufficient 
operational experience. The wing is expected to 
become fully operational in 1985 but, because 
of the rotation of the crews, training will be 
continuous. 
59. It is the first time that a mix of personnel 
of several nationalities operates the same 
aircraft. There have been precedents for mixed 
international air crews but not to the extent of 
integrating personnel of many nations into one 
large air crew (seventeen members). For support 
functions a software support centre, a logistic 
wing and a base support wing are other 
integrated organisational elements of the 
NAEWF E-3A component. 
13. United Kingdom participation 
60. The American Government offered the 
AWAC system to the NATO countries in 1975. 
At that period, the British Government was as 
much in favour of adopting the system as the 
other European countries. However, in 1977, 
after a discussion between the German and 
British Ministers, Mr. Leber and Mr. Mulley, 
the British Government decided on a separate 
contribution. This, of course, changed the 
financial outlay for the other NATO countries 
and especially in the case of the Federal 
Republic whose financial contribution now 
amounted to more than 30% of the overall cost. 
61. The British Government, in part because 
of the delay in the NATO decision but also 
under pressure from the unions as well as from 
the military establishment, adopted a national 
solution - the Nimrod system. The British 
would use the Hawker Siddeley Nimrod AEW 
Mk 3, a modified Comet, which will be 
optimised to survey the seas and oceans but will 
also have detection capability over land. Their 
system is planned to consist of eleven aircraft 
and would have originally cost $300 million. 
Since then the cost has more than doubled as 
radar, as well as data processing equipment, 
has become much more expensive. In addition, 
it appears to take more than three years longer 
to convert the Nimrod aircraft into an AWACS 
aircraft. There are now two flying test prototype 
Nimrod AEW Mk 3 aircraft. Maintenance 
costs of the eleven Nimrod aircraft will be 
considerably more than if maintenance had 
been pooled with the E3-A component. 
62. The United Kingdom's airborne early 
warning capability will of course, be greatly 
improved when the Shackletons - the old 
Lancaster bomber version - now being used are 
replaced by Nimrod over the next few years. 
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14. France 
63. On the French side, from the beginning 
there has been little enthusiasm for participation 
in the AWACS programme. Between NADGE 
and French air defence sites there has been, 
and still is, an exchange of air defence data, 
but the French do not want to appear to be 
integrated into a NATO military system. 
However, since the British experience and 
following the French examination of several 
different types of aircraft, the French might 
now wish to buy three to five Boeing E-3A 
aircraft. These aircraft might be deployed in 
either the Mediterranean or the Atlantic areas. 
64. The French Government's five-year 
defence plan allocates funding for the purchase 
of the initial AEW aircraft in 1986-88. The 
remaining units would be acquired after 1988. 
65. Before the French Government's pro-
visional choice for the Boeing E-3A and 
Grumman E-3C was made, it considered other 
solutions. For instance, the C-160 Transall 
transport built in an international consortium 
led by Aerospatiale was examined as well as 
the new generation Atlantic 'patrol aircraft 
manufactured in a multinational consortium 
headed by Dassault-Breguet. However, one 
disadvantage of a refit programme is the delay 
in the aircraft's service introduction, but an 
advantage of this solution would be the creation 
of employment for France's aerospace industry. 
Other European aircraft possibilities considered 
in the past were the Airbus Industrie A-300 
outfitted with the Marconi avionics and the 
Nimrod AEW Mk 3. 
66. For the French navy's airborne early 
warning mission, the Grumman E-2C Hawkeye, 
or a follow-on aircraft, could also be evaluated. 
Serious consideration by the navy probably 
would not, however, begin for five to ten years 
and would be complementary to the Boeing E-
3A land-based aircraft. 
67. Elimination of European possibilities and 
the Grumman E-2C leaves Boeing's E-3A 
AWACS for the French air force airborne early 
warning capability. France is discussing acqui-
sition with the United States together with 
French industrial offset packages to go with the 
purchase of E-3As. 
68. France still has several months in which 
to make its final decision on the AEW buy. 
However, as Boeing is planning to close the 
production line in 1988 and as it would be 
extremely costly to reopen such a line for only 
three to five aircraft, the French Government 
cannot wait too long before coming to a 
decision. It is, however, evident that a solution 
involving use of the CFM-56 engine could be 
attractive for France since the French Snecma 
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has a 50% share of the CFM-56 engine 
programme. 
69. Boeing is surveying the French industry to 
determine areas of offset applicable to an E-3A 
buy. One issue is the matter of non-recurring 
costs for the AWACS which were waived for 
NATO. Boeing might also order the CFM-56 
engine for other similar aircraft. If France 
decides on the AEW buy and provides the 
necessary funding, arrangements will probably 
have to be made between France and the 
NATO authorities on maintenance and support 
facilities. 
15. Other countries 
70. Saudi Arabia requires five AWACS air-
craft and eight 707 tankers for in-flight fuelling. 
71. Israel, Australia and Japan also have 
airborne warning and control systems and use 
the Hawkeye aircraft constructed by Grumman. 
72. Spain does not yet participate in the 
NATO system but, should it join the integrated 
NATO military structure, it might also partici-
pate in the AWACS force. The ground 
environment system now in existence in Spain 
operates in conjunction with the Portuguese 
system and is directly linked to the existing 
French Strida 11 system. 
73. The Soviet Union has the Moss Tupolev 
Tu-126 and the 11yushin 11-76, the latter is the 
same type of aircraft as the American Starlifter 
C-141. An AWACS version of the 11-76 has 
been under development since the 1970s. 
Known to NATO as Mainstay, it is said to 
carry a more capable early warning radar than 
that of the Tu-126, to have better data-
transmission systems and to promise significant 
improvement of the ability of Soviet strategic 
and tactical aircraft to conduct longer-range 
surveillance operations. 
74. Unconfirmed reports suggest that Main-
stay has a conventionally located rotating 
"saucer" radome and a flight refuelling probe. 
Assessments that at least thirty Mainstays 
would support Soviet air forces by the mid-
1980s might assume a too-early date for initial 
operational capabilities. 
16. Summing up 
75. The invasion of Czechoslovakia confirmed 
that NATO's surveillance coverage at low level 
over the approaches to alliance airspace was 
insufficient and demonstrated that the Warsaw 
Pact could mount operations at low level and 
that there appeared to be an increased low level 
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air threat for the NATO countries. This 
problem was then studied by NATO which 
eventually accepted a concept of operations for 
a land-based airborne early warning system. 
76. A maximum degree of interoperability is 
in the interest of NATO as well as in that of 
the United States which is one of the main 
countries participating in the NATO airborne 
early warning force. Apart from the eighteen 
NATO E-3A AWACS, this force will also 
comprise eleven British Nimrods which will be 
operated and supported by the United Kingdom 
and assigned to NATO. 
77. Contrary to the British Nimrods, the 
American AWACS .were not originally sea-
oriented but the NATO aircraft have a 
maritime capability. The Nimrod inclusion is 
therefore quite practical. When more Nimrods 
become operational, the advantages of co-
ordination between AWACS and Nimrod 
aircraft will be evident. 
78. The NATO and United Kingdom pro-
grammes are also planned to achieve a 
maximum degree of interoperability. However, 
if there are three different authorities deciding 
on the hardware and software configuration and 
on the procedures to be followed for the various 
systems, permanent efforts by all parties 
concerned are absolutely necessary as well as 
organisational structures to harmonise these 
efforts. 
79. All NATO AWACS aircraft are newly-
built and equipped with new electronics com-
pared to the already existing United States 
AWACS aircraft. They have therefore different 
capabilities. United States programmes aim at 
bringing the original United States AWACS up 
to the same standard as the more recent NATO 
AWACS aircraft in order to maintain a 
common configuration. 
80. The AWACS experience has so far been 
quite positive. However, it is not certain what 
will happen if there is enemy interference, such 
as direct attack, jamming, cuts in communica-
tions, etc. The system will probably be very 
useful. The force is in the build-up stage. 
81. The first forward operating base for the 
airborne early warning force became activated 
on 25th October 1983 at Konya, Turkey. The 
forward operating location for the force in 
Norway was activated on 2nd November 1983. 
82. Both bases are fully equipped and the 
Norwegian and Turkish ground crews are 
trained and in place. Full-scale deployment of 
the aircraft to the bases is not expected until 
mid-1984, though the NATO aircraft have 
already done proving flights to both bases. 
83. NATO Airborne Early Warning Force. 
E-3A forward operating bases are also sched-
uled to be operational at Preveza, Greece, in 
mid-1984, and Trapani, Italy, in early 1985. 
84. The presence of the airborne warning and 
control E-3A aircraft at the forward bases will 
gradually increase as more of the aircraft are 
delivered. At the end of 1984 they will be 
present full-time at the forward bases. 
85. As far as the organisation is concerned, 
the NAEW force is an integrated force and, 
contrary to other forces in NATO, support 
functions are the responsibility of the force 
commander. 
86. Although it has happened before that an 
air crew of different nationalities operated the 
same aircraft- examples are: the Euro-NATO 
Joint Jet Pilot Training Programme, the 
Trinational Tornado Training Establishment 
and exchange programmes of operational air 
crew members - the integration of personnel of 
many NATO nations (17) into a large air crew 
is new, as is the integration of multinational 
personnel for support functions. 
87. Not only are the multinational E-3A 
crews operating the same aircraft but they are 
also interchangeable on all aircraft. Crews of 
different nationalities have created no difficul-
ties whatsoever. On the ground there were some 
general problems such as security and police 
regulations, registration of land vehicles, flying 
regulations, common medical standards, finan-
cial procedures and others. All, however, have 
been solved by selecting the best national 
regulations wherever possible. For instance, 
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flight safety regulations mainly based on 
Canadian regulations were developed. 
88. Although many personnel problems have 
been solved, one still outstanding concerns the 
large civilian maintenance force. Decisions will 
have to be taken on the possibilities of 
transferring personnel to duty stations. Military 
personnel can of course be easily transferred 
from one base to another. This is not easy with 
civilian personnel but it will be necessary if the 
aircraft are to be dispersed in the NATO area. 
89. The NAEW E-3A fleet is expected to 
become fully operational in late 1985 and might 
remain so for many years to come (twenty to 
thirty) as they have brand-new airframes and 
engines. 
90. The ground radar stations will all be 
interconnected once the whole NAEW force is 
fully operational. 
91. The training for the E-3A is a continuing 
process since new crews take over as old crews 
leave. Most of this training is conducted at 
Geilenkirchen. 
92. Aircraft of the NATO AEW force will fly 
everywhere in NATO airspace. 
93. If war were to break out, the NATO E-
3A and Nimrod aircraft could be dispersed as 
fast as possible in order to complicate any 
enemy action aimed at their destruction. In 
view of their value as surveillance systems, they 
certainly would not be left just at their home 
bases. 
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Reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council 
I. Introductory remarks 
1. This report replying to the twenty-ninth 
annual report of the Council was submitted by 
your Rapporteur to the committee on 15th May 
1984 when it was adopted unanimously. 
2. As is not unusual, it was attached to 
another report by your Rapporteur on AWACS 
and Nimrod aircraft. However, in view of the 
diversity of the questions examined, your 
Rapporteur thought it unwise to follow that 
procedure on this occasion. At his proposal, the 
committee therefore decided to submit it to the 
Assembly as a separate report 
3. The committee is fairly satisfied with the 
interest shown by the Council in scientific, 
technological and aerospace questions, but it 
has to repeat that the Council's interest goes no 
further than the bare subjects discussed by the 
committee and, even then, only from a very 
short-term viewpoint. The committee would, of 
course, have preferred a more detailed and 
longer-term discussion on the energy situation 
in Europe, the law of the sea problems and the 
future of the Airbus programme. 
4. Particularly since the prospects of reacti-
vating WEU are widely discussed outside WEU, 
it would have been of great interest if the 
twenty-ninth annual report of the Council had 
given an inside view of the direction Europe 
should take in scientific, technological and 
aerospace questions. 
11. The energy situation 
5. On the energy situation in Europe and 
especially relations between Norway and the 
other countries of WEU, it would have been 
extremely useful if the Council had given its 
views on further developments in the European 
energy situation and the relationship between 
gas supplied by the Soviet Union and that by 
Norway. 
6. Furthermore, an intra-European gas pipe-
line network remains of the utmost importance 
for all Western Europe from the economic, 
political and security viewpoints. The Council 
states that it is not in a position to take a more 
definite stand on this subject but it should 
prompt the member governments to examine 
the question from a Western European angle 
rather than from a British or Dutch point of 
view for instance. 
7. Of course, the Siberian gas pipeline to 
Western Europe will remain an important 
matter which should be discussed regularly. 
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8. A dialogue between the Assembly and the 
Council is not possible if the Council fails to 
elaborate on the policy aspects of the points 
under discussion and the opinions of member 
countries. There is no need to be a prophet to 
predict new shortages of energy in the next 
decade. Now that large supplies are available, 
an acceptable intra-European supply system 
should be worked out. 
Ill. The law of the sea convention 
9. With regard to the law of the sea 
convention, the committee is rather pessimistic 
about the final outcome since constructive and 
acceptable solutions to the issue of the deep 
seabed regime are still not in sight. 
10. The convention, with its 320 articles and 
9 annexes, deals with practically every possible 
use by mankind of the high seas, oceans and 
the seabed. As indicated in the report by Mr. 
Lenzer (Document 946), the convention is a 
huge package deal and it is regrettable that the 
European countries are staying in the rearguard 
of international co-operation. 
11. From a security point of view, important 
parts of the draft convention are advantageous 
for all member countries of WEU. This fact is 
also recognised by the Council. The provisions 
on the free passage of ships through territorial 
waters, international straits and archipelagic 
states constitute an important concession by 
many governments in the developing world. 
Here the convention could make a significant 
contribution to international law and practice. 
It seems hardly possible to revert to the theses 
of Grotius and other international lawyers of 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
12. The committee understands full well the 
divergent interests of industrialised and devel-
oping countries in exploration and exploitation 
of the sea bed, fisheries and maritime boundaries. 
But it is very worried about a majority of 
European states not accepting the convention. 
13. Belgium, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Italy, Luxembourg and the United 
Kingdom have not signed, mainly because they 
feel the provisions on deep-sea mining are 
unsatisfactory. The deadline for signing the 
convention is approaching rapidly, the limit 
being two years after the opening for signature 
on 9th December 1982. 
14. The question now is should the abovemen-
tioned member countries sign the convention -
although unwilling to ratify - in order to 
become members of the preparatory commission 
for the international seabed authority and for 
the international tribunal for the law of the sea 
with the possibility of participating in pioneer 
activities. 
15. The convention will only enter into force 
after sixty nations have become parties to it so 
there is still time to reflect on ratification. 
However, several governments have already 
declared that they will sign only if the seabed 
regime is acceptable to them. As it is not likely 
that this will be the case, the political questions 
to sign or not to sign will have to be debated 
within governments and parliaments. The time 
of decision-making is at hand. 
IV. European aeronautics 
16. On European aeronautics, your Rappor-
teur would like to underline very strongly the 
need for collaboration. From 19th to 22nd 
March the committee had discussions with 
authorities of the French aerospace industries 
in Paris, Marseille, Cannes and Bordeaux. A 
general conclusion from the discussions is that 
without European collaborative efforts these 
European industries might still be able to 
provide a next generation of transport or fighter 
aircraft but after that no individual country 
will be able to raise the money or provide the 
necessary know-how to build the following 
generation of aircraft. 
17. For this and other reasons the committee 
has always been deeply interested in the Airbus 
programme. It is happy to note that Airbus 
Industrie's A-320 has now been endorsed by 
the Governments of France, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Spa~n and the United 
Kingdom. The slow-down in the Airbus produc-
tion rate has been felt by all European 
companies and particularly by Aerospatiale. 
Monthly output in 1983 at the Airbus Aeros-
patiale final assembly facility in Toulouse was 
at around five A-310 and this has dropped to 
three per month. 
18. The new European 150-seat aircraft is 
expected to make its first flight in the spring of 
198 7. Certification and first deliveries are 
planned in the beginning of 1988. In the 
meantime, endurance tests will be held on two 
prototypes. 
19. To improve the contract distribution in 
Europe the United States industry's present 
share of some 30% in the pr.ogramme should be 
reduced. 
20. The British Government was quite hesitant 
about approving funds mainly because it was 
not satisfied with the profitability of Airbus 
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Industrie and the distribution of equipment 
contracts for British industry. 
21. The overall programme-sharing arrange-
ment for the A-320 is that France will take 
approximately 36%, the United Kingdom will 
keep its 26%, the Federal Republic of Germany 
will take on 31% and Spain 6%. A memorandum 
of understanding will mention in detail the 
financial support commitments of each country 
and outline their industry's share in the 
programme. These figures will be about the 
same as those mentioned above: Aerospatiale 
36%, MBB 31%, British Aerospace 26% and 
Casa 6%. 
22. The engines to be incorporated will be 
General Electric Snecma CFM-56-4 which will 
give the aircraft a speed of Mach 0.74 to 0.80. 
Other engines - Rolls Royce - are possible. 
23. The committee regrets that Fokker from 
the Netherlands will not take part in this 
venture and that the Dutch Government has 
agreed to guarantee loans of some $300 million 
to allow Fokker to develop its proposed new 
Fokker 50 and Fokker 100 transport aircraft. 
24. The United States Department of Trade 
is also very interested in this new aircraft since 
the value of United States participation in the 
Airbus A-320 might be much lower than in the 
Airbus A-300 or A-310 mainly because the 
engines will now be produced only partly in the 
United States whereas the engines for the 
earlier Airbuses were wholly American. 
25. In this respect political problems could 
arise between the United States and the 
European Community and between the United 
States and other members of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation. The United States Gov-
ernment is concerned lest the various govern-
ments funding the programme dictate the 
equipment to be used. Your Rapporteur thought 
it useful to hint at some of the possible political 
problems. 
26. During the abovementioned visit to French 
aerospace industries, the future of the European 
combat aircraft was of course also discussed. 
One of the problems here is that British 
Aerospace has its experimental aircraft pro-
gramme which is a technology demonstrator 
aircraft for the British Ministry of Defence. 
The French demonstrator aircraft, called the 
ACX (avion de combat experimentale), is being 
built by Dassault. Both aircraft are scheduled 
to make their first flights in 1986. The EAP 
will be powered by two turbo-union RB-199 
engines and the ACX will be powered by twin 
General Electric F-404s. 
27. The Governments of the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Italy and Spain are not participat-
ing in these two prototype aircraft but are very 
interested in the future European fighter 
aircraft. However, they do not wish to appear 
to be taking sides between the rival British and 
French proposals. 
28. Although convinced that some competition 
is sound, the committee hopes that the Council 
and the Western European governments will 
take care that this intra-European competition 
will not be to the detriment of the European 
aircraft industries. In considering these ques-
tions one should realise that electronics in 
fighter aircraft now comprise one-third and 
perhaps 40% of the cost of the aircraft and that 
European technology is lagging well behind 
American technology in this field. 
29. Your Rapporteur hopes - as declared by 
the Council in its reply to Written Question 
239 - that "the chances of co-operation on a 
future European fighter aircraft are perfectly 
realistic and, in spite of the uncertainties that 
may be felt in this complex field where there 
are many underlying industrial interests, it is 
important to be optimistic about the results of 
present efforts to harmonise requirements". 
V. Study on the Japanese armaments industry 
30. Finally, your Rapporteur wishes to point 
out that in the chapter on the Standing 
Armaments Committee the Council has indi-
cated that the international secretariat has 
begun a programme of research for a Standing 
Armaments Committee study on the future 
prospects of the Japanese armaments industry. 
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31. Here your Rapporteur recalls his remarks 
at the beginning of this chapter that it is 
regrettable that the Council is not providing 
more factual and political information. What is 
the purpose of this study and what is the 
Japanese armaments industry considered to be? 
32. In the report by Lord Northfield (Docu-
ment 956), it was pointed out that Japan's 
military industrial policy is becoming increas-
ingly active in many high technology fields: 
aeronautics, communications, electronics, mar-
ine science and many fields of great importance 
for its energy supply. 
33. Research and development in Japan is 
being conducted largely in private firms where 
of course no difference is made between civil 
and military research. The abovementioned 
fields are for them, however, of much greater 
importance in the civil than the military field 
which is directly related to the Japanese position 
on defence and security. 
34. A study of prospects of the Japanese 
armaments industry will therefore become 
highly speculative as no clear-~ut line can be 
drawn between civil and military programmes. 
This is especially true in the field of electronics 
and data-transmission research and develop-
ment. 
35. A more informative report by the Council 
should have indicated first of all the difficulties 
involved but, secondly, the purpose and possi-
bilities of the Standing Armaments Committee 
for fulfilling its task meaningfully. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on the military use of space 
The Assembly, 
(i) Aware of the consistent interest shown by Western European Union in the strategic and 
industrial implications of the space capabilities of the member countries; 
(ii) Appreciating the considerable achievements of Western European countries in the space field 
both nationally and under the aegis of the European Space Agency, most notably in the Spacelab 
and Ariane and satellite programmes; 
(iii) Conscious of the need for Europe to initiate new projects in both the space science and 
applications fields if Europe's successful development of telecommunications and remote-sensing 
satellite systems, together with launch vehicles and manned work modules, are to be fully exploited; 
(iv) Understanding that the United States spends about ten times as much as Western Europe on 
space activities and that at least half the United States space programme is directly or indirectly 
funded by the Department of Defence; 
(v) Aware also that current efforts by the Soviet Union to expand its present space capability should 
not go unmatched by western countries; 
(vi) Concerned that in addition to the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, 
other major nations, such as Japan, India, Brazil and the People's Republic of China, are pursuing 
active space programmes which could jeopardise Europe's current position as the established third 
force after the United States and the Soviet Union in space activities; 
(vii) Believing that space capability will be a key determinant in future warfare, that in military 
terms the difference in potential between the space-capable nations and the others will be almost as 
great as the current difference in power between nuclear and non-nuclear nations and that Europe 
should not only take note but act upon this fact; 
(viii)Noting President Mitterrand's call in his speech of 7th February 1984 for a "European space 
community" and his remarks on the potential of a manned European space station as well as current 
Western European interest in this subject; 
(ix) Supporting initiatives to exploit space technology to bring about confidence-building measures 
such as the proposed international satellite monitoring agency and determined to use Europe's space 
capabilities in order to reduce the risk of war by eliminating the advantage of surprise through 
surveillance satellite systems; 
(x) Confident that WEU can offer a valuable forum for debate about and analysis of the 
implications for the defence of Western Europe of the latest military space technologies as well as 
an institutional framework untrammelled by the political inhibitions of the ESA convention for the 
initiation by the principal space-capable nations of Western Europe of a defensive European military 
space programme, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Urge the governments of member countries to do all in their power to secure negotiations 
between the United States and the Soviet Union so as to prevent the military use of space through 
the deployment of offensive space weapon systems by promoting new international treaties and 
related verification procedures, as well as through the implementation of existing accords to limit the 
military uses of space; 
2. Demand a larger European industrial involvement both in NATO telecommunications satellites 
and in NATO military satellite programmes as well as in the associated ground station infrastructure, 
in addition to supporting successful national military communications satellites like Skynet; 
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3. Commission a detailed analysis by the Standing Armaments Committee of the implications for 
European defence of developments in military space technology and in particular of Soviet research 
and development in this field; 
4. Initiate a study by the Agency for the Control of Armaments of the confidence- and security-
building measures that could be taken in Europe following the establishment of either an 
international satellite monitoring agency or of Western European oceanic and terrestrial surveillance 
satellite systems; 
5. Establish a dialogue with the European Space Agency whereby the industrial implications of 
ESA scientific or applications programmes can be discussed in an institutional framework appropriate 
for the formulation of Western European security polic_y; 
6. Set clear European space policy objectives and priorities in the course of its politico-military 
consultations in the key strategic fields of launchers, manned modules, space station integration, 
telecommunications, meteorological and remote-sensing satellites and manned reusable service and 
space transport vehicles; 
7. Propose a European surveillance and reconnaissance satellite programme adapting and refining 
the sensor technologies in the existing CNES Spot project and the ESA ERS-1 project; 
8. Concert a joint response by the member countries to the NASA proposals for European 
participation in the projected United States space station and evolve a common strategy to utilise the 
consequent technological expertise should a European space station programme be initiated; 
9. Require the construction of a Western European military meteorological satellite programme to 
follow the successful series of civil Meteosat satellites. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. The Assembly of Western European Union 
has taken a consistent interest for many years 
in space matters and in particular those aspects 
of strategic and military significance. The 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions in particular has produced 
a large number of reports in this field. There 
was the report published in 1966 on juridical 
problems and space policy (Document 388 -
Rapporteur Mrs. Maxsein). In 1968 there was 
the report on the Soviet orbital bombardment 
system (Document 444 - Rapporteur Mr. 
Ha~sen). I~ 1972 there was the report on 
orbttal stations and the civil and military 
consequences (Document 572- Rapporteur Mr. 
Kahn-.Ackermann). In addition, your Rappor-
teur htmself has previously produced two reports 
for the committee, one on a European earth 
resources detection satellite programme (Docu-
ment 842) and one on the future of European 
space activities (Document 883). 
11. The institutional framework 
~- Th.e Assembly of Western European Union 
ts the tdeal forum for informed discussion and 
debate about the military uses of space. As the 
sole . European parliamentary assembly with 
specific competence by treaty in the defence 
field, its statutory terms of reference have lent 
themselves ideally to serious treatment by WEU 
of both the strategic and industrial aspects of 
a European space programme and of the 
implications for Western European defence of 
developments in space technology. The indus-
trial and technical ramifications of the European 
space programme have stimulated a keen 
interest on the part of the Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Ques-
tions in the work of the European Space Agency 
(ESA) since its inception twenty years ago. It 
must at the same time be made quite clear 
tha~, while the A.ssembly of Western European 
~mon . has momtored. carefully the growing 
mdustnal competence m space matters which 
has been developed within Europe under the 
aegis of ESA, there has been no attempt on the 
part of ESA to promote the militarisation of 
ESA's activities which is explicitly debarred 
under the terms of the ESA convention 1• 
l. See Appendix 11. 
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3. Of course the national membership of ESA 
and WEU are not conterminous since the 
European Space Agen~y has numerically more 
members, some of whtch are neutral countries 
like Sweden and Ireland. Nevertheless the 
Benelux nations, the Federal Republic of 
Germany •. ~ranee, Italy and the United King-
dom do JOintly constitute the inner core of 
space-capable countries in Europe. Other West-
ern Europea~ countries like Norway, Sweden 
~nd Spat~ m particu!ar have a significant 
mdustnal t_nvolvement m space but nothing to 
compare wtth the effort of the WEU nations. 
4. Just as the WEU member nations have a 
particular importance in the context of Euro-
pean defence, since they all, with the exception 
of Luxembourg, have either NATO nuclear 
forces stationed upon their soil or a national 
nuclear deterrent or both, so they have a 
particul~r significance as far as space-based 
defence ts concerned by virtue of their technical 
competence and sophisticated industrial base. 
5. The organs of WEU lend themselves 
naturally to the promotion of a Western 
Eur~pea_n strategy and policy for the defensive 
apphcations of space technology. First the 
Ministerial Council should be userl' for 
politico-military consultations at the highest 
governmental level to bring about a strategic 
concertation of policy and planning. Second, 
the Assembly of WEU should be the forum for 
reflection certainly but much more - the forum 
for mobilising political commitment to an active 
~uropean space programme. Third, the Stand-
mg Armaments Committee can undertake the 
de.tll:iled. technical. studies needed and guide the 
mtmster~al C:oul!ctl and parlia!Dentary assembly 
on the tmphcations of the htghly complicated 
technical developments in the space field. 
Fourth and last, the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments can examine the arms control and 
li!Ditation aspects of military space systems, the 
difficult problems of verification of international 
agreements in this field and related confidence-
building measures. 
~· _In ~hort, WEU is in most respects the only 
ms~tt~!to~al framework for the political control 
of mttiatives and developments in the military 
uses of space. These have an international and 
national dimension in Europe. There are both 
national S_Pace p~ogrammes and programmes 
based on International European collaboration. 
The argument that greater reliance on WEU 
would derogate from the existing role of NATO 
and its agencies in this field is fallacious since 
the European industrial competition for NATO 
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space-based systems, especially in telecom-
munications, has been woefully inadequate. 
Since initiatives are currently being undertaken 
at the highest level for reviving WEU and 
involving more actively the ministerial Council, 
the Standing Armaments Committee and the 
Agency for the Control of Armaments, it would 
be timely and in step with current political 
thinking in Europe to make a study of the 
implications for European defence of develop-
ments in military space technology. 
Ill. The Soviet space challenge 
7. No sane person seeks the militarisation of 
space or an extension of the costly nuclear arms 
race to space-based systems. However, there is 
no doubt from an objective analysis of Soviet 
efforts in space that they are determined to 
obtain major strategic benefits from an 
extremely innovative, ambitious and costly 
space programme with clear military objectives. 
The Soviet space programme 
8. The Soviets have made much progress 
toward their dual military objectives of global 
support to military forces and denial of enemy 
employment of space during wartime. In 
addition, progress has been made toward the 
two other key objectives of enhancing the 
influence and prestige of the USSR and 
contributing to the Soviet economy. There has 
been no ~~ange in !he . heavy Soviet emphasis 
on ~he. mllttary applications of space, reflecting 
thetr vtew, noted as early as two decades ago in 
the classified Soviet military publication, Mili-
tary Thought, that "the mastering of space (is) 
a prerequisite for achieving victory in war". 
9. Since last year, the Soviet developmental 
programmes for providing a family of new space 
launch vehicles and reusable spacecraft suitable 
for military and civil purposes have come into 
sharper focus. Significant new launch and 
support . facilities at Tyuratam are nearing 
completion. Some of these should be ready this 
year or next to support initial testing of new 
launch vehicles. These vehicles include a space 
transportation system (STS), that in many 
respects copies the design of the United States 
space shuttle, a new heavy-lift launch vehicle 
based on the core rockets of the STS and a new 
medium-lift launch vehicle that is evidently 
designed for high launch rates. The new 
spacecraft include a space shuttle that differs 
from the United States shuttle only in the 
respect that the main engines are not on the 
orbiter, a small spacecraft that could be a test 
vehicle or a scale version of a military 
spacecraft, and a space tug that would be used 
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in space to move equipment and supplies from 
one orbit to another. The Soviet shuttle could 
be first tested in the mid-to-late 1980s. The 
space plane scale model has already been tested 
three times, and the space tug probably will 
reach operational status late in the 1980s. 
10. In addition, the Soviets evidently intend to 
continue using their many types of operational 
space launch vehicles for at least another 
decade. This current family of vehicles, which 
supports a space effort of 100 or more launches 
per year, combined with the new generation of 
systems, indicates that the Soviets will be able 
by the mid-to-late 1980s to increase signifi-
cantly their space programme both in numbers 
and payload weight. In this regard, the new 
heavy-lift vehicle is estimated to have the 
capability to place payloads weighing upwards 
of 330,000 pounds into low-earth orbit. This is 
about seven times more than the largest 
operational Soviet booster can deliver today, 
and about five times the maximum United 
States capability. Despite the obvious civil and 
scientific uses to which these capabilities could 
be put, the Soviets will continue, as in the past 
to devote most of their future space programm~ 
to military purposes. 
11. Military systems now account for more 
than 70% of Soviet space launches. Another 
20% have combined military-civil application ~it_h l_ess . than . ~ ~% devote~ to purely 
ctvlljsctentific act1Vlties. Very httle of their 
effort is devoted to programmes that have 
economic benefit. 
12. The Soviets routinely conduct about four 
to five times as many space launches per year 
as the United States. This is necessitated 
primarily by the shorter system lifetimes and 
poorer reliability of most Soviet satellites. The 
fact that they routinely operate this way in 
peacetime, however, gives them an inherently 
greater capability to increase rapidly the 
number of military satellites in orbit and to 
replace lost or damaged satellites as long as 
launch facilities are intact. 
13.. T~e United States and USSR currently 
mam~am ~bout t~e same number of operational 
satellites m orbtt, 110 to 120. The Soviet 
inventory .o~ operational space systems provides 
the c~pabthty to perform the following military 
functions: 
- reconnaissance and surveillance, 
- command, control and communications, 
- ICBM launch detection and attack 
warning, 
- strategic and tactical targeting, 
- navigational support, 
- meteorological support, and 
- anti-satellite operations. 
14. The Soviets have satellites that are 
designed to perform naval surveillance and 
targeting missions. These satellites are strictly 
military systems intended to support Soviet 
naval operations against large surface ships and 
other surface ship formations. 
15. The Soviets have a deployed anti-satellite 
weapon system that is capable of attacking 
satellites in low-to-medium earth orbits. Recent 
Soviet proposals to ban all ASA T tests and 
future deployments of ASAT weapons are 
intended to put the United States at a 
disadvantage in this area. It is important to 
note that the proposed treaty does not prevent 
developing and deploying advanced ground-
based weapons - such as high energy lasers -
that could be used in an anti-satellite role. 
16. The Soviets continue to pursue their 
manned space programmes maintaining in orbit 
the Salyut space station, which is manned 
during most of the year. This gives the Soviets 
the capability to perform a variety of functions 
from space, including military research and 
development and the use of man to augment 
their other reconnaissance and surveillance 
efforts. A larger, permanently manned space 
station, expected during the next decade, will 
significantly increase their in-orbit operations 
capabilities. This station could be used as a 
stepping stone to interplanetary exploration and 
the establishment of bases on other planetary 
bodies. The Soviets, however, are more likely to 
use such a station to perform command and 
control, reconnaissance and targeting functions. 
During wartime, it could perform these func-
tions and more offensively oriented missions as 
well. The Soviets believe in the military utility 
of maintaining cosmonauts in orbit. Over the 
next ten years, therefore, the Soviets are likely 
to develop primarily for military purposes: 
- a permanently manned Skylab-sized 
space station to be operational in the 
next two to three years with a six- to 
twelve-person crew, and 
- a very large modular space station, to be 
operational by the early-to-mid-1990s, 
which could house as many as 100 
personnel. 
17. By all measures, the Soviet level of effort 
devoted to space in the 1980s is increasing 
significantly over the activities noted in the 
1970s. The projected annual rate of growth of 
the Soviet space programme is expected to 
outpace both the annual rate of growth in 
overall Soviet military spending, which is tailing 
off, and that of the Soviet gross national 
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product (GNP). This will be the case for a 
number of years to come. 
18. The Soviets have embarked upon a long-
term, broad-based effort to expand their 
operational military capability in space. A 
major Soviet objective is to expand warfighting 
capability in space and achieve a measure of 
superiority in that arena. Their technological 
base is being strengthened and enhanced by 
technology transfer from the West. Their launch 
capability is increasing with the development of 
new facilities and booster systems. They 
continue to operate the world's only operational 
anti-satellite system, while they test and develop 
more sophisticated space weaponry. It is clear 
the Soviets are striving to integrate their space 
systems with the rest of their armed forces to 
ensure superior military capabilities in all 
arenas. 
IV. Aspects of international space law 
19. Attempts to control by treaty the devel-
opment of an exceedingly costly and ethic'ally 
unwelcome extension of the arms race to space 
have continued in recent years. However, taken 
together, such international agreements as have 
been reached are mostly exceedingly difficult if 
not impossible to verify and unenforceable as 
well. In addition to the anti-ballistic missile 
treaty of 1972 (ABM treaty) which has 
implications for the offence/defence nuclear 
balance in that it favours the proliferation of 
offensive nuclear delivery systems by the 
superpowers rather than defensive systems to 
maintain mutual deterrence, there have been a 
series of international treaties and draft agree-
ments to contain the militarisation of space. 
The principal ones are: 
(i) the treaty on principles governing the 
activities of states in the exploration 
and use of outer space, including the 
moon and other celestial bodies, of 
January 1967, which is referred to as 
the outer space treaty; 
(ii) the convention on the rescue of astro-
nauts, the return of astronauts and the 
return of objects launched into outer 
space, which is referred to as the rescue 
agreement of 1968; 
(iii) the convention on international liability 
for damage caused by space objects of 
March 1972; 
(iv) the convention on registration of objects 
launched into outer space of January 
197 5, which is referred to as the 
registration convention; 
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(v) the draft treaty submitted by the 
United Nations General Assembly on 
banning the stationing of any weapons 
in outer space (1981). 
20. Article IV of the outer space treaty bans 
the orbiting of weapons of mass destruction 
under certain conditions, prohibits military 
facilities on celestial bodies and restrains 
military manoeuvres on such bodies. However, 
it does not provide for the demilitarisation of 
outer space as such. 
21. In none of these treaties were provisions 
agreed to that would ensure demilitarisation. 
One could say that celestial bodies are in part 
demilitarised but outer space is not. 
22. A number of arms control treaties have 
dealt with outer space and activities therein, 
such as the treaties with respect to the non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons, the limited 
test ban treaty, the environmental modification 
technics convention and the SALT I agreement 
which declared that there would be no 
interference with the reconnaissance undertaken 
in outer space to ensure compliance with the 
agreement. 
V. Current initiatives and developments in 
defensive space systems 
23. A question under study is whether a 
combination of space technologies could provide 
a workable defence against nuclear missiles. 
The system being studied incorporates orbiting 
surveillance stations, space- and land-based 
laser weapons and particle-beam weapons. 
These possibilities are being studied at the 
space command with its headquarters at 
Colorado Springs which is related to the North 
American aerospace defence command. The 
command was set up in June 1982. The budget 
of the space activities of all three United States 
forces has passed from $2 billion in 1973 to $8 
billion in 1983. 
24. In Chapter 11 of Document 883 of 15th 
June 1981 on the future of European space 
activities - reply to the twenty-sixth annual 
report of the Council, your Rapporteur 
described the military aspects of space and 
stated in paragraph 37 that the United States 
was becoming increasingly dependent on space 
systems for the effective use of its military 
forces. The four principal elements of the 
United States space development programme 
were: improved space surveillance, increased 
satellite system survivability, development of 
anti-satellite capabilities and command, control 
and communication support. 
25. In December 1983, the President of the 
United States approved in principle a five-year 
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$21 billion plan to accelerate the development 
of an arsenal of space weapons -"ray-guns" -
designed to prevent a Soviet nuclear missile 
attack. Other energy-beam weapons are also 
being developed in order to make available 
effective anti-satellite devices mainly because it 
is believed the Soviet Union might have them 
and could use satellites to target United States 
ships and other forces. 
26. Speaking in the House Armed Services 
Committee on 28th February 1984, Richard D. 
DeLauer, Under Secretary of Defence for 
Research and Engineering, said that the 
Defence Department had begun work on a 
second generation of anti-satellite weapons that 
could destroy an enemy spacecraft in high orbit. 
For fiscal year 1984-85, the Defence Depart-
ment wanted $143 million for continued 
development in order to demonstrate the 
capability of the system and to study a follow-
on system with additional capability to place a 
wider range of Soviet satellites at risk. 
27. In paragraph 39 of the abovementioned 
report, your Rapporteur indicated that the 
Soviet space programme had made significant 
advances in both technology and operations to 
support their military and civilian objectives. 
Major operational capabilities were achieved by 
the Soviet Union in space communications, 
meteorology, navigation surveys, and manned 
orbital flights. 
28. In the recommendation attached to the 
report, the Assembly called for the promotion 
of European military communications and 
observation satellites and the investigation of 
the military implications of space technology, 
this, of course, being conducted in a North 
Atlantic context. 
29. The Council failed to answer this part of 
the recommendation in its communication to 
the Assembly on 26th November 1981. 
A French proposal 
30. The question is now raised again since 
President Mitterrand of France, in his speech 
in The Hague in February 19841, suggested 
that there be European co-operation in space-
based military reconnaissance or observation 
programmes which eventually could lead to 
European development of a manned military 
space station2• 
31. According to the French President, a 
military reconnaissance capacity organised and 
1. See Appendix I. 
2. See also the question put to the Council by the 
Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological 
and Aerospace Questions, Mr. Lenzer, on 28th February 
1984. 
controlled by European nations would provide 
a new level of protection against attack. This 
French suggestion for consideration by Western 
European governments was not however a 
formal proposal for a military space station 
programme. 
32. The President said literally: "If Europe 
were able to launch its own manned space 
station allowing it to observe, transmit and 
consequently avert all possible threats, it would 
have taken a big step towards its own defence." 
33. The thinking behind President Mitter-
rand's declaration was that within twenty to 
thirty years the importance of nuclear weaponry 
could diminish because of new developments in 
space. Europe should be present in order to 
participate in this new advanced technology 
without which it is not possible for Europe to 
remain at the same technological level as the 
Americans and the Russians. A precondition of 
such a European space station would be a space 
transportation system, either a launcher or a 
European space shuttle. The launcher should be 
of the Ariane 5 configuration. 
34. France has been advocating an interna-
tional space-based reconnaissance effort for a 
long time. In 1977, it suggested establishing a 
multinational satellite observation agency to 
provide verification data in respect of arms 
limitations. This plan failed in the United 
Nations, but France has continued to look for 
ways of organising such an operation. The idea 
was discussed at the United Nations meeting 
on the peaceful use of space in August 1982. 
35. The European Space Agency has asked its 
member countries to comment on the possible 
formation of an international satellite group 
that would use such spacecraft to monitor the 
application of arms agreements. 
36. In 1982, defence spending constraints 
prevented France from working on its own 
military observation satellite called SAMRO. 
This programme might be revived in future 
years if more favourable conditions are found. 
37. The French President's suggestion might 
raise considerable interest in defence circles and 
among the supporters of European unity. It is 
relevant because it is increasingly acknowledged 
that in the very long-term a European arsenal 
not complemented by space stations would lose 
much of its effectiveness. Satellites are vital for 
communications with nuclear forces, for target-
ing missiles against the enemy and for ensuring 
early warning of an attack. The British Skynet 
IV programme is a recognition of this. Only a 
common effort by the European nations to build 
their own space station capable of detecting 
threats to their security might at least partially 
restore some balance between them and the 
two superpowers. 
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38. The two superpowers already possess a 
highly sophisticated satellite system and enjoy 
huge military superiority over all other nations 
including the minor nuclear powers such as 
France and the United Kingdom. In the future, 
the arms race in space between the United 
States and the Soviet Union will increase the 
gap tremendously. A second important fact is 
that everywhere it is now recognised that 
without a space defence system the nuclear 
arsenals of France and the United Kingdom 
will become obsolete as they cannot afford, by 
themselves, to develop such a space segment. A 
common effort is indicated but it certainly will 
involve a huge cost and presupposes a common 
will for the European defence policy. 
VI. Long-term United States space strategy 
39. The 1972 SALT I agreement on offensive 
weapons was accompanied by an anti-ballistic 
missile treaty (ABM) which limited the number 
of launchers and interceptor missiles which 
each side could deploy and the type and number 
of associated radars. The treaty also prohibits 
the development, testing and deployment of 
ballistic missile defences that are sea-based, 
mobile land-based or space-based. It also places 
restrictions on the development and deployment 
of future systems such as lasers. It did not 
define the characteristics of missile defence 
radars or limit the conversion and up-grading 
of air defence capability to provide a measure 
of defence against ballistic missiles, an omission 
which the Soviets have blatantly exploited. 
40. Since the ABM treaty was signed in May 
1972, the Soviet Union has deployed new, 
mobile phased-array radars and hypersonic 
interceptor missiles and expanded the missile 
defences around Moscow. At the same time, it 
has been particularly active in high-technology 
research into ballistic missile defence and anti-
satellite capability. It has already developed, 
tested and deployed an ASA T system in space 
and demonstrated its effectiveness. 
41. The United States has had under devel-
opment for some years a low-altitude defence 
system designed to intercept incoming re-entry 
vehicles at the lower levels of their trajectory, 
using nuclear- or conventionally-armed intercep-
tor missiles, with the aim of providing some 
protection for missile silos. 
42. It has long been recognised that the only 
really effective BMD system is one capable of 
intercepting enemy ICBMs or IRBMs in the 
boost phase, minutes after launch, when they 
are most vulnerable. This should be supported 
by a mid-course and terminal system to take 
care of leakage of missiles or re-entry vehicles; 
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in other words, a layered ballistic missile 
defence system catering for exoatmospheric and 
endoatmospheric interception. The system would 
use non-nuclear destruct warheads or directed 
energy beams and would be both ground- and 
space-based. 
43. The world strategic situation has changed 
since the 1972 ABM treaty was signed. 
Intelligence analysis of Soviet research and 
development at their Saryshagen, Semniplatinsk 
and Golvinno establishments confirms that they 
are developing high-energy laser, charged and 
neutral particle beam weapons and microwave 
and plasma systems for deployment as ground-
and space-based defensive systems against both 
ballistic missiles and aircraft. It is possible that 
the Soviets are ahead of the United States in 
the development of these exotic weapons 
systems. It is known that they have tested a 
high-energy laser against one of their ICBMs 
and against aircraft and missiles using infrared 
sensors. It should come as no surprise to the 
· West if the Soviet Union climaxed the present 
SoyuzfSalyut-7 space programme with the 
announcement that it has developed a space-
based laser or particle beam weapon system, 
probably well before the end of the decade. If 
it succeeds, it will introduce a serious destabi-
lising factor into the world balance of power 
equation. 
44. The United States has also tested a high-
energy laser weapon against drones, anti-tank 
and air-to-air missiles, but has not yet tested 
either a ground-based or space-based weapon 
against an ICBM or even an ASAT system. 
Europe has so far taken no part in any research 
in this important arena of military affairs. No 
European NATO countries were involved in the 
SALT negotiations or the ABM treaty, not 
even Britain and France although they both 
have nuclear forces. It is only recently, in the 
course of the intermediate-range nuclear force 
negotiations in Geneva, that the French and 
British nuclear forces have been recognised and 
only then as a ploy by the Soviet Union to 
further complicate the discussions. It is against 
this background that European NATO countries 
must consider their attitude to United States 
proposals for the development and deployment 
of strategic missile defences. They must decide 
whether any or all of them should contribute 
technically and financially to the development 
of projects recently approved by the Reagan 
administration which could provide defence 
against ICBMs and IRBMs such as the SS-20 
and SS-22. There can be no doubt that it is in 
Europe's interests to do so. 
45. The deployment of an effective ballistic 
missile defence system by both sides would, of 
course, greatly reduce the threat of nuclear 
attack and provide a better basis for arms 
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reduction negotiations in which the problem of 
verification would be less important. The Soviets 
are feverishly pursuing a policy of defence 
against ballistic missile, cruise missile and 
manned aircraft nuclear attack, coupled with a 
civil defence policy which would so reduce the 
effects of nuclear attack against them that their 
forces would be sure of victory and the Soviet 
Union would survive attack at any level. Dr. 
Edward Teller, commenting on the possibility 
of providing an effective defence against ballistic 
missiles which developments in high technology 
have made possible, described it as the most 
important military breakthrough since the 
atomic bomb. To the informed military 
strategist who has watched the unchallenged 
superiority of the offensive ballistic missile for 
more than twenty-five years, the creation of 
such a defence system would transform the 
military scene. 
The state of the art in ballistic missile defence 
46. When the United States safeguard ABM 
system was put in cold storage in 1972, little 
was heard of the prospects for a ballistic missile 
defence system until the subject was resurrected 
by a non-governmental organisation headed by 
Lt. General Daniel Graham and a small team 
of military experts which became known as 
High Frontier. They recognised that techno-
logical progress in the decade since 1972 had 
provided the means by which an effective non-
nuclear defence against ballistic missiles attack-
ing United States ICBM silos could be 
developed using technology already available. 
A nationwide defence was still not possible, but 
progress in computer technology, microprocess-
ing and developments in laser, charged-particle 
beams and microwave systems had brought 
such defence within the bounds of possibility. 
The testing of Soviet ASA T systems in space 
indicated a developing threat to United States 
military satellites from conventional or 
directed-energy weapons deployed in space, 
which blind reconnaissance and early warning 
satellites on which United States strategic 
nuclear forces depend if they are to maintain a 
credible deterrent. 
47. While informed scientific opinion recog-
nised that the most effective ballistic missile 
defence system would be a layered system 
capable of attacking ballistic missiles in the 
boost, post-boost and terminal phases of the 
trajectory, high-energy directed beams were not 
likely to be available until probably the end of 
the decade. The High Frontier team cut through 
the academic verbiage that so often accompa-
nies any new concepts in military strategy or 
developments in weapons systems and produced 
a study showing how an effective BMD system 
could be produced with existing technology 
until more advanced systems were available. It 
was sufficient to galvanise the administration 
into serious study of the whole concept of 
BMD. The report of the defence technology 
study team is the result. 
48. The High Frontier team had recommended 
a conventional ballistic missile defence system 
involving multiple satellites using kinetic energy 
pellets as the kill mechanism against missiles 
on their trajectories through space, augmented 
by point defence systems to defend against re-
entry vehicles in the terminal phases of their 
trajectories. A committee on national space 
policy considered the state of the art in BMD, 
and the options open to the President, and 
recommended that the United States should, as 
a matter of urgency, develop space- and 
ground-based defence systems against ballistic 
missile attack. 
49. Technologically feasible options for BMD 
were recommended by the defence technologies 
study team in November 1983. Their report 
pointed out what had been known for some 
time that the destruction of ICBMs in the boost 
phase of their flight is the ideal in any BMD 
system, but until recently the technology to 
achieve boost-phase or mid-course interception 
simply was not available. The safeguard ABM 
system of the 1960s, developed but never 
deployed, had a limited capability against 
ballistic missiles in the final stages of their 
trajectories (endoatmospheric) but little or none 
in the mid-course space phase (exoatmospheric). 
50. The defence technology study team advo-
cates a layered defence capability which would 
have a boost and post-boost destruct mechanism 
and a terminal phase defence to limit any 
leakage of nuclear-armed re-entry vehicles into 
the atmosphere on the terminal phase of their 
trajectories. Each layer would employ different 
technologies for acquisition, tracking, identifi-
cation, aiming and interception with selected 
kill mechanisms. 
51. Briefly, a layered BMD system would 
consist of boost phase interception by deploy-
ment of sensors that could detect and track 
ballistic missiles from the moment of ignition to 
post-boost burn-out in the first two to five 
minutes of trajectory. Interception and destruc-
tion could be achieved by one of a number of 
kinetic energy kill mechanisms such as a 
space-based electro-magnetic railgun firing 
hyper-velocity small projectiles. High-energy 
lasers, charged-particle beams and microwave 
systems would be more effective but are not yet 
developed and may take up to ten years to 
become operational. Power supplies for directed 
energy weapons could be provided by compact 
nuclear reactors which are being developed 
now. 
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52. Mid-course acquisition, tracking, identifi-
cation and weapon aiming present different 
problems in that it becomes necessary to deal 
with individual re-entry vehicles released from 
the missiles which have much smaller signatures 
than missiles in the boost phase. The technology 
to achieve this is now within the state of the 
art, including the ability to discriminate between 
decoys, debris and genuine warheads. Kinetic 
energy kill mechanisms can be applied to this 
phase until directed energy teams become 
available. Multiple satellite space platforms 
could be deployed to accommodate the inter-
ception and kill mechanisms. 
53. Terminal defence by mobile interceptor 
launchers with sensors capable of filtering out 
decoys at altitudes up to eighty miles would 
require interceptor missiles to be committed to 
each threatening object and be capable of 
homing on to an object to release low-yield 
nuclear warheads or kinetic energy pellets. 
54. To produce a fully effective layered 
defence such as that outlined !lbove requires a 
great deal of research and development. The 
United States has already allocated about $2 
billion to the project and a bill is now before 
the Senate which would create a unified space 
command for the direction of all ground- and 
space-based strategic defence activity. A new 
agency would be established to co-ordinate 
research into directed energy technology on 
similar lines to the Defence Nuclear Agency. 
The problems still to be overcome in designing, 
developing and deploying an effective layered 
defence system against ballistic missiles are 
formidable, but no longer impossible to achieve. 
55. One promising approach to the problem 
might be the creation of a programme similar 
to the Manhattan project which would pursue 
multiple parallel research into various techno-
logies in which European countries could 
participate with finance and technological input. 
But they would have to be convinced that such 
a programme would be of direct benefit to them 
and would reduce or nullify the threat of 
nuclear attack, which today is more menacing 
than ever before. They must be assured that 
the policy of mutual assured destruction can be 
replaced by one of assured survival and in the 
process reduce the threat of war, nuclear or 
conventional. European countries, particularly 
the United Kingdom, France and West Ger-
many, have the technological knowledge to 
contribute to a Manhattan-type programme 
even though they have not so far been engaged 
in research into ballistic missile defence at any 
level. 
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VII. United Kingdom military satellite 
· communications 
1. &lckground 
56. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence 
interest in satellite communications developed 
during the early 1960s when various research 
equipments using the moon and other passive 
reflecting satellites indicated that the technique 
would be practicable for defence communica-
tions. Theoretical studies showed that, both for 
strategic communications links and for links 
with the Royal Navy ships, satellite communi-
cations would be cost-effective. Formal collab-
oration with the United States Department of 
Defence started in 1965 in preparation for 
United Kingdom participation in the United 
States SHF interim defence communication 
satellite project, and collaboration with NATO 
on various studies and trials of the effectiveness 
of UHF satcoms for small mobile terminals 
started soon afterwards. Ever since those early 
days, close collaboration with the Department 
of Defence and NATO has remained a very 
important aspect of United Kingdom defence 
satellite communications. 
57. The period mid-1967-70 was one of intense 
and rapid development. SHF activities concen-
trated on the use of the IDCSP satellites. A 
transatlantic link between a Department of 
Defence terminal and a Ministry of Defence 
40-ft diameter terminal was established within 
hours of the first satellite launch {16th June 
1966) and the United Kingdom soon had a 
total of seven 20-ft and 40-ft transportable and 
fixed stations in use. The first public demonstra-
tion of a small land-mobile station took place 
at the Paris air show in April 1967 and, 
following an early development using the trials 
ship HMS Wakeful, the first two of many 
Royal Navy ships were fitted with terminals. 
Very soon after the start of IDCSP trials a 
decision was taken to procure United Kingdom 
satellites and the first of these, Skynet lA, 
launched in November 1969, was the world's 
first geostationary defence satellite. There was 
even at that time a strong emphasis on use of 
spread spectrum techniques and on system 
design to allow efficient service of small SHF 
terminals, primarily to meet the Royal Navy 
requirements. 
today provides a useful communications capa-
bility. 
59. Throughout the 1970s there was continued 
development of the Skynet system, particularly 
in the provision of terminals known as SCOT 
for Royal Navy ships. In parallel the Ministry 
of Defence maintained a vigorous research and 
development programme covering detailed 
evaluations of many potential applications of 
satellite communications, experimental work on 
the new techniques for satellite repeaters, 
terminals and traffic handling and a series of 
studies of the overall design of defence satcom 
systems. This work was both intramural and 
with United Kingdom industry. Midway 
through the decade all necessary project studies 
had been performed by MSDS Ltd. for the 
next generation of military satellites. However, 
following a defence review, it was decided that 
the lowest cost solution for maintaining a 
minimum number of essential satcom links 
would be Ministry of Defence participation in 
United States Department of Defence and 
NATO projects at least for the short term. 
Consequently the planned production contract 
for Skynet 3 satellites did not proceed. 
60. The present Skynet 4 project stems from 
the Ministry of Defence's seventeen years of 
operational experience of satellite communica-
tions and from advances in technology which 
have allowed much smaller terminals, more 
cost-effective satellites and significantly 
improved performance against military threats. 
These developments have resulted in satcoms 
being a preferred solution for a wider range of 
defence communications purposes than hitherto, 
though it must be noted that in spite of the 
value and effectiveness of the new techniques, 
the importance of communications in defence is 
such that there cannot be sole reliance on 
satcoms any more than there can be on any 
other particular form of communication. A 
number of factors led the Ministry of Defence 
to conclude that the procurement of their own 
satellites was once again the most practicable 
and cost-effective way forward. These included 
the increasing requirement for satellite com-
munication, the need for satellite transponders 
operating in a manner suitable to accommodate 
small terminals and new types of service, the 
requirement to have both SHF and UHF 
capabilities and the concern to have direct 
control over the satellite resource. 
58. Following Skynet lA, two spacecraft (IB 61. Ministry of Defence intramural studies 
and 2A were lost due to malfunction during during 1978-79 were followed by industrial 
launch operations. However, a second Ministry project definition studies in 1980-81 and the 
of Defence satellite, Skynet 2B, was launched instruction to proceed for the main production 
into geostationary orbit on 20th November contract for two satellites and associated ground 
1974. This had greater radiated power than control equipments was issued on 8th December 
Skynet 1 A, was built by Marconi Space and 1981. Complementing the new spacecraft pro-
Defence Systems Limited (MSDS) and still ject, United Kingdom industry has a number of 
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other contracts for enhancing the earth segment 
of the system, including production of improved 
SCOT terminals by MSDS Ltd. for the Royal 
Navy. 
2. Industrial organisation 
62. British Aerospace Space and Communi-
cations Division (BAe) is the prime contractor 
to the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence for 
the Skynet 4 project. Marconi Space and 
Defence Systems Limited, the major supporting 
contractor, is responsible to British Aerospace 
for the communication payload design and 
development together with the development and 
commissioning of the ground control facility. 
3. Requirements 
63. In the Skynet 4 programme a key theme 
has at all times been the achievement of the 
most cost-effective solution within the context 
of other communications options open to the 
Ministry of Defence. Highly desirable objec-
tives, such as capability to meet the upper limit 
on projections of future satcom traffic, have had 
to be examined repeatedly from the cost-
effectiveness point of view. 
64. Among the more important of the general 
requirements on which this programme is based 
are the following: 
- capability to serve maritime operations, 
which tend not to require high data rates 
but do demand coverage over substantial 
areas of the earth's surface; 
- capability to provide strategic/trunk 
links using relatively large terminals; 
- capability to serve small mobile ter-
minals, mainly in the Western European 
area; 
- strong resistance to electronic counter-
measures and other threats; 
- satellite design matching the capability 
of existing and planned earth-segment 
equipment; 
- interoperability with United States and 
NATO systems; 
- an autonomous spacecraft providing the 
necessary communications capability 
with a minimum of traffic management 
intervention; 
- minimum use of manpower, especially 
skilled manpower for system operations. 
Small terminals normally would be 
expected to be operated unattended; 
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- flexibility to serve changing operational 
needs; 
- maximum possible redundancy and 
step-by-step degradation in system per-
formance. 
65. These requirements and other considera-
tions (launcher options, technical risks, cost, 
timescale) led to the decision to have: 
- two UHF earth-cover channels; 
- four SHF channels covering most of the 
available bandwidth in the 7/8 GHz 
band, incorporating a wide range of gain 
adjustment and served by a number of 
antennas having beamwidths varying 
from earth-cover down to 3 degrees; 
- one EHF uplink channel sponsored by 
the Royal Signals and Radar Establish-
ment for advanced research and devel-
opment; 
- signal-processing equipment provided as 
one of the measures necessary to achieve 
a high level of resistance to electronic 
countermeasures; 
- known NATO requirements built into 
the spacecraft. 
4. The space segment 
66. The first phase of the Skynet 4 programme 
provides for two three-axis stabilised satellites 
in orbit. The satellites comprise developments 
of the proven hardware technology used in 
previous and current Skynet, DSCS and 
European communications satellite (ECS) pro-
grammes. They are planned to be launched in 
the mid-1980s and have a design life of seven 
years. The mass at lift-off is 1,270 kg and the 
end-of-life power is in excess of 1,200 watts. 
67. A modular approach has been adopted for 
the satellites following the well-tried formula of 
the orbital test, European communications and 
Marecs satellites. Each satellite consists of a 
service module capable of providing all the 
basic service functions and a communications 
module which carries the payload. 
68. The satellite is a three-axis stabilised cube 
with two solar paddles, each consisting of 
hinged panels, attached to the bearing and 
power transfer assembly mounted on the north 
and south sides of the satellite, and axially 
aligned along the satellite pitch axis. During 
launch and transfer orbit, the arrays are folded 
against the satellite's north and south sides so 
that the external faces provide power during 
this phase of the mission. In normal operation 
the arrays are deployed and the paddles are 
independently steered to track the sun by 
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revolving around the pitch axis. The SHF, UHF 
and EHF antennas are all located on the 
earth-pointing face. 
69. The PAM-D rocket places the satellite in 
a conventional transfer orbit and a solid apogee 
boost motor injects the satellite into a geosyn-
chronous orbit. The launch vehicle will inject 
the satellite in a spin-stabilised configuration 
which is retained until entry into the geosyn-
chronous orbit. The satellite will then be despun 
using the on-board hydrazine system. The solar 
array paddles will be deployed. The three-axis 
earth-pointing stabilised attitude will be 
acquired. Finally the satellite will be moved to 
a location close to the Greenwich meridian. 
During the subsequent seven-year life the 
satellite will be maintained at plus or minus 
0.1° East-West but the orbit inclination will 
vary by approximately 3° each way. 
70. In the satellite there is very considerable 
provision of spare hardware ("redundancy") in 
order to minimise the probability of failure 
within the design lifetime. This has been seen 
to be of particular importance within the 
communications payload. 
VIII. A new European civil space programme 
for the 1980s and the 1990s 
71. The main programmes of ESA, such as 
Ariane, Spacelab and Marots, are all now 
coming to an end. It is therefore of the greatest 
importance to try to put together a new long-
term ESA programme. One of the elements of 
such a programme would be the ERS-1 satellite 
which would be a follow-up of ESA's Meteosat 
programme and Europe's contribution to the 
World Weather Watch. 
72. In the field of remote sensing ERS-1 is to 
be launched in 1988 for the global observation 
of ocean surface winds, sea states and waves, 
ocean surface topography and sea-ice distribu-
tion and dynamics. 
73. In telecommunications new so-called pig-
gyback systems will be developed for more up-
to-date communications test satellites. 
74. The ESA budget of 1 billion ECU, some 
7 billion francs, will be divided between the 
future Ariane 5 development, an increased 
scientific programme, participation in the space 
station and the abovementioned earth observa-
tion and new telecommunications satellites. 
75. The techniques used for civil purposes can 
also be used for military purposes and it is for 
the states and industries to decide what use 
they make of their knowledge or hardware. 
76. 80% of the money assigned to ESA is 
invested in industry and most of the hardware 
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which belongs to ESA is in the laboratories and 
test facilities of ESTEC in Noordwijk. 
77. It would be of great importance for 
European industry if a military dimension were 
given to their activities. One should take into 
account that Europe has a limited number of 
space experts and these people should therefore 
be used as rationally as possible. This means 
that in the aerospace industries work should be 
done on civil a~ well as on military applications. 
78. Europe does not spend enough money on 
space activities. In the United States NASA 
spends some $7 billion a year and the 
Department of Defence another $10 billion. 
Europe spends less than one-tenth of the total 
American budget. Japan, India, Brazil and the 
People's Republic of China have an increasingly 
active space programme. 
79. If Europe is to participate in a space 
station, it has to spend at least 10% more than 
it spends now on civil space applications. 
80. A military effort would need another $500 
million at least. Such military funding would 
underpin the aerospace industry and the ESA 
studies and effort. All the technology acquired 
in the twenty years of ESA activities belongs to 
the participating countries. This fund of knowl-
edge should be managed skilfully and according 
to the wishes of the participating countries. 
81. One crucial member state of ESA is the 
Federal Republic of Germany which success-
fully completed the Spacelab 1 mission. This 
mission represented a convincing demonstration 
of the enhanced capabilities of the space shuttle 
and the European reuseable spacelab. The 
primary objective of the mission was verification 
of the shuttle-spacelab combination. 
82. As the scientific potential of the spacelab 
concept has been realised, a follow-up is needed 
and whether this will happen depends mainly 
on the Federal Republic of Germany. One way 
or another, the spacelab configuration is a step 
in the direction of the space station and the 
Italian-German project Columbus would consti-
tute a modular spacelab development and be 
compatible with the United States space station. 
83. On 9th and lOth May 1984, an informal 
meeting of the ESA Ministerial Council was 
held at ESTEC, Noordwijk, Netherlands, at 
the request of the Italian Minister for Science 
and Technology, Mr. Granelli. There was a 
general discussion on the goals of the European 
space effort in the short and medium term. A 
discussion was then held on the launch systems, 
European participation in the space station and 
future earth observation and telecommunication 
satellites. This meeting commemorated twenty 
years of ESA. 
An American proposal 
84. President Reagan's proposal to build a 
permanently manned space station within the 
next decade and the invitation to Japan, Canada 
and the European countries to participate in 
the space station programme was widely 
discussed at the beginning of this year. Co-
operation could range from eo-development of 
the space station to use of the completed 
facility. 
85. Mr. James M. Beggs, the NASA Admin-
istrator, underlined that the space station would 
be a civil and not a military programme. It will 
be a logical conclusion of the existence of the 
space shuttle. The manned space station in low 
earth orbit will serve as a base for scientific, 
commercial and technological advances in space 
operations. 
86. Mr. Beggs has informed the national 
European and ESA authorities that once the 
first space station for civil purposes has been 
built, several others will have to follow. 
87. For Europe, it would be of great import-
ance to participate in this new technological 
venture. The building time will be some twelve 
years and Europe might have its own space 
station in twenty to twenty-five years. Questions 
to be asked are: (a) what benefits will such a 
space station provide, and (b) what benefits will 
there be for Europe in participating in the 
construction of an American space station. 
Once these questions have been answered, the 
question of how European participation should 
be organised comes to the fore. 
88. The question of the benefits to be derived 
from a space station is difficult to answer in 
specific terms. There will, of course, be the 
possibility of developing new materials, new 
medical drugs, etc. There will be considerable 
technological spin-off but will all these benefits 
be sufficient and worthwhile? 
89. The main reason for the Americans 
offering the Europeans a role in building the 
space station is that money is tight in the 
United States and they would therefore welcome 
a European contribution. The space station as 
they foresee it will probably cost $8 billion. 
Any European contribution would therefore be 
a worthwhile addition over and above this sum 
of money and would allow other experiments 
than those foreseen by NASA to be conducted. 
90. On the European side the big question 
there is whether more money will be earmarked 
for space activities. France is now budgeting 
some 4 billion francs. The German budget is 
about half of that and the United Kingdom 
budget is even less. Within five years European 
budgeting should be at least double what it is 
now. 
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91. If a space station is built, it would 
probably not be an earth observation station in 
itself but a manned station from which action 
could be taken to recuperate satellites, repair 
and maintain them. From there civil or military 
observation satellites in low orbit could be 
controlled. 
A European defensive space programme 
92. Four major activities in space should 
interest Europeans if they wish to improve the 
defence of their national territories. 
93. Firstly, all countries recognise that tele-
communications are extremely important. The 
United Kingdom is equipping itself with a 
military network of telecommunications satel-
lites called Skynet and the French forces will 
use a segment of the Telecom 1 satellite. 
Discussions are being held between French and 
British authorities on the possibilities of a co-
ordinated effort. Once co-ordination is achieved, 
a logical step would be to Europeanise the 
bilateral achievement. 
94. The Germans have not for the moment 
the same military needs but in the long term 
their national industries might be interested in 
participating in a joint European effort. 
95. The second important space activity, which 
should now have first priority if a telecommuni-
cations satellite system is established, is military 
observation satellites. Such a system could be a 
logical development from the French civil 
system called Spot. The military authorities 
would, of course, want a more sophisticated 
system than Spot. 
96. Apart from this French national pro-
gramme, there is also the ESA ERS-1 
programme which, of course, is a civil pro-
gramme but could without too much difficulty 
become a military programme. 
97. For lack of funds, the French national 
military observation satellite system called 
Samro (Satellite militaire de reconnaissance 
optique) is being set aside for the time being. 
This project will be reactivated as soon as 
financially possible. 
98. It would be very desirable to set up such 
a system and Europe should study the different 
forms and characteristics of reconnaissance 
satellites. The range of reconnaissance satellites 
covers optical devices, synthetic aperture radar, 
hyperfrequencies, electronic listening and 
infrared devices and others capable of detecting 
missile launchings or nuclear explosions. 
99. A European research and development 
effort would be necessary since a satellite 
system and ground installations would be 
extremely costly, particularly the ground radars. 
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100. In the United Kingdom, the military 
authorities preferred the hyperfrequency system 
and a co-operative American/British effort has 
been started. 
101. Europeans should give highest priority to 
a satellite observation system as it would not be 
acceptable for Europe to leave this field wholly 
to the Americans and the Russians. 
102. A satellite observation system with opti-
cal images could cost some 3 billion francs, the 
launching of the satellites included. The military 
segment would cost some 1.5 billion francs 
extra. For a complete system it would be 
necessary to have two and preferably three 
observation satellites which would gather such 
a mass of data that it would probably require 
a relay satellite such as the American TDRSS 
(tracking and data relay satellite system) which 
would allow data to be relayed from and 
between satellites and to command posts on 
earth. 
103. The third type of satellite of interest to 
Europe is the navigational satellite system which 
is of great importance for military shipping and 
submarines and in which the British Govern-
ment might be interested. The difficulty here is 
that airlines would be the first to be able to 
make use of such a system but the cost is 
considered to be too high. 
104. The fourth system involves attack satel-
lites from where missiles can be sent to destroy 
enemy satellites. This type of satellite would 
not have priority in Europe and all that could 
be done would be to follow American or Soviet 
developments. 
105. However, for Europe, and especially for 
the United Kingdom and France, attack 
satellites are of great importance because their 
existence would reduce the military worth of 
their nuclear forces. It is clear that with an 
extremely limited number of nuclear weapons 
the possibility of destroying them in flight 
would reduce the deterrent value of the United 
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Kingdom and French nuclear forces. Politically, 
this is of great importance. 
106. The implications of military satellites 
would be political, military, industrial and 
eventually commercial. 
107. Once Europe has built these satellites, it 
would need to protect them and would therefore 
have to build anti-satellite weapons. The 
protection of satellites would, of course, also be 
extremely ex~nsive but, as .shown. by t~e 
Americans with the F-15 and 1ts antl-satelhte 
weapon, it would be possible. So Europe coul~, 
for instance, use the Tornado F-2 for th1s 
purpose instead of the F-15, but the associated 
infrastructure would be astronomically costly. 
108. With regard to launchers, the trend in 
the use of space will make it necessary to 
launch increasingly large payloads. The Ariane 
2 launcher will be able to place a payload of 
over 2,000 kg in geosynchronous orbit and the 
Ariane 3 a payload of 2,580 kg. The Ariane 4 
launcher, the development of which was 
approved in January 1982, will become opera-
tional in 1986. 
109. In this context your Rapporteur wishes 
to mention a French study on Hermes, a 
hypersonic glider compatible for launching by 
the post Ariane 4 launcher now under study. It 
is capable of carrying four passengers plus 4.5 
tons of cargo into a 400 km circular orbit of 28 
degrees inclination or two passengers plus 1 ton 
of cargo in a circular heliosynchronous orbit 
(800 km). It has a 35 cu.m. cargo bay with a 
diametre of 3 m. The total mass of the vehicle 
at lift-off is some 15 tons. 
110. As for the framework of space activities 
for military purposes, it would be possible to 
use ESA in a consultancy role. As such, it 
would be able to provide a technical contribution 
which would not infringe the ESA convention. 
Within the NATO framework American pres-
sure would be extremely great. If done within 
a European framework, WEU would be more 
suitable than the EEC. 
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APPENDIX I 
Extract from the speech by President Mitterrand 
in the Second Chamber of the States-General, The Hague, 
7th February 1984 
There is still a broad area in which we can 
organise our security however. Not only by 
conventional armaments but also by the new 
means about to erupt on the world scene. We 
must already look beyond the nuclear era if we 
are not to fall behind in a future that is closer 
than one might think. I will quote only one 
example, the conquest of space. If Europe w~re 
able to launch its own manned space station 
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allowing it to observe, transmit and conse-
quently avert all possible threats, it would have 
taken a big step towards its own defence. Nor 
should one forget advances in electronic calcu-
lation and artificial memory, or the known 
capability to fire projectiles at the speed of 
light. To my mind, a European space commun-
ity would be the response best adapted to the 
military realities of tomorrow. 
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APPENDIX 11 
Convention for the establishment 
of a European Space Agency 
Article II 
Purpose 
The purpose of the Agency shall be to 
provide for and to promote, for exclusively 
peaceful purposes, co-operation among Euro-
pean states in space research and technology 
and their space applications, with a view to 
their being used for scientific purposes and for 
operational space applications systems, 
(a) by elaborating and implementing a 
long-term European space policy, by 
recommending space objectives to the 
member states, and by concerting the 
policies of the member states with 
198 
respect to other national and interna-
tional organisations and institutions; 
(b) by elaborating and implementing activ-
ities and programmes in the space field; 
(c) by co-ordinating the European space 
programme and national programmes, 
and by integrating the latter progres-
sively and as completely as possible 
into the European space programme, in 
particular as regards the development 
of applications satellites; 
(d) by elaborating and implementing the 
industrial policy appropriate to its 
programme and by recommending a 
coherent industrial policy to the mem-
ber states. 
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Amendment 1 
Military use of space 
AMENDMENT 11 
tabled by MM. Thorne and Edwards 
1. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraphs 2 to 9. 
l. See 6th sitting, 21st June 1984 (amendment negatived). 
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20th June 1984 
Signed: Thorne, Edwards 
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Amendments 2 and 3 
Military use of spliCe 
AMENDMENTS 2 and 3' 
tabled by Mr. Hardy 
2. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation prOper, leave out: 
"appropriate for the formulation of Western European security policy". 
20th June 1984 
3. In paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "to utilise" and insert "for the 
civil and peaceful utilisation of". 
Signed: Hardy 
1. See 6th sitting, 21st June 1984 (amendments negatived). 
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Amendment 4 
Military use of space 
AMENDMENT 41 
tabled by MM. Tummers and Garrett 
21st June 1984 
4. In the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph 10 as follows: 
"1 0. Postpone reaching decisions on the results of the analysis by the Standing Armaments 
Committee, the study by the Agency for the Control of Armaments and on the other 
abovementioned measures until the Assembly has had an opportunity to gain detailed 
knowledge about these and related military space problems through a broad-based symposium 
on the possibilities and desirability of the use of outer space for military purposes." 
Signed: Tummers, Garrett 
l. See 6th sitting, 21st June 1984 (amendment agreed to). 
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Amendments S, 6 and 7 
Military use of space 
AMENDMENTS S, 6 and 71 
tabled by Mr. Fourre 
21st June 1984 
5. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, after "Soviet" add "and United States". 
6. At the end of paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add: 
"and in the light of this study examine what tasks might be entrusted to the Agency for the 
Control of Armaments with a view to participating in verification that these measures are 
being respected". 
7. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper and insert : 
"Demand a larger European industrial involvement in telecommunications satellites and in 
military satellite programmes pursued at international level as well as in the associated ground 
station infrastructure, in addition to supporting existing national military communications 
satellites like Skynet and Samro;". 
Signed: Fourre 
l. See 6th sitting, 21st June 1984 (amendments 5 and 6 agreed to; amendment 7 negatived). 
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Action taken in parliaments on recommendations adopted 
by the WEU Assembly on the standardisation and production of armaments 
INFORMATION REPORT 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee for Relations with Parliaments 
by Mr. Antretter, Rapporteur 
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Information Report 
(submitted by Mr. Antretter, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. The purpose of the present report is to 
examine the action taken in parliaments of the 
member countries on recommendations adopted 
by the WEU Assembly on the standardisation 
and production of armaments. 
2. In view of the wealth of documentation 
gathered, your Rapporteur proposes to confine 
himself to an analysis of the action taken on 
the recommendations adopted by the Assembly 
in the last five years. 
3. Since the WEU Assembly is the only 
European parliamentary assembly empowered 
by treaty to handle defence matters and 
maintains most valuable relations with the 
national parliaments and ministers, it is not 
surprising to find such a wealth of documenta-
tion. In the course of his study, your Rapporteur 
has gathered the very vast documentation 
composed of government statements in the 
parliaments, and often in other places and 
circumstances too, as well as many written and 
oral questions put by parliamentarians, whether 
members of the national delegations to the 
WEU Assembly or not, and based directly or 
indirectly on recommendations adopted by the 
WEU Assembly. 
4. In view of the breadth of the subject to be 
examined, your Rapporteur proposes confining 
himself to a study of the action taken in the 
parliaments of member countries on the recom-
mendations of the WEU Assembly dealing with 
the production of conventional armaments and 
those referring to standardisation. 
5. He has not therefore examined the possi-
bilities of European co-operation in space 
technology, whose main application is in the 
sector of communications and navigation satel-
lites, nor the use for defence purposes of 
existing meteorological satellites or the military 
applications of data processing. This omission is 
voluntary although these questions have been 
widely debated in the national parliaments. It 
might be worthwhile considering them in a 
second part of this report. 
11. Method of analysis 
6. In order to gather all the elements required 
to draw appropriate conclusions under part V, 
your Rapporteur deems it necessary to proceed 
as follows: 
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- in part Ill the operative text of each 
recommendation will be given in full with 
the date of adoption ; 
- after each recommendation, the full text 
of the corresponding reply of the Council 
with the date of communication to the 
Assembly will be given, followed by a 
brief summary of both documents. Your 
Rapporteur is convinced that a profound 
knowledge of all elements of these 
documents is required for a meaningful 
evaluation of action taken in the different 
parliaments ; 
- after each reply of the Council, the 
corresponding parliamentary questions 
and government answers are given, fol-
lowed by a brief comparison with the 
contents of the abovementioned WEU 
texts; 
- part IV contains other activities in 
parliaments ; 
- for the sake of clarity, the recommenda-
tions are presented in chronological and 
hence numerical order. 
7. In the following documents and statements, 
the terms "standardisation" and "interoperabi-
lity" are used several times. For a better 
understanding of the subject of this report, it is 
perhaps worthwhile explaining the significance 
of these two terms. 
8. The idea of standardisation is the more 
attractive to a broad spectrum of opinion in 
that it meets the wishes of operatives for 
homogeneity and the economic wish to reduce 
unit costs. 
9. According to the NATO glossary, standar-
disation is : 
"The process by which member nations 
achieve the closest practicable co-operation 
among forces, the most efficient use of 
research, development and production 
resources, and agree to adopt on the 
broadest possible basis the use of : 
(a) common or compatible operational, 
administrative and logistic procedures; 
(b) common or compatible technical proce-
dures and criteria ; 
(c) common, compatible or interchangeable 
supplies, components, weapons or equip-
ment; 
(d) common or compatible tactical doctrine 
with corresponding organisational com-
patibility." 
10. The difficulties inherent in standardisation 
have helped to bring to the fore the notion of 
interoperability, which differs from the former 
in that it stresses the compatibility of materiel 
rather than their identity or interchangeability 
and seeks to solve the military problem but not 
the problem of economic production runs. 
11. According to the NATO glossary, inter-
operability is : 
"The ability of systems, units or forces to 
provide services to and accept services from 
other systems, units or forces and to use 
the services so exchanged to enable them to 
operate effectively together." 
12. It may therefore be said for example that 
interoperability is ensuring the compatibility of 
communications systems, identity of fuels and 
munitions and as many joint logistic rules as 
possible. 
Ill. Analysis of recommendations 
13. Recommendation 325 on a European 
armaments policy presented on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments was adopted by the Assembly on 22nd 
November 1978 as follows : 
"The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Urge that efforts to achieve joint 
production, interoperability and, when 
necessary for the security of Europe, the 
standardisation of defence equipment in the 
European countries of the alliance be 
concentrated in the independent European 
programme group with such assistance as 
the Standing Armaments Committee can 
provide; 
2. Give consideration to the restructuring 
of the European armaments industry under 
the aegis of the European Community, 
relying on its responsibility in the fields of 
industrial and customs policy and research ; 
3. Ensure that once the present study of 
the European armaments industry is com-
pleted, full use be made of the resources of 
the Standing Armaments Committee to 
assist in the foregoing tasks ; 
4. Request the governments concerned to 
arrange for the IEPG to submit an annual 
report on its activities to the Assembly." 
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14. The reply of the Council was communi-
cated to the Assembly on 21st March 1979. 
The Council rejected the specific proposal of 
the Assembly concerning the involvement of the 
European Community and the request for an 
annual report to be submitted by the IEPG to 
the Assembly. 
"1. For the reasons previously stated in 
the reply to Assembly Recommendation 
297, the Council consider that efforts to 
organise European co-operation in the field 
of armaments production are essential and 
should be vigorously pursued. This is the 
aim of the independent European pro-
gramme group in its work on the joint 
development and production of weapons 
systems or equipment of major importance 
for the preservation of European armaments 
industries. Although detailed programmes 
have not yet been worked out, considerable 
progress has been made in some fields such 
as the harmonisation of equipment time-
tables, the defining of certain specific 
projects and the study of problems relating 
to practical aspects of co-operation. 
At the same time, the IEPG has succeeded 
in working out a common European line of 
approach to offers of co-operation from the 
North Americans in the framework of the 
'transatlantic dialogue'. Current discussions 
relate to the possibility of sharing develop-
ment and production between Europeans 
and North Americans for certain 'arma-
ments families' with the Europeans seeking 
to redress the balance of production and 
trade in terms of both quality and quantity. 
Indeed, the search for standardisation must 
not be allowed to operate exclusively to the 
advantage of equipment of American origin, 
leaving the European industry with only a 
subordinate role as subcontractors which in 
the long term would be a threat to its 
existence. 
2. The restructuring of the European 
armaments industry raises a number of 
complex problems which are not limited to 
industrial and customs policy or research 
policy, but directly involve the security of 
states. 
The Assembly's suggestion would therefore 
imply a wide interpretation of the field of 
application of the Treaty of Rome; such an 
interpretation has already been opposed by 
a number of governments. 
3. The first results of the Standing 
Armaments Committee's study on the 
European armaments industry confirm that 
this body is a useful instrument for thought 
and analysis which can be used to good 
purpose by the governments. Like the 
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Assembly, the Council consider that the 
resources of the SAC should continue to be 
fully employed and when the current study 
has been completed they will consider the 
possibility of giving it new tasks in areas 
where its resources can be used without 
duplicating the activities of other bodies. 
4. The independent European programme 
group brings together representatives of all 
the European states which are members of 
the alliance, except Iceland. The submission 
of a report on the activities of the IEPG to 
the WEU Assembly, with which they have 
no organisational links, would undoubtedly 
give rise to difficulties for some of these 
states. It is more appropriate for WEU 
Assembly delegates to be briefed through 
national channels on IEPG activities." 
15. The reference to the European Community 
inevitably stirred up repercussions in all parlia-
ments of the member countries and particularly 
in France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. 
16. In the French Senate, Mr. Jeambrun put 
three questions on Recommendation 325. The 
first question on 30th November 1978 came 
before the Council had replied and read as 
follows: 
"To ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs to 
explain the French Government's attitude 
towards the recommendation on a European 
armaments policy adopted by the parlia-
mentary Assembly of Western European 
Union (WEU) on 22nd November 1978. 
To ask him to give the French views on the 
respective possibilities of the independent 
European programme group and of the 
WEU Standing Armaments Committee and 
on the respective advantages of interopera-
bility and standardisation in the production 
of armaments." 
17. The answer by Mr. Barre, French Prime 
Minister, on 28th January 1979, was also 
communicated prior to the Council's reply and 
gave details of the French Government's 
position on all questions linked with internatio-
nal and particularly European co-operation in 
armaments questions : 
"Maintaining a high-quality armaments 
industry in Europe meets economic, social 
and military needs. Safeguarding this 
industrial and technological potential 
implies organising intra-European co-ope-
ration and the French Government there-
fore affor~s active support to all bodies 
working in this sense. The Standing 
Armaments Committee of WEU is in this 
respect an excellent instrument for reflec-
tion and analysis as borne out by the first 
results of the study it made at the request 
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of the WEU Council on the situation of 
armaments industries in WEU member 
countries. The independent European pro-
gramme group, which brings together all 
the European members of the alliance, is 
more particularly responsible for organising 
co-operation for the joint development and 
production of specific weapons systems or 
equipment. In the desire to safeguard 
European interests, the IEPG also, when-
·ever possible, defines the common line of 
conduct which Europeans should follow 
with regard to offers of co-operation 
emanating from the North Americans. In 
particular, it is a matter of avoiding, in 
seeking the standardisation of armaments 
in the alliance, the adoption of a policy 
which would lead to the adoption of 
equipment of solely American origin. The 
French Government therefore considers 
that priority should be given to the 
interoperability of armaments, particularly 
where munitions, fuel and communications 
are concerned. The WEU Assembly's 
recommendation on a European armaments 
policy is therefore acceptable in its reference 
to the IEPG and the WEU Standing 
Armaments Committee. Conversely, for the 
reasons already described by the govern-
ment in reply to earlier written questions 
(reply to the written questions put by Mr. 
Krieg on 21st June 1978 and by Mr. Debre 
on 23rd June 1978), the proposal to give 
the European Community responsibilities in 
respect of the production of armaments is 
not acceptable." 
18. Comment: The question by Mr. Jeambrun 
refers mainly to paragraph 1 of the recommen-
dation. The French Government's answer is in 
line with the content of the Council's reply. As 
for interoperability and standardisation, the 
recommendation mentioned both. The French 
Government expressed a far clearer attitude in 
favour of interoperability, whereas the Council 
said only that the search for standardisation 
should not be allowed to operate exclusively to 
the advantage of equipment of American origin. 
19. The second question by Mr. Jeambrun 
dated 24th March 1979 came after the reply of 
the Council : 
"To ask the Prime Minister what definite 
steps he intends to take in the context of 
the clear and detailed attitude he has 
adopted towards the respective responsibi-
lities of the various European organisations 
concerned with defence matters. Inter alia, 
to ask whether he believes it would be 
desirable for the WEU Council to inform 
the parliamentary assembly of that organi-
sation as soon as possible of the first results 
of the study undertaken by the Standing 
Armaments Committee (SAC) on the 
position of armaments industries in Europe. 
Furthermore, to ask whether it would not 
be appropriate to seek a procedure whereby 
the independent European programme 
group might report regularly on its activities 
to the WEU Assembly, the only European 
assembly with responsibilities in defence 
matters." 
The answer by Mr. Fran9ois-Poncet, Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, was communicated on 
29th May 1979: 
"The WEU Standing Armaments Commit-
tee has not yet completed the study on the 
position of armaments industries in member 
countries that the WEU Council asked it to 
undertake. It is for the Council to decide 
what use should be made of the study when 
it is complete. The French Government has 
already recommended that the information 
obtained be communicated to the Assembly 
of Western European Union in one form or 
another, and it will continue to act in this 
sense. In spite of the interest of such an 
idea, it does not seem possible to work out 
procedure whereby the independent Euro-
pean programme group (IEPG) might 
report on its activities to the WEU 
Assembly. The IEPG is merely a working 
body with no institutional structure and 
some of its members, several of whom are 
not members of WEU, would not agree to 
the establishment of an organic link with 
the Assembly set up under the modified 
Brussels Treaty. The Assembly might 
rather be kept informed in a pragmatic 
manner of the results obtained by the IEPG 
by means of communications as appro-
priate." 
20. Comment : The questioner requests infor-
mation on the first results of the study 
undertaken by the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee (paragraph 3 of the recommendation) 
and refers to paragraph 4 of the recommenda-
tion asking for the French Government's views 
on an annual report by the IEPG to the 
Assembly. As for the Standing Armaments 
Committee's study, the French Government's 
answer refers to the competence of the Council 
without entering into the subject. The French 
Government rejected the idea of an annual 
request for a report from the IEPG as did the 
Council in its reply which concurred with the 
French approach. 
21. The third question by Mr. Jeambrun, put 
on 24th March 1979, read as follows : 
"To ask the Minister of Defence whether it 
would be possible to draw up a list of the 
main bilateral agreements since 1974 
between the United States and the principal 
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European countries, including France, on 
the joint production, supplies or orders of 
military equipment. To ask whether this 
list appears balanced and in conformity 
with the Prime Minister's wish that the 
standardisation of armaments in the Atlan-
tic Alliance should not be tantamount to 
the adoption of equipment of American 
origin alone." 
22. The French Government's answer was 
communicated on 12th June 1979 by 
Mr. Bourges, Minister of Defence: 
"Since 1974, only the Roland programme 
has been the subject of a tripartite 
intergovernmental agreement between the 
United States, the Federal Republic of 
Germany and France. Where the other 
European countries are concerned, France 
is not generally aware of the agreements 
they conclude with the United States. The 
principal known agreements in recent years 
have been: procurement by NATO coun-
tries of licences to manufacture American 
equipment: the F-16 aircraft, the AIM-9L 
missile (successor to Sidewinder), the 
A W AC system ; procuremeqt by the United 
States of licences to manufacture European 
equipment : Harrier aircraft, German tank 
gun. The balance of trade between the 
United States and most European countries 
is generally very unbalanced : each year 
France purchases equipment or components 
for some $30 million from the United States 
and sells the latter $3 million of equipment. 
This tendency is even more pronounced 
among our principal European partners 
(Federal Republic of Germany, Britain, 
etc.) which purchase about ten times more 
from the United States than we do. With 
an eye to operational efficiency, the govern-
ment is seeking interoperability of equip-
ment and munitions, which does not mean 
abandoning national production, rather 
than standardisation, which might mean 
procuring one type of equipment. Moreover, 
the aim of the independent European 
programme group is to encourage European 
co-operation for the development of arma-
ments, an aim we wish to foster as much as 
possible. This policy has produced positive 
results from which European industries and 
in particular our national industry have 
benefited." 
23. Comment: The question deals mainly with 
the problem of a two-way street in armaments 
with the United States as stressed in the 
preamble to the recommendation. The answer 
gives a very precise picture of the current 
situation in arms production co-operation bet-
ween Europe and the United States. 
24. In the Netherlands, on 6th February 1979, 
during the debate on the budget of the Ministry 
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of Defence, Mr. de Boer made the following 
statement: 
"Thirdly, to obtain better and, above all, 
internal European co-operation in this field, 
one needs a more balanced relationship in 
arms-producing capabilities within the 
alliance. This in turn depends on a more 
balanced relationship in competition. To 
this end, the present compartmentalised 
structure of the European armaments 
market must be terminated and the market 
made a joint European problem. 
Only by lengthening production runs -
possible with European co-operation - and 
hence obtaining lower prices will it be 
possible to achieve prices which are more 
competitive than those of American produ-
cers. The Americans have already drawn 
attention to this point, although without 
any noticeable results so far. 
On the European side, there is more or less 
only one series of bilateral negotiations of 
the two-way street type, between a few 
countries and the United States. The 
drawback of these agreements is that in the 
long run they will produce results which 
are contrary to the aim sought, i.e. the 
creation of a common European armaments 
market. 
Furthermore, a common policy for the 
defence industry in Europe is something 
which does not concern only the Minister 
of Defence. It is too closely linked with 
general industrial and S_?cio-econo~ic 
policy. The best way of findmg a solution 
would probably be to have the EEC 
intervene, specifically in regard to socio-
economic and industrial policy problems. 
It remains to be seen how this can be done 
in view of the fact that not all EEC 
member countries are members of NATO 
and not all the European members of 
NATO are members of the EEC. Is the 
government prepared to include this ques-
tion in the agenda of the EEC ? Recom-
mendations in the same sense have been 
adopted in another parliamentary forum." 
25. The answer by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary 
of State for Defence, was communicated on 7th 
February 1979 : 
"The desire for a common European 
defence policy referred to by Mr. de Boer 
is a matter which goes somewhat beyond 
the defence field in the strict meaning of 
the word. For the time being, I consider 
that it is not for the Ministry of Defence to 
take the initiative, although we are perfectly 
prepared to associate our~elves ~ith a!ly 
move which may be made m the mdustnal 
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policy field. As Mr. de Boer knows, this 
problem was placed on the agenda of the 
parliamentary assembly of the European 
Communities through the Klepsch report. 
It might be possible to discuss this type of 
question more easily when most of the 
European member countries of NATO have 
become members of the enlarged European 
Communities." 
26. Comment : Both the statement and the 
reply were pronounced before the Council ~ad 
adopted a position. The statement refers mamly 
to paragraph 2 of the recommendation. The 
reply of the Netherlands Government s~ows 
that it was not in principle opposed to the 1dea 
of the European Community, an attitude which 
differed slightly from the Council's position. 
27. In the Bundestag, on 28th June 1979, Mr. 
Handlos put the following question to the 
Federal Government: 
"Does the Federal Government support the 
wish expressed by the WEU Assembly to 
receive a report on the activities of the 
independent European programme group ?" 
28. The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, 
Mrs. Hamm-Briicher, answered as follows: 
"The independent European programme 
group is not bound to publish a regular 
report. However, as in the past, the Federal 
Government will continue to transmit to it 
recommendations on the work of the group 
addressed to the Council by the Assembly 
and will do its utmost to ensure that the 
Assembly is provided with the desired 
information." 
29. Comment : The question refers mainly to 
paragraph 4 of the recommendation. The 
Council had rejected the idea of the IEPG 
submitting an annual report to the Assembly 
and proposed briefing Assembly del~~3:tes 
through national channels on IEPG actlVltles. 
The Federal Government's answer cannot be 
considered as a "briefing through national 
channels" since it says nothing in substance. 
But as the question did not ask for a briefing it 
was easy for the Federal Government to give an 
answer devoid of substance. 
30. Recommendation 329 on the industrial 
bases of European security presented on behalf 
of the Committee on Scientific, Technological 
and Aerospace Questions (Document 805) was 
adopted by the Assembly on 19th June 1979 as 
follows: 
"The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Urge member countries to determine 
the military equipment : 
(a) to be produced on a co-operative 
basis; 
(b) to be produced with due regard for 
interface conditions to ensure inter-
operability; 
(c) to be the object of special efforts 
because of present shortcomings in 
Europe and their foreseeable impor-
tance; 
2. Assess the results and advantages of 
the various forms of industrial co-operation 
in these fields to date, together with the 
difficulties and setbacks encountered ; 
3. Define methods of ensuring greater 
European co-ordination of research and 
development in such branches of advanced 
technology as integrated circuits, micropro-
cessors, radar systems, lasers and infrared 
sensors for weapons systems ; 
4. Improve methods of procuring arma-
ments and, in close liaison with the 
industries concerned, introduce appropriate 
measures for facilitating the exchange of 
know-how and the protection of industrial 
proprietary rights ; 
5. Seek frameworks for lasting co-opera-
tion between member countries by forming 
permanent industrial consortia, concluding 
European agreements on specifications and 
replacement schedules for military equip-
ment and working out harmonised methods 
of financing ; 
6. Work out methods and structures to 
improve decision-taking and production 
capacity in European co-operation." 
31. The reply of the Council was communi-
cated to the Assembly on 26th November 
1979: 
"1. The Council recognise the usefulness 
of identifying weapon systems which can be 
the object of collaborative production, of 
achieving improved interoperability where 
appropriate and of seeking areas where 
European efforts need to be particularly 
concentrated. The machinery for this sort 
of consideration already exists however. 
Within the alliance as a whole, CNAD 
devotes considerable efforts to achieving 
interoperability in specific equipment areas 
and is at present testing a periodic 
armaments planning system designed to 
improve co-operation between the member 
countries particularly by increasing oppor-
tunities for standardisation and interopera-
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bility of the equipment used by them. As 
the Assembly is aware, the IEPG bears the 
main responsibility for indentifying oppor-
tunities for collaboration in the design and 
production of defence equipment between 
European member countries. Its purpose 
includes the strengthening of the European 
factor in relationship with America and the 
maintenance of a healthy European defence 
industrial base. As part of its work the 
IEPG also looks regularly at areas of 
technology in the defence field to which 
member states should pay special attention. 
Furthermore, as the Council observed in 
their reply to Recommendation 335, the 
study at present being made by the 
Standing Armaments Committee of WEU 
may provide governments with a detailed 
and comparative analysis of the armaments 
industries in the member countries and 
assist them to direct their choices and their 
programmes towards increased eo-opera-
tion. 
2. Industrial co-operation in collaborative 
projects has taken several different forms. 
In every project, the form of co-operative 
structure adopted must be that best suited 
to the particular circumstances. The Coun-
cil believe that the governments, ministries 
and industries of member states are already 
fully aware of the advantages and disad-
vantages of different co-operative struc-
tures. 
3. European governments are very con-
scious of the importance of certain areas of 
advanced technology for both civil and 
military applications. In this connection 
they make every effort to extend their co-
operation to these particular fields, either 
under CNAD and IEPG auspices or 
bilaterally as appropriate, with those nations 
who have similar interests and require-
ments. Such co-operation can take the form 
of information exchange or collaborative 
research and development for projects. 
Devising further formal methods for co-
operation of this sort does not seem for the 
time being likely to promote co-operation. 
4. All nations have over the years devised 
procurement procedures best suited to their 
own circumstances. These are constantly 
being refined, and both CN AD and the 
IEPG have done work on harmonising 
procedures wherever this has been found 
possible or desirable. Certainly one example 
is in the field of industrial or intellectual 
property rights. This is a vital component 
of co-operation, and a sub-group of CNAD 
has been examining the problems. The 
Council do not believe that this work should 
be duplicated. 
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5. Permanent industrial consortia may 
well be established in the future as an 
effective means of undertaking collaborative 
armaments projects. However, industrial 
and management structures must be tailo-
red to the particular circumstances of each 
project, and, before the establishment of a 
permanent consortium, the participants 
would have to be fully satisfied that there 
would be sufficient long-term work for the 
consortium, involving, in every case, the 
same nations and firms. The Council are 
aware that in CNAD, the IEPG, FINABEL 
considerable work is being done on agreeing 
concepts, specifications and on examining 
replacement timetables. The framework 
necessary to encourage co-operation already 
exists. As with industrial and managerial 
arrangements, methods of finance for co-
operative projects must be flexible and must 
be those best suited to the circumstances of 
the project and to the budgetary systems of 
the participating nations. 
6. The Council believe that the necessary 
framework for decision-making already 
exists. The governments concerned are 
necessarily concentrating on the specific 
problems raised by the consideration of 
particular projects where their interests and 
requirements appear to be in sufficient 
conformity. The Council believe that the 
improvement and tightening of European 
co-operation require first and foremost the 
consideration and setting up of concrete 
projects rather than the devising of new 
structures and methodology." 
32. Summary: The focal point of the recom-
mendation is the wish to establish new methods 
and structures in the field of industrial co-
operation. The focal point of the reply is that 
the framework necessary to encourage co-
operation already exists and that the improve-
ment of European co-operation requires first 
and foremost the setting up of specific projects 
rather than establishing new structures and 
methodology. 
33. On 7th August 1979, a member of the 
Belgian Chamber of Representatives put the 
following question to the government : 
"The recent decision of the Council of 
Ministers on the procurement of mechan-
ised infantry combat vehicles (MICVs) 
revived discussion about a concerted Euro-
pean approach to orders for armaments. 
This problem also has a place in the work 
of the Assembly of .Western European 
Union which often considers that results 
achieved fall short of expectations. 
Are consultations between the military 
headquarters of the European member 
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countries of the Atlantic Alliance regular 
enough to produce agreement on joint 
specifications for the military equipment 
required by these countries and on repla-
cement schedules leading to the organisa-
tion of the joint production of armaments 
on a European basis ? 
What assessment may be made of the 
results achieved by FIN ABEL, the IEPG 
and the WEU Standing Armaments Com-
mittee respectively in this field ? 
Reply by Mr. Vanden Boeynants, Deputy 
Prime Minister and Minister of Defence 
(11th September 1979) 
Co-ordination between military headquar-
ters on both the definition of requirements 
and the harmonisation of replacement 
schedules is a major concern for each one, 
i.e. by reducing prices thanks to longer 
production runs, to be able to purchase the 
best equipment at the lowest cost, keeping 
within the limits of the sums available 
under the budget and the agreement of the 
government. 
But there are obstacles to full integration, 
whether in the Atlantic or the European 
framework. 
These political, economic, social, financial, 
legal or commercial obstacles - whether 
national or international - explain why 
results achieved so far by FINABEL, the 
IEPG and WEU's SAC, although encou-
raging, cannot yet be considered as the 
ideal solution." 
34. Comment: The question was put prior to 
the Council's reply and the questioner did not 
refer directly to the wording of the recommen-
dation but asked for specific information on the 
results of studies by the different working 
groups. The answer by the Belgian Government 
was also given before the Council had commu-
nicated its position. In substance the govern-
ment's answer does not correspond entirely to 
the Council's position since it states that results 
so far could not yet be considered as the ideal 
solution because of various political, economic, 
social, financial, legal or commercial obstacles. 
35. On 25th October 1979, Mr. Raper asked 
the United Kingdom Government the following 
question in the House of Commons : 
"Mr. Raper asked the Secretary of State 
for Defence whether he considers that 
consultations between military headquarters 
of the European member countries of the 
Atlantic Alliance are regular enough to 
produce agreement on joint specifications 
for the military equipment required by 
these countries and on replacement sche-
dules leading to the organisation of the 
joint production of armaments on a Euro-
pean basis: and if he is satisfied with 
results achieved by FINABEL, the indepen-
dent European programme group, the 
Conference of National Armaments Direc-
tors and the Standing Armaments Commit-
tee, respectively, in this field. 
Reply by Mr. Pym, Secretary of State for 
Defence 
The many international institutions avail-
able, including those mentioned, provide 
adequate machinery for exploring opportun-
ities for collaboration in the defence 
equipment field. However, I recognise that 
the problems of reconciling different 
national interests and capabilities are 
formidable." 
36. Comment : Both question and answer came 
before the Council had communicated its 
position. The contents of the question were very 
similar to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the question 
put in the Belgian parliament, in fact, nearly 
identical. As for the United Kingdom Govern-
ment's answer, it is very general and does not 
enter into the substance. 
37. On lOth October 1979, Mr. Ahrens put 
the following question in the Bundestag: 
"To ask the Federal Government for its 
views on the results so far obtained by 
European co-operation in the planning, 
development and production of armaments 
and the possibility of concluding an agree-
ment on programmes to allow standardisa-
tion or interoperability by the end of the 
century. 
Reply by Mr. von Balow, Parliamentary 
Secretary of State for Defence 
At present, European armaments co-ope-
ration is mainly carried out in the frame-
work of FINABEL (definition of the 
military requirements of France, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, the Uni-
ted Kingdom and Luxembourg), Eurogroup 
(tactical requirements and projects) and 
the independent European programme 
group, set up in 1976, in which France 
takes part (projects and problems of the 
armaments industry). 
The permanent harmonisation of military 
concepts in the various countries, economic 
requirements and industrial possibilities of 
co-operation herald a development of com-
mon European projects." 
38. Comment: The question was put before 
the Council had communicated its position. The 
answer was very general and does not offer 
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precise information about the Federal position 
towards the relevant recommendation. 
39. On 29th November 1979, Mr. Meintz put 
the following question in the Luxembourg 
Chamber of Deputies : 
"What does the government think of results 
obtained to date through European co-
operation in FINABEL with regard to 
planning, developing and producing arma-
ments and the possibility of concluding an 
agreement on programmes to allow stan-
dardisation or interoperability to be achie-
ved before the end of the century ? 
What are the effects on the armaments of 
the Luxembourg army ? 
Reply by Mr. Krieps, Minister for the Armed 
Forces (28th December 1979) 
Where FINABEL is concerned, the follow-
ing remarks should be made : 
1. The FINABEL Co-ordinating Commit-
tee is an organisation at the level ot: 
chiefs-of-staff of the land forces of the 
seven member countries (France, Italy, 
Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, Luxem1 
bourg and the United Kingdom) who 
wished to establish closer links. 
FINABEL proposals and recommendations 
are transmitted to the governments concer-
ned by their own representatives, their 
army chiefs-of-staff. 
FINABEL's aim is to encourage military 
co-operation between member states of 
NATO in the following fields: 
- exchange of information, tactical and 
logistic studies, studies on the use of 
units, study of training methods and 
procedure, joint tests. 
FINABEL's task is not therefore the joint 
production of military equipment, such a 
role being outside the responsibility of 
chiefs-of-staff. It is nevertheless true that 
bodies responsible for developing such 
equipment take account, inter alia, of the 
requirements of defence staffs. 
Joint production of armaments is rather 
among the principal objectives of the 
independent European programme group 
(IEPG) and the WEU Standing Arma-
ments Committee. 
The government notes that great efforts are 
made in these bodies in matters of 
standardisation and interoperability but 
that results are felt only very slowly because 
of the complexity of the problem and the 
national interests of producing countries. 
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2. Luxembourg was a founder member of 
FINABEL (1953). Since 1968, our parti-
cipation has been confined to the Chiefs-
of-Staff Committee, which meets once a 
year. This committee draws up general 
guidelines and examines the results obtai-
ned. 
Luxembourg receives all the studies and 
agreements prepared by the various com-
mittees and working groups. Tactical and 
logistic concepts worked out by FINABEL 
are very useful to the Luxembourg army, 
as is information on the quality of equip-
ment to be used." 
40. Comment : The question is nearly identical 
with Mr. Ahrens' in the Bundestag. The answer 
by the Luxembourg Government is far more 
specific than that of the Federal Government. 
The Luxembourg Government considers the 
national interests of producing countries to be 
one of the main problems. 
41. On 18th September 1979, Mr. Jeambrun 
put the following question in the French Senate: 
"To ask the Minister of Defence to give 
France's position on Recommendation 329 
of the WEU Assembly. To ask whether it 
is possible to assess the results and benefits 
obtained from the various forms of indus-
trial co-operation practised so far in these 
fields, and also the difficulties and setbacks 
encountered. To ask further what progress 
has been made in drawing up the list of 
future programmes for international arma-
ments co-operation decided on by the 
Ministry of Defence and to what extent 
this list has been prepared in the light of 
similar work carried out in the IEPG 
(independent European programme 
group)." 
42. The French Government's answer is given 
in paragraph 48. 
43. Recommendation 333 on parliaments and 
defence procurement presented on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments (Document 807) was adopted by the 
Assembly on 20th June 1979 : 
"The Assembly, 
Having studied the report of its Committee 
on Defence Questions and Armaments 
analysing the role of national parliaments 
in the national defence equipment procure-
ment process ; 
Considering that national parliaments and 
their defence committees, with the excep-
tion of those of Germany and the Nether-
lands, are usually inadequately informed on 
defence matters ; 
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Believing that parliaments exercise insuffi-
ciently their prerogative to control defence 
procurement policy ; 
Recalling the terms of its Recommendation 
197 on military security and parliamentary 
information; 
With a view to furthering joint production 
and standardisation of defence equipment 
in the armed forces of the countries of 
Western Europe or in the alliance, taking 
due account of the military and economic 
requirements of the alliance as a whole, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
Invite member governments : 
A. To ensure that their parliaments, or 
where appropriate their parliamentary 
defence, budget, or other committees con-
cerned: 
1. Are fully informed in good time, within 
the limits imposed by considerations only 
of external security, not of political or 
administrative convenience, on all aspects 
of defence policy, at both the national and 
allied levels, especially on matters affecting 
the assessment of the military threat and 
the choice of defence equipment ; 
2. Are enabled to exercise sufficiently 
close control of the defence budget and 
appropriations and of all stages of the 
defence procurement process, so as to 
improve defence capability and increase 
standardisation and interoperability of 
equipment; 
3. Are enabled to compile systematically 
information on current research and deve-
lopment projects in the national and 
European defence industry ; 
B. To ensure that full information on 
national defence equipment projects in the 
planning stages is available to allied 
governments, and to take full account of 
alternative defence equipment projects 
available in allied countries; 
C. To provide as far as possible a common 
structure for the national defence budgets, 
national defence equipment procurement 
processes, and, finally, the procedure for 
supplying classified information with a view 
to instituting in the foreseeable future a 
European policy of common procurement 
of new weapons systems." 
44. The reply of the Council was communi-
cated to the Assembly on 20th November 
1979: 
"A. It is a matter for national parliaments 
to determine the amount of information 
required on defence and other matters from 
governments. Detailed information on the 
defence budget is generally presented to 
parliament in nations' annual estimates; in 
addition, parliaments may also debate 
defence policy on publication of an annual 
defence white paper or policy statement. 
Parliamentary defence and finance commit-
tees may commission memoranda from 
ministries and question ministers or their 
representatives and submit reports on 
specific matters to parliament together with 
the guidance submitted to them. 
B. The principal fora for equipment co-
operation are the Conference of National 
Armaments Directors and the IEPG whose 
procedures are specifically organised to 
ensure that members are fully informed of 
the requirements and developments of other 
allies. Wherever potential common interests 
are identified detailed arrangements are 
made to exploit as far as possible the 
opportunities arising for collaboration in 
development or production of equipment. 
C. Work is already in progress in the 
IEPG, CNAD and Eurogroup on exchan-
ging information on different national 
procedures and bringing them into close 
conformity where possible. For instance the 
IEPG has done important work on procu-
rement procedures, CNAD is at present 
testing a periodic armaments planning 
system designed to improve co-operation 
between the member countries and Euro-
group has a committee examining financial 
planning systems. Although this work is 
useful, it does not solve the real problems 
of trying to set up collaborative projects. 
These problems are not ones of procedures 
or lack of information, but relate to issues 
of requirements, costs, industrial arrange-
ments, etc. and they can only be resolved 
by detailed compromise in relation to the 
particular circumstances of each project." 
45. A member of the Belgian parliament put 
the following question on Recommendation 
333: 
"The technological development of arma-
ments and the emergence of new weapons 
systems seem likely to require yet further 
European consultations in respect of their 
procurement. 
What measures does the government con-
sider should be taken jointly by member 
countries of the Atlantic Alliance to 
facilitate the institution of a European 
policy of procurement of new weapons 
systems? 
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Should not the structure for national 
defence budgets be made more homo-
geneous, as well as defence equipment 
procurement processes and procedure for 
supplying classified information ?" 
46. Mr. Vanden Boeynants, Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister of Defence, answered on 
9th October 1979 as follows : 
"1. The Ministry of Defence shares the 
opinion of the honourable member and also 
considers that the technological develop-
ment of armaments and the emergence of 
new weapons systems require yet further 
European consultations in respect of their 
procurement. 
2. The Ministry of Defence therefore 
supports all steps likely to promote such 
consultations. Some are at present being 
taken in NATO, Eurogroup and the IEPG 
(independant European programme group) 
with a view to promoting international co-
operation starting at the development stage 
for military equipment. 
3. The practical achieve"'ent of such co-
operation stretches beyond the strict 
framework of the Ministry of Defence. It 
encounters several obstacles including the 
effective independence of various countries, 
the political, economic, financial and tech-
nological implications of each major pro-
gramme and the limits inherent in national 
interests or available resources. 
4. Harmonisation of the structures of 
defence budgets and defence equipment 
procurement processes and procedure for 
supplying classified information would cer-
tainly be likely to facilitate European 
consultations on armaments procurement. 
But only a strengthening of political 
authority at supranational level would be 
able to produce an early and spectacular 
improvement in this field." · 
4 7. Comment : The discussion in the Belgian 
parliament was held before the Council had 
communicated its position. The Belgian Govern-
ment's answer contains a clear confession to a 
strengthening of political authority at suprana-
tional level, an element which one cannot find 
in the Council's reply. 
48. On 18th September 1979, in the French 
Senate, Mr. Jeambrun asked "the Minister of 
Defence to state France's attitude towards 
Recommendation 333 of the Assembly of 
Western European Union". On 30th November, 
Mr. Bourges, Minister of Defence, answered as 
follows: 
"The honourable member is asked to refer 
to the statements made by the Minister of 
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Defence during the discussion on oral 
questions for debate Nos. 245, 247 and 257 
on defence policy (Journal officiel, parlia-
mentary debates (Senate), 24th October 
1979, pages 3435 to 3445). The Standing 
Armaments Committee (SAC), which is 
kept regularly informed of the work of the 
independent European programme group 
(IEPG), informs the Defence Committee of 
the Assembly of Western European Union 
on its work and that of the IEPG at the 
customary joint meetings. The French 
Government makes certain, when authori-
sing sales of military equipment, that 
contracts signed do not jeopardise its action 
for international detente and the defence of 
human rights and freedoms." 
49. On 25th October 1979, Mr. Raper put the 
following question in the House of Commons : 
"Mr. Raper asked the Secretary of State 
for Defence if he will consider, with his 
colleagues in the Western European Union 
Council, measures to be taken jointly to 
provide a common structure for national 
defence budgets, national defence equip-
ment procurement processes and procedure 
for supplying classified information, with a 
view to instituting a European policy of 
procurement of new weapons systems. 
Reply by Mr. Pym, Secretary of State for 
Defence 
The Western European Union Council is at 
present considering an Assembly recom-
mendation on precisely these matters." 
50. Comment : Since the question was put 
prior to the Council's reply to the Assembly, 
the United Kingdom Government referred to 
the competence of the Council and said nothing 
in substance. 
51. Recommendation 335 on political condi-
tions for European armaments co-operation, 
presented on behalf of the General Affairs 
Committee (Document 802), was adopted by 
the Assembly on 21st June 1979: 
"The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. In application of Article IV of the 
modified Brussels Treaty, ensure that Euro-
pean armaments co-operation develops 
along lines which conform to the latest 
technological requirements and to the 
defence policy and strategy applied by the 
members of the Atlantic Alliance; 
2. Keep the Assembly informed, by what-
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ever means it considers appropriate, of the 
results already achieved in the study 
undertaken by the SAC, of the progress 
made and of the goals towards which its 
work is directed ; 
3. Ensure that the SAC has access to the 
sources of information it needs so that its 
study may be completed in the reasonably 
near future ; 
4. Study attentively the results of the 
study with a view to preparing on this basis 
guidance to be addressed to the appropriate 
authorities in member countries and to the 
European organisations concerned; 
5. Keep the Assembly regularly informed 
of the progress of work in the IEPG ; 
6. Examine the limitations which Europe 
should advocate in regard to exporters and 
importers of armaments and itself to 
prevent the trade in arms stepping up the 
armaments race, particularly in areas where 
peace is threatened." 
52. The reply of the Council was communi-
cated to the Assembly on 5th November 1979 : 
"In their reply to Recommendation 297 the 
Council explained why they consider it 
necessary to develop armaments co-opera-
tion between European countries and in 
their reply to Recommendation 325 they 
described the common European line of 
approach to offers of co-operation in the 
framework of the transatlantic dialogue ; 
they also defined the aims which, in their 
view, should guide the action of member 
countries, whilst acknowledging the diffi-
culties of such an undertaking, since it is 
carried out by countries whose armaments 
industries have widely differing structures 
and levels of development. 
The Council wish to reaffirm the importance 
they attach to the continuation of the work 
at present being carried out, with a view to 
achieving greater harmonisation of national 
policies which should lead to genuine co-
operation on specific programmes; in this 
connection, they consider that the work 
undertaken by the independent European 
programme group and the study at present 
being made by the Standing Armaments 
Committee meet the Assembly's concern 
about the technical and political direction 
it would wish such co-operation to take. 
As the Assembly is aware, only the legal 
part of the SAC's study on the armaments 
sector of industry in the member countries 
has so far reached the Council; indeed the 
SAC was not in a position to submit its 
final report when the Ministerial Council 
met in Rome on 16th May 1979; that 
meeting did, however, confirm the SAC's 
mandate and agreed that the first part of 
the economic study should be completed 
both swiftly and to the best effect, with the 
co-operation of the administrations concer-
ned. 
When the final report from the SAC is 
received, the Council will not fail, as was 
stated by the Chairman-in-Office at the 
second sitting of the twenty-fifth ordinary 
session, to consider how the Assembly 
might be informed of its content and its 
principal conclusions. It is still too soon, in 
the present state of this study, to express a 
view as to the practical follow-up action to 
be taken. The study may enable govern-
ments for the first time to have a detailed 
and comparative analysis of the armaments 
industries in the member countries and 
assist them to direct their choices and their 
programmes towards increased co-opera-
tion. 
Within the IEPG, in the expert groups, 
European countries also continue to study 
the possibility of joint production in certain 
sectors of armaments ; at the same time, 
they have started a dialogue with the 
United States with the basic hope of 
conserving their share of European interests 
while co-operating with that country for the 
production of certain types of armaments. 
In their reply to Recommendation 325, the 
Council stressed the difficulties encountered 
by some countries which are members of 
the IEPG but not of WEU with regard to 
passing on the results of the work of that 
group to the Assembly of the organisation. 
The Council have noted the Assembly's 
concern regarding the dangers of the trade 
in arms in areas where peace is threatened. 
This is an important problem which involves 
different political factors in each country ; 
it would be unrealistic to deal with it in the 
European framework only, since in fact this 
excludes the principal armaments exporting 
and importing countries. 
On the other hand, bearing in mind its 
responsibilities in this respect, every Euro-
pean country could draw relevant conclu-
sions from the results of joint action that 
might be taken between countries of the 
same geographical area with a view to 
voluntary limitation of their own imports : 
such consultations, which would also bring 
in the main supplier countries, would indeed 
make it possible to envisage concerted 
limitation on the sales of conventional 
weapons." 
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53. Summary: The crucial points of the 
recommendations are to keep the Assembly 
informed of the results of the studies undertaken 
by the SAC and IEPG and to examine the 
limitations of the export and import of 
armaments. The Council states that the SAC 
study is not yet completed and that there are 
difficulties in giving information about the 
IEPG's work since some of its member countries 
are not members of WEU. Finally, the Council 
thinks that the problem of arms trade is an 
important one but it would be unrealistic to 
deal with it in the European framework only. 
Consultation should be held between the 
relevant European countries. Although para-
graph 6 does not concern the present subject 
directly, it will be taken into account due to the 
high political relevance of the problem. 
54. On 25th October 1979, Mr. Raper put 
three questions in the House of Commons on 
Recommendation 335: 
"Mr. Raper asked the Lord Privy Seal, in 
application of Article IV of the modified 
Brussels Treaty, what steps he has taken to 
ensure that European armaments co-ope-
ration develops along lines which conform 
to the latest technological requirements and 
to the defence policy and strategy applied 
by the members of the Atlantic Alliance. 
Reply by Sir fan Gilmour, Lord Privy Seal 
Her Majesty's Government want to see 
European armaments co-operation develop 
in ways which meet the challenges of new 
technology and the needs of the alliance. 
Work in the European programme group 
-the main focus of European efforts in this 
area - is closely co-ordinated with work in 
NATO through NATO's Conference of 
National Armaments Directors. 
Question put by Mr. Roper on Recommen-
dation 335 
Mr. Raper asked the Lord Privy Seal what 
is his policy regarding the limitations which 
should be placed nationally and within 
Europe on exporters and importers of 
armaments to prevent the trade in arms 
stepping up the armaments race, particu-
larly in areas where peace is threatened. 
Reply by Mr. Hurd, Minister of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 
Proposed arms exports are carefully exa-
mined, on a case-by-case basis, taking into 
account all relevant factors. Particular care 
is taken in considering sales to areas of 
tension. A policy of restraint by European 
states alone would not be effective, since it 
would exclude the major exporters. The 
government, however, support efforts to 
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focus attention on this matter in the United 
Nations. 
Question put by Mr. Roper on Recommen-
dation 335 
Mr. Roper asked the Secretary of State for 
Defence what differences there are between 
the study undertaken by the European 
Commission on European armaments indus-
tries and the task allotted to the Western 
European Union Standing Armaments 
Committee on 31st May 1976; whether 
there is duplication of work in these two 
studies; and what steps he intends to take 
to avoid this being so. 
Reply by Mr. Pym, Secretary of State for 
Defence 
I hope that duplication between the two 
studies will be avoided although I under-
stand that both cover similar ground. The 
scope of the European Commission study 
and how it will be used is a matter for the 
Commission, over which I have no influ-
ence." 
55. Comment: The discussion in the House of 
Commons was held before the Council had 
communicated its reply to the Assembly. The 
British reference to CNAD is not to be found 
in the Council's reply. As for the arms trade, 
the United Kingdom Government introduces 
the involvement of the United Nations. 
56. On 25th January 1980, Mr. Enders put 
two questions in the Bundestag on Recommen-
dation 335: 
"To what extent does the study by the 
Commission of the European Communities 
on the European armaments industry differ 
from that entrusted to the WEU Standing 
Armaments Committee on 31st May 1976 
and what steps is the Federal Government 
considering to avoid duplication of work? 
Reply by Mr. Schne/1, Secretary of State for 
Defence 
It is true that both organisations have 
asked that a study be made of the European 
armaments industry. 
On 31st May 1976, the WEU Council of 
Ministers instructed the Standing Arma-
ments Committee to make a descriptive 
analysis of the situation in the armaments 
sector of member countries' industries. This 
analysis was to bring out the industrial and 
economic implications of greater standar-
disation of armaments. 
At the same time the Council clearly 
indicated, at Germany's request, that 
duplication of work and overlapping with 
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studies being carried out by other organi-
sations should be avoided. 
According to statements by its secretariat, 
the Commission of the European Commu-
nities undertook its study on its own 
responsibility and in the framework of the 
resolution adopted by the European Parlia-
ment in June 1978 asking the Commission 
to submit an action programme with a view 
to a European armaments procurement 
policy. The Federal Government has not 
made its position known on this matter. 
The Commission instructed Professor 
Greenwood of Aberdeen University to 
prepare the study on the European arma-
ments market and this work is now 
completed. 
In the meantime, the Commission has 
indicated that, for reasons of competence in 
defence matters, it has no intention of 
undertaking further work as a result of this 
study. 
It is noted that although both studies are 
concerned with the armaments industries in 
member countries, there are differences due 
to the membership of the two organisations 
and to the course followed in the studies. 
The WEU study hinges on the improvement 
of armaments co-operation and on standar-
disation whereas the Commission's study 
deals with the importance of the armaments 
sector for overall economic development in 
Europe. 
The Federal Government will endeavour to 
make the Commission's study available to 
member countries as a basic document." 
Question put by Mr. Enders on Recommen-
dation 335 
"Is the Federal Government prepared to 
ask the WEU Council to undertake a study 
of member countries' armaments export 
policy designed to guide European policy 
towards a slowing down in the arms race, 
particularly in areas of tension ? 
Reply by Mrs. Hamm-Briicher, Minister of 
State for Foreign Affairs 
For the following reasons, the Federal 
Government considers there is little justifi-
cation for asking the WEU Council to 
make such a study : 
The governments of certain WEU member 
states consider arms exports to be an 
instrument of their foreign policy and a 
legitimate and essential part of their 
countries' economic relations with other 
states. They consider that they alone are 
empowered to take sovereign decisions in 
connection with their armaments export 
policies and are consequently opposed to 
WEU organs handling matters relating to 
such policies. 
In its reply to Recommendation 335 of the 
WEU Assembly, the Council underlined 
the differences between the structures of 
armaments industries and the various 
political factors peculiar to each member 
country ; it stated that it would be 
unrealistic to handle the question of trade 
in arms in areas of tension in the European 
framework only since the principal sup-
plying countries would be excluded. The 
Federal Government shares this view." 
57. Comment: The first question by Mr. 
Enders corresponds to the third question put by 
Mr. Raper in the House of Commons. The 
Federal Government's answer is very detailed 
and substantial. 
58. On 24th August 1979, Mr. d' Aillieres put 
the following question in the French Senate on 
Recommendation 335, which was followed by 
a longer statement : 
"To ask the Minister of Defence to give the 
government's views on the present state of 
European co-operation in the joint produc-
tion of armaments on the one hand and the 
search for and improvement of interopera-
bility between armaments and also to 
indicate the present state of relations 
between the United States and Europe in 
these two fields. 
Statement by Mr. d'Aillieres (23rd October 
1979) 
Yet European co-operation in armaments 
production seems to be slowing down. What 
is the exact position ? What definite 
programmes are there for the coming 
years ? Is France playing a true role of 
initiator in the current negotiations ? 
And above all, Mr. Minister, I wish to 
know what progress has been made with 
the work of the independent European 
programme group which we joined and in 
which we rightly set such great store. Has 
the group at last managed to draw up a 
balance-sheet of further requirements for 
the armies of the various member coun-
tries ? Is it about to make firm proposals 
for joint achievements ? 
The second point on which I wish to have 
your views, Mr. Minister, is the interope-
rability of equipment in use in the European 
theatre. This concept, which you originated, 
Mr. Minister, is essential. I do not need to 
tell you so. 
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However, I feel it would be most appropriate 
if, at every level, the armed forces of the 
member countries of the Atlantic Alliance 
could easily, throughout the territory cov-
ered by the treaty, be supplied with 
munitions, spare parts or fuel. What is the 
present position in this respect ? 
The third and last factor about which I 
think it would be useful to have information 
is the question of co-operation between 
Europe and the United States. 
Reply by Mr. Bourges, Minister of Defence 
Mr. d'Aillieres placed co-operation in the 
armaments industry in the framework of 
European security. France, for its part, has 
undertaken a praiseworthy and large-scale 
military effort in order to obtain a defence 
instrument which meets the requirements 
of the situation. Armaments co-operation 
has a place in this policy. 
For many years, in fact, we have been 
trying to promote the joint development 
and production of armaments in Eurbpe 
itself. I would remind Mr. Boucheny that 
this co-operation began more than twenty 
years ago and that it was not necessarily, 
as he seemed to fear in certain respects, to 
the detriment of the interests either of our 
industry or of our defence. 
Mr. d' Aillieres was concerned that since 
197 5 no major co-operative programme 
including our country had been launched. 
It should not be deduced from this that 
European co-operation is exhausted or that 
the government does not still attach 
importance or value to it. In fact, since 
that date, no major programme, apart from 
Mirage 2000, has been launched in any 
European country. This is why we cannot 
speak of the failure of European co-
operation. On the contrary, most future 
equipment planned by France and by other 
European countries is at present the subject 
of numerous joint preliminary study agree-
ments. 
The value of seeking to carry out program-
mes jointly is evident. It leads to lower 
costs. It guarantees better use of industrial 
capabilities because of longer production 
runs and our share in them. 
If such research is carried out with a 
limited number of countries, it is because 
the harmonisation of timetables and ope-
rational specifications, and the management 
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of programmes, is less difficult. However, 
as you know, France also takes part in the 
work of the independent European pro-
gramme group. Mr. d'Aillieres asked me 
what the position was in this respect. It 
must be realised that, in European co-
operation of this kind, it is not a matter of 
imposing the weapons systems we have 
adopted on our partners but of comparing 
and harmonising the requirements of our 
armies and seeking means of meeting them 
through a joint effort. 
We start with the requirements of our own 
defence and try to see whether co-operation 
is possible with other countries having 
similar requirements and whether the same 
equipment can meet our requirements and 
those of our associates. We obviously try, 
thanks to longer production runs, to obtain 
lower costs. Our industry, Mr. Boucheny, 
loses nothing in the process. 
Since the independent European pro-
gramme group was set up in 1976, it is 
admittedly rather too early for it to have 
achieved concrete results. But it has already 
proved to be a useful body for studying 
programmes in an exclusively European 
framework and in the conditions which I 
have just recalled. 
For instance, certain IEPG working groups 
have carried out major work on identifying 
and comparing member countries' replace-
ment schedules for armaments and have 
started to look for areas or programmes 
where co-operation might be possible. 
Other working groups have studied proce-
dure for different types of co-operation to 
be conducted efficiently in Europe to the 
mutual benefit of the co-operating countries. 
Finally, other groups are studying how to 
co-ordinate the means of meeting American 
offensives in the field of armaments, thus 
safeguarding the varying interests of the 
European countries." 
59. Comment: The discussion was held prior 
to communication of the Council's reply and 
does not entirely deal with matters of the 
recommendation. 
60. On 7th August 1979, a Belgian member 
of parliament put the following question on 
Recommendation 335: 
"Many voices of authority have spoken in 
appropriate circles, warning the political 
world about the revival of the arms race. 
Although Belgium is an arms exporting 
country, it is not the only one in Western 
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Europe. Moreover, do not the defence and 
armaments responsibilities of Western 
European Union allow it to play a role in 
controlling the arms trade ? Is the govern-
ment prepared to take action in this sense ? 
If not, in what framework should an 
examination be made of the limitations to 
be applied to arms exporters and importers 
and also to be imposed on Europe in order 
to avoid trade in arms fostering the arms 
race, particularly in areas where peace is 
threatened ? 
Reply by Mr. Simonet, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs (2nd October 1979) 
I fully share the concerns of the honourable 
member concerning the repercussions of the 
expansion of the arms trade on the arms 
race. 
Moreover, the recommendation from the 
recent meeting of the WEU Assembly 
asking the Council to 'examine the limita-
tions which Europe should advocate in 
regard to exporters and importers of 
armaments and itself secured my full 
attention. 
As implied in the question by the honour-
able member, it is true that what is needed 
above all is to find the appropriate 
framework for working out such limitations 
so as to facilitate their acceptance both by 
importers and exporters. 
Indeed the problem involves many political, 
economic and defence factors and the 
question of sovereignty in general, to which 
are added the objections of those who do 
not wish a solution to be sought in the 
framework of Europe alone because this 
does not include the two main arms 
exporters. 
Moreover, if the European countries con-
cerned nevertheless managed to agree on a 
joint policy towards limitations, it is to be 
feared that the de facto application of these 
limitations on importers would be taken by 
the importing countries as an attack on 
their sovereign right to determine the level 
of their means of defence. 
Belgium therefore advocates that this 
matter also be dealt with in the framework 
of a regional approach to disarmament the 
idea of which it submitted to the United 
Nations General Assembly and whose 
principle was approved in 1977. 
Bearing this in mind, the European coun-
tries should promote and encourage the 
search for regional solutions, possibly in the 
form of agreements between countries in 
the same geographical area for imposing 
their own limits on imports of conventional 
weapons. The possible association of the 
main supplying countries with such regional 
agreements would lead to a concerted 
limitation of sales of arms without the 
drawbacks mentioned above. 
Loyal to the concept of a regional approach, 
Belgium strongly encourages the initiative 
taken by Mexico which seeks to conclude 
a regional agreement between Latin Ame-
rican countries on limiting the procurement 
of armaments." 
61. Comment : The discussion was held prior 
to communication of the Council's reply. The 
Belgian Government's answer introduces the 
interesting aspect of a regional approach to the 
problem. 
62. On 18th September 1979, Mr. Jeambrun 
put the following question on Recommendation 
335: 
"To ask the Minister of Defence to state 
France's attitude towards Recommendation 
335 of Western European Union (WEU). 
In accordance with the course defined by 
the Prime Minister for keeping the WEU 
Assembly informed 'pragmatically by 
means of communications' about the work 
of the IEPG (independent European pro-
gramme group), to ask whether, in agree-
ment with our partners, he soon intends to 
start such communications, which would be 
of the utmost interest to the WEU 
Assembly." 
63. The answer by Mr. Bourges, Minister of 
Defence, on 30th November 1979, was very 
general since it summarised three questions on 
Recommendations 329, 333 and 335 (see 
paragraph 48). 
64. Recommendation 337 on political condi-
tions for European armaments co-operation, 
presented on behalf of the General Affairs 
Committee (Document 819), was adopted by 
the Assembly on 3rd December 1979 : 
"The Assembly, 
Rejecting the assertions in paragraph 4 of 
the reply of the Council to Recommendation 
331 and in the corresponding paragraphs of 
the replies to Recommendations 325 and 
330: 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Use every means at its disposal to 
promote co-operation between its members 
in the production of armaments ; 
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2. Examine, inter alia on the basis of the 
work of the Standing Armaments Commit-
tee, by what means it would be possible to 
establish in Western Europe, account being 
taken of the specific responsibilities of each 
institution : 
(a) an organisation responsible for gather-
ing and circulating all necessary infor-
mation on European supply and demand 
in the field of armaments ; 
(b) a body responsible for analysing choices 
of armaments programmes and their 
overall financial, technical, economic 
and social repercussions ; 
(c) appropriate customs legislation for 
transfers of armaments between Wes-
tern European states ; 
(d) appropriate legislation for transnational 
bodies producing armaments ; 
(e) legislation designed to promote exchan-
ges of technology between European 
industries ; 
{f) legislation and effective action against 
the illicit production of and traffic in 
armaments; 
3. Encourage all member states to co-
operate by communicating all the informa-
tion needed to facilitate this work; 
4. Re-examine and explain the positions 
expressed in paragraph 4 of its replies to 
Recommendations 325 and 331 and inform 
the Assembly of developments in the work 
of the IEPG as it undertook to do in its 
reply to Recommendation 298." 
65. The reply of the Council was communi-
cated to the Assembly on 12th March 1980 : 
"1. The Council agree that all efforts 
should be made to promote co-operation in 
the defence equipment field and to exploit 
suitable opportunities in the interests of 
member countries. 
2. (a) All members of WEU contribute, 
together with the five other members of the 
group, to the annual IEPG equipment 
replacement schedule. By cataloguing repla-
cement intentions for a period of some 
fifteen years ahead this provides a compre-
hensive description of the demand side of 
the European armaments market. On the 
supply side mention should be made of the 
SAC's continuing work in this direction and 
of the studies undertaken in the IEPG 
Panel Ill. However, the present system of 
armaments co-operation in Europe is a 
sequential process in which matching natio-
nal requirements (demands) are considered 
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against production possibilities (supplies) in 
participating countries or elsewhere. 'Sup-
ply' in this context is a complex matter 
since substantial development work and 
new production investment are required for 
many modern weapons. The Council do not 
consider that the cause of equipment co-
operation would in practice be greatly, 
advanced by formalising the collection of 
'supply' information through an internatio-
nal organisation. 
2. (b) There are formidable theoretical 
and practical difficulties in devising methods 
suitable to the needs of different govern-
ments for analysing choices of international 
armaments programmes from even the most 
comprehensive information. The technical, 
economic and social issues are very com-
plex, and the nature of national interests 
involved do not lend themselves to uniform 
evaluation. Collective international analysis 
of such information, leading to agreed 
conclusions which are capable of implemen-
tation, is unlikely to be feasible at present. 
Furthermore, compromises on national 
equipment requirements are often necessary 
to secure agreement in collaborative pro-
jects: national governments alone have to 
take the decisions. The Council are doubtful 
of the value of creating further international 
machinery to supplement national policy 
makers' analysis of alternative methods of 
meeting equipment needs. 
2. (c) No customs duties are payable on 
the transfer of armaments or any other 
manufactured goods between WEU coun-
tries, or other EEC states. 
2. (d) The Council do not believe that 
specific legislation is required to facilitate 
the formation of transnational bodies pro-
ducing armaments. As the Assembly is 
aware, several consortia, such as Euromis-
sile and Panavia, already exist. Moreover, 
in the Council's view, legislation governing 
international bodies producing armaments 
should not be separated from the general 
body of national and EEC company law. 
2. (e) The Council do not believe that 
transfer of technology between industries in 
member states of WEU can be significantly 
improved by legislation. In their view the 
primary requirement is the agreement of 
acceptable transfer terms within specific 
projects. 
2. (j) Sharing the concern expressed by 
the Assembly, the Council agree that every 
effort should continue to be made to halt 
the illegal trading of arms. 
3. The WEU Council are not empowered 
to make any statement to the Assembly on 
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behalf of the IEPG, but will continue to 
encourage appropriate exchanges of infor-
mation. There are five members of the 
IEPG who are not members of WEU. 
Formally therefore the making of a report 
on its activities to the WEU Assembly is a 
matter for the Chairman and wider mem-
bership of the IEPG to consider. It is, 
however, open to members of the Assembly 
to question their own governments about 
developments in ·the IEPG through their 
national parliaments." 
66. Summary : The crucial point of the 
recommendation is to inaugurate a new organ-
isation and legislation to facilitate joint produc-
tion and armaments co-operation. The reply of 
the Council stresses mainly that there is no 
need for new structures and new legislation but 
attention should be paid to special projects. It 
reiterates that information on the IEPG can be 
given only through national channels. 
67. On 14th May 1980, in the United Kingdom 
House of Commons, Mr. Foulkes put the 
following question on Recommendation 337: 
"Mr. Foulkes asked the Secretary of State 
for Defence if he will raise with his 
European colleagues within the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation the need to 
co-operate in the collection and circulation 
of information on European supply and 
demand in armaments, the choice of 
armaments programmes and their overall 
financial, technical, economic and social 
repercussions, as suggested in Recommen-
dation 337 of the Assembly of Western 
European Union. 
Reply by Mr. Hayhoe, Under-Secretary of 
State for Defence for the Army 
My right hon. Friend will not be raising 
this matter with his colleagues, since the 
elaborate machinery suggested in the 
recommendation is unlikely to add usefully 
to the practical work of bringing together 
information on future equipment needs 
already being done within the independent 
European programme group and the Con-
ference of National Armaments Directors." 
68. Comment: The discussion in the House of 
Commons was held after the Council had 
replied. Nevertheless, it is not clear whether the 
questioner, who referred mainly to paragraph 2 
(a) and (b) of the recommendation, had used 
the opportunity to take into account the relevant 
statements of the Council. The Council had 
stated that it did not consider that the cause of 
equipment co-operation would in practice be 
greatly advanced by formalising the collection 
of "supply" information through an internatio-
nal organisation. The questioner did not take 
up this attitude of the Council. Consequently, 
the United Kingdom Government was in a 
position to give a brief answer in line with the 
Council. 
69. On 19th March 1980, Mr. Glesener put 
the following question in the Luxembourg 
Chamber of Deputies on Recommendation 337: 
"To ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
whether he would be prepared, inter alia on 
the basis of the work of the Standing 
Armaments Committee of Western Euro-
pean Union, to examine by what means it 
would be possible to establish in Western 
Europe, account being taken of the specific 
responsibilities of each institution : 
(a) an organisation responsible for gather-
ing and circulating all necessary infor-
mation on European supply and demand 
in the field of armaments ; 
(b) a body responsible for analysing choices 
of armaments programmes and their 
overall financial, technical, economic 
and social repercussions ; 
(c) appropriate customs legislation for 
transfers of armaments between Wes-
tern European states; 
(d) appropriate legislation for transnational 
bodies producing armaments ; 
(e) legislation designed to promote exchan-
ges of technology between European 
industries ; 
(f) legislation and effective action against 
the illicit production of and traffic in 
armaments. 
To ask the Minister whether he can indicate 
what role Luxembourg might play in 
implementing this programme. 
Reply by Mr. Thorn, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs (16th April 1980) 
Where Recommendation 337 of the Assem-
bly of Western European Union is concer-
ned, the proposed programme set out 
therein is certainly worthy of detailed and 
attentive examination inter alia in the 
framework of the WEU Standing Arma-
ments Committee and the Council in 
accordance with that organisation's custo-
mary procedure and account being taken of 
the specific responsibilities of each of its 
institutions. 
As regards the role which Luxembourg 
might play in implementing the programme 
referred to in Recommendation 337, I have 
to draw the attention of the honourable 
member to the fact that our country lacks 
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both the experience and the necessary staff 
for considering making a national contri-
bution to the study and implementing the 
said programme." 
70. Comment : The questioner quoted directly 
the text of the recommendation. But it seems 
unlikely that he had already taken note of the 
Council's comments since the question does not 
discuss the Council's position. The Luxembourg 
Government's answer is very general but adopts 
a fairly positive attitude in contrast to the 
Council's position. 
71. Recommendation 338 on the definition of 
armaments requirements and procurement in 
Western Europe, presented on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments (Document 821), was adopted by the 
Assembly on 3rd December 1979 : 
"The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Urge member governments: 
1. To encourage, through their defence 
procurement policies, the restructuring of 
the European armaments industry through 
the creation of permanent international 
consortia in Europe leading eventually to 
fully European corporations for the produc-
tion of the more sophisticated defence 
equipment; 
2. (a) To foster a policy of European 
preference for bi- or multilateral European 
defence equipment projects duly examined 
by the IEPG; 
(b) To foster creation of an alliance-
wide market for defence equipment so that 
dependence upon exports to third countries 
can be reduced ; 
3. (a) To keep their national parliamentary 
defence committees fully informed about 
future national and allied defence equip-
ment requirements and projects, in parti-
cular through the communication to them 
of the equipment replacement schedules 
prepared by Panel I of the IEPG and 
completed by the Conference of National 
Armaments Directors; 
(b) To request the Chairman of Panel I 
to communicate these schedules to the 
Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments of the WEU Assembly." 
72. The reply of the Council was communi-
cated to the Assembly on 30th April 1980 : 
"1. The Council consider that the creation 
of a number of international consortia for 
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the production of defence equipment has 
been a useful contribution to a better 
organisation of armaments co-operation in 
Europe. In order to preserve the technolo-
gical know-how and experience in man-
agement techniques gained by such co-
operation when a continuing need is 
foreseen, these consortia, which might be 
opened to firms from other member coun-
tries, should be encouraged to bid for 
further co-operative projects and to adopt 
an appropriate structure; this would not of 
itself rule out the possibility of competition. 
Successful projects, such as the production 
of the Hot, Milan and Roland missiles and 
the Tornado aircraft clearly point the way 
to this new form of co-operation. The 
Council are of the opinion that if, in the 
context of their efforts towards harmonisa-
tion, member countries reach agreement on 
common requirements, this may stimulate 
the formation of such international consor-
tia. Such agreement would provide oppor-
tunities for the industries to try to meet 
those common requirements by proposals 
for producing the necessary equipment 
jointly. It should nevertheless be left to the 
industries concerned to organise themselves 
and to choose the type of co-operation 
which best suits their requirements. 
Although the Assembly recommendation 
and the points made in the previous 
paragraph primarily concern European 
armaments industries, the Council observe 
that this form of co-operation does not 
exclude joint production by European and 
North American firms together. 
2. (a) As the Assembly is aware, the 
member states of IEPG already undertook 
at the meeting of armaments directors in 
September 1977 to give preference to future 
collaborative equipment selected for pro-
duction in the framework of the IEPG 
rather than non-European equipment in 
competition. The countries represented in 
the IEPG agreed not to depart from this 
preference unless for overriding reasons, 
particularly performance, price and delivery 
date. 
2. (b) The Council are fully aware of the 
advantages of an alliance-wide market for 
defence equipment. Much work in this 
respect has already been done. Already in 
1975, in this spirit, two member countries 
which had developed the Roland weapons 
system grart.ted the licence for that system 
to the United States on favourable terms. 
Furthermore, the proposals forwarded to 
CNAD by the United States representative 
constitute in the opinion of the Council a 
significant step towards achieving the goal 
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of greater co-operation within the alliance 
and a 'two-way street' in defence equip-
ment with the United States insofar as this 
is consistent with the guidelines recalled in 
paragraph 2(a) above. In this respect, it 
may be recalled that the member countries 
of the IEPG have given a favourable 
reception to the proposals mentioned above, 
which are designed to bring about an 
alliance-wide co-operation in the defence 
equipment field through bilateral memo-
randa of understanding, dual production of 
defence equipment and the concept of 
families of weapons. Greater co-operation 
between the allies and a better division of 
the production of defence equipment will 
indeed reduce the economic importance of 
exports to third countries, a consideration 
which certainly has the sympathy of the 
Council. 
3. (a) As stated by the Council in their 
reply to Assembly Recommendation 333, 
paragraph A, national parliamentary 
defence committees are generally kept 
informed on national defence budgets. 
However, it should be left to the govern-
ments of individual member states to decide 
within the context of existing national laws 
and procedures to what extent detailed 
information can be given about future 
national defence equipment requirements. 
The annual equipment replacement sche-
dules prepared by the IEPG and completed 
by CNAD, which bring together the 
equipment requirements of the alliance as 
a whole, and, as a consequence, contain 
very sensitive information, are classified 
'confidential', and the Council are not in a 
position to request member governments to 
communicate these documents to national 
defence committees. 
3. (b) For the same reasons, the Council 
see no possibility of requesting the Chair-
man of Panel I of the IEPG to communicate 
these schedules to the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments of the 
Assembly. The Council, though fully appre-
ciating the wish of the Assembly to be kept 
informed, cannot ignore the difficulties 
encountered by some countries which are 
members of the IEPG, but not of WEU 
with regard to informing the Assembly or 
its Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments about the work undertaken by 
the IEPG and consequently have to leave 
it to the member governments to brief their 
national delegates on IEPG activities." 
73. Summary: The crucial points of the 
recommendation are : to encourage the creation 
of international consortia in Europe, to keep the 
national parliamentary defence committees fully 
informed about future defence equipment 
requirements and projects and to communicate 
the equipment replacement schedules prepared 
by Panel I of the IEPG to the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments of the 
Assembly. The Council shows a generally 
positive attitude towards the first point. As for 
informing national defence committees, it refers 
to the sovereignty of the individual member 
states. The schedules are classified "confiden-
tial." Consequently, the Council has no means 
to request member governments to communicate 
these documents to national committees. The 
Council reiterates its position that information 
about the work undertaken by the IEPG can be 
given only through national channels. 
74. On 14th May 1980, Mr. Foulkes put the 
following question in the United Kingdom House 
of Commons on Recommendation 338: 
"Mr. Foulkes asked the Secretary of State 
for Defence if he will pursue a procurement 
policy designed to encourage the restructur-
ing of the European armaments industry as 
suggested in Recommendation 338 of the 
Assembly of Western European Union 
Reply by Mr. Hayhoe, Under-Secretary of 
State for Defence for the Army 
United Kingdom defence procurement 
policy is designed to encourage collaborative 
solutions to our needs when this makes 
sense. Such joint projects have led to the 
formation of important international con-
sortia, such as Panavia, and I expect further 
similar developments in the future." 
75. Comment: The question and governmental 
answer are very general without taking up 
particular aspects of the recommendation and 
the Council's reply. 
76. Recommendation 339 on the industrial 
bases of European security - guidelines drawn 
from the symposium on 15th, 16th and 17th 
October 1979, presented on behalf of the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions (Document 823), was 
adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December 
1979: 
"The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
Invite member governments : 
1. To promote a continuous dialogue 
between their commanders-in-chief, lower 
echelon commanders, armaments directors 
and industrialists in the most suitable 
framework, and related to the independent 
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European programme group insofar as this 
is compatible with the Atlantic Alliance ; 
2. To start discussions now on the battle 
tank of the 1990s ; 
3. To bring to a successful conclusion 
without delay discussions on the successor, 
for the 1990s, to the Franco-British Jaguar, 
the F-4F Phantom of the Federal German 
air force and the further development of 
the British Harrier ; 
4. To maintain Europe's warship building 
capability, to agree on the production of 
interchangeable components and to promote 
containerisation; 
5. To continue European co-operation in 
the production of missiles and to promote 
specialisation by ordering several versions 
of the same type of missile ; 
6. To promote greater standardisation of 
telecommunications equipment and to 
create a joint integrated digital system for 
the new command communications which 
are to be developed ; 
7. To pursue research and development in 
such branches of advanced technology as 
integrated circuits, microprocessors, radar 
systems, lasers and infrared sensors for 
weapons systems; 
8. To afford support to co-operation in 
their countries by maintaining existing 
structures, particularly in the form of 
permanent European consortia and, when-
ever possible, by setting up new ones." 
77. The reply of the Council was communi-
cated to the Assembly, on 30th April 1980 : 
"The Council welcome the interest which 
the Assembly, as the only European 
assembly with defence responsibilities, takes 
in the future of the European industries 
and of the co-operation which must be 
established between them. 
1. With regard to the framework and 
form of such co-operation, they consider 
that the most effective use should be made 
of existing machinery for concerting mea-
sures in the armaments field, in particular 
the IEPG and the Conference of National 
Armaments Directors. This co-operation, 
which involves many interests, is a compli-
cated, large-scale undertaking. 
2. The Assembly will be aware that, in 
the spirit of its recommendation, the French 
and German Governments have recently 
decided to develop jointly a battle tank for 
the 1990s and that other countries have 
expressed interest in this programme. 
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3. The IEPG is currently exammmg the 
problems connected with the future combat 
aircraft which is also the subject of intense 
tripartite discussions between the French, 
German and United Kingdom Govern-
ments. The Council share the Assembly's 
concern that these efforts to co-operate 
should produce European successors for the 
Jaguar, Harrier and Phantom F-4F. 
4. The position of the European ship-
building industries is a matter for concern 
but this state of affairs is not confined to 
Europe. The production of interchangeable 
components and standardisation would be 
very difficult in practice, firstly, because 
warships are not mass-produced and secon-
dly, because they vary considerably in both 
design and type of service from country to 
country. In this particular field individual 
economic problems add further to the 
differences between states and supply and 
demand vary in the same way. 
5. Co-operation on missiles through bila-
teral programmes or the Euromissile con-
sortium is already producing very satisfac-
tory results. The expediency of producing 
several versions of the same missile must 
be dictated by the operational requirements 
of the different armed forces; these requi-
rements are taken into account, together 
with a number of constraints, particularly 
of a financial nature. The necessary choices 
must therefore be based on the findings of 
studies on the subject. 
6. The Council are aware of the military 
requirements for joint communications in 
the field of command and control. On this 
point, as on the subject of advanced 
technology, it should be noted that several 
member countries of WEU have industries 
capable of competing with the industries 
named by the Assembly in the fields of 
telecommunications and lasers for example. 
However, the Council are not convinced 
that the standardisation of telecommunica-
tions equipment would help, in the imme-
diate future, to promote the European 
equipment which they have already decla-
red to be necessary. Governments are aware 
of the importance for the future of the 
armaments industries of mastering these 
techniques in a European context and of 
what has to be done to achieve this. 
7. The creation of consortia forms the 
subject of Recommendation 338 to which 
the Council have replied separately." 
78. Summary: The Assembly proposes pro-
moting a continuous dialogue between 
commanders-in-chief, armaments directors and 
industrialists, and starting discussion on specific 
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projects such as a battle tank for the 1990s, 
future combat aircraft, warship building, pro-
duction of missiles, standardisation of telecom-
munications, pursuing research in advanced 
technology and support for European consortia. 
The Council's attitude is generally positive 
except for the question of standardising telecom-
munications equipment. 
79. On 17th March 1980, Mr. Ferretti put the 
following question on Recommendation 339 in 
the French National Assembly: 
"To ask the Minister of Defence: 
(a) how soon does he expect to be able to 
release information about requirements 
for the battle' tank of the 1990s, new 
transport and armoured assault helicop-
ters and new air-to-air and air-to-
surface missiles; 
(b) when will decisions be taken on the 
successor to the Franco-British Jaguar 
and the F-4F Phantom of the Federal 
German air force and on the further 
development of the British Harrier ; 
(c) what action does he intend to take to 
maintain Europe's warship building 
capability ? 
Reply by Mr. Bourges, Minister of Defence 
(30th June 1980) 
Following the co-operation agreement with 
the Federal Republic of Germany, France 
intends, as from the 1990s, to introduce a 
new battle tank to be built jointly ; the 
French army has an expected requirement 
for 1,500 tanks of this type. Where new 
generations of transport and assault heli-
copters are concerned, current studies 
should be completed by 1981-82 ; these 
helicopters might be produced in co-opera-
tion with other European states (the United 
Kingdom and the Federal Republic for the 
transport helicopter; the Federal Republic 
for the assault helicopter) ; France is 
considering procuring some one hundred 
assault helicopters for delivery starting 
towards the end of the decade. Once the 
last air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles 
(Magic I, Super 530 F-1, AM-39 now being 
delivered) have become operational, the 
guided air-to-surface Laser AS-30L missile 
and the improved Magic 11 will be brought 
into service in 1984, and the Super 5300 
in about 1986 ; in the longer term, current 
work should determine the types and 
features of the new generation of missiles 
to equip the successor to Jaguar and which 
will constitute an improved version of the 
Mirage 2000's armament. Studies are now 
being carried out on the possibility of 
producing the future tactical fighter aircraft 
in co-operation with the Federal Republic 
and the United Kingdom. A report prepared 
at the request of the Ministers of Defence 
of the three countries will be examined in 
a few months' time. In view of the 
particular effort devoted to study and 
research, regular investments to maintain 
and improve industrial capability, prospects 
opened up by the military programme law 
and responsibility for industrial firms depen-
ding on the Ministry of Defence should be 
ensured at a satisfactory level." 
80. Comment: The question by Mr. Ferretti 
was put prior to the Council's reply. It refers 
especially to paragraphs 2 to 4 of the recom-
mendation. The French Government's answer 
gives a detailed description of existing and 
future projects. On the other hand, the 
government does not answer the question 
concerning warship building capacity. 
81. Recommendation 358 on the future of 
European security, presented on behalf of the 
General Affairs Committee (Document 854) 
was adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 
1980: 
"The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Set up a working group to examine 
measures to be taken by all member 
countries to adapt WEU to the present 
requirements of European defence and 
instruct it to study in particular : 
(a) the co-ordination of member countries' 
policies in its areas of responsibility, 
namely defence, armaments and disar-
mament; 
(b) the participation of Ministers of 
Defence or their representatives in its 
meetings when matters which concern 
them are discussed ; 
(c) the convening of meetings before those 
of the North Atlantic Council with a 
view to identifying the joint views of its 
members on matters relating to Europe's 
security; 
(d) the question of inviting all countries 
which are members of the EEC, have 
applied for membership or are European 
members of NATO to take all steps 
and measures likely to promote the 
closest possible participation of their 
activities in the achievement of the 
aims of the modified Brussels Treaty; 
(e) the action to be taken on the study 
being conducted by the Standing Arma-
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ments Committee so that the outcome 
may be a true European armaments 
policy." 
82. The reply of the Council was communi-
cated to the Assembly on 8th May 1981 : 
"The Council have noted with interest the 
report on the future of European security 
presented on behalf of the General Affairs 
Committee, and have examined very atten-
tively the contents of the Assembly's 
recommendation. 
Among the various suggestions put forward 
by the Assembly in its proposal to set up a 
working group, two are matters of constant 
concern to the Council : 
- the co-ordination of member countries' 
policies in its areas of responsibility is 
one of the reasons for the Council's 
existence. Article VIII of the modified 
Brussels Treaty gives the Council ade-
quate scope to discuss a wide variety of 
subjects. The Council continue to be 
flexible and have sufficiently wide powers 
to embrace any debate relevant to the 
application of the treaty; 
- the question of any follow-up to the 
study being conducted by the Standing 
Armaments Committee and which is to 
make a descriptive analysis of the 
armaments industry in member countries 
has yet to be considered by the Council. 
In any case, the Council are still willing 
to improve European consultation and 
co-operation in the sphere of armaments, 
'with a view to finding joint solutions 
which would assist governments of mem-
ber countries in meeting their equipment 
requirements' (Article 10 of the decision 
of the Council of 7th May 1955 setting 
up the Standing Armaments Committee). 
The three other suggestions introduce new 
elements, which the Council analyse as 
follows: 
- the participation of Ministers of Defence, 
or their representatives in Council meet-
ings would certainly not be without its 
value. This would be possible where 
matters which are the direct responsibi-
lity of Defence Ministers were to be 
discussed. Where this is not the case, 
their participation in essentially political 
discussions would not appear to be 
strictly necessary ; 
- the systematic convening of Council 
meetings before those of the North 
Atlantic Council would scarcely appear 
to offer any new advantages over the 
current practice ; 
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- the participation of other countries in the 
achievement of the aims of the treaty is 
in the first place a matter for those 
countries themselves, since the treaty sets 
out procedures for that purpose. 
For all these reasons, the Council consider 
that the setting up of a working group as 
recommended by the Assembly is not a 
necessity in present circumstances." 
83. Summary: The crucial point of the 
recommendation is the proposal to set up a 
working group to study the co-ordination of 
member countries' policies in defence areas, 
participation of Ministers of Defence in relevant 
meetings, convening meetings before meetings 
of the North Atlantic Council, inviting other 
European countries, action to be taken on the 
study conducted by the SAC. The Council 
replied that there was no need for a working 
group because co-ordination was one of the 
reasons for the Council's existence. As for the 
study, the Council said that this had yet to be 
considered. The Council does not believe that 
Council meetings before those of the North 
Atlantic Council would offer any new advan-
tages. The participation of other countries is in 
the first place a matter for those countries 
themselves. 
84. On 4th June 1981, Mr. Ahrens put the 
following question in the Bundestag: 
"What conclusions does the Federal 
Government draw from the study on a 
European armaments policy conducted by 
the Standing Armaments Committee of 
Western European Union? 
Reply by Mr. Penner, Parliamentary Secre-
tary of State for Defence (17th June 1981) 
On 31st May 1976, the WEU Council of 
Ministers instructed the Standing Arma-
ments Committee to make a descriptive 
analysis of the situation in the armaments 
sector of industries in the member countries. 
At the present stage, this analysis consists 
of a definition of the industrial sector and 
of defence equipment (based on the work 
of the IEPG), a juridical study (April 
1978) and an economic study (May 1981). 
The juridical study describes the juridical 
system and structure in force in member 
countries where armaments firms and 
international co-operative undertakings are 
concerned. The economic study, which has 
in the meantime been submitted to the 
WEU Assembly, attempts, by collating 
data available from · national budgets, 
NATO publications and other statistical 
sources, to give an overall view of member 
countries' defence efforts through expendi-
ture on defence and armaments. 
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Because of difficulties in collecting, presen-
ting and harmonising data, it has so far 
been possible to give a clear and systematic 
presentation only of information which was, 
on the whole, already known. The main 
part of the study - a presentation of 
armaments capabilities in Europe, and 
more specifically in WEU member countries 
- still has to be carried out and work is 
continuing in the IEPG. Because of the 
difficulty 9f ·the subject involved, no early 
results carr be expected. 
The juridical and economic studies are 
more descriptive than analytical. Their 
information value is therefore minimal. 
At its meeting on 3rd June 1981, the 
Council of Ministers took a decision on the 
continuation of the armaments study; only 
the updating of figures in the economic 
study was approved. 
On the basis of the partial results of the 
study at present available, it is not yet 
possible for the Federal Government to 
draw conclusions for a European armaments 
policy. The figures are available as sources 
of information for practical co-operation in 
the armaments field." 
85. On 23rd February 1982, Mr. Ahrens put 
another question to the Federal Government on 
the same subject : 
"Does the Federal Government consider 
that the study of European defence indus-
tries conducted by the WEU Standing 
Armaments Committee will point to con-
crete measures to ensure optimum returns 
from investments by member states ? 
Reply by Mr. Penner, Parliamentary Secre-
tary of State for Defence 
In a reply dated 17th June 1981 (Bulletin 
9/596, No. 48) I informed you of the 
progress made with the study conducted by 
the Standing Armaments Committee. In 
reply to your new questions: 
The Federal Government will examine the 
results of the study as soon as it is 
complete. In view of the difficulty of the 
subject, results cannot be expected in the 
short term. 
The governments of member states will 
examine together, in the framework of the 
Council, whether it is possible to draw 
conclusions from the study and if so what 
conclusions. So far, the Council has taken 
no decision on this subject." 
86. Comment: The questioner emphasised the 
problem of the study so that the Federal 
Government could describe the progress of 
work. 
87. On 4th June 1981, Mr. Kittelmann put 
the following question in the Bundestag: 
"To what extent are restrictions in the 
WEU budget under the heading of general 
economy measures expected to affect the 
acti~ities of that organis~tion and, in 
particular, to what extent will they prevent 
the implementation of certain tasks assigned 
to it under the Brussels Treaty ? 
Reply by Mrs. Hamm-Brucher, Minister of 
State for Foreign Affairs (12th June 1981) 
The budget adopted by the WEU Council 
in April 1981 (which does not include the 
Assembly budget) makes no provision for 
restrictions but more specifically for zero 
growth, account being taken of inflation. 
Guaranteed compensation for inflation 
allows the organisation to pursue its current 
activities without restriction. 
The Federal Government and the govern-
ments of certain other member states think 
it quite possible to make savings without 
jeopardising the implementation of tasks 
assigned to WEU. 
I wish moreover to underline that guaran-
teed full compensation for inflation in the 
WEU budget implies that the Federal 
Government's contribution will increase 
proportionally more than the federal budget 
in view of foreseeable rise in the rate of 
inflation in France, where the Assembly has 
its seat, and in Great Britain, where WEU 
has its seat. 
The same applies to the WEU Assembly 
budget which the WEU Council considers 
should also remain within the limits of a 
simple compensation for inflation. 
An ad hoc working group, also set up at 
the request of the Federal Government, is 
at present studying the staff structure of 
the Office of the Clerk, the Agency for the 
Control of Armaments and the international 
secretariat of the Standing Armaments 
Committee with a view to making econo-
mies and simplifying administration." 
88. Comment: Neither question nor reply are 
quite within the purview of Recommendation 
358. 
89. On 11th February 1981, Mr. Maravalle 
put the following question on Recommendation 
358: 
"To ask the Minister of Defence what 
action Italy has taken on Recommenda-
tion 358 on the future of European security 
227 
DOCUMENT 977 
adopted by the WEU Assembly on 2nd 
December 1980. 
The Assembly recommends that the Council 
set up a working group to adapt Western 
European Union to the present require-
ments of European defence, in particular 
by the co-ordination of member countries' 
defence policies prior to meetings of the 
North Atlantic Council with a view to 
identifying the joint views of its members 
on matters relating to Europe's security. It 
also recommends inviting countries which 
are members of the EEC, have applied for 
membership or are European members of 
NATO but which are not members of 
WEU to participate in the attainment of 
these aims. 
Finally, it recommends that action be taken 
on t~e study being conducted by the 
Standmg Armaments Committee so that 
the outcome may be a true European 
armaments policy. 
Reply by Mr. l.Agorio, Minister of Defence 
(14th December 1981) 
The Counc~l .of Western European Union, 
after exammmg Recommendation 358 of 
the WEU Assembly, expressed in its reply 
to that recommendation the conviction that 
the setti~g up of a working group of the 
type envisaged would not be expedient for 
practical reasons and because the co-
ordination of member countries' policies 
was one of the reasons for the Council's 
existence. 
Apart from these reasons, which are 
m·~deniable, to set up a working group of 
thts type would merely add to the prolife-
ration of bodies handling the same matters 
without any particular advantage for 
WEU." 
90. Comment : The questioner could not take 
the Council's position into account because he 
put his question prior to the communication of 
the Council's reply. The Italian Government 
merely repeated the tenor of the Council's 
position. Apart from this, the Italian Govern-
ment replies only to one aspect of the detailed 
question. 
91. On ~7th Dec~mber 1980, Mr. Jager put 
the followmg question on Recommendation 358 
in the French Senate : 
~T~ ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs to 
mdtcate the French Government's attitude 
towards Recommendation 358, recently 
ado~ted by the WEU Assembly, with 
particular regard to the participation of 
Ministers of Defence in the WEU Council 
the accession of new members to th~ 
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modified Brussels Treaty and action to be 
taken on the study being conducted by the 
Standing Armaments Committee. 
Reply by Mr. Franr;ois-Poncet, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs (2nd April 1981) 
As the honourable member knows, it is for 
the WEU Council to reply to Recommen-
dation 358 recently adopted by the Assem-
bly. It is in that framework and in 
accordance with the procedure laid down in 
the Brussels Treaty that the French 
Government will help to define the joint 
point of view of members of the Council on 
the proposals made in the recommenda-
tion." 
92. Comment : This is an example of what 
may happen when the question in a national 
parliament is raised too early. The French 
Government simply refers to the competence of 
the Council without being bound to say 
anything of substance. 
93. On 17th February 1981, Mr. Glesener put 
two questions in the Luxembourg Chamber of 
Deputies: 
"1. To ask the government to explain 
what action it intends to take on the study 
conducted by the Standing Armaments 
Committee of Western European Union so 
that it may lead to a true European 
armaments policy. 
2. With reference to the policy of limiting 
expenditure due to the general economic 
situation, to ask the government whether it 
is determined to ensure that any budgetary 
restrictions imposed on Western European 
Union will not reduce the activities of that 
organisation or prevent the implementation 
of certain tasks assigned to it under the 
modified Brussels Treaty. 
Replies by Mrs. Flesch, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs (27th March 1981) 
1. The study entrusted to the Standing 
Armaments Committee by the Council of 
Western European Union has not yet been 
completed. However, certain sections have 
already been transmitted to members of the 
Council and, if need be, the Luxembourg 
Government will use the data they contain. 
When the whole study has been completed, 
it will be for the WEU Council to examine 
what action should be taken on it and how 
to keep the WEU Assembly adequately 
informed. . 
2. The general economic situation imposes 
a policy of budgetary restrictions on all our 
states. It is consequently normal that this 
policy of limiting expenditure should also 
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be observed in the framework of Western 
European Union. However, restrictions will 
not be such as to reduce the activities of 
the organisation or prevent the implemen-
tation of certain tasks assigned to it under 
the modified Brussels Treaty and its 
protocols. The purpose of the policy of 
restrictions will be rather to allow a more 
rational use of funds with a view to 
improving methods of work and the way 
staff of the· organisation are employed, 
without affecting its ability to carry out its 
commitments under the modified Brussels 
Treaty and its protocols and the Council 
decision of 7th May 1955." 
94. Comment : Both question and answer were 
prior to the communication of the Council's 
position. The first question follows a line similar 
to that of the two questions put by Mr. Ahrens. 
The second question is similar to that put by 
Mr. Kittelmann. The Luxembourg Govern-
ment's answer to the first question is less 
informative than the Federal Government's 
answer. The second question is only indirectly 
linked with Recommendation 358. 
95. On 17th March 1981, the following 
question was put in the First Chamber of the 
Netherlands parliament : 
"What is the opinion of the government on 
the recommendation of the Assembly of 
WEU to the Council of that organisation to 
set up a working group to examine measures 
to be taken to adapt WEU to the present 
requirements of European defence (Recom-
mendation 358 adopted on 2nd December 
1980) ? 
Reply by Mr. van der Klaauw, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs (2nd April 1981) 
In accordance with Article V of the Brussels 
Treaty as amended in 1954, the countries 
of WEU have pledged themselves to afford 
automatic aid and assistance should any of 
the parties be the object of an armed attack 
in Europe. 
In the same treaty (Article IV), the WEU 
countries state that in implementation of 
the treaty they shall work in close co-
operation with NATO. The assistance 
referred to in Article V will therefore be 
effected mainly within the framework of 
NATO. 
The Netherlands Government has noted 
with interest the proposals set out in 
Recommendation 358 of the WEU Assem-
bly. The government is of the opinion that 
WEU duly fulfils its tasks as laid down in 
the modified Brussels Treaty. The above-
mentioned close link with NATO is a 
decisive factor in determining this opinion 
regarding co-operation within WEU." 
96. Comment: The questioner raised the 
problem of setting up a working group. The 
Netherlands Government's answer is rather 
evasive. 
97. On 18th February 1981, Lord Northfield 
put the following two questions on Recommen-
dation 358 in the House of Lords: 
"1. To ask Her Majesty's Government 
what action they propose to take on the 
study conducted by the Standing Arma-
ments Committee of Western European 
Union on how to achieve a truly European 
armaments policy. 
2. To ask Her Majesty's Government to 
what extent the policy of limiting expendi-
ture in the present economic situation will 
reduce the activities of Western European 
Union or prevent implementation of certain 
tasks assigned to it under the modified 
Brussels Treaty. 
Replies by Lord Carrington, Secretary of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 
(2nd March 1981) 
1. The Standing Armaments Committee 
of Western European Union was instructed 
to make a descriptive analysis of the 
situation in the armaments industry in 
member countries; its work is complemen-
tary to work in the independent European 
programme group which is still in progress. 
The Standing Armaments Committee's 
report has been presented to the Council of 
Western European Union and is under 
study by member ·governments. 
2. All member governments of Western 
European Union are aiming at limiting the 
1981 budget to zero growth in real terms 
at most. Her Majesty's Government believe 
that it will be possible to accommodate this 
without loss of efficiency and that it will 
not affect the continued implementation of 
the tasks required of WEU under the 
modified Brussels Treaty." 
98. Comment: The discussion was held prior 
to communication of the Council's reply. The 
questions are similar to those put by MM. 
Ahrens and Kittelmann in the Bundestag. 
99. Recommendation 362 on international 
industrial consortia and collaborative arrange-
ments for the production of high technology 
military equipment, presented on behalf of the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions (Document 863), was 
adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 
1980: 
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"The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Monitor on a regular basis through the 
Standing Armaments Committee progress 
towards achieving the interoperability and 
standardisation of defence equipment within 
the alliance, and encourage where practical 
Western European industrial collaboration 
to achieve these objectives ; 
2. Persuade the governments of the Wes-
tern European Union countries to establish 
a link whereby the Assembly of Western 
European Union is kept regularly informed 
of the work of the independent European 
programme group (IEPG) as this Assembly 
is the only European parliamentary assem-
bly with a locus standi established by treaty 
on defence matters, and has invalu-
able connections with national parliaments 
and ministers ; 
3. Invite the governments of member 
countries to convene a West European 
strategic summit at the earliest practical 
opportunity to seek agreement at the 
highest political level on the collaborative 
definition and development of the next 
generation of military projects such as a 
new European combat aircraft (ECA) to 
replace the Jaguar in the French and 
British air forces and to replace the 
Phantom in the German air force ; 
4. Promote a European policy for high 
technology weapons with a view to ensuring 
the development of a genuinely balanced 
transatlantic market whereby the standar-
disation of equipment within the North 
Atlantic Alliance as a whole would be 
enhanced: such a two-way street on a 
strictly equitable basis between the United 
States and Western Europe should involve 
on an increasing scale co-operative produc-
tion programmes and the placing of offset 
work rather than outright purchases of 
equipment 'off the shelf ; 
5. Press the member nations to ensure 
that when their military staffs issue requests 
for proposals (RFPs) to industrial manufac-
turers to meet a specified military require-
ment, they issue RFPs to existing industrial 
consortia as well as to individual firms ; 
6. Continue to press member countries 
working through the independent European 
programme group to harmonise to the 
maximum extent possible the requirements 
of their armed forces and the joint phasing 
of their re-equipment plans." 
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100. The reply of the Council was communi-
cated to the· Assembly on 3rd April 1981 : 
"1. In view of the specific tasks of WEU 
and NATO, it would be difficult to entrust 
the SAC with the task of 'monitoring' the 
progress towards achieving the interopera-
bility and standardisation of defence equip-
ment within the alliance. The alliance, in 
fact, has its own structures for fulfilling 
this task and they do not need to be 
'overseen' as it were, by the SAC. 
2. As the Council have in the past made 
clear to the Assembly, not all the member 
states of the IEPG are members of WEU. 
Consequently, it does not seem logical to 
establish the proposed link between the 
IEPG and the Assembly as this would 
imply that the latter would be supplied with 
information by nations that are not mem-
bers of both institutions. Such information, 
therefore, can only be transmitted to the 
WEU parliamentarians within a national 
framework and insofar as their governments 
participate in the IEPG. 
3. As the Assembly is aware, the develop-
ment of co-operative armaments program-
mes is, moreover, a long and arduous task 
requiring, in the countries concerned, con-
sensus with regard to industrial, economic, 
military and political interests. Co-operation 
in the matter of armaments is more readily 
achieved by pragmatic and patient endea-
vour than by declarations of principle, 
whose limitations have been shown by past 
experience. 
4. The 'transatlantic dialogue' and the 
'two-way street' are necessities. In order to 
implement them, two conditions must be 
met: 
- European co-operation in the matter of 
armaments must first have acquired 
sufficient weight for the dialogue to be a 
balanced one ; 
- the problem of harmonising the standards 
in force on both sides of the Atlantic 
should be satisfactorily solved, as recently 
exemplified by the transfer of the Roland 
licence to the United States. 
It should be emphasised in this context that 
the IEPG is striving to implement the 
transatlantic dialogue and has recently 
intensified its efforts in this direction. 
5. The problem of 'requests for proposals' 
issued by military staffs touches on an area 
of national prerogative that is very sensitive. 
It is up to member countries to decide the 
ways in which requests for proposals are 
passed on to industry. 
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6. The member states are in fact main-
taining their efforts through the IEPG to 
harmonise to the maximum extent possible 
the requirements of their armies and their 
re-equipment plans. They clearly intend to 
continue these efforts." 
101. Summary: (i) The Assembly recommends 
a monitoring system through the Standing 
Armaments Committee for progress towards 
achieving interoperability and standardisation 
within the alliance; (ii) the Assembly repeats 
the wish to be informed about the work of the 
independent European programme group 
(IEPG); (iii) it proposes a Western European 
strategic summit ; (iv) it advocates a European 
policy for high technology, standardisation and 
a two-way street; (v) it proposes to use existing 
industrial consortia or individual firms ; (vi) it 
proposes harmonising the requirements of the 
armed forces through the IEPG. 
102. The Council (i) rejects the idea of 
monitoring progress because the alliance has its 
own structures; (ii) repeats that information on 
the IEPG can be given only through national 
channels; (iii) thinks that co-operation is more 
readily achieved by pragmatic and patient 
endeavour than by declaration of principle; (iv) 
believes the transatlantic dialogue and two-way 
street are necessities ; two conditions must be 
met : sufficient weight in the European co-
operation, the problem of harmonising the 
standards in force should be satisfactorily 
solved, as for example transfer of the Roland 
licence to the United States; (v) believes the 
problem of 'requests for proposals' is up to the 
member countries; (vi) considers that the 
member states are in fact maintaining their 
efforts through the IEPG to harmonise the 
requirements of the armed forces. 
103. On 21st January 1981, Mr. Glesener put 
the following question on Recommendation 362 
in the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies : 
"What is the government's attitude towards 
this recommendation? Is it prepared to 
support it in the Council of Ministers of 
Western European Union? 
Reply by Mr. Krieps, Minister for the Armed 
Forces (4th March 1981) 
There is no doubt that Luxembourg still 
subscribes to the principles and aims of 
stronger armaments co-operation in Europe 
and hence in the alliance as a whole. 
The aim of this co-operation is a more 
rational use of defence budgets, rationa-
lisation of logistics and above all to make 
decisive progress towards standardisation 
and interoperability of military equipment. 
It is clearly in the interests of a small 
country which has no real armaments 
industry and therefore has to import all its 
arms, munitions, transport vehicles, etc., to 
subscribe to the abovementioned aims. Like 
other European countries with only a small 
armaments industry, Luxembourg has to 
make sustained efforts to find compensation 
in other branches of industry. In this 
respect, its representative at the annual 
high-level meeting of the independent 
European programme group held in Oslo in 
November 1980 laid particular emphasis on 
this question of compensation. 
In the light of the foregoing, the Luxem-
bourg Government can affirm that it is 
prepared to support Recommendation 362 
of the Assembly of Western European 
Union." 
104. Comment: The question is a sound and 
useful effort to influence the Council's position 
through the channels of a member government. 
The Luxembourg Government's answer is 
generally positive and somewhat different to the 
position communicated by the Council to the 
Assembly. Moreover, the answer gives an 
interesting insight into the position of European 
countries which have only a small armaments 
industry (question of compensation). 
105. Recommendation 368 on the European 
combat aircraft and other aeronautical develop-
ments, presented on behalf of the Committee 
on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace 
Questions (Document 874), was adopted by the 
Assembly on 17th June 1981 : 
"The Assembly 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Recall the need to design a multi-
purpose aircraft adaptable to the specific 
requirements of the various WEU member 
countries; 
2. Insist on such co-operation being orga-
nised flexibly and efficiently, drawing on 
the lessons of twenty years of European 
experience of co-operation ; 
3. Ask the interested governments to 
tackle their present study in greater detail 
and harmonise the specifications required 
by the staffs of the air forces so that the 
development of a European combat aircraft 
may be undertaken; 
4. Ask the governments of the WEU 
member states, in the framework of the 
Standing Armaments Committee and of 
the independent European programme 
group, to show their interest in the 
development of this aircraft which should 
be available for procurement in about 
fifteen years' time ; 
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5. Consider extending European co-ope-
ration to other types of aircraft (helicopters, 
transport aircraft, etc.)." 
106. The reply of the Council was communi-
cated to the Assembly on 20th November 
1981 : 
"The Council welcome the interest which 
the Assembly, the only European assembly 
competent in defence matters, shows in 
projects arising from European co-operation 
in the field of aeronautics, notably the 
combat aircraft. 
1. The Council are fully aware of the 
need to design a technologically advanced 
multi-purpose aircraft able to meet the 
various forms of threat to which European 
countries may be subjected. 
2. The development of co-operative arma-
ments programmes is a long and arduous 
task calling for consensus at national level 
between industrial, economic, military and 
political interests. The countries concerned 
with the combat aircraft are fully apprised 
of the importance of flexibility and effi-
ciency in organisation, taking into account 
its requirements. Co-operation in the matter 
of armaments, which is the fruit of 
pragmatic and patient efforts, naturally 
draws upon the lessons of the past, even if 
the programmes present themselves under 
the same configuration. 
3. The countries concerned will be consi-
dering together most carefully the way 
forward in this field. At the preliminary 
design stage, definition of characteristics 
and harmonisation procedures must involve 
using with maximum efficiency the already 
existing machinery for concerted action in 
the sphere of armaments and chiefly the 
IEPG and Conference of National Arma-
ments Directors. 
4. The future combat aircraft is notably 
the subject of intense tripartite discussions 
between the French, German and United 
Kingdom Governments. In addition, 
because of the interest shown by various 
European governments, a project group for 
this aircraft has been set up within the 
independent European programme group, 
thus providing a vehicle for concerted 
action and exchanges of information. 
Although the interest of the various 
countries within the IEPG has been stressed 
and regularly reaffirmed, the fact remains 
that any further progress within this project 
group will be dependent on harmonisation 
of characteristics, a matter currently being 
discussed in detail between the military 
authorities and the staff of the armaments 
directors of the various countries. 
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5. The efforts pursued within the frame-
work of the IEPG are aimed at the 
maximum harmonisation of renewal plans 
and military requirements ; thus it examines 
on an annual basis the evolution of the 
schedules of each of the member countries 
and endeavours to promote machinery for 
co-operation whenever this is possible. With 
regard to aeronautics, in addition to the 
future combat aircraft, joint talks have 
started, particularly in connection with 
helicopters and transport aircraft. Regard-
ing the latter, initial studies have led to the 
setting up within the IEPG of an explora-
tory group whose terms of reference are to 
determine the long-term requirements of 
the various European countries in the 
matter of transport aircraft." 
107. Summary: The crucial point of the 
recommendation is to urge the governments of 
the WEU member states to use all existing 
structures to achieve the aim of constructing a 
future combat aircraft. The Council's attitude 
is generally positive. On the other hand, the 
Council refers again to the competence of 
member states and to existing machinery. The 
Council reports on the tripartite discussions 
between the French, German and United 
Kingdom Governments, the setting up of a 
project group within the IEPG and joint talks 
in connection with helicopters and transport 
aircraft. 
108. On 8th August 1981 a Belgian member 
of parliament put the following question to his 
government on Recommendation 368: 
"In its reply to Recommendation 339 of 
the WEU Assembly, the WEU Council 
announced that the independent European 
programme group was examining the pro-
blems raised by the definition of a future 
combat aircraft which is the subject of 
intense tripartite discussions between the 
Governments of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, France and the United Kingdom. 
Is it still possible for the governments of 
these countries to work out common 
specifications for the future combat air-
craft ? Is an agreement on the specifications 
of this aircraft in sight ? Is the extension of 
European co-operation to other types of 
aircraft, including helicopters and a trans-
port aircraft, being considered ? 
Would it not be in the interests of our 
armed forces and industries for the Belgian 
Government to be associated with this 
multi-purpose aircraft project ? 
Reply by Mr. Swaelen, Minister of Defence 
(29th September 1981) 
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1. On 9th April 1976, an ad hoc group 
set up within the independent European 
programme group and composed of repre-
sentatives of five nations : Belgium, France, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, was 
instructed to identify the future require-
ments of the European NATO nations for 
a joint tactical combat aircraft and the 
possibilities of designing, developing and 
building it in Europe in an efficient and 
economical manner. 
2. The work of this ad hoc group 
continued until 28th November 1978 when 
it was noted that there were divergencies of 
views, that the Netherlands and Belgium 
had been informally left out and that 
tripartite discussions were being continued 
between the other three nations. 
3. At the meeting of IEPG national 
armaments directors held on 26th and 27th 
March 1981 it was noted that there was 
little likelihood of the talks between France, 
the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
United Kingdom reaching a conclusion in 
the near future and that therefore no 
enlargement of the IEPG's activities was to 
be considered for the time being. Neverthe-
less, in view of its importance, the directors 
decided that the group working on this 
project would not be dissolved but 'moth-
balled' until such time as the member 
states consider it useful to reactivate it. 
4. There are various bodies for promoting 
co-operation on and development of helicop-
ters. 
At military level, study groups have been 
set up in NATO, the IEPG and FINABEL, 
where Belgium is represented. 
At industrial level, there is a quadripartite 
technical committee formed by France, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and 
the United Kingdom. In practice, this 
forum has led to international develop-
ments, limited however to bilateral agree-
ments. 
5. In March 1980 the national armaments 
directors reaffirmed their interest in setting 
up a working group on the future transport 
aircraft. Since then, two meetings have 
been held. The first results are expected at 
the end of 1981. 
The Belgian air force plays an active part 
in this group in the framework of the future 
replacement of its C-130H fleet. Other 
participants are France, the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom. It is not out of 
the question that the Federal Republic of 
Germany and Italy will join the working 
group at a later date. 
6. Finally, emphasis should be laid on the 
unremitting efforts of the national arma-
ments directors who, in the framework of 
Eurogroup and with the assistance of the 
independent European programme group, 
endeavour to identify common requirements 
and promote co-operation in armaments 
matters." 
109. Comment: The question deals mainly 
with the tripartite talks on the definition of a 
future combat aircraft and the role the Belgian 
Government could play in this connection. The 
answer gives a very detailed picture of the 
relevant stage of the discussion and the different 
projects. 
110. On 24th July 1981, Mr. Jeambrun put 
the following question in the French Senate on 
Recommendation 368: 
"In its reply to Recommendation 339 of 
the WEU Assembly, the Council announced 
that the independent European programme 
group was examining the problems connec-
ted with the future combat aircraft which 
was also the subject of intense tripartite 
discussions between the French, German 
and United Kingdom Governments. Does 
the Minister of Defence still consider it 
possible for the governments of these 
countries to work out common specifications 
for the future combat aircraft ? Is an 
agreement on the specifications of this 
aircraft in sight ? Is the extension of 
European co-operation to other types of 
aircraft, including helicopters and a trans-
port aircraft, being considered ? 
Reply Mr. Hernu, Minister of Defence (8th 
December 1981) 
For several years, France, the United 
Kingdom and the Federal Republic of 
Germany have been studying possibilities 
for European co-operation on a new combat 
aircraft programme. Consultations are con-
tinuing ; it is not yet possible to foresee the 
date for launching the programme for 
developing this aircraft and hence the date 
on which it will come into service. Further-
more, France, the United Kingdom, the 
Federal Republic of Germany and Italy 
signed an agreement of principle in 1978 
expressing their intention to work together 
on the development and production of 
certain new types of helicopter. This co-
operation remains open to the other member 
countries of the independent European 
programme group (IEPG), which are kept 
informed of work under way. Finally, an 
IEPG working group, in which France 
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takes part, is endeavouring to draw up the 
operational requirements for a transport 
aircraft." 
111. Comment : The question is nearly identi-
cal to the main part of the Belgian question 
discussed previously. The French Government's 
answer is far more general than that of the 
Belgian Government. 
112. On 28th October 1981, Mrs. Knight put 
the following question to the United Kingdom 
Government on Recommendation 368 : 
"Mrs. Knight asked the Secretary of State 
for Defence whether he estimates that Her 
Majesty's Government and the Govern-
ments of France and West Germany will 
be able to work out common specifications 
for the future combat aircraft; whether an 
agreement on the specifications of this 
aircraft is imminent ; and whether the 
extension of European co-operation to other 
types of aircraft, including helicopters and 
a transport aircraft, is being considered. 
Reply by Mr. Pattie, Parliamentary Uru/er-
Secretary of State for Defence Procurement 
We are continuing discussions with poten-
tial partners on future combat aircraft, but 
it is too early to say what the outcome will 
be. Opportunities for European collabora-
tion on future weapon systems, including 
helicopters and, in the much longer term, 
for transport aircraft, are under constant 
. " revtew. 
113. Comment: The question is particularly 
related to tripartite talks on the future combat 
aircraft. The answer is very vague and general. 
114. This concludes the analysis of action 
taken in parliaments on the different recom-
mendations adopted by the WEU Assembly. 
115. It is worth underlining that on 16th 
December 1983 the military chiefs-of-staff of 
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom signed an 
agreement on a preliminary plan for a European 
combat aircraft for the 1990s. 
116. Though it is difficult to prove how this 
practical result was influenced by action taken 
in the relevant national parliaments, it shows 
that several suggestions in WEU recommenda-
tions manage, albeit slowly, to produce results. 
117. The conclusion of the abovementioned 
agreement provoked several questions by Mr. 
Kolbow in the Bundestag on 23rd December 
1983, to which Mr. Hiehle. Secretary of State 
for Defence, replied. 
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IV. Analysis of other activities in national 
parliaments 
Belgi11m 
118. On 30th May 1983, a member of the 
Senate put the following question on reciprocal 
armaments procurement by the United States 
and other NATO partners : 
"What is the value of United States 
armaments procurement from its NATO 
partners and vice versa ? 
Reply by Mr. Tindemans, Minister for 
External Relations (26th July 1983) 
1. Information about the procurement of 
armaments by the United States from its 
NATO partners and the procurement by 
those partners of armaments from the 
United States is a matter for each of the 
governments concerned. 
2. However, the honourable member will 
probably find the following details of 
interest: 
(a) the transatlantic dialogue was developed 
in 1975 on United States Government 
initiative recommending that restric-
tions under the Buy America Act be 
lifted and that the principles of the 
standardisation of armaments between 
allies be taken into account when the 
Pentagon procured equipment; 
(b) after seven years' experience, it is now 
possible to assess the results of the 
transatlantic dialogue. It must be noted 
that the Europeandefence industry is 
now healthier than it was in 197 5 and 
that there have been definite improve-
ments in the acquisition of American 
technology by the Europeans. 
3. With particular regard to Belgium, it 
can be revealed that the United States has 
already concluded several major contracts 
with Belgian firms which are of particular 
scientific and technological interest. 
I therefore note that the progress, although 
very long, is nevertheless under way and is 
developing favourably." 
France 
119. The relevant problem had an echo 
particularly in the National Assembly, in 
debates on the draft budgets for 1981, 1982, 
1983 and 1984, and in opinions by the National 
Defence and Armed Forces Committee and the 
Foreign Affairs Committee on these bills. 
Italy 
120. In December 1981, the Minister of 
Defence, Mr. Lagorio, spoke in the Chamber of 
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Deputies on progress with certain problems of 
modernisation, increasing the capability of the 
armed forces and the conclusions of the 
twenty-seventh session of the WEU Assembly 
in whose work he had participated to uphold 
the need to strengthen WEU's role in Europe 
in solving problems which arose in the defence 
sector. This speech was followed by many 
questions and a very lively debate. 
L11xembo11rg 
121. On 27th October 1983, Mr. Prussen 
made a statement in the Chamber of Deputies 
as follows: 
"The WEU countries have a population of 
255 million. It is a force of which many 
people and governments seem unaware. 
It is therefore regrettable that the work of 
the WEU parliamentary Assembly, which 
is at least as intense and detailed as in the 
NATO parliament, is not seen in its true 
light. 
The governments of signatory countries, 
such as France but also the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the United 
Kingdom, are aware that, in the interest of 
closer European defence co-operation and 
without wishing to call NATO in question, 
greater efforts should be made in the 
exchange of information, the joint produc-
tion and standardisation of armaments, 
ensuring interoperability in the defence of 
Europe or NATO and making it more 
effective." 
Netherlands 
122. On 28th October 1983, Mr. Blaauw 
asked his government if the Standing Arma-
ments Committee could not be used more 
actively for armaments co-operation in the 
European framework. His government answered 
as follows: 
"The Council of WEU Ministers took note 
of the proposals of the new head of the 
international secretariat of the Standing 
Armaments Committee, Mr. Hintermann, 
on 17th May 1983, concerning work in the 
near future. In the meantime, a proposal 
by Mr. Hintermann to use the international 
secretariat of the Standing Armaments 
Committee to help the IEPG has also been 
placed on the agenda of the Standing 
Armaments Committee. In view of the fact 
that the IEPG is based on a larger group 
of countries than WEU, it is logical that 
emphasis should be placed on the pursuance 
of wider co-operation in the IEPG frame-
work. The course thus proposed by the 
Standing Armaments Committee is there-
fore considered right and acceptable ; it is 
in direct line with the question as put for 
using the Standing Armaments Committee 
more actively for co-operation in the 
European framework in the defence equip-
ment field. Furthermore, it was stated in 
the decision setting up the Standing 
Armaments Committee on 7th May 1955 
that this committee - in close co-operation 
with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisa-
tion - shall seek to improve consultation 
and co-operation in the defence equipment 
field. 
It remains the considered view of my 
defence colleague and myself that discus-
sions on questions concerning co-operation 
on defence equipment in the first instance 
should remain the purview of the IEPG 
and NATO. 
Finally, in the view of the Netherlands, the 
economically weaker allies which are par-
ticipating in NATO and the IEPG but not 
in WEU would not understand the indus-
trially stronger countries concentrating their 
mutual co-operation in the smaller group of 
WEU countries." 
United Kingdom 
123. On 4th May 1982, Mrs. Knight put the 
following question on the study of the WEU 
Standing Armaments Committee : 
"Mrs. Knight asked the Secretary of State 
for Defence whether Her Majesty's Govern-
ment are taking action to follow up the 
study conducted by the Standing Arma-
ments Committee of the Western European 
Union on the European armaments indus-
tries in order to gain maximum efficiency 
from military investment expenditure in the 
member countries. 
Reply by Mr. Pattie, Under-Secretary of 
State for Defence Procurement 
We take every opportunity to seek co-
operation with our European allies, parti-
cularly on equipment developments, in 
order to improve the benefits from our 
military expenditure. Information contained 
in this study by the Standing Armaments 
Committee as well as related work by the 
independent European programme group 
and in other fora is taken into account 
during such discussions." 
124. Comment : The United Kingdom Govern-
ment's answer is rather general. Mr. Ahrens, 
for his part, had put two similar questions in 
the Bundestag, the Federal Government's ans-
wer to which is given in paragraphs 84 and 85. 
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V. Conclusions 
125. One of the major tasks of members of 
the WEU Assembly is to ensure that Assembly 
initiatives and recommendations are examined 
by their respective parliaments and transmitted 
to governments. The aim should be to have as 
much influence as possible, through national 
channels, on Council decisions in accordance 
with Assembly recommendations. More gener-
ally speaking, they also try to help to ensure 
that political leaders and public opinion become 
more aware of the work and aims of WEU. 
126. This is particularly important at a time 
when governments are giving serious consider-
ation to the idea of reactivating and giving new 
impetus to the WEU organs and redefining 
their role. Thus, the tasks and responsibilities of 
WEU parliamentarians are bound to increase. 
127. After endeavouring to analyse the ele-
ments set out in the foregoing four chapters, 
your Rapporteur considers there are four 
aspects to his task, i.e. to determine whether : 
- we have carried out our tasks as described 
above, taking as an example the standar-
disation and production of armaments ; 
- the governments of member states take 
sufficient account of representatives' ini-
tiatives and Council decisions; 
- parliamentary debates have had a notice-
able influence on the working out of 
Council decisions and actual co-operation 
between member states ; and 
- debates in parliaments might instigate 
further initiatives in regard to the Council 
or the governments of WEU member 
countries. 
128. Your Rapporteur wishes it to be under-
stood that, in accordance with the nature of the 
present report, he has not only made a critical 
analysis of the way the governments and the 
Council act but has also had to tackle the 
activities of representatives themselves from a 
critical standpoint. We shall be able to draw 
conclusions from this analysis which will be 
important for the future of our work. 
129. Thus, as it emerges from the information 
in Chapter Ill of the report, action taken in 
parliaments on the recommendations with which 
we are concerned here is mainly in the form of 
oral and written questions. This is in fact one 
of the possible, useful and customary ways of 
inducing governments to adopt positions on the 
matters dealt with. However, this method raises 
a series of problems : 
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The time factor 
130. It is well known that on average several 
months elapse between the adoption of a 
recommendation and the receipt of a reply from 
the Council. In the case of the recommendations 
studied in this report, this lapse of time varied 
from three to five months. 
131. All representatives should consider whe-
ther relevant questions should be put to their 
governments before or after the Council has 
adopted a position. There are various arguments 
in favour of each of these possibilities: 
- If a government is asked by a represen-
tative to adopt a position as soon as a 
recommendation has been adopted, i.e. 
before the Council replies to it, the 
advantage is that the recommendation is 
still topical. Moreover, it is still possible 
to encourage the government to make its 
position carry a certain amount of weight 
when the Council's decision is being 
worked out. In this way, a representative 
can try to influence the Council's decisions 
in the way the Assembly wishes. However, 
this is possible only if the question is put 
early enough for the government to have 
time to express its position in the Council. 
Once this stage has been passed, the 
government can but wait for the Council's 
reply and reproduce what it says. 
- There are however other arguments in 
favour of waiting for the Council's reply 
and then putting a question to the 
governments. This method has the advan-
tage of enabling the representative to take 
account of the Council's reply when 
working out his question and encouraging 
his government to draw conclusions from 
the Council's reply. 
132. From Chapter Ill it can be seen that in 
the majority of the cases studied representatives 
have put questions to their governments before 
the Council has replied. Statistically speaking, 
your Rapporteur has noted - without claiming 
to have exhausted the subject - that of thirty-
seven questions studied at least twenty-two 
were put to governments before the Council's 
reply was issued. In order to study the effect of 
questions more closely, account must be taken 
of another factor : 
The nature and content of questions 
133. Many questions were simple requests for 
information, not very likely to help to spur the 
governments to take action. A few examples 
are given below : 
Effect produced by questions put and answered 
before the Council's reply 
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134. The question put in the House of 
Commons on Recommendation 329 (para-
graph 33) was a request for general information 
which took no account of the Assembly's wish 
to find new methods and structures in the field 
of industrial co-operation. Consequently, the 
British Government was able to give only a 
very general answer. Hence it also seems 
doubtful whether it made use of this intervention 
in order to take a particularly determined stand 
in the Council. 
135. The question put in the Bundestag on 
the same recommendation (paragraph 35) was 
also mainly a request for information, as was a 
similar question put in the Belgian parliament. 
The same may be said of a number of questions 
put on Recommendations 325, 335 and 368. 
136. However, even in cases where the author 
of the question urged his government to adopt 
a firm stand, the answer was sometimes very 
superficial. An example is the answer to a 
question put in the House of Commons on 
Recommendation 333 (paragraph 47) : the 
Secretary of State for Defence merely indicated 
that the WEU Council was at present conside-
ring the matters referred to in the question. A 
question put to the French Government on 
Recommendation 358 fared hardly better (para-
graph 89). The government recalled the Coun-
cil's competence in the matter, without saying 
anything about the actual subject. Similarly, in 
most comparable cases the governments gave 
no particularly encouraging answers. This is for 
instance the case of the Netherlands Govern-
ment's answer to a question on Recommenda-
tion 325, the Belgian Government's answers to 
questions on Recommendations 333 and 335, 
the French Government's answers to questions 
on Recommendations 338 and 339, the Luxem-
bourg Government's answer to a question on 
Recommendation 358 and the British Govern-
ment's answer to a question on Recommenda-
tion 358. 
137. The Luxembourg Government's answer 
to a question on Recommendation 362 is a rare 
positive example of a government stating clearly 
that it was prepared to endorse an Assembly 
recommendation in the Council. 
Effect produced by questions put before and 
answered after the Council's reply 
138. An example is the action taken on a 
question put in the Italian parliament on 
Recommendation 358. The representative asked 
his government what action it had taken in 
application of Recommendation 358. The Italian 
Government took about ten months to answer. 
In the meantime, the Council had indicated its 
position. The Italian Government then merely 
quoted the Council's position. 
Effect produced by questions put after the 
Council's reply 
139. In the case of this type of question, it is 
rarely possible to decide whether the author of 
the question took account of the relevant reply 
of the Council when preparing his text. 
140. For instance, a representative put a 
question in the Bundestag on Recommenda-
tion 325, in which he recalled the wish expressed 
by the Assembly to receive an annual report 
from the IEPG. But this request had already 
been rejected by the Council inter alia because 
not all members of the IEPG were members of 
WEU. The Council had therefore recommended 
that representatives be briefed through national 
channels. Neither the question nor the Federal 
Government's answer seems to take account of 
the position adopted by the Council. 
141. Even in cases of this type, representatives 
often limit themselves to making simple requests 
for information. This is the case of a French 
question on Recommendation 325, a Nether-
lands question on Recommendation 329 and 
two questions put in the Bundestag on Recom-
mendation 358. 
142. However, even where questions are not 
just requests for information (e.g. the questions 
put in the Bundestag on Recommendation 335, 
in the House of Commons on Recommenda-
tions 337 and 338 and in the Luxembourg 
parliament on Recommendation 337), govern-
ment positions very rarely go further into the 
subject. This seems partly due to the questions 
not being sufficiently incisive or to the fact that 
they do not dispute the position adopted by the 
Council. 
Co-ordinating the text of questions 
143. As a general rule, each WEU Assembly 
recommendation contains a series of proposals 
and considerations of various kinds for the 
Council to examine. 
144. It is very rare for a representative to 
take up all the elements of a recommendation 
for a debate in his parliament. Hence it is 
exceptional that the major part of Recommen-
dation 337, for instance, should have been 
included in a question put in the Luxembourg 
parliament. 
145. Most representatives select the specific 
points in recommendations which they find of 
particular interest. However, there is rarely any 
co-ordination between members of the WEU 
Assembly in this respect. Your Rapporteur 
found no more than five examples of identical 
or similar questions being put in several 
parliaments. These were questions put by Mr. 
Dejardin ~nd Mr. Roper on Recommendation 
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329, by Mr. Ahrens and Mr. Meintz on 
Recommendation 329, by Mr. Enders and 
Mr. Roper on Recommendation 335, by 
Mr. Glesener, Mr. Ahrens, Mr. Kittelmann and 
Lord Northfield on Recommendation 358 and 
by Mr. Dejardin and Mr. Jeambrun on Recom-
mendation 368. 
146. Otherwise, highly varied questions were 
put on one and the same recommendation. It is 
therefore certain that the government often had 
no trouble in answering the questions since they 
were hardly liable to contradict the Council or 
the answers of other governments. It is even 
easier for the governments if questions relate 
only indirectly to recommendations. 
Government answers 
147. Your Rapporteur discerned no real 
contradictions between government statements 
and the Council's reply. However, it has 
happened that the governments concerned shift 
the emphasis and underline different points 
from the Council or another government. Even 
in such cases, it would be useful if representa-
tives could grasp all the slight differences. 
148. Your Rapporteur found only one example 
of a representative putting questions to his 
government on the same subject on more than 
one occasion : in the Bundestag, questions on 
the Standing Armaments Committee were put 
twice. In both cases, admittedly, the Federal 
Government gave very general answers. 
149. In none of the cases studied was your 
Rapporteur able to note that a government was 
compelled to indicate in detail any differences 
between its position and that of the Council. 
This seems to be due to the type of questions 
put and to the fact that the subject was never 
taken up again once the government had 
answered. 
150. The following few examples should allow 
this phenomenon to be better explained : 
(i) Answering a question on Recommenda-
tion 325, the French Government clearly stated 
that it favoured the interoperability of arma-
ments. In this recommendation, the Assembly 
had advocated "interoperability and, when 
necessary for the security of Europe, the 
standardisation of defence equipment". In its 
reply, the Council referred to "armaments 
families" and continued as follows: "... the 
search for standardisation must not be allowed 
to operate exclusively to the advantage of 
equipment of American origin, leaving the 
European industry with only a subordinate role 
as subcontractors which in the long term would 
be a threat to its existence". It emerges from 
these differences in wording that there seems to 
be very considerable nuances between the 
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Assembly, the Council and the French Govern-
ment which might have provided a good starting 
point for other questions in parliament. 
(ii) Answering a statement by a representative 
in the Netherlands parliament on the same 
recommendation, the Netherlands Government 
stated inter alia that the intervention of the 
EEC proposed by the Assembly might be more 
easily discussed when most of the European 
member countries of NATO had become 
members of the EEC. The Council on the 
contrary had stated that a number of govern-
ments had already opposed a wider interpreta-
tion of the Treaty of Rome. Here there was 
material for further questions. 
(iii) Answering a question on Recommenda-
tion 329, the Belgian Government inter alia 
expressed the opinion that the results achieved 
so far by existing bodies such as FINABEL, 
the IEPG and the SAC could not yet be 
considered as the ideal solution because of the 
political, economic, social, financial, legal and 
commercial obstacles which existed. The Council 
had stated inter alia that it believed that the 
necessary framework for decision-making 
already existed. 
(iv) Similarly, the positions adopted by the 
Federal German, British and Luxembourg 
Governments when answering questions on 
Recommendation 329 would have provided 
material for further questions. 
(v) Answering a question on Recommenda-
tion 333, the Belgian Government said it was in 
favour of strengthening political authority at 
supranationallevel. This aspect was not referred 
to in the corresponding reply of the Council. 
(vi) Answering questions on Recommendations 
337 and 362, the Luxembourg Government 
adopted an attitude which was on the whole 
more positive than the corresponding statements 
of the Council. 
Result 
151. (i) From a strictly statistical point of 
view, an analysis of the questions put by 
representatives gives altogether positive results. 
However, no recommendation could be found 
which was the subject of questions in all 
parliaments. In this respect, Recommendation 
358 had the best score, with questions put in 
five parliaments, followed by Recommenda-
tions 325, 329 and 335, each of which was the 
subject of questions in four parliaments. 
Questions were put on Recommendation 368 in 
three parliaments. 
(ii) Nevertheless, the general impression obtai-
ned is that 'the results of questions and 
governments' response to them have to date 
been relatively modest. Governments have 
practically never (with only very few exceptions) 
stated that parliamentary questions would 
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encourage them to take action in the Council. 
Furthermore, there are no discernible points of 
reference which allow the extent to which 
parliamentary questions may influence actual 
co-operation between member states to be 
verified. The only possibility they afford is on 
the whole to make governments abide by the 
partially positive positions they adopt. From this 
point of view, parliamentary questions can be 
useful. In order to make them even more 
effective, the following suggestions may be 
made: 
(a) it should be ensured that if possible 
each recommendation is the subject of 
questions in all parliaments ; 
(b) account should be taken of the stage at 
which questions are put. A question will 
in fact follow a different line and have 
a different tenor according to whether 
it is put before or after the Council 
replies. In the first case, it will have to 
urge the government to bring determi-
ned influence to bear in the Council 
and in the second it will as far as 
possible have to bring up for debate the 
subject matter of the Council's reply. 
(iii) Government answers should not be made 
too easy. In this connection, mere requests for 
information do not generally go very far. This 
is also the case of questions only indirectly 
related to a recommendation. 
(iv) Members of the WEU Assembly should 
as far as possible agree on the stage at which 
they intend to put a question and on its 
contents. To this end, the same essential points 
of Assembly recommendations should be selec-
ted if possible. 
(v) A question should not be systematically 
considered to have been disposed of as soon as 
the government has answered. An attempt 
should be made to verify that the answer 
accords with the Council's opinions and those 
of other governments and if necessary further 
questions should be put. In certain cases, it 
may be useful to put questions both before and 
after the Council replies. 
152. The possibilities available to members of 
the WEU Assembly for bringing influence to 
bear by indicating guidelines in the parliaments 
should admittedly not be overestimated. In 
effect, one of the most arduous tasks of WEU 
parliamentarians is to arouse sufficient interest 
in WEU in the parliaments for relatively strong 
parliamentary pressure to be brought to bear 
on governments. Inclusion of a recommendation 
in the agenda of a national foreign affairs or 
defence committee would already be one step 
forward, but this raises a problem, i.e. that 
generally speaking members of the WEU 
Assembly are not at the same time members of 
such a national committee. 
153. Topics such as those which are the 
subject of the present report are not very 
appropriate for discussion before a wide public, 
whose younger members in particular are more 
interested in progress achieved in disarmament, 
the maintenance of peace and the prevention of 
war. 
154. It will therefore always be difficult to 
reduce to a common denominator in parliaments 
the various interests of representatives with 
different concepts. 
155. Hence, on the first three aspects listed in 
paragraph 127, your Rapporteur's analysis leads 
to the conclusion that it is for parliamentarians 
themselves to increase their efforts to ensure 
that Assembly recommendations have an impact 
in member states. 
156. As for the fourth aspect, the following 
questions seem to arise from the debates in 
parliaments : 
(i) Standardisation and interoperability 
157. Neither the Assembly nor the Council 
has ever given clear priority to either of these 
two matters, although they seem quite distinct 
subjects. Is it not necessary to invite the 
governments, through the Council, to work out 
a specific joint approach to these matters, 
indicating the various steps to be taken ? 
(ii) Co-operation between Europe and the United 
States in the production of armaments 
158. According to several governmental state-
ments in parliaments, the relationship between 
Europe and the United States seems to be 
mainly in the shape of bilateral co-operation 
between various European states and the United 
States. Moreover, there do not seem to be very 
far-reaching reciprocal exchanges of informa-
tion between European countries about their 
relations with the United States in these 
matters. Consequently, should the Council be 
asked to improve co-ordination and information 
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between the European governments concerned ? 
Should the governments be asked to examine 
more closely present United States legislation 
restricting European imports and to intensify 
efforts towards a real two-way street between 
Europe and the United States ? 
(iii) Methods and structures of industrial co-
operation 
159. Several governments stressed the enor-
mous obstacles to full integration of armaments 
production, whether in the Atlantic or the 
European framework. None of these statements 
entirely corresponds to the repeated affirmations 
of the Council that existing structures and 
methods are sufficient. Should the Council's 
attention be directed towards these divergences 
and should it be asked to reconsider the relevant 
recommendations of the Assembly including 
joint production ventures ? 
(iv) Restrictions on the sale of armaments 
160. Debates in several parliaments show that 
there were different approaches• to the problem 
by the governments. Would it not be worthwhile 
to urge parliaments and member governments 
to reconsider this problem so as to reach a joint 
Western European Union position insofar as 
possible? 
(v) Study conducted by the Standing Armaments 
Committee 
161. Several governments stressed the impor-
tance of the study conducted by the Standing 
Armaments Committee, underlining that this 
study could not be expected to produce results 
in the short term. Is the time ripe to ask for a 
report on the state of progress of the study and 
for a report on the work of the IEPG ? Should 
the governments not also be asked again to 
report on existing and future armaments 
projects? 
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Draft Recommendation 
on the situation in the Middle East and European security 
The Assembly, 
(i) Recalling its Recommendations 341, 349, 361, 371, 386 and 389; 
(ii) Considering that armed conflicts in the Middle East are a serious threat to Europe's security; 
(iii) Considering in particular that there is a serious risk of the war between Iran and Iraq escalating 
and further endangering stability in the area and the world economy; 
(iv) Considering that the use of chemical weapons by either of the belligerents seriously undermines 
respect for international conventions in all international warfare; 
(v) Condemning also the use of children in an army at war, and the ill-treatment of prisoners; 
(vi) Considering that the situation of Lebanon continues to be likely to provoke international crises 
and that such a risk remains grave whilst part of the country is subject to foreign domination; 
(vii) Considering that the situation in Lebanon should not be seen only nor even primarily in terms 
of the East-West conflict; 
(viii)Welcoming the formation in Lebanon of a government which reflects the demographic balance 
and the rights of the different political and other elements in the country; 
(ix) Deploring the heavy losses suffered by units of the multinational buffer force and United 
Nations forces; 
(x) Convinced that all foreign forces other than those of the United Nations should leave Lebanese 
soil completely; 
(xi) Considering that the vicious circle of terrorism and repression and the installation of settlements 
are obstacles to the establishment of lasting peace in the Middle East, which rather requires: 
- recognition by those who have not yet done so, including most Arab countries and the PLO, 
of the right of Israel to exist within secure and internationally-recognised frontiers; 
- recognition by Israel of the fact that most Palestinian people still consider the PLO under its 
present leadership as their representative and of their right to their own national homeland; 
(xii) Welcoming the improvement in relations between the PLO and Jordan with a view to solving 
the Palestinian problem, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. Co-ordinate the policies of member countries towards Iran and Iraq with a view to ensuring that 
no action is taken which might prolong the conflict and to help to restore peace between these two 
countries; 
2. In order to confirm declarations by member countries that they have not supplied the 
belligerents, directly or indirectly, with chemical weapons, instruct the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments to verify declarations made by member countries in this connection; 
3. Press for the complete withdrawal from Lebanon of all foreign forces, except for those of the 
United Nations, in application of United Nations Resolutions 508 and 509; 
4. Formally reaffirm the joint views of the Western European countries expressed by the Ten in 
their Venice declaration of June 1980, and in particular: 
(a) recall that stability in the Middle East depends, on the one hand, on the PLO and all 
nations recognising Israel and its rights and, on the other hand, on Israel recognising the 
fact that the Palestinian people have the right to their own national homeland and that they 
are represented by the PLO; 
(b) repeat its condemnation of Israel's continued settlement policy on territories occupied since 
1967 and warn that country that there must be no further expulsion of Arab populations 
from these territories. 
241 
DOCUMENT 978 
Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Lord Reay, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. On 21st September 1983 the Presidential 
Committee of the Assembly decided to include 
a report on the Middle East in the agenda of 
the November session. However, so many 
amendments were tabled in plenary session to 
the draft recommendation in the report which 
the General Affairs Committee had adopted on 
29th November 1983 by 13 votes to 2 with 3 
abstentions that the Chairman and Rapporteur 
were led to request its withdrawal from the 
agenda for resubmission at the first part of the 
Assembly's thirtieth session. 
2. The General Affairs Committee has already 
devoted considerable study and reflection in 
earlier years to matters relating to this 
important region. Mter Sir Frederic Bennett, 
who was Rapporteur in 1979, 1980 and 1981 
(Documents 820, 844 and 871), your Rappor-
teur already presented a report on European 
security and the Middle East in December 1982 
(Document 927) when he drew up a list of 
documents on the subject. Hence, the present 
document will not go back over past history but 
merely refer to developments in. 198,3 a~~ the 
beginning of 1984. The commttte~ s VlSlt . to 
Jordan in March 1984 and the mformat10n 
there obtained, particularly from HRH Cr?'Yn 
Prince Hassan Bin Talal, not to speak of vtstts 
which your Rapporteur was personally able to 
make to other countries of the region have 
allowed the November 1983 report to be 
seriously updated. 
3. In fact two matters which are at first sight 
quite separate have made events in the Middle 
East a subject of keen con~rn fo~ _Europe_'s 
security. One is the resumption of ctv~l war. m 
Lebanon during the summer of 1983 m whtch 
foreign powers have been involved in v~rious 
ways, including certain member countnes of 
WEU or the Atlantic Alliance. The other is the 
continued fighting between Iraq and Iran and 
the risk of this war spreading, which Europe 
cannot disregard, and the possible consequences 
for the entire region. However, the two matters 
cannot be completely isolated from each other 
or from all questions relating to the Middle 
East. Indeed, it seems evident that an Iranian 
success would have incalculable consequences 
for the regional balance of .forces and al~o for 
the internal stability of all Moslem countnes. It 
would then be difficult to avoid the great powers 
becoming involved and many observers fear, not 
without good reason, that this part of the world 
could be the detonator of world war. 
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4. Without wishing to subscribe to these 
apocalyptic views, your Rapporteur must recall 
a few facts which illustrate the extreme 
sensitivity of the region and its importance ~th 
for Europe and for the t~o superpow~rs. Ft~st, 
Iran has long .frontiers wtth the Sov1et Umon 
and Afghanistan, which has been i~vaded by 
the Soviet army, and the state frontiers do not 
correspond to ethnic, religious and cult~ral 
realities. Second, the religious fundamentahsm 
of Iranian Islam seems to be a growing 
attraction for a large part of the Mosle~ world, 
particularly its Shiite elements, whtch are 
numerous in the Middle East. It is linked both 
with highly reactionary aims from the stand-
point of legislation, ~ustoms and ~reedom, 
revolutionary and terronst methods whtch have 
total disregard for anything foreign to that form 
of religion, including hu~an ri~hts and .r~spect 
for human life, and wtth radtcal hostihty to 
anything foreign to Iranian Sh~is.~, i!lcluding 
the principal values of western ClVlhsation. 
5. Moreover, the Middle East countries have 
always had very close links with Western 
Europe in cultural, religious and personal 
matters, as well as in the economic field. It 
must not be overlooked either that the Gulf 
area contains 54% of known world reserves of 
oil and 25% of gas reserves and that _in the 
decade 1973-83 it supplied 60% of the. oll used 
in Western Europe, 70% of that ~sed m Jap~n 
and 30% of that used in the Umted States, m 
spite of a sharp drop in its production during 
that period. 
6. For all these reasons, Western Europe 
cannot disregard this essential region nor _can it 
rely on the United States alone t? exerctse _an 
influence even if Europe does not mtend to nsk 
jeopardising its g~ relati?ns with. the United 
States, which are vttal for 1ts secunty. 
11. The war between Iraq and Iran 
7. While in the course of 1983 there seemed 
to have been a substantial shift in the balance 
of power towards Iran which was better a_ble t? 
maintain its oil exports and therefore 1ts ml 
revenues than Iraq, Iraq became heavily 
dependent on subsidies ~rom Saudi A~ab_ia a~d 
certain Gulf states. Thts led to pess1m1sm m 
Iraq and consequently a desire to end the war 
as soon as possible. 
8. Iran has just managed to push the theatre 
of operations beyond its frontier. However, as 
Iran has a larger population, abundant oil 
reserves which can continue to be exported 
through the Kharg terminal and the Strait of 
Hormuz, can replace its equipment, inter alia 
by procuring American weapons from Israel or 
directly from the United States, an~ has s~own 
that Iraq is unable to break the Iraman natiOnal 
spirit, it seemed at the end of 1983 to be better 
placed than its enemy. 
9. Since then, the situation seems to have 
shifted slightly in favour of Iraq. The maj?r 
Iranian offensives in January and February 10 
several sectors of the front in fact brought them 
only very limited advantages and very heavy 
losses, particularly in the attacks in the marshy 
region separating Shatt al' Arab from Basra. In 
spite of repeated offensives, the Iranians did not 
manage to cut the main road from Basra to 
Baghdad. Iraq seems to have managed ~o ~a~e 
up for its fewer numbers by clear supenortty 10 
equipment, military organisation and command 
and to inflict very heavy losses on the enemy. 
Figures given by the two sides in this connection 
are so contradictory that it is impossible for 
your Rapporteur to give further details. One 
way or another, losses on both sides now have 
to be counted in hundreds of thousands. 
10. However, from what is known of opera-
tions in the early months of 1984, five remarks 
may be made: 
(i) While the foreign press is allowed no 
direct contact with the front on the 
Iranian side, Iraq has allowed many 
journalists to approach the front and 
report in detail on what they saw, 
including the difficulties encountered 
by the Iraqi counter-offensive in March 
1984. 
(ii) According to direct and probably 
impartial sources, the Iranian offensive 
at the beginning of March was carried 
out by very young and inexperienced 
soldiers including many fourteen-year 
old children. Iraqi artillery is reported 
to have massacred these children, who 
were badly equipped, had little military 
training but had been turned into 
fanatics by unscrupulous politico-reli-
gious propaganda. Reports by western 
journalists who personally visited prison 
camps in Iraq bore out this fact. 
(iii) A number of Iranian wounded who had 
been very seriously burned were sent to 
hospitals in the West. The nature of 
their burns convinced the doctors 
treating them that they had been 
caused by chemical substances, particu-
larly yperite and tabun. 
The matter is particularly serious since 
the 1899 Convention of The Hague 
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bans the use of chemical weapons. Its 
provisions were renewed in the 1925 
Geneva Protocol and have been almost 
respected since 1935. The use of such 
weapons would be a very serious 
setback in the application of the laws 
of war and in the organisation of 
international order. Iran has accused 
the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom 
and France of having delivered such 
weapons to Iraq. All three countries 
have formally denied doing so. But the 
production of such weapons seems in 
no way beyond the capabilities of the 
Iraqi or Iranian chemical industries and 
the Iraqi authorities attribute the 
effects noted by western doctors to an 
accident in an Iranian chemical factory. 
Your Rapporteur has no further infor-
mation to clarify this most important 
point, but the use of such weapons 
reveals the bitterness of the fighting. 
Your Rapporteur recalls that the stocks 
of chemical weapons of WEU member 
countries on the mainland of Europe 
are subject to verification by the 
Agency for the Control of Armaments 
under Article Ill and Annex 11 to 
Protocol No. Ill and under Article VII, 
paragraph I, of Protocol No. IV to the 
modified Brussels Treaty and suggests 
that the Assembly question the Council 
about its conclusions regarding the 
application of these articles by the 
signatory countries and the possibility 
of them being able to supply such 
weapons to the belligerents. Convinced 
that none of the WEU member coun-
tries has supplied such weapons, he 
believes the Council should publicly 
confirm, with the full authority of an 
international organisation, the declara-
tions of the countries concerned. 
(iv) Although in 1983 Iraq had considerable 
air superiority, ensuring true mastery 
of the air, in the first months of 1984 
Iran carried out bombing operations on 
Iraqi towns, thus demonstrating that 
Iraq's mastery was slipping. 
(v) Iraq has several times threatened to 
use its air force to destroy the Kharg 
terminal and in three years of war it 
has sunk some fifty low-tonnage oil 
tankers flying the flags of non-belliger-
ent countries in the Gulf. Iran for its 
part is blocking Iraq's only outlet to 
the sea and has threatened to block the 
Strait of Hormuz if the Kharg terminal 
is destroyed. Execution of this threat 
seems hardly probable as long as Iran 
is able to export its oil through this 
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strait since it would be the first to 
suffer the consequences. But it cannot 
be excluded if Iraq manages to halt 
Iranian exports and it is certain that 
this question is disturbing for all the 
Arab oil-exporting countries and all 
importing countries. It is therefore 
probable that if Iraq attacks Kharg or 
Iran attempts to block the Strait of 
Hormuz it would spread the conflict to 
the Arab countries around the Gulf. 
These countries have made a valiant 
effort in recent years to develop their 
armies, navies and air forces. They all 
fear Iranian hegemony in the region 
and probably the strength they have 
thus developed has helped to avert, so 
far, the implementation of these 
threats. Furthermore, the presence of 
American, British, French and Soviet 
warships in the area of the strait shows 
the importance all attach to maintain-
ing navigation through this essential 
waterway. 
11. At the present time Iran has still not 
dropped its demand for the removal of the 
present Iraqi Government as a precondition for 
peace. Obviously this demand cannot be 
accepted by the Iraqi regime. However, the 
purchase of five Super-Etendard aircraft from 
France with sixty Exocet missiles in autumn 
1983 can be seen as an attempt by Iraq to 
increase its leverage in order to bring about 
peace as soon as possible. For more than a year 
Iraq has been calling for peace on the basis of 
the status quo ante bello. Thus, whatever 
opinion one may have of the respective 
responsibilities of the two governments at the 
beginning of the war, it is now quite clear that 
Iraq wants peace to be restored and it is Iran 
that is insisting on conditions which are 
unacceptable for its enemy. 
12. Iran's uncompromising attitude is certainly 
a matter of concern for most Arab countries. 
Their history has taught them that Iran never 
considered Zagros to be a natural frontier for 
its area of influence but that it was rather 
nostalgic about its former empires which 
extended to the Mediterranean. Moreover, the 
repeated declaration by Imam Khomeiny and 
many other Iranian leaders that their funda-
mental aim was to "free" Jerusalem should hold 
the attention of all states in the region, whether 
Arab or not. The fact that Syria is hostile to 
Iraq and that Israel is at grips with Arab 
interests should not prevent them from perceiv-
ing the full dangers they would face with an 
increase in the power of Iran, the most 
densely-populated country in the region and at 
the same time the principal hotbed of an 
ideology the most subversive for peace. 
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13. Western Europe's reasons for being inter-
ested in this matter are not quite the same as 
for the fighting in Lebanon. There is obviously 
a fear of internationalisation which would be 
particularly dangerous as Iran is a neighbour of 
the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. The Soviet 
Union is the main supplier of weapons to the 
Iraqi army while the United States, after a 
long crisis in relations with Khomeiny's Iran, 
has apparently again begun to supply it with 
weapons. · 
14. But the Europeans are far more concerned 
about the oil question. In spite of a considerable 
drop in western oil supplies from the Middle 
East due on the one hand to reduced 
consumption and on the other to increased 
output in other regions - Africa, the Soviet 
Union, the North Sea, for instance- more than 
12% of the world's oil consumption still comes 
from the Gulf. The shares produced by Iran 
and Iraq respectively have admittedly fallen to 
a very low level because of the war. But most 
of the output of Bahrein, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates still 
passes through the Gulf and it is now possible 
for Iran, which has taken control of the islands 
scattered in the Strait of Hormuz, to cut off oil 
shipments through this sole gateway to the 
Gulf. Any prolonged interruption of supplies 
would be enough to cause another oil crisis 
whose effects on the price of oil and on the 
whole world economy cannot be foreseen. 
15. So far, the only measures taken by the 
West to avert this danger have been to build up 
the naval forces of countries - mainly the 
United States, France and the United Kingdom 
- in the Indian Ocean and the formation of the 
United States rapid deployment force, which is 
still far from complete, and the establishment 
of American bases in the north-west of the 
Indian Ocean. Perhaps the concentration of 
these forces in the area of the Strait of Hormuz 
and the co-operation of the still small naval 
forces of the Arab countries near the Gulf 
would be enough to stop any attempt by Iran 
to block traffic through the Strait. However this 
may be, the destruction of a few giant tankers 
in the Gulf would seriously perturb movement 
and cause severe damage through the resulting 
water pollution to the cost of the coastal 
countries. 
16. France for its part has gone further than 
any other country in direct assistance to Iraq. 
Although one may wonder whether France has 
not allowed Iraq to incur too heavy a debt and 
whether the desire to maintain its armaments 
exports has not led it to take undue risks, it is 
now clear that support for Iraq has become 
essential to the stability of the region and to 
the restoration of peace which is hardly likely 
to result from an Iranian victory. Moreover, too 
many restrictions on western assistance to Iraq 
would make it wholly dependent on supplies 
from the Soviet Union which already account 
for most of its weapons and would help to 
increase the risk of an internationalisation of 
the war. However, such assistance should be 
limited to types of armaments that would not 
make the fighting even more inhumane and it 
should exclude anything that might help the 
belligerents to violate international conventions 
setting out the rules of warfare. 
17. Finally, the risks of Iraq being economi-
cally stifled by the closing of Shatt al' Arab 
seem to be diminishing, on the one hand 
because of the development of lines of com-
munication linking Aqaba with Iraq through 
Jordan and, on the other hand, because of the 
forthcoming completion of the oil pipeline which 
is to link oilfields in northern Iraq with the 
Mediterranean across Turkish territory, allow-
ing Iraq to resume its place among the principal 
Middle East oil exporters. 
18. There still remains the possibility that 
Iraq could succumb to the continuing Iranian 
offensives. Iranian forces have not, at the time 
of writing, been dislodged from the marshes 
close to the Basra-Baghdad highway, despite 
intense Iraqi efforts to recover this ground, 
strategically important also for its hitherto 
unexploited oilfield. Incidentally, the retention 
of this oilfield by Iran has been suggested as a 
possible means of satisfying Iran's demands for 
reparations from Iraq. If Iranian forces were to 
penetrate Baghdad itself, the regime of Saddam 
Hussein must be at risk. 
19. Alternatively, if superior Iranian resources 
are not going to be allowed to decide the 
outcome in the longer term, the explanation 
would very likely be the collapse of Iran's 
revolutionary cohesion, which could be the 
consequence of a power struggle to succeed 
Khomeiny. 
20. These seem the most likely alternative 
ways to a decisive outcome to the war. It will 
certainly not be ended by missions or telegrams 
from anxious or peaceloving outsiders. 
Ill. The situation in Lebanon 
(a) Tire civil war 
21. President Amin Gemayel, who was elected 
in Beirut in September 1982 at a time when 
part of the town was occupied by the Israelis 
and the assassination of his brother, President 
Bechir Gemayel, had raised the clashes between 
Lebanese communities to a new level, has not 
managed to impose his authority on Lebanon 
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as a whole. Syria was invited to come to the 
assistance of the Lebanese Government in 1976 
but this invitation was withdrawn on 2nd 
September 1983 by President Gemayel, who 
then called upon the Arab League to withdraw 
Syrian and Palestinian troops from Lebanon, 
while Israel, which had invaded a large area of 
Lebanese territory in June 1982, withdrew its 
forces from part of this area to the Awali river. 
The north and east of the country are still 
occupied by Syria, while Israel occupies the 
south. 
22. President Gemayel came under strong 
criticism from most Moslem and some Christian 
groups in Lebanon. They objected to his 
privileged relationship with Israel and with the 
United States and the collusion between the 
armed forces of the Lebanese state and the 
Christian Phalangists led by his father, Pierre 
Gemayel. 
23. In these circumstances, the decision by 
the Israeli Government on 4th September 1983 
to evacuate the mountainous Chuf area between 
Beirut and the River Awali, where Christian 
and Druze populations are closeJy intermingled, 
could but lead to a resumption of the civil war, 
each of the communities being determined to 
do its utmost to control the area. Israel and the 
Lebanese Government signed an accord on 17th 
May on the evacuation of Lebanese territory, 
but this accord was not ratified and made the 
departure of the Israelis dependent on the 
Syrians leaving too. Whether the United States 
could ever have persuaded the Syrians to leave 
Lebanon must remain doubtful. But what is 
absolutely certain is that the Syrians could 
never have accepted the 17th May accord- yet 
its implementation depended on their accepting 
it. Not only was the United States now 
demanding conditions for an Israeli withdrawal 
- namely Syrian withdrawal - whereas pre-
viously the United States had called for Israeli 
withdrawal unconditionally - notably in its 
support for United Nations Security Council 
resolutions to that effect. But also the accord 
would have left Israel with rights in Lebanon 
- along the frontier, overflight reconnaissance, 
etc. - which would not have been granted to 
Syria. The United States asked the Israelis to 
postpone their evacuation until Lebanese armed 
forces were able to occupy the area effectively, 
but to no avail. 
24. The result was a month of open warfare 
between the Druzes and their Syrian allies on 
the one hand and the Lebanese army and 
Christian Phalangists on the other, and the 
military operations brought the Druzes and 
Syrians to the outskirts of Beirut. The interna-
tional buffer forces composed of American, 
British, French and Italian units were under 
attack several times and the American and 
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French in particular suffered very serious 
casualties. The Americans and French have 
retaliated by shooting or bombing. 
25. The attempt by King Fahd of Saudi 
Arabia at the beginning of October 1983 to 
convene a Lebanese national reconciliation 
congress led to the opening of a first meeting in 
Switzerland at the beginning of November. The 
refusal by several Lebanese heads of clans to 
take part had forced several postponements and 
changes in proposed meeting places and the 
idea of holding the congress in Lebanon had to 
be given up. Discussions in the Lebanese 
national congress were suspended to allow 
President Gemayel to implement the first 
decisions which were first to recognise Lebanon 
as an Arab country, then to insist on the 
evacuation of Israeli troops, confirm the cease-
fire which began in the Chuf and Lebanese 
mountains on 25th September and, finally, 
accept the principle of a discussion on reforms 
to be introduced in Lebanon. Furthermore, 
most of the leaders other than President 
Gemayel insisted on the denunciation of the 
Israeli-Lebanese agreement of 17th May 1983. 
President Gemayel was finally instructed to 
consult the countries concerned by the situation 
in Lebanon in order to examine how to negate 
this agreement. 
26. Certain steps by the clan leaders indicate 
that in any event several of them do not wish 
to revert to a state based on the national 
compromise of 1943. Thus, Mr. Walid Jumblatt, 
leader of the Druze community and of the 
Progressive Socialist Party, started to requisition 
land belonging to Christians in the Chuf, 
announced on 4th October the creation of a 
civil administration in that area and appealed 
to Lebanese soldiers and officers to show 
insubordination. The massacres perpetrated by 
all parties during ten years of civil war and 
quite recently during the occupation of the 
Chuf by the Druzes can certainly not be 
expected to end overnight. Many Lebanese 
have had to leave their homes to take refuge in 
sectors controlled by their political friends or 
co-religionists, particularly in certain quarters 
of Beirut. 
27. In any event, it seems most unlikely that 
Lebanese unity can ever be restored on the 
basis of the 1943 national compromise. The 
numerical breakdown of the communities in 
Lebanon is no longer the same, the Moslems 
now comprising a majority. If the unity of 
Lebanon can be restored, it will have to be on 
new political bases. 
28. The negotiations between President 
Gemayel and the Lebanese heads of clans, who 
held a second meeting in Lausanne in March 
1984 without managing to agree on the bases 
for a new constitutional organisation of the 
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country, failed to halt the fighting for any 
length of time and the civil war is continuing in 
Lebanon, with alternating periods of calm and 
crisis, cease-fires which are not fully respected 
and fighting flaring up here and there. Such 
fighting is not between Christian and Moslem 
communities as a whole but often between 
factions of communities either side, for instance, 
in March 1984, between Mr. Nihbi Berri's 
Shiites and Mr. Walid Jumblatt's Druzes. On 
the Christian side, the Phalangists are encoun-
tering strong opposition from other leanings, 
such as the group led by Mr. Frangie, who is 
prominent among opponents of the Gemayel 
family as a result of the assassination of several 
members of his family. 
29. Nevertheless the prospects for peace in 
Lebanon appear better than for some time. 
There seems little doubt that the withdrawal of 
the United States marines amounted to a 
watershed in Lebanon's history as an indepen-
dent country. Although presumably motivated 
by President Reagan's memories of President 
Carter's debacle at the hands of the Iranian 
hostage-takers, it in effect signalled an aban-
donment of United States support for the 
privileged Christian position in Lebanon and 
opened the way to the reassertion of Syrian 
influence, a realistic attempt to find a national 
backing for President Gemayel, based on a 
more up-to-date appreciation of the balance of 
national forces, backed by appropriate institu-
tional changes, and to the abrogation by 
President Gemayel of the 17th May accord 
with Israel, sponsored by the United States but 
detested by the Moslems. 
30. The fact that the Lausanne conference did 
not produce an agreement is of little long-term 
significance. Given Lebanese history, with its 
closely-woven net of internecine wars, rivalries, 
revenges and betrayals, peace cannot be 
produced out of a hat, but at least one can now 
believe that the foundation has been laid. 
31. No doubt Israel will try and disturb any 
positive developments to the north of it. But it 
has its own difficulties. The Moslems probably 
expect that the 600,000 Shiites now under 
Israeli occupation in southern Lebanon will 
prove most dangerous subjects; no doubt they 
also hope that a weariness with this residue of 
its Lebanese adventure will tell with the Israeli 
public, both these pressures leading, they hope, 
to a final Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. No 
doubt there will be "many a slip 'twixt the cup 
and the lip". Nevertheless, the situation is 
dangerous. It only needs to be borne in mind 
that both Israel and Syria are countries on a 
war footing, and that with the Israelis in 
southern Lebanon they are only twenty-five 
miles from Damascus. 
(b) Foreign intervention 
32. The rivalry between Lebanese clans can 
certainly not be attributed to foreign interven-
tion but intervention considerably enhanced the effe~ts of rivalry, not least by helping to p~ovide 
certain communities with large quantities of 
very sophisticated weaponry. 
33. (i) Until 1982, the main foreign _f~rce 
involved in Lebanese affairs was Palestiman, 
expulsed from the territory which became Israel 
in 1949 and then from the territories occupied 
in 1967 and accepted into Lebanon as refugees. 
The revolt of the Palestinians in Jordan in 
September 1970 and the ensuing repression of 
the revolt further increased the number of 
Palestinians in Lebanon, which they made the 
PLO centre. 
34. Forced to leave Lebanon in 1982 after the 
Israeli attack, some of them returned. Yasser 
Arafat, after the split in the PLO in June 1982, 
had to leave Syria where dissident elements 
had the upper hand under the prot~ctio~ of. t~e 
Syrian authorities. He took refuge m Tnpoh, m 
northern Lebanon, where the PLO exercised de 
facto control. But after a long beleaguerment, 
the Syrian army took the town in December 
1983, and forced Yasser Arafat and his 
followers to leave. They were evacuated at the 
last moment by sea on Greek ships escorted by 
French warships to various Arab countries. 
35. (ii) Moreover, the Syrian army controls a 
large part of Lebanon. It is powerfully equip~, 
thanks to military assistance from the Sovtet 
Union which provides it with the latest weapons, 
particularly anti-aircraft missiles. Syria seems 
to have a twofold aim: first, to prepare an 
annexation or at least the establishment of 
permanent control over part or all of ~ebanese 
territory which Syria has always constdered to 
have been unfairly snatched from it after the 
first world war and, second, to obtain the 
complete submission of the Palestinian armed 
forces, perhaps with a view ~o using theiJ?- to 
retrieve the Golan area, occupted by Israel smce 
1967. 
36. Furthermore, Syria sponsored the devel-
opment of a dissident movement in .the PLO 
and used it to take control of Bekaa m eastern 
Lebanon and Tripoli in the north-west. With 
Syrian support, this dissident movement pra~­
tically eliminated Yasser Arafat's PLO m 
Lebanon although he apparently still has the 
support 'of oth.er Arab . co~ntries and of 
Palestinians outstde the terntones controlled by 
Syria, in particular on the West Bank. 
37. (iii) The Israeli army, which ha.d b~e~ in 
the frontier area to the south of the Lttam st~ce 
1978 reached Beirut in 1982. The evacuation 
of th~ Chuf seems to indicate an evolution in 
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Israeli policy: after trying to restore the unity 
of Lebanon round a government which was 
favourable to it, as provided for in the Israeli-
Lebanese agreement of 17th May 1983, and 
having managed to chase the Palestini~ns out 
of Lebanon, Israel now seems to have gtven up 
the first of these aims and is relying on the 
division of Lebanon to protect its frontier. 
Among its reasons for doing. so were the 
relatively heavy losses the Israeh army suffered 
in Lebanon. Almost 600 deaths have been 
reported since 1978, most of them in attacks. 
38. The Christian forces formerly commanded 
by Colonel Haddad occupy the zone controlled 
by Israel and have made it their own area by 
forcing out the Moslem and Druze elements, 
thus helping to convince the latter that there 
was collusion between Israel and the Lebanese 
Christians to expel the other communities and 
bring about, if not annexation by Israel, at 
least the creation of a small state closely 
controlled by Israel, whose role would be to 
create a buffer zone between the Israeli frontier 
and Moslem territories. This would also allow 
Israel to control part of the waters of the Druze 
Djebel and use them to irrigate its own 
territory. 
39. (iv) Although most Arab countrie~ still 
consider the unity of Lebanon to be destrable 
for the restoration of peace in the Middle East, 
they hardly have t~e means t? carry th.is into 
effect, with the posstble exception of Syna. 
40. (v) Although the United Nations force in 
southern Lebanon (UNIFIL) has been u~a~le 
to play its role since 1982 because of the hmtts 
imposed on it, this is not true for the 
multinational buffer force which first came to 
protect the refugee camps, .and .was to a cert~in 
extent effective in preventmg mter-commumty 
clashes from getting out of hand in the to':"n ?f 
Beirut after the civil war flared up agam m 
September 1983 before the Lebanese army was 
strong enough to take over. The very fact that 
it was the target of Syrian and Druze shooting 
and perhaps also of other elements shows that 
its political role was not scorned by the 
belligerents. 
41. However, this involvement of the buffer 
force has led the governments concerned to re-
examine the true task of the force. At the 
outset, it was simply a matter of keeping the 
various factions apart, at the reques~ of ~he 
legitimate Lebanese Governmen~, but tmpl~mg 
no intervention in Lebanese pohcy or posstble 
fighting (at least as far as the European 
elements were concerned). When the force was 
attacked and bombed, the question then arose 
as to whether it would retaliate, remain without 
reacting in positions which were liable to 
become impossible to hold, or be evacuated. 
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The countries concerned were not absolutely 
unanimous about the choice to be made. 
42. The British and Italian units remained on 
the spot without reacting to attacks which, 
admittedly, mainly affected the French and 
American contingents. The question of evacu-
ation was raised in Italy. Conversely, France 
and the United States had sent large naval 
forces, including aircraft-carriers. They reacted 
when attacks were perpetrated against the 
buffer force, the Americans with artillery and 
bombing and the French with an air attack on 
a Syrian artillery battery. 
43. However, France and the United States 
do not appear to have had the same view of 
their role insofar as the United States, which 
equipped the Lebanese army, seemed to 
envisage the restoration of Lebanese unity not 
only round President Gemayel to whom it 
supplied strong political and military assistance 
but also on the basis of an accord with Israel, 
whereas France was far more reserved about 
the possible political aspect of restoring 
Lebanese unity and did not wish to appear to 
be supporting any particular party. 
44. In the night of 22nd to 23rd October 
1983, there were two extremely serious attacks 
which destroyed the buildings housing the 
United States and French forces in Beirut. 
There were 230 American and 58 French 
victims. These attacks were carried out with 
lorries loaded with explosives which were 
crashed into the buildings. Responsibility was 
claimed by an Islamic Jihad group about which 
few details are known, but the powerful means 
implemented seemed to indicate that it had the 
backing of a state seeking to whip up public 
opinion in the two countries contributing most 
troops to the buffer force against maintaining 
a contingent in Lebanon. 
45. These attacks certainly influenced the 
decision taken by the governments of countries 
taking part in the multinational buffer force at 
the beginning of 1984 to withdraw their 
contingents from Lebanon. But the real reason 
for withdrawal is to be found in developments 
in Lebanon itself. The buffer force had been set 
up in September 1982 after the massacre of 
Palestinians by Lebanese Christians in sectors 
of Beirut then occupied by the Israeli army. 
46. Since then, both the PLO and the Israeli 
army having left Beirut, the force was no longer 
a buffer between foreign forces on Lebanese 
territory but between Lebanese factions. As 
long as all the .Lebanese factions accepted and 
were even pleased about the presence of this 
force, its maintenance was justified. This was 
no longer so from the moment certain Lebanese 
groups no longer wanted it, as shown in the 
October 1983 attacks. 
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47. It was then no longer a matter of being a 
buffer between foreign forces in Lebanon but of 
intervening in internal Lebanese affairs. In view 
of the failure of the Lausanne negotiations 
between the Lebanese parties, the presence of 
the buffer force in Beirut was no longer justified 
and Italy, the United Kingdom and the United 
States withdrew their contingents in February 
1984 and France at the end of March only, 
probably to indicate that its position did not 
coincide with that of the United States. 
48. (vi) One may wonder to what extent the 
Soviet Union has refrained from direct interven-
tion in the fighting, since some of the missiles 
used by the Syrian army or by its Druze or 
Shiite proteges were in the hands of Soviet 
experts. It has, in any event, delivered arms to 
Syria and has replaced the missiles destroyed 
by the Israelis in the Bekaa Valley. The new 
missiles have been deployed on Syrian territory 
in order to be less provocative to the Israelis. 
The Soviet Union has at least 6,000 "military 
advisers" in Syria, thus ensuring control over 
Syria's use of the weapons it has supplied. It 
also protested at the American and French 
retaliation to attacks on the buffer force, but it 
seems anxious not to become too deeply involved 
in a matter beyond its control. It is still 
impossible to know whether the Soviet Union 
played a part in these attacks but it did not 
condemned the one on 23rd October and its 
presence was felt increasingly in the conflict. 
49. The internationalisation of the Lebanese 
conflict has therefore become a fact which no 
longer concerns only neighbouring countries but 
in which European countries and the two great 
powers narrowly missed becoming involved. If 
the withdrawal of the buffer force could be an 
opportunity of agreeing with the Soviet Union 
to leave the Lebanese to settle their own affairs, 
it would probably be a worthwhile guarantee 
against the possible consequences of the 
Lebanese crisis for the rest of the world. It 
might also be strong encouragement to the 
Lebanese parties to make the mutual conces-
sions necessary for a return to civil peace on 
the basis of a new constitutional organisation of 
the country. 
(c) Lebano• a•d Europea• security 
50. The importance Western Europe attaches 
to restoring peace in Lebanon is evident, as is 
testified by the fact that at the 1983 economic 
and political juncture three Western European 
countries, without any national objective, main-
tained contingents in Lebanon for more than 
eighteen months and supported them in face of 
strongly-armed opponents merely to form a 
buffer between the combatants. 
51. (i) First and foremost it is a matter of 
preventing continued fighting in Lebanon from 
bringing the two great powers into direct 
confrontation, first in that country and then in 
the rest of the world. The very special nature of 
the Lebanese civil war signifies that no solution 
can be found by a compromise between the two 
great powers, whereas they both might leave 
Lebanese affairs alone if they were sure that 
lasting peace could be restored in the country. 
In this case, it is quite obviously a local conflict 
whose duration has led to the direct or indirect 
intervention of the United States and the Soviet 
Union, and not a local form of a worldwide 
conflict. 
52. (ii) Nor does Western Europe have any 
interest in the further continuation in Lebanon 
or elsewhere of a regional conflict which in this 
instance has been smouldering for thirty-six 
years and which is always liable to flare up, 
provoking more widespread hostilities which 
might cut off the West's oil supply lines, as was 
the case in 1956 and 1973. 
53. (iii) For historic reasons, the West is 
committed to ensuring acceptable living condi-
tions for Christian minorities in the East. As 
far back as 1860, fighting between Druzes and 
Maronites was at the origin of a conflict 
between France and Turkey. Today, too, the 
disappearance of the Christian minorities from 
the Levant in an Arab-Islamic world in the grip 
of a fundamentalist revival would be difficult 
for certain sections of western public opinion to 
accept since it would appear to be a renunciation 
of the values upheld for two centuries. 
54. This is in no way a call for some kind of 
crusade as Mr. Jumblatt claimed in an attack 
on Lebanese Christians, the United States and 
France. On the contrary, your Rapporteur feels 
the western countries should confine themselves 
to the application of a few principles: 
(i) to spare innocent human lives con-
stantly threatened by the relentless 
nature of the fighting; 
(ii) not to intervene in Lebanon's internal 
affairs, i.e. to leave it to the Lebanese 
themselves to decide what type of 
institutions should govern the restora-
tion of peace in their country; 
(iii) to obtain the total evacuation of the 
country by all foreign armed forces and 
the full restoration of its sovereignty, 
which should be facilitated by the 
withdrawal of the PLO's armed forces. 
Moreover, it should be recalled that 
United Nations Resolutions 508 and 
509 advocating this were voted for by 
the United States, the Soviet Union 
and its allies and all the Western 
European countries; 
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(iv) to consider that peace in Lebanon can 
be assured only with the agreement of 
the countries in the area and conse-
quently with the establishment of peace 
throughout the Middle East on a 
sufficiently fair basis to inspire confi-
dence that it will be lasting. This 
implies the re-establishment of fair 
peace between Israel and its neighbours 
and your Rapporteur considers that 
this can be achieved only through the 
application of the principles set out in 
Security Council Resolution 242. This 
is in any event what the General 
Affairs Committee has resolutely 
upheld since 1967. 
55. For the immediate future, application of 
these principles implies: 
(i) seeking a negotiated agreement 
between Lebanese groups with a view 
to drawing up a national pact based on 
new bases which take account of the 
demographic trend in Lebanon since 
the 1943 compromise; 
(ii) continuing to refuse to intervene, in 
Lebanese internal affairs and insisting 
on the withdrawal of remaining foreign 
forces; 
(iii) reaching agreement between all the 
Western European countries on the 
aims and the means which those 
countries might employ to achieve 
them; 
(iv) concerting the views of these countries 
and of the United States in order to 
encourage the latter to respect the 
same principles. 
IV. Palestine 
56. Although the Lebanese conflict has 
become international and is liable to worsen 
and spread not only to neighbouring countries 
but even to the great powers, it is evident that 
no lasting solution can be found as long as the 
Palestine question has not been solved. Some 
four million Palestinians are in fact now 
scattered throughout the Arab world. The map 
on page 7 4 of the brief on European security 
and the Middle East prepared by your 
Rapporteur in December 1982 showed their 
location at that time. They are still a factor of 
instability for the weaker states among those in 
which they are living and an instrument for 
action by others such as Libya and Syria. 
57. Syria's attempt in 1983 to take control of 
the Palestinian organisations, first on its own 
territory and then in Lebanon, to the detriment 
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of the PLO which it tried to take over, although 
·managing only to split the factions under close 
Syrian control and the independent PLO run 
by Yasser Arafat, gave that country possibilities 
of action, particularly terrorist action, through-
out the world, but above all in Arab countries, 
to an extent still difficult to assess. 
58. What has so far ensured the PLO's 
independence of any country in the region is 
that it represents, as validly as possible, the 
Arab people of Palestine both in the area which 
forms the territory of Israel and in the territories 
occupied by the Israelis since 1967. Admittedly, 
in 1950 the Palestinian territory which had 
remained Arab was incorporated in Jordan and 
its population is still represented in the 
Jordanian parliament where it has half the 
members. However, as King Hussein recalled 
on 16th January 1984 when opening the new 
session of the Jordanian parliament which had 
not met for ten years, the act of April 1950 
which consecrated the uniting of the two banks 
of the Jordan proclaimed as its aim the 
preservation of Arab rights in Palestine and did 
not prejudge the eventual settlement of the 
Palestinian question. But in the same speech 
King Hussein said he intended to pursue a 
dialogue with the PLO with a view to finding 
means of practical co-operation with the 
Palestinian central body "Legitimate and Free 
Liberation Organisation". 
59. This clearly meant that Jordan, while 
recognising its responsibility towards the West 
Bank where, in spite of everything, it still 
exercises certain sovereign rights, including 
paying the salaries of civil servants, refrained 
from acting without the agreement of the PLO 
but rejected the dissident Palestinian organisa-
tion sponsored by Syria and that it aimed at 
reaching agreement with Mr. Yasser Arafat on 
a future Jordano-Palestinian confederation of 
two independent states which is in a way 
already foreshadowed by the composition of the 
Jordanian parliament. Since about 60% of the 
present population of Jordan, excluding the 
West Bank, is of Palestinian origin, such a 
confederation should not encounter opposition 
from the population of the two territories. 
60. In fact, in February 1984, Mr. Yasser 
Arafat was able to review the PLO troops 
incorporated in the Jordanian army and speak 
to them in the presence of Jordanian military 
authorities, just as he was able to meet West 
Bank representatives to the Jordanian parlia-
ment at the royal palace in Amman. However, 
Yasser Arafat, from the PLO headquarters in 
Tunis, is apparently making agreement with 
Jordan subject to a joint policy towards Israel 
and to the prior settlement of three questions: 
the status of Palestinians living in Jordan, 
granting the PLO the right to station armed 
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forces in Jordan and reactivation of the 
Jordanian parliament, which was done in 
January 1984. 
61. These are highly delicate problems since 
experience of the uprising in September 1970 
and the subsequent Lebanese crisis must make 
Jordan fear the reconstitution of a true PLO 
state in the Jordanian state. However, the 
weakening of the PLO by Syria certainly makes 
it no easier for it to lay down the law in Jordan, 
while Jordan, which has good reason to fear 
further expulsions of Arab populations by Israel 
with the serious consequences that would ensue 
for its economy and internal balance, needs to 
be on good terms with the PLO in order, one 
way or another, to achieve a settlement with 
Israel. As Crown Prince Hassan Bin Talal 
recently said, without the support of the 
Palestinians themselves, Jordan could take no 
realistic steps towards peace. He said 1984 
would be decisive since the situation in the 
occupied territories continued to develop alarm-
ingly. 
62. Now even more than in the past, it seems 
clear that peace cannot be restored in the 
Middle East solely through agreements between 
Israel and the neighbouring countries but also 
by guaranteeing Palestinians their right to a 
homeland and self-determination, at the same 
time of course guaranteeing Israel secure and 
recognised frontiers. Israel's illegal occupation 
of the West Bank since 1967 has prevented the 
restoration of any such peace. It is to be hoped 
however that the government to be formed after 
the forthcoming elections in Israel will show 
greater understanding in the light of its 
composition and the serious internal problems 
it has to solve. The first measure one is entitled 
to expect is that settlements on the West Bank 
will be terminated. 
63. These settlements, which multiplied under 
Mr. Begin's government and continued under 
Mr. Shamir's government, constitute hardly 
implicit threats to annex the West Bank and 
expulse the Arab section of the population 
which remained in that area. For instance, 
there have been large-scale displacements of 
Arab populations within the territories con-
trolled by Israel, thus helping to uproot them 
and, according to Jordanian observers, to 
prepare for their expulsion. 
64. The very nature of the state of Israel in 
fact precludes acceptance of long-term cohabi-
tation between a native Moslem and Arab 
population and an immigrant Jewish population. 
Jewish immigration in Israel now accounts for 
only a small proportion of a population whose 
rate of natural reproduction is very low, like 
that of the population of most industrialised 
countries. Conversely, the Arab population 
continues to have a very high birth rate, which 
means that in two decades it would be in the 
majority in a state of Israel to which the West 
Bank would be annexed. This in itself no doubt 
amounts to a discouragement to Israel to annex 
the West Bank formally. At the same time it 
adds further credibility to Jordanian fears that 
Israel may seek an early opportunity to provoke 
a mass exodus of West Bank Palestinians into 
Jordan. 
65. It should also be recalled that the 
Palestinians are playing an increasingly import-
ant part in the public life of many Arab 
countries and consequently, the influence of the 
Palestinians remains strong in the Arab world. 
Any policy which sought to separate the Arab 
countries from the Palestinian cause would 
therefore have little future. 
66. But the policy followed by the Israeli 
Government on the West Bank and in Gaza 
and heralded by various plans soon to be 
introduced in these territories seems to indicate 
that Israel wishes to incorporate them progres-
sively as it has already done in the case of the 
city of Jerusalem and a large area of the 
surrounding West Bank. It is clear that the 
present political crisis in Israel makes it 
impossible to anticipate what will actually 
become of these colonisation programmes aimed 
at annexation, particularly the Ben Porat plan, 
following the legislative elections to be held on 
23rd July 1984. But it is to be feared that the 
probably forced inactivity of the United States 
in the Middle East in an electoral year will be 
used by Israel to achieve its goals without 
delay, bearing in mind the very clear opposition 
shown by President Reagan's administration to 
the settlement of Israeli colonies on the West 
Bank. This opposition did not halt Israel but its 
government would probably prefer to act at a 
time when the United States is not eager to 
react. Nor is it certain that if a different 
majority were elected in Israel it would be 
willing to stop these settlements. 
67. It is clear that the annexation of territories 
occupied since 1967 would make peace in the 
Middle East impossible, compromise the Camp 
David agreements between Israel and Egypt 
and, within the PLO and all Arab countries 
prepared to negotiate with Israel, bolster the 
most intransigent elements which are the most 
strongly opposed to any negotiated solution. 
68. Conversely, agreement between the PLO 
and Jordan might considerably assist the search 
for such a solution because it would help to 
solve the prior condition which has prevented 
negotiations since 1967, i.e. recognition of the 
PLO by Israel and of Israel's right to exist by 
the Arab countries. From the moment the 
negotiations can tackle the root of the problem, 
i.e. Israel's security, the Camp David precedent 
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shows that realistic solutions might be envis-
aged. 
69. However, it would be difficult to open such 
negotiations without the intervention of a third 
power which was not disqualified out of hand 
by Arab public opinion because of its relations 
with certain countries in the region. Members 
of the General Affairs Committee who visited 
Jordan in March 1984 were able to see that in 
this respect the position of the United States in 
the area was no longer the same as when it 
sponsored the Camp David agreements. The 
way it allowed Israel to shrug off its advice in 
the matter of the settlements on the West Bank 
without this resulting in a deterioration of 
relations between Israel and the United States, 
its opposition in March 1984 to the delivery of 
American weapons, particularly anti-aircraft 
weapons, to Saudi Arabia and Jordan and the 
ambiguities of American policy in Lebanon add 
up to a loss of confidence in the Middle East. 
A new wave of anti-Americanism has emerged 
in recent months. 
70. Furthermore, the Soviet Union, which 
openly supports Syria and Libya and probably 
indirectly supplies arms to Iran through 'the 
intermediary of those two countries, is still 
suspected by many Arab countries of fanning 
the flames of present conflicts. Again, its 
hostility to Israel is too open for it to obtain a 
hearing there. Conversely, the Western Euro-
pean countries seem to enjoy a privileged 
position at present, although everyone is aware 
that their military resources are limited and 
their views far from unified. 
71. In this connection it is to be regretted that 
internal European Community preoccupations 
should have prevented the heads of state and of 
government and the ministers for foreign affairs 
from tackling, as planned, the part of the 
agenda of their meetings relating to the 
preparation of a joint position on the Middle 
East. The difficulties of the multinational force 
in Lebanon, the various views held by the 
different parties on the local situation and 
Europe's means of taking action there, memories 
of the Venice declaration which remained 
without effect, not to speak of the concern not 
to split away from the United States, would in 
any event certainly not make it easy for the 
Ten to agree on this item. 
72. It is nevertheless clear to your Rapporteur 
that European action would now be useful for 
those Arab forces which want a negotiated 
settlement with Israel, particularly as it would 
not show opposition between Europe and the 
United States but encourage the Americans not 
to view Middle East problems solely from the 
standpoint of East-West confrontation but to 
take greater account of the local situation, 
particularly the fate of the populations. Separ-
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ated from the United States, Europe would in 
fact carry no weight. It is therefore by the 
content of its message, the moderation and 
realism of its language and the reminder that 
the problems of the region are interdependent 
that Europe can and must play a rdle and 
encourage the opening of negotiations between 
Israel and its moderate Arab neighbours 
without placing the latter before an impossible 
choice between restoring peace and abandoning 
the cause of the Palestinians, still represented 
by Yasser Arafat's PLO, which would probably 
in the long run result in the victory of the most 
subversive forces throughout the Arab world. 
73. To sum up then, the Jordanian Govern-
ment is trying to reach an agreement with 
Arafat on a solution to the Palestinian problem, 
based on a confederation of two apparently 
independent states, the Palestinian state to be 
situated on the West Bank and in Gaza. 
However, such plans can get nowhere unless 
Israel will negotiate, which it will not, at least 
in present circumstances, or unless they can be 
pressed by war which, again at least at present, 
the Arab countries are in no position to pursue. 
Moreover, Jordan feels at a great disadvantage. 
It finds itself quite unsupported by the United 
States, which explains King Hussein's recent 
and much resented interview with the New 
York Times in which he scathingly attacked 
the United States. It fears that Israel may feel 
less restrained than ever during a United States 
presidential election year, and may consider it 
has a unique opportunity to further consolidate 
its hold on the West Bank, and by implementing 
the abovementioned Ben Porat plan of relocat-
ing Palestinian refugees on the West Bank 
along the Jordan River to prepare a mass 
expulsion of Palestinians into Jordan. 
74. At the same time the future of Arafat is 
far from secure. No one knows whether he 
would now secure a mandate for his policies 
from the Palestine National Council. The 
radicals much resent his visit to Cairo and his 
dialogue with Jordan. On the other hand, he 
enjoys overwhelming support on the West Bank, 
where the Palestinians see all other possibilities 
slipping away. This is shown by recent opinion 
polls conducted by the Jerusalem Post. More-
over, the Soviet Union has evidently tried to 
restrain Syria's opposition to Arafat. 
75. For the time being the question remains 
unresolved and the Palestine National Council 
has not met. A further complication must be 
remembered: the West Bank members of the 
PNC, who form a large minority and who can 
be assumed to be Arafat supporters, are 
dependent on Israeli compliance for their ability 
to attend any meeting that may be called. 
76. On the other hand, there are dangers in 
the present vacuum. The loss of credit sustained 
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by the United States for the debacle of its 
Lebanese policy has had repercussions else-
where. For one thing it has emboldened Syria 
and other countries to put pressure on President 
Mubarak to abrogate the Camp David accord. 
Moreover, radical extremists everywhere are 
given a chance to recoup their losses in Lebanon 
and become active again on the terrorist front. 
A new wave of Arab terrorism must seriously 
be feared. 
V. Conclusions 
77. The principal conclusion drawn by your 
Rapporteur from his visit to the Middle East in 
March 1984 concerns the close link between all 
the problems of the region, at one and the same 
time divided because of its heterogeneous 
populations and united because of the existence 
and increasingly strong affirmation of move-
ments which cross the frontiers of existing 
states. The widespread intermingling of the 
populations in Palestine and neighbouring 
countries and then, with the development of oil, 
the nearby Gulf states add to these transnational 
movements and the fundamentalist tendencies 
which are emerging within all communities, be 
they Christian, Jewish, Shiite or Sunnite. The 
most important of these, and probably the most 
threatening, is no doubt Islamic fundamentalism 
directed against anything coming from Europe, 
including Soviet communism, Zionism and 
American civilisation. It is liable to sweep 
through the states and moderate regimes of the 
region and lead to extremely serious clashes. 
The present war between Iran and Iraq gives 
an idea of the degree of bitterness they can 
attain. 
78. A division of the region into areas of 
influence for the two great powers would 
probably bring no solution to Middle East 
problems but would, as the present situation 
already suggests, radicalise hostilities, provide 
arms for the belligerents and heighten the 
dangers of internationalisation. That is why 
Europe, if it manages to co-ordinate its action, 
for instance in arms supplies, can still, in spite 
of the scepticism which may have been caused 
by its recent setbacks, particularly in Lebanon, 
play a rdle in the region, not by force of arms 
but by the disinterested nature of its statements. 
At present, these can but advocate: 
(i) the re-establishment of peace between 
Iraq and Iran on the basis of the status 
quo ante; 
(ii) the restoration of the Lebanese state, 
once the whole country has been 
evacuated by all foreign powers, on a 
constitutional basis previously agreed 
by all factions in the country; 
(iii) application of United Nations Resolu-
tion 242 on Palestine, thanks to the 
opening of negotiations between Israel 
and the Arab countries prepared to 
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find a compromise solution guarantee-
ing the security of Israel and self-
determination for the Palestinians. 
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Amendments 1, 2, 3 and 4 
Situation in the Middle East and European security 
AMENDMENTS 1, 2, 3 and 41 
tabled by Mr. Ctwaliere 
18th June 1984 
1. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out paragraph (ix) and insert: 
"Paying tribute to the peacekeeping task accomplished by units of the multinational buffer 
force and deploring the heavy losses suffered by two of these units ~". 
2. In the first sub-paragraph of paragraph (xi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, 
leave out "and the PLO". 
3. Leave out the second sub-paragraph of paragraph (xi) of the preamble to the draft 
recommendation and insert: 
"- recognition by Israel of the right of the Palestinian people to their own national 
homeland ; ". 
4. Leave out sub-paragraph 4 (a) of the draft recommendation proper and insert: 
"(a) recall that peace on the territory of former Palestine depends, on the one hand, on all Arab 
countries recognising Israel and its rights and, on the other hand, on Israel recognising the 
fact that the Palestinian people have the right to their own national homeland;". 
I. See 2nd sitting, 19th June 1984 (amendment I agreed to; amendments 2, 3 and 4 negatived). 
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AmendmentS 
18th June 1984 
Situation in the Middle East and European security 
AMENDMENT 5' 
tabled by Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt 
5. In sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out: 
"and warn that country that there must be no further expulsion of Arab populations from 
these territories." 
Signed: Dreyfus-Schmidt 
1. See 2nd sitting, 19th June 1984 (amendment negatived). 
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Amendment6 
Situation in the Middle East and European security 
AMENDMENT 61 
tabled by Mr. lung 
6. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out sub-paragraph 4 (b). 
1. See 2nd sitting, 19th June 1984 (amendment negatived). 
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18th June 1984 
Signed: lung 
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Political implications of European security in 1984-
reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council 
REPORT1 
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee'l 
by Mr. Thoss, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
24th May 1984 
on the political implications of European security in 1984 - reply to the 
twenty-ninth annual report of the Council 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Thoss, Rapporteur 
I. Introduction 
11. Threats to European security 
Ill. The West's uncertainties 
IV. WEU in 1984 
V. The twenty-ninth annual report of the Council 
VI. Conclusions 
I. Adopted in committee by 12 votes to 0 with 3 abstentions. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Michel (Chairman); MM. Hardy, van der Werff (Alternate: Blaauw) (Vice-Chairmen); 
Mr. Ahrens, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Berrier, Bianco, Bogaerts, Caro, Hill, Lagneau, Lagorce, Lord MeN air, MM. Martino, 
Masciadri, Maller, Prouvost, Lord Reay, MM. Reddemann, Ruet, Rumpf, van der Sanden, Spitella (Alternate: Amadei), 
Thoss, Vecchietti, Vogt, de Vries. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on the political implications of European security in 1984-
reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council 
The Assembly, 
(i) Aware of the difficulties in defence policy, not only in Europe but throughout the western world; 
(ii) Aware also of the fact that in the medium and long term the only way to end the unbridled 
armaments race and the division of Europe is to find firm answers to the many political, social, 
economic and strategic questions of our era; 
(iii) Emphasising that in present circumstances a conflict between the two blocs might lead to the 
near-total destruction of Europe; 
(iv) Aware of the overriding need for: 
- a balanced, general, effective and verified disarmament policy; 
- political control of armaments and more particularly of recourse to nuclear weapons in the 
event of a conventional attack by Warsaw Pact forces; 
- the meaningful pursuit of East-West disarmament negotiations in spite of the difficulties and 
setbacks in recent months; 
- political, economic and social co-operation between East and West in the spirit of the Helsinki 
final act; 
(v) Therefore underlining: 
- the growing importance of WEU for the security of Western Europe; 
- the need for the European members of NATO to assume greater weight but also greater 
defence responsibilities vis-a-vis their North American partners, while maintaining close co-
operation with them; 
(vi) Welcoming the fact that the Council is examining the structural and operational changes to be 
made in WEU to allow it better to fulfil the role assigned to it under the modified Brussels Treaty; 
(vii) Considering that recent developments in Europe and in transatlantic and international relations 
make this an appropriate time for such an examination; 
(viii)Considering that the way the Council now operates does not allow it to give continuous political 
impetus to the organisation; 
(ix) Welcoming the Italian proposal to hold a meeting of ministers of defence of the WEU member 
countries in Rome in October 1984 and hoping this meeting will lead to decisions likely to promote 
a European armaments policy; 
(x) Regretting that the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council does not refer to the problems 
raised by the reorganisation of WEU and that the Assembly is systematically left without knowledge 
of the Council's activities on this essential matter, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
I. Be guided at all times by the preceding considerations and general principles, particularly in the 
necessary reactivation of WEU; 
2. Examine attentively the conditions in which better use might be made of WEU in the coming 
decades to achieve in particular: 
(i) a permanent representation of member countries on the Council so that it may take more 
effective action; 
(ii) more frequent meetings, particularly at ministerial level and the continuation, after the 
Rome meeting, of regular meetings of ministers of defence in the framework of WEU, inter 
alia so as to give steady encouragement to the European armaments policy; 
(iii) a regrouping of the various WEU organs; 
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an adaptation of the Secretariat-General to the organisation's new requirements; 
an agenda for its meetings allowing consultations on all matters relating to the security of 
Western Europe and the definition of a collegial European position prior to each meeting of 
the North Atlantic Council; 
(vi) a possible enlargement of Western European Union; 
(vii) co-operation between the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee 
and the Independent European Programme Group without jeopardising the other tasks of 
the SAC, in view of the fact that paragraph 10 of the statute of the SAC specifies that 
agreements or arrangements concluded in the framework of that body remain open to 
participation by other countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation; 
(viii) an assessment of the consequences for the Agency for the Control of Armaments of 
cancelling Annex Ill to Protocol No. Ill and possible modifications to Annex IV; 
(ix) a definition of Europe's present requirements in the control of armaments and the adaptation 
of the Agency for the Control of Armaments to a different role; 
(x) the possible use of the competence acquired by the Agency for the Control of Armaments 
for the benefit of representations of member countries at international conferences on 
disarmament or the limitation of armaments and for more general research on the level of 
world armaments; 
(xi) the provision of financial means for the Assembly allowing it better to carry out its role; 
3. Keep the Assembly properly informed about the stage reached in its discussions on all matters 
relating to the future of WEU and in any event report on them either in its next annual report or 
in a supplementary report to be submitted to the Assembly on the occasion of the thirtieth 
anniversary of WEU. 
259 
DOCUMENT 979 
Explanatory Memorandum 
(s11bmitted by Mr. Thoss, Rapporte11r) 
I. Introduction 
1. The thirty-eight years since 1945 without 
armed conflict constitute the longest period of 
peace in the history of the European continent. 
2. A peace, however, which has allowed 
Eastern Europe to be separated from Western 
Europe and the political gap between the two 
parts of our continent to become wider. At the 
present time it still offers little hope of a swing 
towards more liberal regimes and an end to 
Soviet domination of the Eastern European 
countries. The human problem stemming from 
the division of the German nation into two 
states is still acute, in spite of the efforts of the 
Federal Republic to establish a pragmatic 
dialogue between the two German states. 
3. Still more serious is the fact that the degree 
of detente evident in East-West relations after 
the death of Stalin in 1953 has been seriously 
jeopardised by Soviet rearmament, non-appli-
cation of the principles defined in the Helsinki 
final act of 1975, the build-up and improvement 
of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union's refusal 
to allow the Eastern European countries to 
glean a little more independence, as evidenced 
by the situation in Poland since 1981, and the 
increase in local conflicts outside Europe, where 
the great powers have to a varying extent been 
involved. 
4. Moreover, threats of war in Europe which 
one might have hoped had gone forever, are 
again emerging and there are now widespread 
doubts about the effectiveness of a mainly 
nuclear deterrent. The improvement, diversifi-
cation, increase and miniaturisation of nuclear 
weapons on both sides encourage military 
leaders to give closer consideration to the 
possibility of hostilities in which such weapons 
might be used without necessarily resulting in 
the almost total destruction of the world. 
5. Their accuracy, like that of new conven-
tional weapons, allows speculation about the 
possibility of disarming an enemy by the 
preventive destruction of his nuclear arsenal. 
Hence, while nuclear war might have seemed 
unthinkable a few years ago, recourse to nuclear 
weapons as a means of combat is gaining a 
place in strategic thinking and consequently is 
no longer playing the purely deterrent role 
which it had for so long. 
6. The deterrent effect of nuclear weapons is 
also diminished by the very understandable 
tendency of Americans to look for strategies 
destined to postpone for as long as possible the 
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use of tactical nuclear weapons thanks to the 
use of ultramodern conventional weapons capa-
ble of containing any conventional attack. This 
is the aim of the Rogers doctrine already 
adopted by the United States general staff and 
based on technology available only to the 
United States but which it would naturally be 
quite prepared to sell to its European partners. 
7. There is little need to emphasise the gravity 
of this evolution since, on the one hand, 
particularly in view of the very high level of 
urbanisation in Europe, a purely conventional 
war might cause a still greater disaster than the 
second world war and, on the other, the risk of 
it degenerating into a nuclear war cannot even 
be ignored. 
8. Again, whether one likes it or not, the 
security system set up by the West since 1949 
has been called in question by developments in 
armaments. It no longer provides the same type 
or the same degree of guarantee of the 
maintenance of peace that it did hitherto. 
9. This is probably one explanation and to a 
great extent one justification for the consider-
able spread of pacifist, or in any event anti-
nuclear movements which have emerged in 
most European countries in the last five years 
and whose opposition has been centred on the 
deployment of American Pershing 11 or cruise 
missiles in most European countries directly 
concerned by this deployment. 
10. As noted in several reports adopted by the 
Assembly, including Mr. Mommersteeg's report 
on the problem of nuclear weapons in Europe 
(Document 918) submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments and Mr. Lagorce's report on the problems 
for European security arising from pacifism and 
neutralism (Document 934) submitted on behalf 
of the General Affairs Committee, the spread 
of pacifist movements in Western Europe, whose 
legitimacy and spontaneity were not in doubt is 
closely linked with the prospect of the deploy-
ment of new American missiles with nuclear 
warheads in several Western European countries 
and more general uneasiness perhaps stemming 
from the fact that less confidence is now placed 
in the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons. The 
spontaneity and legitimacy of these pacifist 
movements had moreover already been rightly 
underlined in the report submitted by Mr. Page 
and Mr. Dejardin on the analysis and evaluation 
of action taken on Assembly Recommendations 
383 on the problems of nuclear weapons in 
Europe and 388 on the problems for European 
security ansmg from pacifism and neutralism 
(Document 943) on behalf of the Committee 
for Relations with Parliaments. 
11. Nor is there any doubt that there is a 
connection between the fear and mistrust 
expressed by currents of public opinion, on 
differing scales, certainly, but nevertheless real 
in the two German states due to the fact that 
they would be the first and most severely 
affected by a nuclear holocaust in Europe, 
whereas this would not be the case, in Western 
Europe, of France, Italy or the United Kingdom. 
However, it is true that this connection is less 
real at the level of public authorities in the two 
German states as long as the GDR continues 
unreservedly to endorse Soviet strategy and 
bans any public expression of opinion whose 
importance cannot therefore be assessed and 
which remains without influence on the policy 
of the country. 
12. Last but not least, it is evident that the 
disturbing rise in unemployment, particularly 
among the younger generations, and the 
resulting absence of firm prospects for the 
future are not likely to put an end to this 
undeniable uneasiness. In this connection, it 
should be recalled that at the end of September 
1983 OECD experts forecast that there would 
be about 35 million unemployed in 1984 in the 
twenty-four industrialised western countries as 
a whole, i.e. an increase of 5 million as 
compared with 1982. This increase moreover 
will be reflected mainly in Western European 
statistics. 
13. There would be no point in turning a blind 
eye to these facts, and the WEU Assembly has 
had the merit of tackling them head-on, 
whatever opinion one may have about the 
political and military conclusions it has drawn. 
14. This trend in the concept of deterrence, 
with all its possible effects on the will of the 
European or American nations to pursue the 
task undertaken in 1949 by the signatories of 
the North Atlantic Treaty, cannot and in any 
event must not be glossed over by organisations 
which claim to ensure the security of Western 
Europe. It has certainly not been overlooked by 
our governments, and the concern to which it 
has given rise can be discerned in North 
Atlantic Council communiques in the last ten 
years. There are still more signs of this concern 
in addresses by representatives of several of our 
governments to the Assembly in recent years, 
particularly the Federal German and French 
Governments since 1980. 
15. The purpose of the present report is to try 
to examine the possible consequences of the 
weakening of the traditional notion of nuclear 
deterrence and the emergence of new reactions 
among European public opinion about Western 
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Europe's security and, more particularly, what 
indications it can provide for the course WEU 
should follow in the coming years in every area 
of its activities. 
16. Everyone knows that, as from the year 
2004, any countries wishing to do so will have 
the right to denounce their adhesion to the 
modified Brussels Treaty, although nothing at 
the pr~sent juncture indicates that any signatory 
country intends to make use of this right. 
However, it seems that some countries are 
considering giving the European Communities 
and their parliamentary assembly, in the 
defence sphere, perhaps not responsibilities but 
at least a course to follow and activities with 
regard to Europe's security. They wish, in 2004 
in any event and perhaps even before that date, 
the Communities to extend their action in the 
sector which has so far belonged to WEU. 
17. It is also known that these views, largely 
endorsed by the Colombo-Genscher proposal in 
1982, have met with strong opposition, particu-
larly from the United Kingdom and France 
which, for reasons connected with the type and 
means of their defence policies, seem opposed 
to giving defence-related responsibilities to 
Community bodies. Furthermore, Ireland's 
accession to a European security system seems 
most doubtful as long as the question of Ulster 
has not been solved in a manner it considers 
acceptable, Denmark's accession is not very 
likely at the present juncture and it is also 
hardly probable that Greece's partners would 
be prepared to accept it in such a system as 
long as its differences with Turkey have not 
been settled. It therefore seems very problem-
atical to envisage organising European security 
in the ten-power framework, at least for quite 
some time to come. 
18. As noted in 1981 in Mr. De Poi's report 
on European union and WEU (Document 894), 
WEU has a number of trump cards of its own 
which no other organisation will have unless 
the responsibilities conferred on WEU under 
the modified Brussels Treaty are officially 
transferred to it. Not only has this situation not 
changed since, but some of those who formerly 
called for the de facto transfer of WEU's 
activities to the Ten today recognise that the 
major part of the modified Brussels Treaty, 
particularly its Article V, is, now as in the past, 
one of the principal bases of European security. 
They would be reluctant for it to be deprived of 
content if similar guarantees could not be given 
to Western Europe through other instruments. 
19. This is the case in particular of the 
Belgian Minister for External Relations, Mr. 
Leo Tindemans, who, writing in Le Monde on 
23rd December 1983, said: 
"I think that reflection among our govern-
ments on strategic concepts and certain 
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forms of co-operation in defence matters is 
today possible and desirable. Not everyone 
in the Community shares this opinion. We 
cannot therefore use the framework for 
political co-operation which is the natural 
extension of the Community. This leaves 
WEU, a long-standing organisation whose 
structures and possibilities are largely 
unused. I personally see no reason why we 
should not try to develop a form of co-
operation in politico-military matters in 
WEU, provided the organisation itself is 
open to all the members of the Community 
that accept its rules. 
Such a trend would, at least provisionally, 
introduce a 'differentiated' notion of Europe 
in the security field, similar to the one 
which the European monetary system has 
established in the monetary field. This 
notion obviously involves dangers for over-
all cohesion. But provided it excludes only 
countries which exclude themselves and 
provided a serious effort is made in practice 
to bring the various structures as close 
together as possible it seems to me that 
there is the least harm in this course. 
Europe can no longer allow itself to miss 
any opportunity whatsoever on the pretext 
that it is not quite what the most 
demanding of us might wish." 
20. However, this does not yet mean that 
WEU in its present form is able to continue to 
play that role, not just after 2004 but even 
today, if certain aspects of its activities are not 
reviewed with a view to adapting them to the 
new requirements of the international situation 
and of western security. 
21. The question of adapting WEU's activities 
to new circumstances has already been raised 
in the Assembly's replies to the annual reports 
of the Council for 1981 (reports submitted by 
Mr. Prussen on the application of the Brussels 
Treaty - reply to the twenty-seventh annual 
report of the Council, Document 908, on behalf 
of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments and by Mr. Vecchietti on the 
political activities of the Council - reply to the 
twenty-seventh annual report of the Council, 
Document 913, on behalf of the General Affairs 
Committee) and for 1982 (report submitted by 
Mr. Ahrens on the political activities of the 
Council - reply to the twenty-eighth annual 
report of the Council, Document 944, on behalf 
of the General Affairs Committee and the 
report submitted again by Mr. Prussen on the 
application of the Brussels Treaty- reply to the 
twenty-eighth annual report of the Council, 
Document 948). 
22. However, the very nature of these reports, 
being closely linked with the activities of the 
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Council, together with the reluctance constantly 
shown by the Council - but not by all its 
members- since the outset to go to the root of 
the problems and openly discuss its duties have 
not allowed the problem to be broached in full 
for quite a long time. This is what your 
Rapporteur will try to do in this report. 
23. It is gratifying that the WEU Council for 
its part at last undertook to tackle this question 
in 1983 and it is to be regretted that the 
Assembly has not been better informed of this 
action which would probably have allowed it to 
form a more considered opinion about the 
questions under discussion. Nevertheless, what 
your Rapporteur has learned about the preoc-
cupations of certain ·governments, particularly 
the views of the French Government as 
presented to the Assembly by the Defence 
Minister, Mr. Charles Hernu, in December 
1983, and from certain articles in the European 
press in the first weeks of 1984, gives some 
guidance in this respect and allows him to hope 
that his approach runs parallel to that of the 
Council and can thus provide the Assembly 
with an opportunity of usefully expressing its 
opinion. He is comforted in this hope by the 
statements made by the ministers concerned in 
most the member countries in February and 
March 1984. 
11. Threats to European security 
24. When the Paris Agreements modifying 
the Brussels Treaty were negotiated in 1954, 
there was perhaps only one real threat to the 
continent of Europe: the Soviet Union's military 
strength, in terms of numbers of armed forces 
and conventional weapons. Consequently, it was 
essential that the rivalries between European 
nations up to the second world war be overcome 
so that their armed forces might be linked to 
ensure their common security and thus make 
the most of the ultimate guarantee afforded by 
the Atlantic Alliance and American nuclear 
strength. 
25. The kind of threat which Europe might 
have to face has since changed considerably. 
The development of the Atlantic Alliance and 
the continuous presence of American forces on 
the European continent have made Soviet 
leaders understand that they could not hope to 
distrupt the independence of the Western 
European countries without the risk of unleash-
ing a world war in which it might be difficult 
to avoid using nuclear weapons. In other words, 
the West's system of deterrence has played its 
part. However, the increase in Soviet nuclear 
strength led at the same time to the establish-
ment of a balance which allowed the Soviet 
Union to impose its domination firmly on the 
eastern part of Europe. 
26. Thus Europe as a whole was caught in a 
division inflicted upon it without any possibility 
of evading the consequences of a confrontation 
between the two blocs, of which both sides are 
part and parcel whether they like it or not, and 
any attempts so far to change the situation by 
tipping the balance in favour of one or other of 
the two blocs have failed. 
27. The Soviet Union has admittedly had to 
face a number of difficulties in the part of 
Europe it dominates but it is now more aware 
than in the past of the disadvantages of using 
armed force to solve them. Although the crises 
in the German Democratic Republic and 
Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 
1968 were fairly quickly settled through direct 
Soviet armed intervention, this has not been the 
case for Poland since 1981. The Soviet Union 
has so far avoided sending in its army to keep 
Poland under its domination, but it has not 
been able to avert the permanent threat of 
subversion in a country whose geographical 
position places it at the centre of its defence 
system in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union's 
doubts about the willingness, not of the 
governments, but of the peoples of the countries 
it dominates, may help to detract it from taking 
military action against Western Europe with 
armies of the Warsaw Pact. 
28. Moreover, since December 1979, the 
Soviet Union has been involved in military 
operations in Afghanistan. Although on the 
Soviet scale the number of forces engaged in 
that country is not high, possibly not more than 
115,000 men, the fact that no progress has 
been made towards the restoration of peace in 
the last four years must be a source of political 
and military concern for the Soviet leaders. 
They cannot neglect the danger of hostilities 
spreading to Afghanistan's neighbours or the 
fact that China cannot remain indifferent to 
developments in Central Asia. They must also 
take account of the negative effects this matter 
may have on international public opinion and 
among the Moslem population in the Soviet 
Union. These considerations must obviously 
encourage them to be even more cautious in 
their European policy. 
29. Offsetting these factors is the considerable 
growth in and diversification of Soviet nuclear 
weapons. Although the SALT agreements 
allowed the establishment of a relative balance 
in the long-range nuclear weapons of the United 
States and the Soviet Union, the great majority 
of western military experts feel the same is not 
true for tactical nuclear weapons nor, above all, 
continental-range launchers. According to these 
experts, the deployment of SS-20 missiles in 
Eastern Europe has now given the Soviet Union 
a near monopoly of medium-range weapons and 
consequently the possibility, in the event of 
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hostilities, of mastering escalation and selecting 
the type of forces it might use. 
30. When making these comparisons, it is 
probably not possible to gloss over the undeni-
able United States superiority over the Soviet 
Union in practically all branches of basic 
technology relating to nuclear weapons nor to 
ignore the extra-European military effort of 
Japan and China and probably - as long as 
Western Europe is protected by American 
strategic nuclear weapons - the threat repre-
sented by the SS-20s is limited in strictly 
military terms. But the Soviet Union derives 
considerable political advantages from the SS-
20s deployed in Europe by limiting the 
possibilities of reaction by European countries 
to actions such as the invasion of Afghanistan 
or pressure on Poland. 
31. The pressure brought to bear on the 
western countries by the SS-20s is therefore 
still considerable and Mr. Andropov's recent 
proposals for including French and British 
nuclear forces among the weapons to be taken 
into account in the Geneva INF negotiations in 
August 1983 were also intended to make the 
most of this advantage in order to undermine 
the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance, deprive 
the European members of the alliance of much 
of their political influence and make the United 
States, from the very start of hostilities, face up 
to the impossible choice between a conventional 
war in which the Soviet Union would be in a 
position of force and all-out nuclear war, 
whereas the independent powers of decision 
conferred upon the United Kingdom and France 
by their nuclear weapons allows these two 
European states to have a word to say in these 
questions with all the advantages that involves 
for the deterrent capability of the alliance. 
32. In this event, what would be the point of 
the American flexible response concept in 
Europe and how can one then be surprised that 
certain French political circles finally conclude 
that the idea of including French and British 
nuclear weapons in the calculation of the 
number of medium-range missiles is no more 
than a veiled but concerted attempt by the 
Soviet Union and the United States to bring 
France fully back under the American high 
command, thereby strengthening their respec-
tive positions in the two Europes. Admittedly, 
in absolute terms these forces do not add much 
to the American arsenal but they contribute to 
deterrence by creating an additional factor of 
uncertainty. It would therefore be vain to have 
them included in United States-Soviet negotia-
tions, but if their existence allowed two Western 
European states to take part in the negotiations 
directly it might meet the need to give 
Europeans a say in the essential chapter dealing 
with the level of fundamental weapons in 
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Europe. However this may be, the United 
States did not agree to include British and 
French nuclear weapons in the calculations 
which were to serve as a basis for the bilateral 
United States-Soviet negotiations. 
33. Soviet superiority in this decisive field is 
particularly serious since, although the deterrent 
strategy of the countries of the Atlantic Alliance 
has paved the way in Europe for starting a 
policy of detente in disarmament and co-
operation, particularly in the framework of the 
CSCE, areas of instability have increased in the 
rest of the world. The Middle East continues to 
present the most serious dangers to international 
peace following the Iranian revolution because 
of the attraction which the Iranian theocratic 
regime seems to have for a large part of the 
Islamic world. The prolongation of the war 
between Iran and Iraq, where there is a strong 
risk of it spreading all round the Gulf, has to 
be added to the worsening of the conflict in the 
Middle East due to the invasion of Lebanon by 
the Syrians and by the Israelis and the activity 
of Palestinian resistance movements throughout 
this part of the world. So far, the Soviet Union 
has been careful not to intervene, at least 
directly, in all these questions, certainly encour-
aged to be cautious by the fact that more than 
a quarter of its population is Moslem and might 
feel concerned by conflicts which are fundamen-
tally ideological and theological and at the 
same time disturbing. 
34. A second area of instability is on the 
African continent where the Soviet Union has 
also refrained from intervening directly but 
where its allies, particularly Cuba, have sent 
military forces which are large if compared with 
African armies. The whole of southern Africa 
is unstable and conflict-rife, and Colonel 
Kadhafi's actions have made Libya a very 
disturbing factor in northern Africa. In .summer 
1983, the Libyan army provided considerable 
military support for the rebellion spreading in 
northern Chad and tried to use this rebellion to 
extend its influence to the heart of the African 
continent. 
35. It would certainly be a great exaggeration 
to claim that the Soviet Union is behind Colonel 
Kadhafi's undertakings. But it is clear that no 
great power can remain indefinitely outside 
conflicts in which its interests may one day be 
jeopardised. The destabilisation of Africa is 
probably not contrary to Soviet interests. 
36. Finally, Central America is becoming 
increasingly an area of conflict and instability. 
There is growi~g unrest and the governments, 
whatever their political inclinations, are having 
difficulty in finding enough support to maintain 
internal peace. So far, the influence of these 
internal conflicts has been limited and there has 
been no sign of direct Soviet intervention. 
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37. But there too Cuba is playing a significant 
role by supplying weapons for the revolutionary 
movements which have broken out in many 
countries and, insofar as the United States 
considers its own security to be threatened by 
any external intervention in matters relating to 
the American continent, the risk of internation-
alisation of the growing number of conflicts in 
Central and Latin America is particularly 
dangerous. 
38·. One must often question the wisdom of an 
American policy of supporting conservative and 
dictatorial regimes in countries where the 
economic and social situation of the people is 
deplorable and where it would consequently 
appear that the emancipation of the peoples lies 
in far-reaching political change. But one cannot 
forget how important the United States con-
siders this area to be from a security point of 
view. 
39. In disarmament matters, it is to be hoped 
that the government formed in the Soviet Union 
after the death of Mr. Andropov will show a 
more positive attitude than its predecessors. The 
latter, by accepting the proposals for a final act 
submitted by the western countries for the 
Madrid conference on security and co-operation 
in Europe, allowed the conference to achieve 
positive results, however, one of which should 
be the opening in 1984 of a conference on 
disarmament in Europe which should enable 
substantial progress to be made in areas where 
so far no serious result had been obtained. 
40. It is yet too soon to anticipate the impact 
of the first conversations between the new 
General Secretary of the Soviet Communist 
Party, Mr. Chernenko, and his western partners, 
but information available points to a determi-
nation to succeed which so far seemed to be 
lacking in Soviet diplomacy in these matters in 
spite of the fact that when NATO started 
deploying the first Pershing 11 and cruise 
missiles the Soviets broke off the Geneva 
negotiations on strategic armaments. 
41. Thus, it now appears that it may be 
possible for both conventional and nuclear 
disarmament which, even in 1982, might still 
have seemed to be mainly an instrument of 
propaganda for the Soviet Union, to be the 
subject of serious negotiations between the 
eastern and western partners. 
42. Conversely, for more than fifteen years 
there has been a considerable growth in Soviet 
naval strength which is now able to challenge 
the American fleet for first place in the world. 
In particular, it has built more nuclear-propelled 
submarines than the United States and the 
western countries all together. The latest 
information obtained about Soviet armaments 
indicates that these submarines have a better 
performance than western submarines, particu-
larly thanks to their ability to dive to great 
depths, allowing them to escape detection and 
destruction in the present state of technology, 
and above all thanks to the protection of a 
double hull which makes them far less 
vulnerable to anti-submarine weapons. 
43. The Soviet Union has also built aircraft-
carriers, although limited to a sub-sonic aircraft 
capability, and has fleets permanently deployed 
on all the world's seas, including the Indian 
Ocean. These fleets often include troop-carriers, 
at least in areas where the Soviet Union may 
have to conduct land operations with the 
support of air forces large in size but of limited 
capability. Thus the Soviet Union is now able 
to send in troops, equipment and combat 
aircraft anywhere in the world at short notice. 
Finally, it has just started building a first 
high-capability aircraft-carrier which, in a few 
years' time, should increase its capability 
considerably. 
44. Moreover, at the present time, it seems 
more important for the Soviet Union to have 
access from the Norwegian Sea to the Atlantic 
and hence to the rest of the oceans than for it 
to be able to reach the central part of the 
European continent. Thus, the British Isles were 
relatively remote from Soviet threat in 1954. 
This allowed the United Kingdom to devote the 
major part of its defence effort to the collective 
security of mainland Europe. But it is now 
facing a far more serious air and naval threat, 
which has led a number of British observers to 
consider a redeployment of forces and a new 
direction for its military and naval effort at the 
expense of its army of the Rhine. 
45. Two editorials in The Times on 13th and 
17th August 1983 provoked a most interesting 
discussion on this matter in which a number of 
persons known for their knowledge of security 
and defence matters took part. This discussion 
brought to light the far-reaching repercussions 
the military disengagement of certain countries 
might have on the overall deployment of 
western forces in Europe. The maintenance of 
Belgian and Netherlands forces beyond the 
Rhine would inevitably be in doubt and the 
Federal Republic might have to review its 
defence system in depth. 
46. It is admittedly more than probable that 
such ideas will not, at any rate in the immediate 
future, lead to political and military decisions. 
Reactions to the Times articles show clearly 
that no one is prepared to face such conse-
quences. But there is a general tendency, 
particularly among the larger western military 
powers, no longer to consider Central Europe as 
almost the only place where their security 
might be threatened. 
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47. Several years ago, the United States 
started building up a rapid deployment force 
for intervention anywhere in the world, particu-
larly in the Middle East. Part of this force was 
formed from troops stationed in Europe. In 
March 1984, the former Secretary of State, 
Henry Kissinger, raised, in an interview in Time 
magazine, the idea of a partial disengagement 
of American forces assigned to NATO. This 
idea has not yet been taken up again by the 
American authorities who, on the contrary, 
have endeavoured to reassure their European 
partners who were disturbed at this prospect. 
48. France, which has forces in several African 
countries and in Lebanon and which has been 
involved in Chad since August 1983, has 
already decided to withdraw some of its troops 
from the Federal Republic to combine them 
with its overseas intervention forces in a new 
corps of some 47,000 men, which would be 
made particularly mobile so that it may, 
depending on circumstances, intervene either 
outside Europe or in the Federal Republic 
because, for some years to come, some of the 
means earmarked for the rapid deployment 
force will have to be assigned jointly to ,this 
force and.to the first French army. 
49. There would be no point in deploring these 
redeployments of forces by several WEU 
member countries and it would be unfair insofar 
as these forces are in fact intended to meet 
threats which concern Europe even if they occur 
outside our continent. But it must be ascertained 
that such redeployments are not made at the 
expense of Europe's security. 
50. It may be possible to ensure security with 
fewer troops. It cannot be ensured if WEU 
member countries' confidence in each other 
weakens, in other words if redeployments are 
not discussed frankly between the European 
partners of the Atlantic Alliance. The modified 
Brussels Treaty makes such discussion compul-
sory before British forces are withdrawn from 
the mainland of Europe. This is not the case for 
the other signatory countries. However, the 
need for great confidence between partners in 
a common security policy makes understanding 
between them in this connection essential. 
France and the Federal Republic seem to have 
drawn the full consequences of this by deciding 
in October 1983 to extend their bilateral 
relations to defence matters. The partners of 
these two countries in WEU now have to face 
the question of whether they prefer to see this 
bilateralism develop or to use the WEU 
framework to extend such consultations to the 
Seven. 
51. The new situation which has emerged in 
recent years is assessed differently not only 
among the various countries of the Atlantic 
Alliance but even within each country. Almost 
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everywhere in Western Europe public opinion is 
now deeply divided in assessing the nature and 
importance of the threats today. Thus in most 
countries in this area there is a strong current 
which, without denying outright the existence 
of a Soviet threat, seems to consider that the 
threat is largely caused by western policy, in 
armaments at least, and that the best way to 
avert it would be to take steps, prior to 
negotiations, to restore the confidence of the 
Soviet leaders. It seems difficult, however, to 
link purely psychological and hence less tangible 
considerations with an assessment of the Soviet 
threat which depends above all on the size of 
the forces and the armaments deployed. 
52. This approach is behind opposition to the 
deployment of American Pershing 11 missiles in 
the Federal Republic or of cruise missiles in 
certain countries. Conversely, the governments 
of those countries, with the support of an 
unchallenged and unchallengeable electoral 
majority, whichever party may be in power, 
have said they are prepared to apply the NATO 
twofold decision of December 1979 by author-
ising such deployment in the case of the so-
called INF negotiations failing to come to an 
agreement before the end of 1983. In this way 
they showed their conviction that the Soviet 
threat was undiminished and that it was 
impossible to disarm without negotiated agree-
ments, otherwise Europe's security, already 
weakened by the unilateral deployment of SS-
20s by the Soviet Union, would be seriously 
jeopardised. They considered the main problem 
was not to appease Soviet fears but to maintain 
deterrence based on the balance of forces. 
53. Assessments of the nature and importance 
of the threats to peace in Europe, the 
development of Soviet naval strength and the 
increasing number of overseas conflicts also 
vary between western states and give rise to 
controversy in public opinion. Generally speak-
ing, the United States is more convinced than 
its European partners that Soviet initiatives are 
behind most disturbances outside Europe. 
Without denying that the Soviet Union often 
tries to take advantage of conflicts to increase 
its influence or to undermine western solidarity, 
European members of the alliance often seem 
more reluctant to take such a view. They 
believe rather that the often justified discontent 
of the local populations in Iran, Africa and 
Latin America is the principal cause of such 
troubles. However, some consider that the best 
way to preserve international peace is to refrain 
from any initiative likely to internationalise 
such conflicts, while others consider that 
European action, if legally justified and effec-
tively conducted in practice might solve some 
of the crises before internationalisation. 
54. Often, these are not positions of doctrine 
but assessments of specific situations which vary 
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in the light of circumstances. It is normal for 
countries which once had colonial strength and 
responsibilities to be more aware than others of 
the local aspects of such crises, particularly in 
areas where they had, and sometimes still have, 
special interests. For instance, this was the case 
for the United Kingdom in the Falklands during 
the 1982 crisis and France in Chad in 1983. 
55. There could be no question of other 
European powers taking part in fighting over 
these territories. However, insofar as forces 
were withdrawn from Europe to be sent to 
remote areas on these occasions, the partners of 
the United Kingdom and France could not 
consider the measures taken by their allies to 
be of no concern to them. 
56. When the Assembly adopted a recommen-
dation in November 1982 on the Falklands 
crisis (Document 935), submitted by Mr. 
Cavaliere on behalf of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments, it showed 
clearly the importance for all the Western 
European countries of any overseas military 
commitment by one of them because it meant 
moving forces directly or indirectly assigned to 
the defence of the European continent or of 
maritime approaches vital for its security and 
because the solidarity of these countries in the 
defence field, as defined in Article V of the 
modified Brussels Treaty, required a degree of 
political solidarity, the exercise of which is 
provided for in Article VIII of the treaty. This 
is in no way limited to purely European affairs 
and the practice of holding political consulta-
tions between members of the European 
Community is a serious step towards applying 
the modified Brussels Treaty, even if in many 
respects insufficient. 
57. Nevertheless, Western Europe, like the 
Atlantic Alliance, although having all the 
necessary institutional elements for consulta-
tions on matters relating to its security, even 
outside Europe, has not managed to apply them 
satisfactorily. Everything indicates that coun-
tries believing they should take action did so in 
almost every case without effective prior 
consultations with their partners and therefore 
obtained from them no more than verbal 
indications of support which had little impact. 
58. The Falklands war, in which arms pur-
chased in WEU member countries were used 
against one of them, testifies to the inadequacy 
of European consultations. Although it might 
have seemed inevitable in 1954 that certain 
European powers should retain total freedom of 
action overseas in respect of their WEU 
partners, this no longer corresponds to the 
realities of today. 
59. Similarly, Mr. Andropov's request in 
August 1983 that British and French nuclear 
forces be included in the calculation of weapons 
which Soviet SS-20s are supposed to counter 
makes it particularly necessary to reach agree-
ment between WEU countries on defining a 
joint position towards the INF negotiations and 
furthermore that, for nuclear weapons, the 
negotiations should be conducted on the western 
side by the United States alone. Naturally, the 
necessary consultations between Europeans and 
Americans on this subject are held in the 
framework of NATO, but if a European voice 
is to make itself heard in NATO, the framework 
of WEU seems an obvious choice for concerting 
positions. It is to be hoped that the meeting of 
European Defence Ministers to be held in 
Rome in autumn 1984 will launch this 
procedure. 
60. Indeed, the more Europe hesitates and is 
divided, the more the United States will feel 
justified in keeping to its own views on the 
subject. Compared with the reluctance so far of 
the United Kingdom and France to allow 
weapons which they consider to be purely 
national to be included in the Geneva negotia-
tions, on 2nd September 1983 the Netherlands 
States-General passed a motion calling for the 
inclusion of these weapons in the enumeration 
of western missiles. 
61. A similar attitude, moreover, was adopted 
on German television on 24th September 1983 
by the leader of the SPD parliamentary 
opposition in the Federal Republic, Hans-
Jochen Vogel, when he also quoted the Italian 
Prime Minister, Bettino Craxi, as stating that, 
after all, these 162 British and French missiles 
were not on the moon. In autumn 1983, certain 
British leaders, in line moreover with the United 
States Vice-President, Mr. Bush, and, for the 
East, Mr. Ceausescu, admitted that if certain 
conditions were met in the future and, in 
particular, a substantial reduction in the arms 
of the two superpowers, the question might be 
tackled. But the British, French and Americans 
agree that this time has not yet come. 
62. In this matter there is moreover some 
confusion, principally due to the evolution of 
the relevant terminology. At the outset, the 
Soviet Union classified French and British 
nuclear weapons as strategic whereas only 
recently has the Soviet Union classified them as 
medium-range missiles. 
63. As is known, to this is added some 
irritation in many European political circles 
about not being kept informed of what was 
really said during informal contacts in Geneva 
in July 1983 during the only too famous "forest 
stroll" taken by the American Paul Nitze and 
the Soviet Kvitsinsky. These contacts probably 
bore little resemblance to the idea which these 
political circles had formed of the serious nature 
of the negotiations required by the twofold 
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decision taken by NATO in 1979. As might be 
expected, the two spokesmen were finally 
disavowed by their governments. 
64. Such conflicting positions and contradic-
tions are obviously most likely to weaken 
Europe's standing in the world and give the 
Soviet Union the impression that skilful exploi-
tation of dissent between European countries 
could shatter western cohesion. It is therefore 
of the utmost importance for such differences 
of opinion to be overcome if the deterrence 
exercised by the Atlantic Alliance is to be 
maintained, just as differences of opinion 
between one or other Western European country 
between 1949 and 1954, making it impossible 
to set up a European defence system, were 
settled by the Paris Agreements modifying the 
1948 Brussels Treaty. 
Ill. The West's uncertainties 
65. The western world cannot tackle the 
question of its security without taking account 
of the economic recession during the past ten 
years. In spite of significant signs of recovery in 
1983, some aspects at least of the crisis seem 
liable to persist for a long time to come: high 
unemployment, monetary instability, excessive 
foreign debts by many countries, high interest 
rates, low growth rates and state budgetary 
deficits. In particular, there are fears of the 
possible repercussions on the international 
economy of some of the debtor countries going 
bankrupt. 
66. All these factors weigh heavily on the 
resources available to member countries of the 
Atlantic Alliance for their security efforts. In 
1980, they agreed on the principle of an 
increase of 3% per year in their defence budgets 
in constant values. None of them has yet 
managed to respect this undertaking. Several 
have even reduced their defence budgets. 
67. There would probably be little point in 
deploring this situation. It is not for lack of 
good will that the western countries failed to 
keep their promises but because of economic 
stresses beyond their control. Increasing taxa-
tion or reducing other state expenditure to meet 
defence costs would probably have made the 
crisis worse and led to social and political 
unrest whose effects on foreign and defence 
policy would perhaps have been even more 
serious. The fact that at present the threats are 
of more immediate concern to areas on other 
continents makes it even more difficult to 
convince the electorate in democratic regimes 
of the extent of the sacrifices needed to 
strengthen military potentials. 
68. Admittedly, the Soviet Union also has 
many economic problems, but it is still capable 
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of allocating for defence purposes a proportion 
of its gross national product which is variously 
estimated at between 12 and 14%, whereas the 
members of the Atlantic Alliance spend only 
1.8 to 6% of their GNP on defence. This is due 
to the existence in the Soviet Union of a 
totalitarian, highly-centralised, one-party 
regime which can keep the major part of the 
population largely in ignorance of budgetary 
realities and of living conditions in the rest of 
the world. 
69. Logically, there can be no question of the 
West paying for its defence effort, however 
necessary, at the expense of the very values 
which it wishes to preserve and defend. 
Moreover, it must not be forgotten that a 
comparison only between the respective per-
centages of GNP earmarked for defence 
purposes is not enough: account must of course 
also be taken of the total amounts of the GNP 
to which they relate. Nevertheless, it is in 
difficult conditions that the West has to face up 
to external threats which are probably not so 
easy to discern as in the past. Prevailing 
differences between Europe and the United 
States over the measures to be taken to meet 
the economic crisis have grown deeper in recent 
years and have led to an increase in mutual 
mistrust. In the United States, there is greater 
lassitude in face of the burden of maintaining 
American forces in Europe and, in Europe, 
hostile reactions to United States policy have 
been expressed to a certain extent in the spread 
of agitation against the deployment of Pershing 
11 and cruise missiles. 
70. These reactions could probably be over-
come more easily if Europe had stronger, more 
concerted positions to defend its viewpoints, 
particularly in the framework of NATO. Ever 
since that organisation was created, it has 
reflected an imbalance between American power 
and that of each of its European members. The 
imbalance is moreover a fact, particularly in 
defence matters because Europe's security is 
closely linked with the participation of the 
United States in its defence. All the European 
governments recognise this, including the 
French Government, as President Mitterrand 
recalled in his speech to the Netherlands 
States-General on 7th February 1984. 
71. The development by the United Kingdom 
and then France of national nuclear weapons 
has not changed this situation very much since 
neither of those countries is able - nor do they 
claim to be able - to offer their European 
partners the support of a credible deterrent. 
Although in the 1975 Ottawa declaration, the 
members of the alliance acknowledged that 
these two countries' nuclear weapons made a 
contribution to common security and deterrence 
for the benefit of all, neither of them has ever 
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claimed that they could take the place of 
American conventional and nuclear forces. 
Quite the contrary: both have encouraged their 
partners to agree to the deployment of new 
American missiles in Europe since no agreement 
was reached in the Geneva negotiations by the 
end of 1983. 
72. But we must have no illusions, there can 
be no truly European approach to defence 
without a minimum of agreement on what the 
United Kingdom and French nuclear forces 
represent for the security of Europe. There will 
be no possibility of organising a European pillar 
of defence if these two countries fail to define 
jointly the conditions for resorting to nuclear 
warfare on European territory, if only to remove 
any ambiguity about the interpretation of 
Article V of the Brussels Treaty. Admittedly, it 
seems difficult to imagine allies sharing the 
ultimate decision to use nuclear weapons, but 
to consecrate the sanctuary doctrine would 
make it impossible to organise European 
security. An intermediate formula is even less 
easy to find in that uncertainty about the cases 
in which nuclear weapons would be used adds 
to the deterrent effect of such weapons. Yet 
since autumn 1983 it seems that France has 
agreed to examine this question with the 
Federal Republic, obviously the country the 
most concerned, and its overtures for reactivat-
ing WEU signify that it is prepared to do 
likewise with its other European partners. 
73. Ever since the Atlantic Alliance was set 
up, there has been a desire to establish a truly 
European defence organisation in the framework 
of the alliance in order to balance American 
influence. This was an aim of the proposed 
European Defence Community, the 1954 Paris 
conference which modified the 1948 Brussels 
Treaty and the subsequent creation of the 
NATO Eurogroup and of the Independent 
European Programme Group for matters relat-
ing to armaments. 
74. However, some European members of the 
Atlantic Alliance were afraid a strong develop-
ment of a European nucleus in the alliance 
might give the Americans a reason or a pretext 
for backing out of their commitments and, in 
particular, for reducing the level of their forces 
in Europe or even repatriating them, which 
would have deprived NATO of much of its 
deterrent power. Certainly no American govern-
ment has ever used this threat but isolationist 
trends have been constantly evident among 
American public opinion and Congress, particu-
larly after the serious setback in Vietnam which 
severely shook the Americans' confidence in 
their government and led them to wonder about 
the success of interventions abroad. 
75. Moreover, because many European were 
afraid that a withdrawal of American conven-
tional forces from Europe would give the Soviet 
Union serious doubts about the firmness of the 
United States' intention to use its nuclear 
weapons if necessary to counter a massive 
Soviet attack in Europe, they preferred direct 
dialogues between each European state and the 
United States to the formation of a true 
European defence entity. In other words, they 
preferred, so to speak, the non-existence of 
Europe to the risk of Europe being separated 
from the United States. In many respects such 
a choice was understandable. But on the one 
hand it encouraged certain European countries, 
within the limits of their resources, to seek a 
national solution to the problem of their 
security, on the other hand it prevented any 
European organisation concerned with security 
problems from assuming true responsibilities 
and finally in many countries it led to reactions 
which may be interpreted as pacifist but whose 
success would perhaps not so much consolidate 
peace as diminish Europe's security. 
76. These were not the only obstacles to the 
political and military organisation of Europe, 
particularly in recent years. When the main 
Soviet threat was levelled at Central Europe, 
all the countries in the area felt directly 
concerned by a European defence organisation. 
These countries have some geographical homo-
geneity since they constitute a fairly compact 
whole and the density of their populations in 
small areas raises special defence problems, 
making it almost unthinkable, for instance, to 
conduct warfare in which tactical nuclear 
weapons would be used on their territory in 
view of the incalculable devastation that would 
result. Likewise, the vulnerability of urban 
areas, their lines of supply and of communica-
tions, means that their defence cannot be 
planned in the same way as that of open spaces 
and civil defence raises very delicate problems. 
These are certainly questions whose implications 
Europeans in this area should examine and the 
framework of WEU would be particularly 
suitable for such joint reflection. 
77. Conversely, the Scandinavian countries in 
the north and certain Mediterranean countries 
such as Turkey and Greece in the south could 
not expect a great deal from a European 
defence organisation and quite rightly consider 
that only the United States would be able to 
ensure their security. Defence Europe could 
therefore hardly assume the dimensions of the 
Council of Europe or of the European Com-
munity enlarged to include Ireland, Denmark 
and Greece. Only the seven WEU member 
countries could muster similar views on the 
main issue, i.e. the security of the central region 
of Europe including the western Mediterranean. 
Once the principal challenges to international 
peace shifted out of Europe, this situation 
changed. Various links between European 
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countries and their former colonies, special 
alliances and concerns or interests specific to 
certain countries led them to involve their forces 
in conflicts elsewhere. 
78. Even if all the Western European countries 
have a common interest in maintaining peace 
throughout the world and respect for interna-
tional law, there may be differences between 
those who consider that the best basis for peace 
lies in defence of the status quo by every means 
and those who think undue conservatism is 
liable in the long run to worsen conflicts and 
make a solution difficult. For instance, certain 
European countries, including France, were 
against United States action in Vietnam and 
Latin America. 
79. Moreover, action by members, particularly 
European members, of the Atlantic Alliance 
outside the European continent inevitably lead 
to a reduction in their share of joint defence in 
Europe. Even when fully justified in interna-
tional law and morally, it is often difficult to 
foresee their longer-term effects on the defence 
of Europe. Thus, the Royal Navy was weakened 
by its losses during the Falklands campaign 
and no one can at present foresee the possible 
consequences of the deployment of French 
forces in Chad. 
80. Your Rapporteur does not intend to 
approve or condemn either of these operations 
but to underline that they cannot remain a 
matter of indifference for the European partners 
of the countries who have assumed responsibility 
for them. 
81. Finally, the economic crisis has slowed 
down the implementation of our countries' 
armaments programmes and limits the possibil-
ity of recruiting troops, equipping them with 
modem weapons and replacing losses, thus 
enhancing the danger of Europe's forces being 
dispersed. The shift of the more immediate 
threat to other areas may admittedly make this 
dispersal seem acceptable. However, the shift 
was itself the consequence of the deterrence 
exercised by nuclear weapons and by the overall 
deployment of NATO forces in Europe. 
82. Reactions to the Times editorials of 13th 
and 17th August 1983 show that the withdrawal 
of British troops from the army of the Rhine 
might discourage Belgium and the Netherlands 
from keeping troops in the Federal Republic 
and in the long run lead the Germans 
themselves, under pressure of public opinion, to 
seek a guarantee of their security outside a 
disintegrating NATO, particularly as the 
deployment of French forces may also weaken 
their presence in the Federal Republic and, 
above all, reduce their means of action there, 
particularly in combat helicopters. 
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83. In other words, any national choices made 
by one or other member of the Atlantic Alliance 
have a European aspect and concern all their 
partners. Both the Atlantic Alliance and the 
modified Brussels Treaty date back to the time 
when the then colonial powers were anxious to 
retain a free hand in all overseas matters. 
84. This approach is no longer valid today 
and consultations between Western European 
countries on all matters relating to international 
peace, disarmament and joint security are now 
of far greater importance than in 1954. Article 
VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty provides 
the framework in which WEU member coun-
tries could fulfil this necessity. Neither the 
North Atlantic Council nor the meetings of the 
ministers for foreign affairs of the Ten can do 
so to the same extent because of problems 
specific to northern or southern European 
countries which belong to one or other of these 
organisations but not to WEU. 
85. Obviously, a European security policy 
must not be matched against the national 
policies of certain states, particularly outside 
the NATO area. Most WEU countries do not 
have the wherewithal to conduct military 
operations in such areas and have no intention 
of taking part in them. Nor can countries which 
engage their forces in such operations be 
expected to make their freedom of action 
subject to a European consensus which it would 
be very difficult to obtain. They would not agree 
and their refusal is clear from their reluctance 
to handle defence-related questions in the 
framework of the ten-power Community. 
86. Conversely, it may be imagined or hoped 
that the progressive integration of Community 
Europe and the development of political 
consultations will lead subsequently to the 
inclusion of security questions in the responsi-
bilities of a future European confederation, 
although no early progress in this sense can be 
seriously expected. 
87. The consultations which are needed can 
therefore be held only in a framework in which 
the problem of limits on states' freedom in 
foreign policy is not a matter of principle, the 
problem being that of the possible consequences 
for European security of a specific decision 
taken or, better, in the process of being 
considered by each member state. The proposal 
that "we Europeans should henceforth under-
take an intensive effort of thinking and talking" 
on matters relating to security and disarmament 
was made to the Assembly by Mr. Jobert, then 
French Minister for Foreign Affairs, in Nov-
ember 1973, and the present French Govern-
ment, particularly through Mr. Cheysson, 
Minister for External Relations, in June 1983, 
has made it clear that the French Government 
still considers "WEU to be indispensable for 
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the discussion and formulation of decisions 
which link Europeans in the matter of security". 
88. However, the Assembly has never been 
informed whether these proposals were actually 
submitted to the Council, or whether it 
examined them or, a fortiori, whether it took 
any action on them. But whereas until 1983 it 
had good reason to doubt that such proposals 
had been made to the Council, information 
given in the press indicates that since October 
1983 this is no longer so: indeed, it has been 
reported that France and Italy have each made 
overtures in this sense and some of their 
partners, particularly the Federal Republic and 
Belgium, have responded favourably. 
89. Thus, although the urgency of such 
initiatives was not evident even in 1973, this is 
no longer the case in 1983. Problems relating 
to disarmament, particularly as they arise in 
the Geneva negotiations because of the 1979 
decision to deploy Pershing 11 and cruise 
missiles on the territory of European members 
of the Atlantic Alliance and Mr. Andropov's 
proposal in August 1983 to limit the number of 
SS-20s deployed in Europe to the number of 
launchers belonging to the United Kingdom 
and France, directly concern the members of 
WEU, several of whom, as we have seen, have 
adopted very different positions to those of 
France and the United Kingdom on this matter. 
90. But it is not enough for the Assembly to 
have discussed the matter to be able to talk of 
European consultations. These questions, like 
member countries' policies outside Europe, are 
at the hub of the main problem of political and 
military cohesion in Western Europe, itself 
essential for Europe's security and the mainten-
ance of deterrence and peace. 
91. If Europe wishes to avoid each country 
tackling or pursuing individually and separately 
a policy of detente to which they are all 
attached and consequently from a position of 
weakness, it is essential to maintain a security 
policy based on deterrence. Yet the confusion 
between detente and disarmament too often 
caused and encouraged by Soviet propaganda 
is now resulting in misunderstanding between 
Europe and the United States and also between 
European countries. 
92. The main role of WEU in such circum-
stances should be to promote the pursuit of 
detente and progress towards disarmament by 
ensuring the maintenance of deterrence, which 
the alliance with the United States is no longer 
alone in ensuring. Article V of the modified 
Brussels Treaty, nuclear weapons held by the 
United Kingdom and France or even the 
policies of those countries outside Europe may 
to varying degrees be a help in this context if 
it appears that the Brussels Treaty has produced 
an alliance which is still alive thanks inter alia 
to the application of its Article VIII. This is not 
the case today: one only has to examine the 
annual report of the Council for 1983 to realise 
this. But any revival of the activities of WEU 
as discussed for some two years now depends 
perhaps on a revision of the treaty and in any 
case on a restructuring of each of its bodies. 
IV. WEU in 1984 
93. Western European Union is now faced 
with a choice which the governments will have 
to make in the next few years or months even. 
If they do not decide to pump new life into the 
WEU bodies which depend on them, the 
organisation will probably continue to jog along 
for another twenty years, i.e. until the date on 
which member states will be entitled to 
denounce their signature of the modified 
Brussels Treaty, and even longer if none of 
them does so, which is probable. But it is not 
very likely that the sole approach of that date 
will incite the European governments to make 
better use of this instrument than they do at 
present. 
94. Your Rapporteur first wishes to examine 
the reasons why member countries show so little 
zeal where WEU is concerned. This is not easy 
insofar as these reasons are not generally voiced 
aloud but, on the contrary, are modestly 
shrouded in mystery by national administrations 
and by government authorities whose represen-
tatives on the Council generally manage to 
achieve the unanimity necessary for replying to 
Assembly recommendations or questions put by 
members only if the replies are as general or 
evasive as possible. Your Rapporteur neverthe-
less believes he can deduce some kind of reason 
from scattered information, speeches, studies 
published in the press, confidences or hints from 
certain officials. 
95. (i) The development of sometimes violent 
agitation in several countries which extends to 
many different circles is making the govern-
ments avoid taking any action which might, 
rightly or wrongly, seem liable to revive East-
West tension. They are not necessarily wrong in 
doing their utmost to avoid discussion about 
their foreign policy, and above all defence 
policy, which might cause too deep a split and, 
for internal policy reasons, result in a collapse 
of the will to defend oneself. 
96. The French Government, by making 
known since the Assembly's December 1981 
session its concern at the development of 
pacifist and neutralist movements in certain 
neighbouring countries, certainly had the merit 
of stressing that WEU's role was precisely to 
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tackle matters liable to affect Europe's security. 
But then, why did this statement concern only 
the Assembly and not the Council? Was it just 
because the French Government considered it 
had done all it could to make tlte Council deal 
with such questions and in desperation was 
reduced to inviting the Assembly to refer them 
to the Council in its recommentations? The 
answer is not easy. In any event there is nothing 
to show that these problems have been brought 
before the Council other than through Recom-
mendation 388 of the Assembly and, if the 
French request has been followed up by a series 
of initiatives by the Assembly, it is not apparent 
that the Council has really tried to do anything 
more than seek a verbal compromise to meet its 
commitments without tackling the real roots of 
the problem. 
97. (ii) In the past, the governments have been 
diverted from making full use of the possibilities 
offered by WEU because, as already mentioned, 
they feared that the development of activities 
for the defence of Europe Ol!tside the NATO 
framework might give the American3 a pretext 
for reducing their role in that organisation. 
Everything indicates that this f~ar is no longer 
so strong and that most member countries wish 
joint security matters to be considered between 
Europeans. In addition to the French proposals, 
this is also evident in the so-called Genscher-
Colombo plan which includes the idea of 
developing consultations on these questions 
among the Ten. In view of present difficulties in 
applying this proposal, WEU may at the present 
juncture seem to be the most appropriate 
framework for doing so at least so long as the 
Ten have not managed to reach agreement in 
this connection, since the Seven already agreed 
in principle in Article VIII of the modified 
Brussels Treaty that it should be done by the 
WEU Council. Moreover, it should be recalled 
that not only is there no antagonism between 
NATO and WEU, but the Paris Agreements 
which gave birth to WEU provided for and 
organised close co-operation, precluding overlap-
ping, between the two organisations. 
98. (iii) Furthermore, there are signs that the 
United States's longstanding wariness of the 
prospect of reactivating WEU has today been 
dispelled, mainly because of the French Govern-
ment's positive attitude towards the application 
of NATO's twofold decision of December 1979 
and, in general, the co-operation between the 
forces under French national command and 
those assigned to NATO. Indeed, at the present 
juncture the calls to reactivate WEU launched 
by the French Government can no longer be 
seen as attempts to separate the European allies 
from the United States but, on the contrary, 
the United States Government sees them as 
attempting to strengthen the western alliance. 
According to the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zei-
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tung of 29th February 1984, the Minister of 
State of the Federal Republic, Mr. Mertes, 
announced that Chancellor Kohl would enquire 
about United States support for reactivating 
WEU during his visit to Washington at the 
beginning of March. Information available to 
date throws no further light on this matter. 
99. A certain apathy in Europe in recent years 
combines with the desire of some countries not 
to displease the United States on which they 
count for help in resolving their economic 
difficulties. But for a long time the United 
States was convinced that an organised Europe 
would strengthen the alliance and there is no 
valid reason why it should abandon that 
conviction if the Europeans themselves show 
equal determination and act in consequence. 
100. (iv) The development of armaments and 
strategies in recent years has high-lighted 
certain specific aspects of Europe's defence and 
in particular medium-range missiles. 
101. (v) The preference of several member 
governments for the Community framework for 
strengthening European co-operation has some-
times led them in the past to oppose the 
development of WEU activities or even suspend 
them for fear that they might be detrimental to 
Community Europe. 
102. The article by Mr. Tindemans quoted in 
paragraph 19 shows a clear evolution by some 
towards WEU. Indeed, the limitations of ten-
power consultations on truly political matters 
which have become evident in recent months, 
France's refusal, reiterated by Mr. Cheysson at 
the Assembly's last session, reservations by the 
United Kingdom and Greece, fundamental 
objections by Ireland and the prospect of the 
Communities being extended to include other 
countries whose positions on the subject do not 
yet seem to be definitely fixed, imply that the 
choice of the Community framework for 
developing co-operation on European security 
might delay progress and make it more difficult. 
If, when the time comes, the WEU member 
countries were to denounce the modified 
Brussels Treaty without another alliance having 
been set up beforehand in the Community 
framework Europe's defence would be weakened 
and the prospect of extending Community 
responsibilities to the security field would 
become more remote. 
103. (vi) Under the modified Brussels Treaty, 
certain countries have more obligations than 
others and, not without reason, they feel they 
are victims of discrimination which, although 
perhaps justified in 1954, is no longer so today. 
104. For instance, this is the case for the lists 
of conventional armaments in Annex Ill to 
Protocol No. Ill of the Paris Agreements that 
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the Federal Republic has undertaken not to 
produce. 
105. It is perhaps also the case for the British 
commitments in Article VI of Protocol No. 11 
on the maintenance on the mainland of Europe 
of four divisions and a tactical air force. 
106. It is also the case for France, which, 
unlike the United Kingdom, under Article Ill 
of Protocol No. Ill has to submit its atomic 
weapons to control, although this has never 
been applied, because it would jeopardise an 
essential foundation of the deterrent role of 
these weapons. The Federal Republic for its 
part is subject, under Article 11 of Protocol No. 
11, to restrictions on its naval armament. 
107. Finally, it is the case for members of 
WEU which do not have forces outside the 
European continent since all their forces are 
subject to control which is not the case for 
British forces other than the army of the Rhine. 
108. When the Paris Agreements were signed, 
it was felt that these various commitments 
balanced each other relatively harmoniously 
and that they met the needs of the day. Control 
of the non-production of certain German 
armaments was understandable, partly because 
of memories of the second world war, still very 
recent. France, which did not yet have nuclear 
weapons, did not feel affected by Protocol No. 
Ill and the United Kingdom saw its commit-
ments offset by the fact that its forces stationed 
on its own territory were not subject to control. 
Nowadays, it is apparent that some of them are 
no longer justified and your Rapporteur will 
later examine the consequences to be drawn. 
109. Here he merely wishes to underline that 
certain changes might be made in this respect. 
Diplomatic practice during thirty years of 
application of the modified Brussels Treaty has 
been to play down or in any event to obfuscate 
as far as possible the problems raised by the 
application of the protocols; in fact, it paralysed 
the organisation so that the treaty commitments 
might be forgotten. But your Rapporteur feels 
that no revival of the Council is possible if the 
governments do no consent to lay their cards on 
the table and to consider together the difficul-
ties, which in all cases are nothing to be 
ashamed of, that application of the treaty 
involves for them. 
110. (vii) The composition of the Council has 
also sometimes been quoted as an obstacle to 
its functioning correctly. The Ministers for 
Foreign Affairs who have to attend innumerable 
international meetings now only meet once a 
year in the context of WEU and often send 
replacements to these so-called ministerial 
meetings. 
Ill. For the ambassadors in London, who 
form the Permanent Council, WEU is a 
subsidiary activity, whereas to represent their 
countries at the Court of St. James takes first 
place. They are not urged by their duties, by 
the instructions they receive or by what their 
governments expect of them to take initiatives 
in the framework of WEU, and Article VIII, 
paragraph 3, of the treaty providing for 
emergency meetings of the Council to allow it 
"to consult with regard to any situation which 
may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever 
areas this threat should arise, or a danger to 
economic stability" has never in fact been 
invoked. 
112. One might wonder, as was done in a 
German newspaper, the General Anzeiger of 
Bonn, at the beginning of January, whether 
moving the Council from London to Paris might 
not solve this question. It would have the 
obvious advantage of bringing the seat of the 
Council closer to that of the other WEU organs 
and reducing significantly the operating costs of 
the organisation. But the question is whether an 
effective reactivation of WEU would not mean 
the Council being attended by permanent 
representatives who might, moreover, at the 
same time be the permanent representatives of 
the member countries to NATO rather than 
ambassadors to one of the countries. In any 
case, this too is a question worthy of study and 
on which it would be interesting to know the 
opinion of the governments. 
113. Compared with these difficulties, whose 
importance should not be underestimated and 
which have been largely responsible for para-
lysing intergovernmental action in the frame-
work of WEU, a brief reminder should be given 
of the parts of the modified Brussels Treaty 
which have retained their full importance or 
whose importance has increased since 1954 and 
which any European defence organisation 
should be careful to preserve. 
114. (i) The obligation under Article V to 
afford mutual assistance by all means within 
the power of each of the partners in the event 
of a member country being the object of an 
armed attack in Europe. This is a particularly 
binding provision and forms the main basis of 
Western European security. None of the 
signatories of the treaty has ever seriously 
questioned it, although the means by which 
France would intervene is still a moot point 
since that country left the NATO integrated 
military structure. Conversely, France's with-
drawal from that structure means that Article 
V of the modified Brussels Treaty is the 
essential legal basis for its participation in joint 
European defence and, as the Council recalls in 
its reply to written question 233, France has 
never questioned that obligation. 
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115. (ii) In peacetime already, British partici-
pation in the defence of the mainland of Europe 
is ensured in the conditions described above. 
Directly or indirectly all British forces are 
associated with the defence of the mainland of 
Europe, thus giving it the benefit of the full 
deterrence of the United Kingdom's nuclear 
force. 
116. (iii) In 1954, the principle that an 
international organisation should fix the maxi-
mum level of armed forces and armaments of 
the allied countries was an absolute novelty. 
Admittedly, the application of these measures 
gave rise to certain difficulties, particularly 
because the convention allowing the Agency for 
the Control of Armaments to make on-the-spot 
checks in private firms without the agreement 
of the firms, and hence of the governments 
concerned, has not been ratified. 
117. Your Rapporteur considers however that 
an accurate, verified knowledge of the level of 
forces and armaments of all the members of an 
alliance by their partners is a factor of 
importance for security and for mutual confi-
dence: 
- for security because it allows the alliance 
to remind each party of the needs of 
collective defence and may on occasion 
help the governments to make public 
opinion understand these needs; 
- for mutual confidence because it inhibits 
attempts inside or outside the countries 
concerned to weaken the alliance by 
casting doubts on the underlying motives 
of one country or another. 
118. Finally, retaining a team of experts on 
armaments control may, when the time comes, 
be very useful to fall back on if disarmament 
negotiations in a wider framework than WEU 
should one day allow the development of 
controls, which would be all the more effective 
if the procedure had already been tested in the 
framework of WEU. This would moreover be 
even more convincing if the Agency's controls 
were to cover a list which tallied with present 
military realities more than the 1954 list. 
119. Information gathered from the press in 
February 1984 indicates that the French 
Government has taken a major step in this 
direction since, in renewing its proposal to 
reactivate the WEU Council, it has also 
proposed deleting Annex Ill of Protocol No. Ill 
of the treaty. The Council's reply to Recom-
mendation 380, adopted by the Assembly on 
29th November 1983, requesting this deletion 
will allow the joint position of the Seven on this 
point to be known. Your Rapporteur has every 
reason to hope that the deletion of what remains 
of this list will raise no objection of principle 
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from the member countries if the Federal 
Republic so requests under the procedure laid 
down in the treaty. 
120. The question of maintaining Annex IV 
of the same protocol was also raised in 
Recommendation 380 and presumably in the 
French proposal. The speech by Mr. Hernu, 
French Minister of Defence, in our Assembly 
gives some idea of what this proposal may be, 
particularly when he said: 
"It Is a good thing that, in regard to the 
Conference on Disarmament in Europe or 
the negotiation of other treaties such as 
the ban on the production and stockpiling 
of chemical weapons, the WEU states 
should be able, within the framework of 
WEU where they have technical expertise 
available, to add to their knowledge and 
develop their joint thinking on arms 
limitations, in accordance with their own 
security concepts. This dimension, already 
present in certain of the reports which your 
Assembly has examined, could, it seems to 
me, be made more systematic and thus 
help to enlighten the Council. 
The limits to such an enterprise must be 
clearly set, however, as otherwise its 
chances of success will be jeopardised. 
There can be no question of intervening in 
the negotiation processes or of questioning 
the existing consultation machinery. On 
the other hand - and that might be a new 
dimension for the Agency for the Control 
of Armaments - it would be very useful 
for the European states to conduct studies, 
discussions and technical investigations in 
the field of arms limitation." 
121. It is obvious that if this proposal were to 
be retained it would result in a far-reaching 
transformation of the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments and of its role. So far its task has 
been to verify the statements of the member 
countries regarding force levels and armaments 
by means of regular documentary and on-the-
spot checks. Certain members of our Assembly 
consider that these verifications are now 
obsolete. This is perhaps true insofar as the list 
of armaments to be controlled appearing in 
Annex IV was drawn up in 1954. It has never 
been changed since and includes outdated 
weapons and not others whose importance has 
since grown considerably such as combat 
helicopters. They are also no doubt obsolete 
because post-war distrust has been gradually 
replaced by full confidence in the intentions of 
the European allies, thanks mainly to arma-
ments controls. 
122. However, your Rapporteur feels that 
controls following a perhaps shortened but 
updated list might still have significance. On 
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the one hand, the fact that a military alliance 
is accompanied by a commitment to reveal the 
military means of each party has certainly not 
lost all meaning, even though the need is no 
longer felt so keenly. For instance, it might be 
an argument in East-West negotiations to be 
able to underline the effectiveness of this 
practice. On the other hand, since the main 
problem of the alliance today is not to restrain 
the partners from doing too much but to urge 
them to make. ail adequate armaments effort, 
verification not only of maximum levels but 
also of minimum levels might help to achieve 
this result and a protocol might be envisaged 
obliging the governments to declare their 
armaments efforts and to allow the Agency to 
verify them. Among the sectors of Western 
Europe's defence effort that might be subject to 
such controls, once the member countries have 
defined them by joint agreement, consideration 
should be given first and foremost to those 
outside NATO's reach such as logistics, which 
are essential to joint security. WEU might set 
joint goals as for instance for stocks of fuel and 
verify that the member countries take the 
appropriate measures. 
123. The French Minister has not adopted a 
position on these two points but he mentioned 
a new way of using the Agency to make it 
respond to the new requirements of the 
European countries in affording them assistance 
in all international negotiations involving the 
establishment of arms controls. This is a role 
not mentioned in the modified Brussels Treaty 
but which could be of real interest since there 
is nothing appropriate in Europe. Furthermore, 
thanks to thirty years' experience, it might be 
used to train European controllers. Finally, the 
idea has been voiced of giving it the permanent 
task of studying the state of armaments in the 
world as does the United States Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency. This task would still 
have to be spelled out and the Agency given 
the means to fulfil it: here it is recalled that the 
budget of the United States agency, which 
conducts no on-the-spot verifications, was fixed 
in August 1983 at $ 23.4 million, i.e. about 
eight times that of the WEU Agency for the 
Control of Armaments which is F 24 million, or 
$ 3 million. In all these cases, the Council 
might base itself on Article VIII, paragraph 2 
of the treaty which, at the same time as it 
establishes the agency, stipulates that the 
Council "shall set up such subsidiary bodies as 
may be considered necessary", which obviously 
implies that it can assign to the agency tasks 
other than those defined in Protocol No. IV. 
124. Your Rapporteur is gratified to note that 
the Council is studying these various possibili-
ties. He nevertheless wishes the Council to keep 
the Assembly better informed and, above all, 
that budgetary considerations should not induce 
it to sacrifice a well-tried instrument such as 
the Agency without having first studied with 
the closest attention the future prospects of all 
forms of armaments control by a European 
agency. 
125. (iv) Insofar as the Federal Republic 
wishes the undertakings not to manufacture 
ABC weapons into which it entered in 1954 in 
accordance with its basic law and which were 
confirmed, for nuclear weapons, by its signature 
of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons to remain subject to international 
control, emphasis may be laid on the positive 
role played by WEU and its Agency for the 
Control of Armaments in an area which is of 
importance not so much for relations between 
WEU countries but for the development of an 
East-West policy of detente. 
126. The very fact that the WEU member 
countries have joint security interests but very 
different positions towards the possession of 
weapons of mass destruction or the deployment 
of foreign nuclear weapons on their territory 
should lead them to examine together the 
possible effects of the use of these weapons in 
Western Europe and to define a joint attitude 
towards them. 
127. Although few details are known of the 
content of the Franco-German discussions on 
security questions launched in autumn 1983, it 
may be thought that this problem was one of 
the subjects tackled. Many suggestions have 
been made in this respect and particularly to 
provide the Federal Republic of Germany with 
a second key for French nuclear weapons, at 
least when they are to be used on German 
territory. In any event, it is essential for the 
European members of the Atlantic Alliance to 
exchange views on this matter and work out a 
proper European nuclear doctrine, even if the 
weapons are to remain in the sole custody of the 
United Kingdom and France. The Agency for 
the Control of Armaments might then be called 
upon to verify that the commitments entered 
into by various parties in this matter are 
effectively respected. 
128. (v) Even if in many respects Article VIII 
of the modified Brussels Treaty providing for 
consultations between its signatories with regard 
to any situation which may constitute a threat 
to peace or a danger to economic stability, in 
whatever area this threat should arise, is in fact 
better applied through ten-power consultations 
than by the WEU Council, it should be recalled 
that the Brussels Treaty is the only text making 
such consultations compulsory, above all for 
questions arising outside the North Atlantic 
Treaty area. 
129. (vi) Finally, Article IX, which brought 
the Assembly into being, and making it 
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responsible for all matters relating to the 
application of the treaty, is of real importance 
insofar as it associates freely-elected represen-
tatives of public opinion, delegated by their 
parliaments, with the application of a treaty of 
alliance, thus giving special impact to that 
alliance. If the official speeches by all the 
ministers who have described their governments' 
views to the Assembly are to be believed, they 
endorse this approach and count on the 
Assembly to make European public opinion 
more interested in European security. 
130. For these reasons your Rapporteur con-
cludes not only that WEU retains its full 
importance for European security in the years 
to come, but that events in the last decade -
detente and the opening of new arms control 
negotiations and the spread of conflicts outside 
the NATO area - call for links to be 
strengthened between Western European coun-
tries in security matters and in present 
circumstances WEU is the only organisation 
which can provide a suitable framework. 
131. On the other hand, WEU cannot play 
this role unless the discrimination mentioned at 
the beginning of this chapter is terminated with 
particular regard to the way members are not 
treated equally, which today is no longer 
justified. 
132. Your Rapporteur therefore endorses the 
request in Recommendation 380, adopted by 
the Assembly in June 1982, that the Council 
"in application of Article 11 of Protocol No. Ill 
of the modified Brussels Treaty cancel para-
graphs IV and VI of the list at Annex Ill to 
Protocol No. Ill". He also suggests that 
governments experiencing special difficulties in 
applying the modified Brussels Treaty should 
explain them to the Council so that the seven 
governments might jointly seek a solution 
without jeopardising the treaty. 
133. Your Rapporte.ur is convinced that mem-
ber states' views have drawn closer enough in 
the last decade for most of them to be able to 
find such a solution, whether it be the easing of 
commitments relating to British forces stationed 
on the mainland of Europe or the practical 
consequences of the independence of the French 
nuclear force for Europe's defence. He believes 
fundamental clarification of these problems in 
particular might help to avoid clashes between 
European allies such as occurred over the 
motion passed by the Netherlands States-
General on 2nd September 1983 asking that 
French and British nuclear weapons be taken 
into account in the INF negotiations, whereas 
the United Kingdom and France have shown 
their radical opposition to this point of view. 
134. In the same way, your Rapporteur would 
willingly endorse paragraph 2 of Recommen-
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dation 380, asking that the Council "in 
application of Article V of Protocol No. Ill of 
the modified Brussels Treaty, vary by reducing 
the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. Ill" if the 
words "by reducing" did not seem to him alien 
to the problem raised. As he has tried to show, 
he considers it is less a question of "reducing", 
which would deprive the control of armaments 
of much of its significance, than of "updating" 
and modernising in the light of the evolution of 
weapons in the last thirty years. 
135. Only insofar as it will be possible to 
remove obstacles to the control of armaments 
will all the WEU organs be able to break free 
and really play their due rdle. This is 
particularly true of the Council, about which 
the suggestions made by Mr. Jobert ten years 
ago are still just as topical, although it may be 
desirable to reconsider the composition of the 
Council. The Assembly has made proposals in 
this connection on several occasions and your 
Rapporteur will merely emphasise how import-
ant it is for the governments to provide 
themselves with the means of applying Article 
VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty effectively. 
136. In February 1984, the press announced 
that the Italian Government had invited the 
WEU defence ministers to meet in Rome in 
October on the occasion of the thirtieth 
anniversary of the Paris Agreements. This is a 
most interesting initiative which might be of 
considerable importance. It is rather surprising 
however that it took thirty years for the seven 
defence ministers to meet in the framework of 
the only European organisation with responsi-
bilities in defence matters, with the exception 
of the meeting of WEU defence ministers held 
in Paris on 17th April 1958 on the occasion of 
a NATO Council meeting to co-ordinate WEU 
and NATO work in the joint production of 
armaments. Some press reports say that the 
members of WEU are not unanimous towards 
the Italian initiative. 
137. The question is obviously what will be on 
the agenda of this meeting. In itself, the 
commemoration of the Paris Agreements is of 
only limited interest. Will the restructuring of 
WEU be mentioned on that occasion? Will 
consideration be given to the implications for 
Europe of the requirements of its security and 
of the negotiations on disarmament? Will the 
problems raised in 1958 be taken up again with 
a view to ensuring co-ordination between the 
SAC and the IEPG, with particular regard to 
having the secretariat of the former act also on 
behalf of the latter and reaffirming the open 
nature of the SAC with regard to all the 
members of the Atlantic Alliance? Will con-
sideration be given to holding regular meetings 
of defence ministers in the WEU framework? 
It would obviously be necessary for the Council 
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to provide the Assembly with meaningful 
information on this matter which concerns 
WEU as a whole and, through it, the future of 
European security. 
138. The activities of the Standing Armaments 
Committee too have fallen far short of the 
expectations of the authors of the Decision of 
7th May 1955 setting up this body. This may 
be due to five quite different types of reason: 
- the reserVations sometimes shown, for 
reasons ·which have nothing to do with 
the point production of armaments, 
about all the activities of WEU; 
- the creation and development of parallel 
organisations in the framework of 
NATO, its Eurogroup and the IEPG; 
- the interest shown by the European 
Communities in the armaments industry, 
as described by Mr. Davignon, Vice-
President of the Commission, at the 
symposium organised by the Assembly 
in Brussels in 1979; 
- the reluctance with which several not to 
say most of the governments tackle any 
prospect of true co-operation in this 
field, either because they are anxious to 
protect their national industries or 
because they are afraid of co-operation 
between firms of different status (private 
or nationalised), as pointed out in the 
SAC study on the European armaments 
industries, or because they are not very 
anxious to have an international organi-
sation looking into their external arma-
ments trade, or finally because they 
grant priority to relations with the 
United States for everything connected 
by near or by far with defence; 
- the very complexity of problems relating 
to the joint production of armaments 
gives some people, particularly the major 
armaments producers, the impression 
that it is pointless to seek such a goal at 
all costs in a framework as broad as the 
EEC or WEU. They believe it is better 
to proclaim the many successful bi- or 
trilateral programmes than to lose hope 
in pursuing broader-based efforts which 
fail. 
139. This assertion, which carries some weight, 
calls for comment however. First, co-operation 
in the SAC does not mean everyone taking part 
in all programmes but remains extremely 
flexible. Second, the only results recorded for 
broad co-operation have been in the armaments 
for ground forces thanks to the work of 
FINABEL, i.e. after co-ordination between 
headquarters on specifications for the desired 
equipment. Whatever may be the specific 
requirements of naval and air forces, could not 
consideration be given to applying to them a 
method which seems to have been successful 
for the ground forces? This is a suggestion 
which goes beyond the purview of the General 
Affairs Committee but which would merit close 
consideration. 
140. Such reluctance obviously plays an 
important role since organisations which are in 
no way dependent on WEU, including the 
IEPG, have not achieved much better results 
than the SAC. This makes one wonder whether 
the fear of overlapping is not often used as an 
excuse for a lack of will to succeed. 
141. This means that the removal of present 
obstacles to WEU's activities will probably not 
suffice to give the SAC the role assigned to it 
by those who set it up. If the Assembly's 
information is correct, the proposals submitted 
by Mr. Hintermann, head of the international 
secretariat of the SAC, to the WEU Council in 
spring 1983, of which Assembly committees 
were informed in Brussels in June, seem to 
have taken account of all the obstacles facing 
the institution. 
142. Deliberately leaving it to the IEPG to 
study production programmes for which Euro-
pean co-operation might be developed, they 
direct the SAC, in the light of the conclusions 
of the study on European governments' concern 
to avoid duplicating the work of NATO, 
Eurogroup and the IEPG, the Assembly's 
approval of which was demonstrated in June 
1983 when it adopted Recommendation 394, 
submitted by Mr. Ahrens on behalf of the 
General Affairs Committee, asking that the 
Council: 
"In that context instruct the SAC inter 
alia to complete its study without delay, 
with the addition of proposals to remove 
economic and legal obstacles to better co-
operation between the armaments indus-
tries of member countries and transmit the 
results of this study to the Assembly; 
Instruct the SAC to study the possible 
implications for European armaments pro-
duction of all the latest technological 
developments in the armaments field." 
143. The chapters of the study made by the 
international secretariat of the SAC on the 
European armaments industries show the mag-
nitude of the task to be accomplised in this 
field and the obstacles encountered, both legal 
and economic. Many of them, particularly those 
arising from the status of companies or the 
arms trade, cannot be overcome without the 
political will of the governments which, if they 
intend to take tangible action on the work 
which they instructed the SAC to carry out, 
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will have to draw up directives to solve each of 
the problems raised on the basis of the 
conclusions of the study. 
144. Thus your Rapporteur feels the meeting 
of WEU defence ministers in Rome might be 
of considerable importance if it manages to set 
up a new organisation for European co-operation 
in armaments. The institutional flexibility of the 
SAC, insofar as it is not tied down by the 
modified Brussels Treaty, would allow it to 
adapt itself easily to the requirements defined 
by the ministers, provided they take this Rome 
meeting seriously and have the assistance of 
competent armaments experts including their 
usual representatives on the SAC. This would 
in no way prevent the ministers for foreign 
affairs, provided they attend the Council 
meeting in Paris on 12th June next in person, 
from re-examining the problem of the control 
of armaments and the activities, composition 
and seat of the Council. 
V. The twenty-ninth annual report of the 
Council 
145. The chapters of the twenty-ninth annual 
report of the Council concerning the General 
Affairs Committee reached the Office of the 
Clerk of the Assembly at the beginning of 
March. Their presentation has been improved, 
as requested by the committee, by providing 
the texts of documents or extracts from 
documents mentioned, which makes them 
infinitely more easy to read. The Council should 
therefore be thanked for its efforts to satisfy the 
Assembly's wishes, at least in form. 
146. Conversely, the indications it gives about 
the Council's activities themselves are not likely 
to correct the impression the press seems to 
have: the prospect of reactivating WEU has 
fostered a large number of articles which do 
not fail to allude to the lethargy of the Council, 
even calling it on occasion the "Sleeping 
Beauty". Without wishing to associate himself 
with these judgments, your Rapporteur believes 
he has explained sufficiently in the previous 
chapter the reasons for this paucity of political 
work by the Council for him not to have to 
revert to it here. 
147. He is, however, astonished that the 
twenty-ninth annual report makes no allusion 
to the possibilities of reactivating WEU since 
the press spoke about it at length at the end of 
1983 and ministers, including the prime minis-
ters of several member countries, spoke about 
this matter in relatively clear terms in the 
course of the year. It is just as if the Council 
had nothing to do with this matter, which 
concerns it directly, however, apart from an 
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allusion to thoughts on the activities of the 
Standing Armaments Committee. 
148. This attitude of the Council is hardly in 
conformity with its statements, particularly 
when it refers, in Chapter I of the annual 
report, to the role of the Assembly as follows: 
"The exercise of this responsibility by the 
Assembly calls for a dialogue with the 
Council for which, as was reiterated in 
their reply to Recommendation 394, they 
hold themselves continously available." 
149. Its attitude differs from that of certain 
governments which have used the Assembly's 
rostrum to make their views known on WEU's 
fu~u~e activities, as instanced by the French 
Mtmster of Defence, Charles Hernu, in Decem-
ber 1983. It is significant that in its summary 
of Mr. Hernu's speech the Council did not 
consider it useful to mention specifically the 
proposals he presented. Is it to be concluded 
that the seven governments were unable to 
reach unanimity in reporting the proposals of 
the Minister? In general, contrary to what the 
Council purports, the Assembly is the last to 
receive information about matters concerning 
WEU and its members have everything to gain 
by consulting the press rather than the 
communications of the Council to learn about 
these questions. 
150. Admittedly your Rapporteur in no way 
suspects the Council of reserving its comments 
for newspaper men rather than for parliamen-
tarians, since press correspondents in all capitals 
of the member countries, and not especially 
those resident in London, have signed the many 
articles referring to the revival of WEU which 
your Rapporteur has read. He considers the 
practice of systematically refusing to inform 
opinion to be both futile, since information 
always leaks out, and harmful, since for lack of 
official clarification the facts are sometimes 
deformed, and above all because too strict a 
concept of secrecy arouses distrust and diverts 
the .inter~st of the. public .away from European 
affatrs. Fmally, thts practice is contrary to the 
spirit of the treaty itself which gave WEU a 
parliamentary Assembly specifically so that 
European opinion might express itself on the 
questions within this organisation's competence. 
Whereas . questions concerning the European 
Commumty are regularly posted in communi-
cations from the Community authorities to the 
press and to the European Parliament, one 
might well wonder why those concerning WEU 
are kept under cover on occasions when military 
secrecy can in no way justify such excessive 
discretion. 
151. . As for the Council's day-to-day activities, 
t~ere •s. every reason to ~ear that the description 
gtven m the twenty-moth annual report is 
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exhaustive: the publication of a press commu-
nique on 21st September condemning the 
destruction of a civil airliner of Korean Airlines 
was the only active factor in political matters, 
apart from the adoption of replies to recommen-
dations of the Assembly. This amounts to little, 
even if the communique constitutes a step 
forward compared with the previous years when 
the Council published nothing at all. 
152. Your Rapporteur wishes, however, to 
recall the General Affairs Committee's interest 
in the informal discussion it had, not with the 
Council, but with its Chairman-in-Office, Mr. 
Tindemans, in June 1983, on the evolution of 
relations between the countries of Western 
Europe and the People's Republic of China. He 
found the paragraph of the twenty-ninth annual 
report on this question most interesting and 
notes that the member states do not consider 
that existing regulations currently present "a 
major obstacle to the development of trade and 
co-operation with China". He would like to 
know, however, whether this means that the 
WEU countries consider that the Cocom lists 
may stand in the way of their trade with the 
People's Republic of China. 
153. The other comments solicited by the 
chapters o~ the twenty-ninth annual report of 
the Councll referred to the General Affairs 
Comittee concern questions dealt with in other 
reports of the committee, which makes it 
unnecessary for your Rapporteur to go into 
further details here. He considers however that 
all the questions raised in the previous chapter 
should constitute the principal material for the 
~ialogue between the Council and the Assembly 
m 1984. He recalls that the revival of WEU if 
it i~ .t? take place, will . concern primarily the 
actlVltles of the Councd, without which the 
Assembly's work cannot find its normal political 
outlet, and it should lead to a true dialogue 
between the Council and the Assembly, which 
was hardly the case in 1983. The Assembly 
therefore has the right to hope for a report of 
a completely different kind covering 1984 and 
in any event one which should relate the 
conversations between governments on the 
direction ":EU should take and the implications 
for the vanous organs of the institution. 
VI. Conclusions 
154. The link between the activities of the 
Council, the revision of the lists of armaments 
subject to the Agency control and the redirec-
tio~ of the work of the SAC, including 
asststance to the Assembly for certain studies, 
may not seem evident. However, it is very real 
insofar as WEU is still the only truly European 
organisation with security and defence respon-
sibilities. Article V of the modified Brussels 
Treaty cannot be expected to play its deterrent 
role if the governments fail to uphold the 
institution which is intended to guarantee its 
application, any more than the North Atlantic 
Treaty would play its role if the presence of 
American forces in Europe in the framework of 
the integrated military structures did not give 
its Article V its full deterrent value. 
155. That is a point which cannot be 
overlooked by those who favour a transfer of 
WEU's activities to institutions which depend 
on the EEC. In any case, at the moment it 
seems wiser to consider WEU as the military 
arm of the Community than to envisage 
extending Community activities to defence 
questions. At least serious consideration should 
be given to Mr. Tindemans's proposal that 
WEU be opened to the member countries of 
the EEC wishing to join. The treaty makes 
provision for such an extension but the 
governments have always steered away from it. 
156. Your Rapporteur wishes to recall here 
that the Spanish Prime Minister, Mr. Felipe 
Gonzalez, answered a question put by Mr. 
Valleix in the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe on 31st January last, 
summarised as follows: 
"Mr. Gonzalez answered Mr. Valleix that 
Spain had not yet adopted a final position 
on joining WEU. He recalled that his 
country had been sending an observer to 
that Assembly for many years. The Spanish 
nation took a fairly favourable view of 
Spain joining WEU since it realised that 
rapprochement between European coun-
tries was necessary to improve their 
collective defence." 
157. At a time when the Assembly is about to 
celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of the Paris 
Agreements modifying the 1948 Brussels 
Treaty, your Rapporteur feels that the new type 
of threats to Europe's security, the reactions 
they have aroused among public opinion and 
innovations in armaments technology should 
encourage the WEU member countries to take 
this opportunity of reconsidering the present 
implications of the alliance concluded in 1954. 
158. In doing this they should take full 
account of what already exists and has been 
gained for Europe's security, without relinquish-
ing anything in favour of visions of the future 
of Europe whose achievement it is to be feared 
may suffer further delays. Your Rapporteur 
therefore thought it necessary in this document 
to recall a number of suggestions, most of 
which have already been submitted to the 
Council in the past but which have not been 
granted sufficient attention and which might 
form a better foundation for Europe's security 
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in the coming decade, the alliance with the 
United States remaining the cornerstone but 
perhaps on a less exclusive basis than hitherto. 
159. In February 1984, the main problem, i.e. 
the possibility of maintaining the American 
commitment in NATO, was raised in an article 
by the former United States Secretary of State, 
Henry Kissinger, in Time magazine. Although 
he did not mention the possibility of reviving 
WEU, he expressed the wish that the United 
States withdraw part of its forces stationed in 
Western Europe and that a European general 
henceforth be appointed SACEUR, an Ameri-
can being appointed as Secretary-General of 
NATO. Nevertheless, all the WEU member 
countries were adamant about the United 
States commitment in Europe remammg 
unchanged and also wished SACEUR to remain 
American and the NATO Secretary-General 
European. This was Chancellor Kohl's message 
when he went to Washington on 7th March. 
160. On the other hand, nothing in the opinion 
expressed by Mr. Kissinger could be viewed in 
any way as being an American veto on 
reactivating WEU. It is significant, moreover, 
that the former Secretary of State seemed to 
wish to encourage Europeans to take greater 
responsibility for the defence of Europe and in 
no way to oppose consultations between Euro-
peans on questions of security. All in all, there 
seems to be little foundation for fears that the 
reactivation of WEU might make the United 
States lose interest in the defence of Europe. 
161. In the first months of 1984, the govern-
ments of the member countries with the greatest 
reservations about reactivation spoke in far 
more positive terms about this matter and 
particularly Sir Geoffrey Howe, the United 
Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
in a speech to the London Diplomatic Associ-
ation on 6th March 1984, when he said: 
"Providing it does not undermine the 
transatlantic links on which our security 
ultimately depends, any initiative which 
can usefully promote greater collaboration 
on security issues among European nations 
will certainly have British support." 
162. The Netherlands Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Mr. van den Broek, spoke in similar 
terms in response to a question by Mr. Blaauw 
in the Second Chamber of the States-General 
on 9th February. He then said that he would 
not close the door to discussion of the future 
role of WEU with his colleagues. Mr. Tinde-
mans, Belgian Minister for External Relations, 
referred to Mr. van den Broek's view in answer 
to a question put by Mr. Dejardin in the 
Belgian Chamber of Representatives on 17th 
February, the summary report of which reads 
as follows: 
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"A member asked what the minister 
thought of the French and Italian state-
ments on WEU and European defence. 
The speaker answered that WEU was the 
only European organisation with certain 
responsibilities in defence matters. 
The Minister for External Relations speci-
fied that he largely agreed with the view of 
his Netherlands colleague, Mr. van den 
Broek, who had just been quoted. He 
referred to the report he had drafted 
himself in 1976 on European union in 
which he had already called for a joint 
foreign policy which, to start, should be 
conducted at four levels, including that of 
defence. The minister was consequently in 
favour of more far-reaching awareness of 
Europe within the Atlantic Alliance. 
On the proposals to grant new tasks to 
WEU, the minister said that in the 
framework of European political co-opera-
tion preparations were now being made for 
new initiatives for co-operation in defence 
matters. 
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The problems were not yet solved, but the 
idea was to make a renovated WEU the 
European pillar of NATO, which called 
for an adaptation of the Brussels Pact 
(creating WEU). This pact, which had 
been worked out immediately after the 
second world war, contained a number of 
anti-German elements." 
163. We should welcome the useful work our 
tw~ colleagues have accomplished in obtaining 
from their governments details of their policies 
towards WEU and underline that the repercus-
sions of the French and Italian initiatives, with 
the backing of the Federal Republic, seem most 
promising throughout the member countries. 
164. We must therefore hope that the meeting 
of WEU defence ministers in Rome in October 
1984 will allow all these problems to be 
discussed and a course to be set for WEU to 
enable it to play its full r6le in the framework 
of the Atlantic Alliance and, in the terms of 
the preamble to the modified Brussels Treaty, 
"to promote the unity and to encourage the 
progressive integration of Europe". 
Document 979 
Amendment 1 
Political implications of European security in 1984-
reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENT 11 
tabled by Mr. Cavaliere 
20th June 1984 
1. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "Welcoming the 
fact" and insert "Taking note". 
Signed : Cava/iere 
1. See 5th sitting, 20th June 1984 (amendment agreed to). 
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·Amendment 2 
Political implications of European security in 1984-
reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENT 21 
tabled by Mr. Gianotti 
20th June 1984 
2. In the second sub-paragraph of paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, 
leave out: 
"and more particularly of recourse to nuclear weapons in the event of a conventional attack by 
Warsaw Pact forces". 
I. See 5th sitting, 20th June 1984 (amendment negatived). 
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Document 980 8th June 1984 
Replies of the Council to Recommendations 396 to 402 
RECOMMENDATION 3961 
on European security and burden-sharing in the alliance2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Aware of the manifold difficulties of comparing national defence efforts but concluding that 
the European allies for the most part now carry a very reasonable share of the agreed burden, a 
share which has increased from 24% to 38% in the last twenty-five years, and increased most 
significantly in the decade of the 1970s; recognising that because of its substantial strategic nuclear 
deterrent and world role, the United States spends a higher proportion of its national wealth on 
defence than its European allies; but believing that certain specific improvements in defence efforts 
are required; 
(ii) Noting the existence of the independent nuclear forces of France and the United Kingdom; 
(iii) Considering that an important factor in the continuing burden-sharing debate arises from the 
differing approaches of the European allies and the United States administration to relations with the 
Soviet Union, and consequently from the different views on the necessary size and composition of the 
allied defence effort; 
(iv) Believing that these differences call for increased consultation between the European allies• on 
strategic policies and defence issues; · 
(v) Convinced that within the alliance the political relationship between the European members 
and the United States should reflect more fully their economic, political and defence contributions 
to the security of Western Europe in the fullest sense; 
(vi) Aware that isolation in the United States is likely to grow to the detriment of western security 
unless the European members of the alliance can convince American public opinion and Congress of 
the adequacy of the European contribution to the NATO defence effort, and unless European public 
opinion and parliaments show reciprocal appreciation of all aspects of the United States contribution 
to allied defence; 
(vii) Welcoming therefore the annual report to Congress by the United States Secretary of Defence 
on allied contributions to the common defence; proposals by WEU; and statements by Eurogroup 
which identify the size of the European contribution; 
(viii) Believing that allied defence plans and commitments entered into in the Brussels Treaty must 
take account of the possible consequences of developments beyond the NATO area, and that in the 
case of such developments which the allies jointly recognise as directly threatening the vital interests 
of the alliance the ready assistance of all allies must be forthcoming within the area to facilitate 
United States deployments beyond the area; 
(ix) Recalling that problems of common defence and the support of public opinion for national 
defence projects cannot be isolated from the quality of economic, political and monetary relations 
between the United States and the members of WEU, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
A. Urge the WEU member governments concerned to define jointly for the attention of the North 
Atlantic Council the measures necessary: 
1. To maintain and in the following specific cases improve their defence efforts: 
1, Adopted by the Assembly on 29th November 1983 during the second part of the twenty-ninth ordinary session (6th 
sitting), 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments (Document 959). 
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(a) by maintaining collectively the NATO target of an increase in defence expenditure in real 
terms as long as the Soviet military build-up continues, and by adhering to the biennial 
force goals approved by the nations; 
(b) by augmenting the combat sustainability of the alliance by providing a minimum of thirty 
days' stocks of fuel, ammunition, spare parts and consumables and by improving the 
capacity of reserve forces; 
(c) by maximising conventional firepower and raising the nuclear threshold through the 
progressive introduction of proven systems incorporating emerging technologies jointly 
developed and produced on an equitable Atlantic-wide basis; 
(d) by improving the flexibility, mobility, effectiveness and readiness of European intervention 
forces, both to improve national contributions to ACE Mobile Force and, in a crisis in 
Europe, to compensate as far as possible for any diversion outside the area of United States 
reinforcements destined for Europe; 
2. In the case of developments beyond the NATO area affecting their vital interests: 
(a) to facilitate by all necessary measures within the area the deployment of forces of any 
NATO country beyond the area; 
(b) in the case of those WEU member countries with appropriate military capability to 
participate in such deployments; 
3. To lend vigorous united support to the United States efforts on behalf of the alliance to secure 
satisfactory balanced and verifiable arms control agreements with the Soviet Union in the field of 
both strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces and, failing the latter by the end of 1983, to 
apply the decisions taken on 12th December 1979 by the NATO member countries concerning the 
deployment of GLCM and Pershing 11 missiles; 
4. (a) To deepen and improve European defence deliberations with the WEU Council and the 
informal consultations in Eurogroup and arrange for the European position to Qe expounded clearly 
in the United States, especially to Congress committees and staffs, through a public information 
effort co-ordinated by the Washington embassies of those countries which provide the Eurogroup 
secretariat and Chairman-in-Office; 
(b) To undertake a similar effort with the assistance of the Assembly of WEU to explain to 
the European public and parliaments the contribution which the United States makes to allied 
defence; 
B. Consider and report to the Assembly on: 
1. The expansion and deepening of the European defence activities of the Council, last defined in 
1957; 
2. The obligation to invite all members of WEU to contribute to strengthening the European 
pillar of the western alliance. 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIV 
to Recommendation 396 
1. The Council welcome the Assembly's analysis of the problems of European security and 
burden-sharing in the alliance. While the commitment of the United States and Canada is vital for 
the security of Western Europe, it is equally essential that the European members of the Atlantic 
Alliance, and especially the countries of WEU, make a determined contribution to the common 
effort. 
The contribution of the European countries is considerable. Of the alliance's ready forces in 
Europe, they provide about 90% of the ground forces, 80% of the combat aircraft, 80% of the tanks 
and 90% of the armoured divisions; at sea, in European waters and in the Atlantic, they provide 70% 
of the fighting ships. Moreover, the United States forces deployed to strengthen Europe in time of 
tension, would receive a great deal of help through host nation support, secure lines of communication 
and means of transport. 
During the 1970s, the European allies who are members of the integrated military structure 
of NATO increased their real defence spending by over 2% each year, while United States real 
defence spending declined on average by just over 1% per year. The extent and value of the 
European defence effort is recognised in Secretary Weinberger's reports to Congress on burden-
sharing of 1982 and 1983. 
Whereas the record does therefore appear to be fairly satisfactory, the Council still believe that 
the European allies must maintain and even strengthen their contribution to the common effort. In 
view of the present budgetary constraints called for in all the member states, it is clear that these 
efforts should inter alia concentrate on improved co-ordination. To this end, the WEU members of 
the integrated military structure of NATO approve the measure for maintaining and improving 
NATO's defence effort detailed in Section A, paragraph 1 of the Assembly recommendation. 
2. The Council, aware of the Assembly's concern about possible developments beyond the NATO 
area which might affect the vital interests of the allied partners, reiterate the position adopted on 8th 
and 9th December 1983 by the NATO Council of Ministers who agreed to consult one another in 
good time about any such developments if it was recognised that their common interests were 
affected. 
3. The Council fully support the effort of the United States to secure satisfactory, balanced and 
verifiable arms control agreements with the Soviet Union in the field of nuclear forces, and deeply 
regret the Soviet absence from the Geneva negotiations. 
4. The member countries wish to stress the importance of their consultations within the Council 
on the state of defence and security in Europe. They also wish to underline the need to put across 
the European position in an appropriate and more effective way in the United States. Useful work 
in this direction has already been started within the framework of the Eurogroup. 
Likewise, public opinion and European political circles must be clearly aware of the United 
States contribution to the security of our countries. 
The competent European organisations have an important responsibility in this regard, in 
particular WEU, which has a complete institutional structure suited to this task. The Eurogroup and 
the IEPG also have an important role. 
The WEU Assembly should play a vital role in putting across to the European and American 
public the scale and effectiveness of both the European defence effort and transatlantic co-operation. 
The North Atlantic Assembly, for its part, can contribute to this work of explanation and 
presentation. 
The Council fully endorse the Assembly's observations on the need for consultation within the 
alliance but challenge the assertion that differing approaches by the European countries and the 
United States to relations with the Soviet Union have led to differing views as to the necessary size 
and composition of the allied defence effort. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 5th June 1984. 
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There is no major difference of view on the nature of the Soviet threat and the need to meet 
it. At their ministerial meeting in December 1983, the North Atlantic Council instructed its 
Permanent Council to undertake a thorough appraisal of East-West relations with a view to 
achieving a more constructive East-West dialogue. This objective was reflected in the declaration 
issued at the NATO ministerial meeting held in Washington on 29th to 31st May 1984. 
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RECOMMENDATION 3971 
on the application of the Brussels Treaty - reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the CounciP 
The Assembly, 
(i) Welcoming the wide agreement between the Council and the Assembly on the application of 
the Brussels Treaty, revealed in Recommendation 380 and the Council's reply thereto, and on the 
proposition that WEU should be adapted to meet the requirements of the 1980s; 
(ii) Noting that the Council has received with great interest and is considering the Assembly's 
recommendation to cancel the few remaining restrictions on the production of conventional weapons 
in one member country, and is considering the technical, military and political aspects of the 
Assembly's recommendation to vary by reducing the list of weapons subject to quantitative controls; 
(iii) Aware that the controls on atomic and biological weapons provided for in the modified Brussels 
Treaty have never been applied, but considering in the present circumstances that it is no longer 
appropriate to apply them; 
(iv) Believing that the fullest use should be made of the qualified staffs of the Standing Armaments 
Committee and of the Agency for the Control of Armaments, both for the study of problems within 
their respective competence for the benefit of the alliance as a whole, and to assist the Assembly in 
the preparation of its reports, and warmly welcoming the first tentative experiment in the latter 
connection, in implementation of the Council's reply to Recommendation 331; 
(v) Deploring the severe reductions which the present United States administration has imposed 
on the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, with which the WEU Agency for, the Control of 
Armaments has co-operated from time to time; 
(vi) Welcoming the inclusion in the Council's annual report in response to Recommendations 331 
and 348, of specific information on the levels of British ground and air forces assigned to SACEUR, 
and recognising that no provision of the Brussels Treaty requires this information to be included; 
(vii) Regretting however the Council's refusal in recent years to include in annual reports various 
other items the Assembly has requested, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. In application of Article 11 of Protocol No. Ill of the modified Brussels Treaty, cancel 
paragraphs IV and VI of the list at Annex Ill to Protocol No. Ill; 
2. Submit to the Assembly in the near future the results of its consideration of the technical, 
military and political aspects of varying the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. Ill, in application of 
Article V of Protocol No. Ill of the modified Brussels Treaty, while taking into consideration the 
possibility of deleting the list concerned except for atomic, biological or chemical weapons; 
3. Instruct the Agency for the Control of Armaments to extend its studies of control, verification 
and exports of armaments, in co-operation with the United States Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, with a view to assuming for the benefit of the alliance as a whole certain tasks which the 
latter agency is no longer in a position to undertake; 
4. Instruct the Standing Armaments Committee to extend its study of the European armaments 
industry to include a survey of the status of the two-way street and an analysis of the factors which 
would help to increase the proportion of European equipment in the armed forces of all allied 
countries; 
5. Request the international staff of the Standing Armaments Committee to assist within its 
competence in the preparation of reports of Assembly committees when these so request, and to 
extend such assistance to the collection of the necessary information; 
6. To include in future annual reports: 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 29th November 1983 during the second part of the twenty-ninth ordinary session (7th 
sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Prussen on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments (Document 948). 
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(a) a statement of the levels of forces which the WEU countries make available to NATO, and 
of the French forces in Germany; 
(b) information as full as in reports for 1981 and earlier, on the production and procurement 
of armaments in member countries; 
(c) as far as possible the latest approved lists of chemical and biological weapons subject to 
control. 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIV 
to Recommendation 397 
I. As already stated in their reply to point 1 of Recommendation 380, the Council have noted 
with great interest the position adopted by the Assembly in favour of cancelling paragraphs IV and 
VI of Annex Ill to Protocol No. Ill. As the Assembly is aware, the procedure governing a Council 
decision to this effect involves various aspects which are laid down in Article 11 of this protocol. 
Following the supplementary reply to point 2 of Recommendation 380 given to the Assembly 
in November 1983, the Council, in replying to written question 243, stated that their deliberations 
regarding the list in Annex IV to Protocol No. Ill had not yet come to an end. They added that they 
intended further to examine ways in which the Agency for the Control of Armaments could be 
involved in fields other than the present one. As stated, the Council will inform the Assembly as soon 
as possible after completing their examination of this subject. 
11. The Council have noted with interest the Assembly's suggestion to instruct the Standing 
Armaments Committee to extend its study of the European armaments industry to include a survey 
of the state of the two-way street and an analysis of the factors which could help to increase the 
proportion of European equipment in the armed forces of all the allied countries. The proposal that 
the SAC should be entrusted with preparing a study on the two-way street is one of those put 
forward by the head of the SAC international secretariat which are still being examined by the 
Council, whose concern is to avoid any duplication with the work being done elsewhere, in particular 
by the IEPG. 
The Council's position concerning the possible assistance by the SAC and its international 
secretariat with the work of the Assembly committees has been explained in their replies to 
Recommendations 365 and 379 and during the joint meeting with the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments on 17th May 1983 in Brussels. The Council remain willing to examine, 
in accordance with the criteria already laid down, any requests submitted to them in future by the 
Assembly. 
Ill. As already stated in their reply to points 3-4 of Recommendation 380 regarding the forces 
assigned to NATO, the Council see no possibility of including in their annual reports any statements 
other than those already given on the levels of forces in the WEU member states. 
The Council will continue to provide as much information as possible in their annual reports 
on the production and procurement of armaments in the WEU member countries. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 30th April 1984. 
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RECOMMENDATION 3981 
on the role and contribution of the armed forces 
in the event of natural or other disasters in peacetime2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Having taken note of the results of the information study conducted by the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments of WEU on the role and contribution of the armed forces in the 
event of natural or other disasters in peacetime; 
(ii) Aware that the fundamental institutional task of the armed forces is to ensure national defence 
and security; 
(iii) Recognising the role of guidance and co-ordination incumbent on the civil authorities in 
establishing research and civil defence bodies, planning means of intervention and mobilising local 
authorities and the various civil protection agencies in order to afford assistance and relief to the 
victims of disasters; 
(iv) Stressing the essential contribution which the armed forces have to make in this context by 
affording relief and assistance in the hours immediately following disasters; 
(v) Stressing the international value in terms of human solidarity of the exchange of assistance 
between member countries in the event of disasters and of participation in assistance and relief 
operations in third countries thus struck, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Urge member governments: 
I. To pay particular attention to the role and contribution of the armed forces in studying and 
planning civil protection means; 
2. To this end to promote co-operation between member countries through: 
(a) the exchange of information and experience; 
(b) mutual invitations to and attendance at periodical national and, if possible, transfrontier 
civil protection exercises; and 
(c) the conclusion of bi- or multilateral agreements on mutual assistance and relief; 
3. Together with NATO, in co-operation with the United Nations relief agencies, utilising such 
humanitarian aid as provided by the EEC, and in collaboration through the Council of Europe, to 
contribute to assistance and relief to third countries struck by a natural or collective man-made 
disaster by establishing the necessary structures and means. 
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 29th November 1983 during the second part of the twenty-ninth ordinary session (7th 
sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Pecchioli on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments (Document 960). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIV 
to Recommendation 398 
The Council have noted with great interest Assembly Recommendation 398 on the role and 
contribution of the armed forces in the event of natural or other disasters in peacetime. 
They acknowledge that it is appropriate that the governments of the member countries pay 
particular attention to the establishment of legal and technical instruments designed to improve and 
enhance the effectiveness and speed of such a contribution. 
In this connection, the Council consider that it would be beneficial to envisage greater 
collaboration between the member countries, in particular through the exchange of information and 
experience, mutual invitations to, and attendance at periodical national exercises and by considering 
possible multilateral or even bilateral agreements on mutual assistance and relief, also keeping in 
mind the existing NATO machinery. 
The Council also consider interesting the idea of contributing to assistance to third countries 
struck by natural disaster by making best use of the instruments provided by various international 
organisations, whilst stressing the priority requirement to ensure the speedy arrival of relief in 
whichever part of the globe it is required. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 14th May 1984. 
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RECOMMENDATION 3991 
on the assessment of advanced technology in Japan2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Aware of the limitations imposed on Japan's defence capabilities under Article 9 of the 
Japanese constitution restricting its military forces to defensive purposes; 
(ii) Conscious of the growing industrial power of Japan and o( Japan's success in the field of 
micro-technology, in exploration of space and the oceans and in energy; 
(iii) Considering that defence-related expenditure is about 5% of the total budget and that Japan 
has by far the lowest per capita defence expenditure in the free world; 
(iv) Considering also that, although Japanese technological research and development is not 
directed towards military goals, new weapons systems or possibly the export of armaments, electronic 
developments make the dividing line between civil and military high technology increasingly difficult 
to trace; 
(v) Aware of projects of Japanese collaboration with the EEC and ESA, in OECD and with 
various member states and manufacturing companies in WEU and the United States in advanced 
technology and the impetus given by decisions at the Versailles and Williamsburg summit meetings 
on areas of co-operation; 
(vi) Noting the similarity of problems and of the approach to them by WEU member states and 
Japan; 
(vii) Convinced of the need for a joint approach to problems in the fields of science, technology and 
aerospace, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Instruct the Standing Armaments Committee to study Japanese progress in military high 
technology, or technology which may have military applications, together with its prospects and 
submit the conclusions of this study to the Assembly; 
2. Examine the whole field of possible collaboration with Japan so as to promote more joint 
projects on a bilateral or a multilateral basis; 
3. Examine in particular the possibility of collaboration with the Japanese Institute for New 
Generation Computer Technology (ICOT) on the project for a fifth generation computer; 
4. Examine the possibility of collaboration in production of military and civil aircraft; 
5. Examine with the authorities of EEC member states how to make fuller use of the present 
arrangements for scientific and executive staff, government officials and others to familiarise 
themselves with Japanese culture, management techniques and scientific development by courses and 
periods of study in Japan; 
6. In order to develop practical collaboration in space, and taking account of the fact that Japan 
has just appointed a permanent representative to Paris for space matters, propose the nomination of 
a permanent representative of ESA to Japan to enable ESA to consult continuously on collaborative 
projects. 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 29th November 1983 during the second part of the twenty-ninth ordinary session (7th 
sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Lord Northfield on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 956). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL' 
to Recommendation 399 
The Council welcome Recommendation 399 on the assessment of advanced technology in 
Japan. 
The Council are conscious of the high level of development of technology in Japan and of the 
need for even closer co-operation with Japan in the scientific and technological fields. 
The members of WEU are individually, and in some cases on the basis of bilateral treaties, 
engaged in fruitful technological co-operation in numerous spheres with Japan, and also with ICOT. 
This co-operation can no doubt be expanded. 
The conclusion of a basic agreement between the European Community and Japan on 
scientific and technological co-operation is being discussed among Community member states. 
Conscious of the increasing public attention being paid to Japanese dual-use technology and 
Japan's arms industry, the Council have directed the international secretariat of the Standing 
Armaments Committee to draw up proposals for a study on the prospects for Japan's arms industry 
and the repercussions for Europe. 
The Council feel that one should consider whether it is expedient to allow the intensification 
of scientific and technological co-operation with Japan - in itself desirable - to hinge on the question 
of dual-use technology. They note that the United States, in spite of its privileged links with Japan, 
was, only with great difficulty, able to conclude an agreement with Japan for including dual-use or 
military technology in Japanese exports. They also point to Japan's strict ban on arms exports. 
Accordingly, the Council, who are ready to have further discussions on this point, feel that caution 
should be exercised in the field of military technology. 
It should be left primarily to the relevant industries and institutions of the member countries 
to identify areas of co-operation, including aerospace. It is they who have until now promoted co-
operation in individual sectors and carefully examined in which sectors co-operation is feasible and 
of benefit to Europe. 
The Council welcome the suggestion of making even better use of the existing opportunities for 
becoming acquainted with Japanese culture, management practices and scientific developments 
through courses and periods of study in Japan. 
The Council draw attention to the fact that the forthcoming international decisions on the 
continuation of outer space activities might, inter alia, offer opportunities for closer co-operation 
between ESA and Japan, in which context account must be taken of political and any industrial 
considerations. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 20th March 1984. 
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The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDATION 4001 
on the harmonisation of research in civil 
and military high technology fields2 
(i) Noting with satisfaction that the governments of the WEU member countries have declared 
that they are fully aware of the security interests which determine European collaborative projects 
in high technology fields, including aeronautics, space and microelectronics; 
{ii) Considering that it is essential to master the principal branches of technology covering all 
material needed by the armed forces of member countries and that the evolution of defence research 
makes it necessary to develop intellectual capabilities by a sustained effort of continuous education 
at various levels - engineers, technicians, operatives; 
{iii) Considering that mastery of research and development in the defence field would strengthen 
the defence capability of the European states if they could co-operate without restriction in their 
respective financial and technological efforts; 
(iv) Considering that the growing cost of armaments programmes for the WEU countries calls for 
increased and balanced co-operation in a European framework so that the armaments industries of 
the member countries may contribute fully to defence by mastering new technology to the best of 
their ability; 
(v) Considering that intra-European exchanges of technology are already promising, as is the joint 
production of sophisticated devices of European design, and that further progress can be made in this 
direction by exploiting new technology to the full; 
(vi) Considering that the balance of technology exchange between member states and the United 
States favours the latter and results in a markedly unequal relationship within the Atlantic Alliance; 
(vii) Considering that it is essential not to confuse new technology, weapons systems and strategies 
but that on the contrary our countries should master new tactical concepts, any European effort in 
the field of emergent technology having to take account of the real possibilities of high technology 
co-operation and, as a first stage, of the possibilities offered by the existence of the Standing 
Armaments Committee for independent European thinking, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Instruct the Standing Armaments Committee to prepare for it a study in the form of a review 
and proposals on the possibilities of co-operation between member countries in advanced technology 
for the development of future weaponry, this study, covering both research and the industrialisation 
of the products of such research, to include inter alia: 
- an analysis of the decision-taking structure and the budgetary facilities of each member 
country; 
- an analysis of means available and the possibilities of making optimum use of these means 
to protect innovative capabilities and ensure competitive production costs; 
- proposals on the direction the research and development policies of member countries should 
take to provide Western Europe with the industrial base necessary for future weaponry; 
2. Invite the governments of member countries to encourage contacts between the responsible 
authorities in their industries with a view to promoting the establishment, as soon as possible, of a 
strong co-ordinated European industry for advanced military technology meeting our defence 
requirements; 
3. Invite the governments of member countries to give preference to the procurement, as and 
when necessary, of new weapons whose design and production are the fruit of co-operation between 
several member countries. 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 30th November 1983 during the second part of the twenty-ninth ordinary session (8th 
sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Bassinet on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological 
and Aerospace Questions (Document 963). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL1 
to Recommendation 400 
The Council have noted with interest the second part of the report on the harmonisation of 
research in civil and military high technology fields presented by the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions. They endorse the conclusions of this document regarding 
the need to strengthen co-operation between member countries in the field of high technology, 
considering that the joint development of these advanced technologies and the industrial-scale 
production of the resultant components is one of the prerequisites for co-operation in respect of 
future weapons systems and hence for the maintenance of a credible defence by the western 
countries. The Council however believe that co-operation could take place not only within the context 
of WEU but also on a wider European basis. 
1. The Council point out that - as previously mentioned in their reply to Recommendation 394 
- the head of the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee has placed a 
number of study proposals before the Council and that one of the proposed topics was precisely 
concerned, in substance, with the implication of new conventional weapons for the armaments 
industries of the member countries. The Council also point out that the Assembly, in its 
Recommendation 399, recommends that the SAC be instructed to carry out a study on Japanese 
progress in high technology fields with potential military applications. The SAC is at present 
conducting a study on Japanese progress in high technology fields. There is thus considerable concern 
shared by all the member states regarding advanced technologies. The Council will have to consider, 
however, whether a study as recommended by the Assembly might subsequently be envisaged, taking 
into account inter alia the existing capacity of the international secretariat of the Standing 
Armaments Committee. 
2. Industry has, unquestionably, an important part to play in any form of co-operation. The 
governments of the member countries fully accept the idea that the interests of industry should be 
taken into account since this, after all, is the key to the success of any programme in this field. 
Contacts should therefore be encouraged and diversified with a view to promoting the establishment 
of a European industry for advanced military technology. Such considerations could provide the 
framework for a symposium for the industries concerned; it could be modelled on the one on 
international aeronautical consortia held in London on 9th and lOth February 1982 under the 
auspices of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
3. The member states of WEU generally recognise the essential nature of European preference. 
The Council agree that the spirit of solidarity and the search for European solutions must constitute 
a very important factor in the national armaments planning and decision-making process, thus 
enhancing the European contribution to the common defence effort. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 29th May 1984. 
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RECOMMENDATION 401 1 
on economic relations with the Soviet Union2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering that for several decades the development of the Soviet economy has given priority 
to the armaments effort and that in many sectors these armaments now exceed those of the countries 
of the Atlantic Alliance; 
(ii) Considering that Soviet military power is being ·developed at the expense of the standard of 
living of the population and that it is helping to keep several countries in a state of dependence; 
(iii) Hoping that the opening or continuation of various international negotiations on the limitation 
of armaments will allow the Soviet Union to apply new guidelines for its economic development; 
(iv) Regretting that the members of the Atlantic Alliance have not managed to define a common 
code of conduct for their trade with the eastern countries or to apply sufficiently-concerted economic 
sanctions in response to instances of Soviet abuse of military power; 
(v) Noting that the shooting down by Soviet military aircraft of a South Korean civil aircraft 
together with its crew and passengers on 1st September 1983 is an unacceptable violation of 
international law; 
(vi) Considering the allegations that forced labour was used for the construction of the Siberian gas 
pipeline to Western Europe, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Promote consultations between all democratic countries with a view to working out jointly the 
limits they would accept to ensure that their trade with the eastern countries does not help those 
countries to accumulate armaments and inter alia: 
(a) to ban all exports of advanced technology which might be used for armaments purposes; 
(b) to avoid long-term contracts making western signatories economically dependent on eastern 
countries; 
(c) to avoid undue promotion of Soviet resources at the expense of those of the West or the 
third world; 
(d) to avoid granting over-favourable credit terms to the eastern countries and not to tolerate 
their incurring too great a burden of debts; 
(e) to refuse the principle of countertrade; 
2. Adapt these principles accordingly in the light of results obtained in international negotiations 
on the limitation of armaments; 
3. Urge the preparation, in the framework of the International Civil Aviation Organisation, of 
new international a1r navigation regulations to make a repetition of an incident such as occurred on 
1st September 1983 impossible; 
4. Investigate and report on all evidence of forced labour used on the Siberian gas pipeline. 
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 30th November 1983 during the second part of the twenty-ninth ordinary session (9th 
sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Atkinson on behalf of the General Affairs Committee 
(Document 958). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL1 
to Recommendation 401 
The Council have noted with interest Recommendation 401 on economic relations with the 
Soviet Union and welcome the importance attached by the WEU Assembly to the security aspects 
of East-West trade. 
A concerted, realistic and cautious approach towards the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in 
economic matters has long been a major concern of the WEU member countries. In this regard, the 
Council attach high importance to continuing western co-operation and consultation. They recall that 
western countries have met in various fora in order to discuss a common approach consistent with 
their political and security interests. Since 1982, a study dealing with these aspects of East-West 
economic relations has been undertaken within the Atlantic Alliance. 
The Council recall that the outcome of this and other studies was reflected in the terms of 
various communiques adopted at the conclusion of ministerial meetings such as those of the North 
Atlantic Council on 9th-10th June and 8th-9th December 1983. 
The texts of both North Atlantic Council communiques read as follows: 
"Trade conducted on the basis of commercially sound terms and mutual advantage, that avoids 
preferential treatment of the Soviet Union, contributes to constructive East-West relations. At 
the same time, bilateral economic relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern 
Europe must remain consistent with broad allied security concerns. These include avoiding 
dependence on the Soviet Union, or contributing to Soviet military capabilities. Tqus, 
development of western energy resources should be encouraged. In order to avoid further use 
by the Soviet Union of some forms of trade to enhance its military strength, the allies will 
remain vigilant in their continuing review of the security aspects of East-West economic 
relations. This work will assist allied governments in the conduct of their policies in this field." 
The WEU member states consider that their security interests are best served by stable 
economic and political relations with the Soviet Union. The benefits of East-West trade to the Soviet 
and Eastern European economies must be weighed against this consideration, and against the 
advantages which such trade brings to western businesses and economies. 
As they have already stated, the WEU member countries undertake to manage financial 
relations with the Warsaw Pact countries on a sound economic basis, including commercial prudence 
also in the granting of export credits. 
The Council emphasise that the studies and consultations referred to above have been 
undertaken in a constructive and co-operative spirit. They have led to a clarification of national views 
and interests and to a greater common understanding of the issues at stake, thereby contributing to 
western unity and security. The member countries of WEU will therefore continue to seek ways of 
strengthening and intensifying this process within various bodies and at various levels. 
The Council fully agree with the Assembly on the urgent need to prepare new international air 
navigation regulations with a view to making it impossible for an incident such as the one that 
occurred on 1st September 1983 to be repeated. 
The Council therefore welcome the decision of the Council of the ICAO of 14th October 1983 
to convene an extraordinary session of the ICAO Assembly commencing 24th April 1984 to adopt 
an amendment to the Chicago convention providing for an undertaking to abstain from recourse to 
the use of force against civil aircraft. 
The Council learned of allegations of forced labour being used in the Soviet Union in the 
construction of the Siberian gas pipeline. They recall the special responsibilities of the ILO to watch 
over the application of international labour conventions. The ILO Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations is at present examining the issue of forced labour 
in the Soviet Union and will report on its findings in March 1984. The committee's report will 
subsequently be submitted to the annual June ILO general conference. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 27th March 1984. 
297 
DOCUMENT 980 
The Commission of the European Communities, taking account of the views of member states, 
including those of member states of WEU, has tabled a paper in OECD containing suggestions for 
a joint western approach to the problem of countertrade. The Commission has suggested that western 
nations should restate firmly their unwillingness to accept countertrade practices as a normal form 
of international trade, whilst at the same time expressing their readiness to discuss the practical 
problems that these practices present. In particular, the Commission has stated that it regards 
countertrade as a temporary and exceptional phenomenon which should be replaced as soon as 
possible by more normal forms of trade. 
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RECOMMENDATION 4021 
on Africa's role in a European security policy - ChatP 
The Assembly, 
(i) Condemning the invasion of Chad by Libyan armed forces as a threat to peace in an area 
which is of particular interest to the Western European countries; 
(ii) Considering that Libya is far better armed than the states of Central and West Africa as a 
whole; 
(iii) Considering that France's sending a military force to Chad at the request of its government 
and with the approval of a large number of African states is likely to discourage Libyan intervention; 
(iv) Considering that the respect of internationally-recognised frontiers is essential for the 
maintenance of peace on the African continent; 
(v) Approving the measures taken by France at the request of the Government of Chad to help to 
restore peace in Chad; 
(vi) Considering that the WEU member countries cannot disregard the maintenance of peace in 
Africa or the redeployment of a member's armed forces; 
(vii) Regretting that no member invoked Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty to call for 
relevant consultations between the signatories, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Ensure that France's partners are kept informed of the political and military measures taken 
as a result of the invasion of Chad by Libya; 
2. Express the solidarity of the member countries in regard to the measures taken by France in 
Chad; 
3. 
4. 
Examine the possible political and military consequences of these measures; 
Express its desire for the early restoration of unity, integrity and peace in Chad. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 1st December 1983 during the second part of the twenty-ninth ordinary session {lOth 
sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. MUller on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 
957). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIV 
to Recommendation 402 
The Council have given careful consideration to the Assembly's recommendation concerning 
the situation in Chad. 
The member countries of WEU cannot remain indifferent to the crises which develop in 
Africa, especially when outside interference or intervention are involved. They have on various 
occasions exchanged views on this subject. However, WEU countries should clearly not take it upon 
themselves to interfere in the internal affairs of independent and sovereign countries. 
With particular regard to Chad, this country has had almost nineteen years of civil war which 
has been fanned and fuelled from outside. The Chad Government has made its position clear before 
the OAU and the United Nations Security Council. In August 1983, it appealed to the French 
Government to help check the advance of foreign troops. Since then, the situation in the field has not 
basically changed. Nevertheless, localised military actions have been launched from the northern 
region of Chad and there is still a fear of a more widespread resumption of the fighting. 
It also seems clearer than ever that a settlement of the Chad conflict presupposes the 
withdrawal of the foreign invading forces who are occupying the northern part of the country and 
also reconciliation between the people of Chad. In this connection, the member countries of WEU 
can only regret the failure of the meeting organised by the OAU at the beginning of January 1984 
aimed at initiating this process and voice the hope that the interested parties will find ways of 
achieving a peaceful solution. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 20th March 1984. 
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Written questions 235 and 237 to 246 and replies of the Council 
to written questions 235, 237 to 239, 241 to 243, 245 and 246 
QUESTION 235 
put by Mr. Cox 
on 13th September 1983 
In reply to questions in the Assembly on 
7th June 1983, General Bernard Rogers, 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe, said: 
"There are over 2,100 SS-20 warheads 
deployed. There are 351 launchers deployed 
today. There are three warheads to each 
launcher and there is a second missile deployed 
at the launcher site ... there is some uncertainty 
whether there may be three missiles deployed 
at each launcher ... " 
This warhead count is double that of the 
latest NATO Nuclear Planning Group estimate 
in the communique of 23rd March 1983 which 
states that: " ... the Soviet Union now has 351 
launchers for the ... SS-20 missiles deployed and 
operational, comprising 1,053 warheads." 
Does the Council agree with General 
Rogers' estimate of SS-20 warhead numbers, 
and was he authorised to give it? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 1st February 1984 
The Council, having consulted NATO on 
the question put by the honourable parliamen-
tarian, are able to provide the following 
information: 
The number of 351 operational SS-20 
missiles was valid on 7th June 1983. This figure 
was published earlier, for example, in the 
communique of the Nuclear Planning Group 
held on 23rd March 1983. The present number 
of operational SS-20 missiles is 378. 
The figures of SS-20 warheads given by 
NATO normally encompass only warheads on 
launchers if not specifically stated as being 
otherwise. However, SS-20 launchers can be 
reloaded and the system's operational concept 
envisages reload missiles in its operational units. 
No authorisation is required to use this 
information. 
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QUESTION 237 
put by Mr. Lenzer 
on 21st September 1983 
Does the Council agree that the Airbus 
320 is absolutely vital for the future of the 
European aircraft industry? 
Is the Council aware that, if this aircraft 
is not produced, Boeing will have a world 
monopoly for this type of aircraft? 
Will the Council urge member govern-
ments to give their financial and political 
backing to the production of the Airbus 320? 
Which airlines have already shown an 
interest in this type of aircraft? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 15th December 1983 
1. The industrial partners and the govern-
ments participating in the Airbus programme 
recognise the need to develop a more compre-
hensive range of Airbus products in order to 
enhance the competitive position of the Euro-
pean civil aerospace industry. The governments 
involved are aware that the industrial partners 
are concentrating their efforts on fulfilling the 
necessary conditions for the launching of the 
A-320 programme. 
2. McDonnell-Douglas has recently 
expressed a firm intention to develop new 
versions of its intermediate DC-9 series of 
aircraft, although it has decided to abandon the 
launch of its new generation short/medium-
range aircraft MD-90. In the circumstances, 
the possibility is that Boeing will have the 
monopoly of the new 120-150 seat aircraft 
class. Moreover, Boeing will remain the only 
aircraft producer in the world able to offer a 
complete product range covering short-, 
medium- and long-range aircraft. 
3. The member governments have signified 
their willingness to consider support for the 
launch and development of the Airbus A-320 
provided it can be demonstrated that the 
programme has sound prospects of commercial 
viability. 
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4. In principle an aircraft of the A-320 type 
is of possible interest to all airlines operating 
older design aircraft of this size which will need 
to be replaced from the late 1980s onwards. 
Orders for the A-320 have been placed by Air 
France, Air Inter and British Caledonian. 
Negotiations between Airbus Industrie and 
other airlines are continuing. 
QUFSTION 238 
put by Mr. Bltu~uw 
on 10th September 1981 
Could the Council inform the Assembly 
when France is expected to decide on procure-
ment of an airborne warning and control 
system? 
What is the place of the British AWACS 
unit in the overall NATO system? 
What will be the place of the French 
system in the European AWACS cover? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 15th December 1981 
France is considering the procurement of 
an airborne warning system and funding is 
provided for in the 1984-88 military programme 
law. At present the appropriate departments of 
the French Defence Ministry are studying the 
various possible solutions, namely, a currently 
available United States solution (Boeing E-3A 
aircraft), a European solution that could be an 
adaptation of the British solution, or a French 
airframe with adaptation of the British radar. 
The United Kingdom's airborne early 
warning capability is currently provided by 
Shackleton aircraft. This capability will be 
greatly improved as these are replaced by 
Nimrod AEW over the next few years. The 
aircraft are the United Kingdom's contribution 
to the NATO airborne early warning mixed 
force and will be interoperable with the Boeing 
E-3A (AWACS). The role of this contribution 
as an element of the NATO airborne early 
warning mixed force will depend on the 
operational concept and operational require-
ments of the major NATO commanders. 
No decision regarding the choice has 
been taken. One of the objectives sought for the 
system is interoperability with the NATO air 
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defence systems, France of course having full 
responsibility of decision regarding the use of 
its system. 
QUFSTION 239 
put by Mr. Bltu~uw 
on 10th September 1981 
Will a European procurement co-ordina-
tion body be set up to define joint specifications 
for the advanced combat aircraft for the 1990s? 
If not, will there then be a tripartite 
group- United Kingdom, France, Germany? 
If so, what is the timetable for defining 
such specifications? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 1st February 1984 
Representatives of the air staffs of five 
European countries, France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain and the United Kingdom, have been 
meeting in recent months to examine the 
operational characteristics for a future European 
fighter aircraft which might meet their potential 
national requirements for the 1990s and beyond. 
As a result of the progress made in these talks, 
it is anticipated that they will be followed by 
exploratory discussions among a number of 
nations of the technical and industrial possibil-
ities of meeting such a requirement. Before the 
completion of this phase it would be premature 
to prejudge what type of co-operation could be 
set up: this would be the purpose of the next 
phase, the starting date of which has not yet 
been decided but which could be some time 
during 1984. 
The chances of co-operation on a future 
European fighter aircraft are perfectly realistic 
and, in spite of the uncertainties that may be 
felt in this complex field where there are many 
underlying industrial interests, it is important 
to be optimistic about the results of the present 
efforts to harmonise requirements. 
QUFSTION 240 
put by Mr. Bassinet 
on 11th October 1981 
Since European co-operation in arma-
ments matters is essential, can the Council give 
the Assembly information about the tripartite 
discussions between France, the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany and the United Kingdom in 
Paris on 21st September 1983? 
Will co-operation in overall research and 
development be strengthened? 
Is standardisation possible for NATO 
frigates, guided anti-tank weapons, helicopters 
and above all tactical combat aircraft? 
* 
* * 
No reply has yet been received from the 
Council. 
QUESTION 241 
put by Mr. Blaauw 
on 20th December 1983 
Would the Council inform the Assembly 
of the consequences and implementation of the 
Colombo-Genscher plan for Western European 
Union with reference to the summit conference 
at Stuttgart, where the heads of state and 
government decided to postpone any action up 
to 1988, or for five years after the 1983 
Stuttgart conference? 
What might be the influence, if any, of 
the Athens summit conference on this postpone-
ment? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 5th June 1984 
The heads of state or government and the 
foreign ministers of the ten member states of 
the European Community signed the solemn 
declaration on European union at the European 
Council in Stuttgart on 19th June 1983. This 
document is the product of a "Genscher-
Colombo initiative" which proposed a "Euro-
pean act". 
The declaration constitutes a concrete, 
pragmatic step on the path towards a European 
union. Its basic goals are to bring existing 
achievements closer together, incorporate new 
areas into co-operation among the Ten, expand 
policies already being pursued and improve 
existing mechanisms. 
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signatures of the heads of state or government 
and the foreign ministers. The member states 
have thus assumed a political commitment by 
which their future action will be measured. 
In a so-called review clause, the option of 
a future treaty on European union is held open. 
The declaration is to be subjected to a general 
review as soon as the progress achieved towards 
European unification justifies such action, but 
not later than five years after signature of the 
declaration (i.e. 1988). 
The Ten will, in accordance with the 
political undertaking entered into on 19th June 
1983, continue their efforts in implementing the 
solemn declaration on European union. 
QUFSTION 242 
put by Mr. Tummers 
on 21st December 1983 
Would the Council ~ prepared to 
promote the use of the international secretariat 
of the Standing Armaments Committee as the 
international secretariat of the Independent 
European Programme Group, which has no 
secretariat? 
Could such a secretariat not contribute 
an effective link between WEU and the 
Independent European Programme Group and, 
indirectly, between WEU and NATO? 
Could it not also establish a link between 
armaments procurement and armaments con-
trol? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 14th May 1984 
1. It is the Council's view that existing 
machinery and manpower should be used to 
optimum effect. 
2. Use of the international secretariat of the 
Standing Armaments Committee by the Inde-
pendent European Programme Group would 
require a decision by the IEPG and a decision 
by the WEU Council. As the Assembly is 
aware, the membership of the two bodies is 
different. 
The Council are prepared to consider 
The declaration is a political instrument, whether some kind of arrangement as suggested 
whose high political value is underscored by the in the question would be feasible, at least as far 
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as WEU member countries are concerned. 
Among the many criteria for appreciation which 
should be taken into account within the 
framework of this examination, consideration 
should obviously be given to the question of 
whether such an arrangement might contribute 
to greater effectiveness as regards armaments 
co-operation in Europe as well as in the Atlantic 
Alliance. 
3. As regards the last paragraph of the 
question, the Council would like to await 
further developments in the field of the activities 
of the Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
As the Assembly has been informed, the 
Council intend to examine ways in which the 
Agency for the Control of Armaments could be 
involved in fields other than the present one. 
QUFSTION 243 
put by Mr. Tummers 
on 21st December 1984 
Will the Council inform the Assembly of 
the results of its deliberations regarding the 
possible revision of the inspections conducted 
by the Agency for the Control of Armaments 
and indicate the general guidelines governing 
its approach to this matter? 
How could the Agency's nearly thirty 
years of experience as a verification body be 
exploited in the context of the armaments 
control negotiations? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 20th March 1984 
The Council wish to inform the Assembly 
that their deliberations regarding their exam-
ination of the list in Annex IV to Protocol No. 
Ill have not come to an end yet. 
The Council intend further to examine 
ways in which the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments could be involved in fields other 
than the present one. 
The Council will inform the Assembly as 
soon as possible after the completion of their 
examination of this subject. 
QUFSTION 244 
put by Mr. Wilkinson 
on 24th January 1984 
The European market for military flight 
simulators and training systems for the decade 
1984-94 would amount to some $8 billion -
France $286 million, Germany $339 million, 
United Kingdom $311 million - and further 
sizeable sums of money for Belgium, Italy and 
the Netherlands. 
Would the Council promote a joint or at 
least co-ordinated effort by the countries 
concerned, not so much for existing basic needs 
but for new aircraft, helicopters and other 
weapon systems? 
* 
* * 
No reply has yet been received from the 
Council. 
QUFSTION 245 
put by Mr. Lenzer 
on 28th February 1984 
Will the Council examine President 
Mitterrand's initiative in calling for Western 
European co-operation on a defensive early 
warning station in space? 
Would not such a challenge constitute a 
step towards countering any future threat, 
promote Western European cohesion, advance 
European space efforts and foster the moderni-
1 sation of Western European aerospace and 
computer industries? 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 14th May 1984 
The Council, which have always paid 
close attention to the space efforts of the 
European countries, have taken due note of the 
remarks made by the President of the French 
Republic at The Hague on 7th February last 
concerning a "European space community". 
They nevertheless consider it too early to 
state a view as to how the Council might follow 
up his statement. 
QUFSTION 246 
put by Mr. Wilkinson 
on 12th March 1984 
Why has it not been possible in the last 
thirty years to set up a workable procedure for 
concerting views agreed to by all parties to 
allow the Standing Committee of Staff Associ-
ations of the co-ordinated organisations, the 
Co-ordinating Committee of government budget 
experts, the Co-ordination Committee of mem-
ber governments and the Committee of 
Secretaries-General to discuss the staff problems 
of the co-ordinated organisations and reach 
salary decisions in time and not six to nine 
months later? 
What are the main difficulties involved? 
Would the Council say whether they are 
willing to call for the formation of a group of 
experts to discuss and work out such procedure 
in order to achieve a consensus between all the 
parties involved? 
Is it true that the co-ordinated organisa-
tions, and especially Western European Union, 
are no longer inclined to recruit staff on a 
permanent basis and, if so, what future 
possibilities will there be of acquiring a pension 
in the national framework of each member 
country? 
In view of the diminishing purchasing 
power of salaries, is it not important to agree 
on acceptable working conditions for all staff in 
the co-ordinated organisations? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 29th May 1984 
1, 2 and 3. While the questions raise matters of 
general concern to all the co-ordinated organi-
sations, the Council can only reply in the light 
of experience in WEU. 
The procedure for determining annual 
adjustments in the emoluments of staff serving 
in the co-ordinated organisations is necessarily 
lengthy, when it is borne in mind that proposals 
for such adjustments have to be made in 
accordance with certain measures accepted by 
the councils of the co-ordinated organisations. 
The method of salary adjustment pro-
vides, in respect of A and L grades, for the 
gathering of statistical data on the movement 
of civil service salaries in seven reference 
countries; for B and C grades, periodic surveys 
are made of the corresponding salaries paid by I 
the best local employers in each of the host l 
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countries and the results of these surveys are 
updated at the adjustment date (1st July of 
each year). On the basis of these figures a 
negotiation process then follows in which 
consensus and agreement are being sought 
among: 
( 1) seven international organisations, each 
operating in special and differing 
circumstances, which jointly draw up 
salary scale proposals; 
(2) seven staff associations with whom 
these proposals must be discussed; 
(3) twenty-nine sovereign member gov-
ernments, each with their particular 
national economic situations and 
budgetary policies, which make pro-
posals to the councils through the 
Co-ordinating Committee. 
This process requires sufficient opportun-
ities for discussion and deliberation among the 
representatives of member states of organisa-
tions and of staff associations. They endeavour 
to concert their views on various, complex and 
often very detailed questions of staff and salary 
problems. The main difficulty involved is to find 
solutions which take account of all the concerns 
expressed and of all the wishes brought forward 
and which are, at the same time, acceptable to 
all as a consensus. 
The Council recognise the imperfections 
of the present procedures within co-ordination 
and in particular the resultant delays in 
submitting recommendations and conclusions to 
governments. They are endeavouring, in co-
operation with the secretaries-general and the 
staff associations, to seek improvements. At this 
stage there is no agreement between organisa-
tions that any practical purpose would be served 
in calling on a group of experts. 
4. Western European Union may recruit 
new staff on contracts of limited duration of 
threejfive years, as do other co-ordinated 
organisations, thus ensuring flexibility and 
allowing for variations in staff requirements. 
Article ll of the WEU Staff Rules provides for 
this possibility. Contracts may be renewed after 
expiration, depending on circumstances. 
Pension rights in the national framework 
inevitably depend on length of previous national 
service if any, age and national regulations. 
5. It is, of course, important that working 
conditions shall be acceptable. Taking account 
of the foregoing and the relevant staff rules, the 
Council are confident that this is the case for 
the staff of Western European Union. It is, 
however, recognised that the situation must be 
kept under review in changing national and 
international circumstances. 
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Reactivation of WECJI 
The working group instructed by the 
Council and the political directors to examine 
the prospects for reactivating WEU considered 
that this question could be approached from 
three different angles as follows: 
- Why reactivate WEU now? 
- What content would such a reactivation 
have? 
- What would be the implementing 
procedures? 
The replies to each of these questions 
were as follows: 
1. WEU is at present the only European 
organisation empowered by treaty to discuss 
defence and security matters. It has a well-
developed institutional structure, in particular 
a Council and a parliamentary Assembly. Its 
reactivation is prompted by the following 
considerations: 
1.1. Consultation and joint in-depth reflection 
by the member countries of WEU are needed 
on the problems liable to affect their security, 
together with a more assertive European 
presence in the field of defence and security. 
1.2. The international situation and especially 
the continuing build-up of Soviet military forces 
deployed against Western Europe are a matter 
of major concern. 
1.3. As partners in the Atlantic Alliance, the 
member states of WEU are aware of the need 
to step up their contribution to the transatlantic 
dialogue. 
1.4. It is important that public opinion be 
involved in the debate about defence and 
security, principally through an improved dia-
logue between the WEU Council and the 
Assembly and by raising the profile of the 
activities of those bodies. 
In these circumstances, a better utilisation 
of WEU would demonstrate that the member 
countries have the will to reflect jointly and in 
depth on the conditions of their security, in the 
face of the threat they have to meet. This will, 
however, require a determined effort to adapt 
and revive the organisation. 
Such reactivation must, and perfectly 
well can, be achieved with due regard for the 
I. Text authorised for publication by the WEU Council 
of Ministers, Paris, 12th June 1984. 
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areas of competence of the other existing 
Atlantic and European institutions. This will 
require an exchange of information, taking into 
account the activities of these institutions: 
- As regards the Atlantic Alliance, with 
which WEU has very close links for co-
operation under the terms of the modified 
Brussels Treaty (Articles IV and VII), the 
proposed reactivation should be seen as a 
contribution to the cohesion of the alliance itself 
and not as an attempt to create a substitute for 
it. It is along these lines that the other members 
of the alliance, who are not members of WEU, 
would be kept informed; the ambassadors of 
the Seven to the alliance could play a useful 
role in this respect. 
- Whereas the Ten, as they declared at 
Stuttgart, are called upon to discuss the political 
and economic aspects of security, this does not 
at present extend to the field of defence. A 
reactivation of WEU would serve as an example 
of what can be achieved through co-operation 
on the European plane, and as a device to keep 
this important area of European co-operation 
active which the Community and the Ten are 
at the present unable to exploit to the extent 
that some of them would wish. 
2. As to the content, a reactivation of WEU 
should lead to a fuller dialogue on topics of 
common and major interest, taking into con-
sideration the European dimension of security 
questions. 
2.1. An urgent topic is the growing threat to 
Europe in its various guises, i.e. military, 
political and psychological. This is a problem 
which, unquestionably, can profitably be dis-
cussed within the Seven, without duplicating 
work and studies carried out elsewhere. Such a 
discussion among Europeans is even comple-
mentary as it may be conducted from a 
different and specific angle. Moreover, European 
public opinion expects its leaders to give thought 
to the problem and to present reasoned 
arguments which meet its preoccupations and 
worries. 
2.2. The discussions could, as provided for by 
Article VIII.3 of the treaty, also focus on the 
effects of the international situation on Euro-
pean security. Even if the Seven have no special 
interests to express on all these problems, they 
at least have specific viewpoints and ideas. 
2.3. Another topic could be ways of strength-
ening the transatlantic dialogue in all its forms. 
2.4. In the field of arms co-operation, the 
magnitude of the tasks to be accomplished in 
Europe - in particular as regards the use of 
new technologies to strengthen conventional 
defence - demands that no opportunity for 
consultation at European level be overlooked. 
Without encroaching on bodies such as the 
Independent European Programme Group 
(IEPG) or the Conference of National Arma-
ments Directors (CNAD), which have their 
own structure and responsibilities, WEU could 
play a useful role as a forum for discussion and 
a source of political impetus. 
3. As regards implementing procedures, this 
reactivation of WEU should lead to greater use 
of the existing institutions, with a number of 
changes. Special attention should be directed to 
the pair formed by the Council and the 
Assembly. 
3.1. The Council has an essential role to play. 
- It fulfils this role more particularly 
when it meets at ministerial level. These 
meetings thus provide the required political 
impetus and at the same time enhance the work 
of the Permanent Council. They could be held 
twice a year. 
- The Permanent Council could, in turn, 
meet more frequently, these meetings being 
expanded, as appropriate, to include senior 
central government staff (political directors; 
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experts on politico-military and defence ques-
tions, ... ). 
3.2. Any reactivation of the Council will have 
implications for its subsidiary bodies - the 
Standing Armaments Committee and the 
Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
3.3. The Assembly has a vital role to play as 
the link with public opinion on such an 
important issue as security. To this end, it 
would appear that a dialogue of greater 
substance should be established between the 
Council and the Assembly, independently of the 
work done by each. 
that: 
In this context, it might be envisaged 
- the exchange of views between the 
Assembly and the Council should be 
directed primarily to the reactivation 
of WEU and how this is to be brought 
about. The value of earlier Assembly 
studies and reports on the subject 
should be borne in mind; 
- the procedure for answering Assembly 
recommendations and written questions 
should be improved. 
Quite clearly the work of the Council and 
that of the Assembly interact and the debates 
in one of them cannot fail to stimulate 
discussions in the other. 
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OPINION ON THE BUDGET OF THE MINISTERIAL ORGANS 
OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION FOR THE FINANOAL YEAR 19831 
submitted on behalf of 
the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration2 
by Mr. de Vries, Rapporteur · 
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Draft Recommendation 
on the b11dget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1981 
The Assembly, 
(i) Noting that in communicating the budget of Western European Union as a whole the Council 
has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter; 
(ii) Having taken note of the contents; 
(iii) Considering that : 
(a) the future structure of the ministerial organs of Western European Union depends essentially 
on the tasks devolving upon them in the framework of political decisions to be taken on this 
matter by the Council; 
(b) it would consequently be pointless at the present juncture to express an opinion on the 
cost-effectiveness of these organs; 
(c) it would however be possible to make budgetary savings if the restructuration of the 
ministerial organs included unification of the Paris and London headquarters and the 
integration of their services; 
(d) in preparing the budget the criterion of "zero growth" was applied, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Examine the possibility of uniting the London and Paris headquarters with a view to integrating 
joint services ; 
2. Adopt flexible criteria in its staff recruitment policy, in view of new tasks to be accorded to the 
ministerial organs of Western European Union; 
3. Specify that the criterion of "zero growth" applies only to operating expenses and that 
expenditure and income relating to pensions should therefore be set out in a separate section of the 
budget; 
4. Inform the Assembly of the stage reached in the studies on improving the status of staff 
announced in the Council's reply to Assembly Recommendation 340 and the participation of staff 
associations in the consultation and conciliation structure of the co-ordinated organisations. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. de Vries, Rapporteur) 
I. Preliminary considerations 
1. Article VIII (c) of the Charter of the 
Assembly states that : 
"The Assembly shall express its views in the 
form of an opinion or recommendation on 
the annual budget of Western European 
Union as soon as it has been communicated." 
To this end, a member of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration is respon-
sible for presenting a report which has to be 
technical since only budgetary and administra-
tive questions are the responsibility of this 
committee. 
Indeed, there can be no question of it 
tackling problems relating to the activities of 
the Council, the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments, the Standing Armaments Commit-
tee and the Public Administration Committee 
from the moment the Presidential Committee 
refers these problems to the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments, the General 
Affairs Committee and the Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Ques-
tions. 
2. However, within the specific framework in 
which it has to give its opinion, the Committee 
on Budgetary Affairs and Administration wishes 
to examine the budget of the ministerial organs 
of WEU from the cost-effectiveness point of 
view to ensure that the tasks entrusted to these 
bodies are fulfilled in the most economical and 
efficient manner. 
Here it should be recalled that in 1981 the 
Council conducted a study of the tasks of the 
ministerial organs of WEU with an eye to 
achieving the greatest efficiency. The conclu-
sions of this study have not been communicated 
to the Assembly. However this may be, it 
should be noted that the budgets for 1982 and 
1983 show no change in the structure of the 
ministerial bodies. 
11. Budget of the ministerial organs of WEU 
for 1983 
3. As is the usual practice, the budget of the 
ministerial organs of WEU for 1983 is presented 
in three different sections, one for each organ 
(cf. summary table, Appendix 1). However, 
since each section is organised according to the 
same criteria, this budget can be examined as 
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a whole. Four main categories of expenditure 
then emerge : 
- staff, 
- travel, 
- general services, 
- pensions, 
each of which should be examined separately. 
4. Staff 
4.1. Expenditure on staff consists of the 
emoluments (salaries and various allowances) 
for 128 officials in Paris and in London (cf. 
table of establishment, Appendix 11). This 
represents 80% of the total budget expenditure. 
It is emphasised that emoluments - as in the 
Office of the Clerk of the Assembly -
correspond, for each grade and step, to the 
scales applied in the co-ordinated organisations. 
These scales are adjusted periodically in 
accordance with the procedure agreed upon by 
the Co-ordinating Committee of government 
budget experts in its 159th report. In this 
respect it is to be noted that the application of 
the criteria for adjusting salaries set out in this 
report (cf. extract at Appendix Ill) is detrimen-
tal to the staff in that it involves a not negligible 
reduction in its purchasing power. This is due 
mainly to the introduction of a parameter for 
making a comparison with national civil services 
and the application of price evolution indices in 
low inflation countries1• 
Furthermore, to take account of the present 
economic recession and the budgetary con-
straints on governments, the Co-ordinating 
Committee, in its 191 st report, introduced a 
levy to moderate grade A and L salaries by 
1.5% with effect from lst July 1983, 3% with 
effect from 1st July 1984 and 4.5% with effect 
from lst July 1985. There is no choice therefore 
but to note that the WEU staff is taking part 
in the effort of the governments of member 
countries to reduce the rate of inflation and 
emerge from the present economic crisis. 
1. The Inter-Organisation Section for studying salaries 
and prices has calculated that from 1st July 1979 to 1st July 
1983 the purchasing power of Grades A6 and A 7 fell by 
11%, other A grades by 8% and B grades by 3%. 
Conversely, the purchasing power of C grades increased by 
2%. 
4.2. However, the committee feels that an 
answer might be found to the question of 
savings in this category of expenditure if the 
structure of the ministerial organs were exam-
ined more closely to assess its cost-effectiveness. 
Indeed, where the Secretariat-General in 
London is concerned, one might wonder whether 
forty-eight persons are not too many for the 
present activities of that body : as was noted in 
the report submitted at the first part of the 
twenty-ninth ordinary session by Mr. Ahrens 
on behalf of the General Affairs Committee, 
"far from extending its consultations the 
Council for its part persists in clinging to a very 
restrictive concept of its role" .1 
In this perspective, a realistic assessment of 
the programme of work to be accomplished in 
the framework of an objective revision of the 
various tasks carried out by the staff might lead 
to a more efficient and less costly organisation 
of the Secretariat-General in London. In this 
connection, it should be underlined that the 
Secretary-General has already adopted a tighter 
staff recruitment policy : certain vacant posts 
are in fact not filled immediately and the 
relevant duties are taken over by other officials. 
Such is the case, for instance, of the post of 
Legal Adviser (Grade A6) which has remained 
vacant in the Secretariat-General following the 
death of its holder. When legal questions arise, 
the Secretary-General consults the Head of the 
Administration and Legal Affairs Division of 
the Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
Of even more importance is that the 
existence of two WEU headquarters, one in 
London and the other in Paris, duplicates the 
duties of general services and translation and 
administrative sections. With particular regard 
to the latter, it is interesting to note the 
following staff figures : 
London Paris 
Assistant Secretary-General 1 HG 
Head of division 1 AS 1 A6 
Head of the Finance and Administrative Section 1 AS 
Deputy Head of the Finance and Administrative 1 A4 
Section 
Deputy bead of division 1 A3 
Administrator 1 A2 
Assistants 2 84 3 84 
Secretary 1 83 
Accountants 2 82 
----
7 8 
I. Document 944, paragraph 39. 
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Thus, fifteen officials of all grades are 
responsible for managing the budget of the 
three ministerial organs of WEU (amounting to 
F 25,359,890 plus £1,096,345) and the adminis-
tration of 128 persons. 
This consideration confirms the sound opi-
nion expressed by Mr. Cavaliere in the debate 
on the Assembly's budget for 1984 that "if the 
two separate offices in Paris and London were 
given up, the WEU institutions could be 
reorganised for the better and better use could 
be made of the funds provided by member 
states for the Assembly"1• 
The structure of the Agency for the Control 
of Armaments seems to concord with the 
organisation laid down in Article IV of Protocol 
No. IV. However, under paragraph 2 of that 
article, its organisation may be modified by 
decision of the Council. The proposals made by 
Mr. Prussen on behalf of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments in his report 
on the application of the Brussels Treaty 
actually pointed either to a reduction in the 
staff of the Agency because of the fewer 
controls carried out or to a redistribution, of 
responsibilities and tasks if the Agency was 
assigned new duties in examining and assisting 
the Council on technical questions which might 
be useful in various negotiations on disarma-
ment or the control of armaments. 
The same idea is valid for the international 
secretariat of the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee. In this respect the committee recalls the 
many proposals the Assembly has made for 
attributing new tasks to this ministerial body. 
Reference should also be made to the recom-
mendations adopted during the last session on 
reports by Mr. Bassinet, Mr. Wilkinson and 
Lord Northfield. 
On the basis of the preceding observations, 
the committee feels that, while generally 
speaking the staff of the ministerial organs may 
be considered too numerous for their present 
activities, they would be able to handle new or 
perhaps increased activities if organised more 
efficiently. 
However this may be, the implementation 
of a programme for gradually modifying the 
structure and, in particular, agreeing to have a 
single seat would allow substantial savings to 
be made in future years, quite apart from the 
fact that by facilitating internal communications 
between the various WEU bodies their effi-
ciency would be enhanced. 
1. Proceedings of the twenty-ninth ordinary session, 
second part, eighth sitting, page 126. 
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5. Travel 
Compared with overall expenditure, the cost 
of travel represents only a small percentage : 
about 1.6% for the Secretariat-General in 
London and the secretariat of the Standing 
Armaments Committee in Paris and 2% for the 
Agency for the Control of Armaments. The 
difference is due to the fact that many of the 
journeys of officials of the Agency are for on-
the-spot verifications which are one of its 
institutional activities. 
Even so, if the structure of the three organs 
of WEU were modified as explained in an 
earlier paragraph, significant savings in this 
category of expenditure might also be made. 
6. General services 
The sums allocated for general services may 
be considered to be the minimum necessary for 
the maintenance of the two seats in London 
and Paris (maintenance, repairs, fuel, electri-
city, water, cleaning, telephone, insurances) and 
for a limited renewal of furniture and equip-
ment. Here it should be noted that the two 
ministerial organs of WEU in Paris (the Agency 
for the Control of Armaments and the Standing 
Armaments Committee) and the Office of the 
Clerk of the Assembly have effectively unified 
the services of joint interest under the respon-
sibility of the secretariat of the SAC. Thus the 
items under sections B and C of the budget of 
the ministerial organs (and in the Assembly's 
budget) show the contribution of each body to 
the total expenditure (joint charges) to be 
established as follows : 
ACA 
SAC 
Office of the Clerk 
45% 
25% 
30% 
Regarding the renewal of equipment and 
furniture, it is to be noted that for the sake of 
economy the credits requested are very small 
and do not allow all the furniture which wears 
out to be replaced nor the office equipment to 
be modernised. Here the committee believes 
greater attention should be paid to this category 
of expenditure. After all, the state of WEU's 
buildings and offices is in a way the outward 
manifestation of its vitality and confidence in 
its own future. 
7. Pensions 
This category of expenditure raises a 
fundamental problem discussed in the Assembly 
during its debate on its draft budget for 1984. 
It is useful to recall that when the pension 
scheme was introduced the Co-ordinating Corn~ 
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mittee examined the various possible systems 
for financing it and concluded that "the only 
solution which can be recommended is to 
charge the full cost of retirement pensions to 
the budgets of the co-ordinated organisations". 
(Cf. extract from the 94th report at Appendix 
IV.) 
The adoption of this solution brought an 
immediate benefit to the governments since 
they immediately received the very high sums 
paid by the staff for validating previous service; 
but as the years pass and as officials retire the 
cost of pensions which was covered by the 
contributions of staff still in service has risen 
well above income with the result that the 
annual contribution to be paid by the govern-
ments is becoming increasingly heavy. (Cf. 
table at Appendix V showing the evolution of 
expenditure on pensions in WEU.) 
Because of this, a national delegation to the 
Co-ordinating Committee has envisaged the 
possibility of having one or several actuaries 
make a study of the cost of the pension scheme 
with a view to changing if necessary the rate of 
contributions. This question is now being 
discussed at the co-ordinating level. Where 
WEU itself is concerned, it appears that certain 
delegations are advocating including the sums 
for new pensions in the calculation of the rate 
of increase of the total budget fixed by the 
application of the zero growth criterion. This is 
tantamount to saying that the increase in 
credits for pensions should, at least partly, be 
compensated by reductions in credits for other 
heads of the budget. The committee cannot 
share this view - which also concerns the 
Assembly's budget - since in the long term the 
operational part of the budget of all the WEU 
bodies might be reduced to the point where its 
work would be so shackled as to grind to a halt. 
The nature and scope of the work of the 
Council and of the ministerial organs is a 
political problem which cannot be decided by 
an administrative measure. It must be examined 
on its own merits and not in the context of how 
economies can be made to meet the increasing 
cost of pensions. 
The zero growth criterion should therefore 
be applied during this period of serious world 
economic crisis to operating expenses alone, 
pensions being an acquired right of retired staff 
and an obligation for the governments of the 
member countries which have received the 
capital sums paid by the staff into the provident 
fund. To this end, it would be desirable for all 
the expenditure and receipts in regard to 
pensions to be set out in a separate part of the 
budget. The figures should also show the cost of 
participating in the operation of the joint 
pensions administrative section of the co-ordi-
nated organisations, which is at present an item 
in the budget of the Secretariat-General 
(Chapter A, Ill, 5m). 
This joint section is responsible for the 
administration of pensions ; at the end of 1983 
it submitted to the Co-ordinating Committee 
an annual progress report, an extract of which 
is at Appendix VI. The ad hoc section of the 
budget should also indicate the evolution of 
expenditure for the payment of pensions for the 
next five years on the basis of estimates of staff 
due for retirement. 
Ill. Considerations on staff policy 
8. Traditionally, in examining the budget of 
the ministerial organs the committee describes 
the development of certain problems which 
specifically concern staff. These problems have 
already been set out in Recommendation 340, 
adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 
1979, to which the Council gave a provisional 
answer. Since that date the Co-ordinating 
Committee of government budget experts has 
continued, inter alia, its "feasibility study on 
comparison of duties, grades and levels of 
remuneration in the co-ordinated organisations, 
other international organisations, certain civil 
services and certain private sector firms". 
No decision has yet been reached on this 
question which clearly is of great complexity. 
The Committee of Secretaries-General of the 
Co-ordinated Organisations has already given 
its opinion : 
- that a firm of advisers or university 
experts should be invited to carry out this 
work; 
- that this feasibility study should be 
undertaken only on the sine qua non 
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condition that the European Communities 
agree to take part. 
As a follow-up to this study, it would be 
desirable for all problems connected with the 
status of the staff to be examined in detail, 
with particular regard to career possibilities to 
which all staff attach the greatest importance. 
9. Finally, mention should be made of the 
problem of arrangements for concerting and 
reconciling the approaches of the three parties 
around the co-ordinating table, i.e. : 
- the budgetary experts of the member 
countries, 
- the representatives of the secretaries-
general, 
- the representatives of the staff. 
The latter complain that they do not have 
the rights of initiative enjoyed, for instance, by 
representatives of a national civil service and 
hence cannot make proposals to the Co-
ordinating Committee other than through the 
secretaries-general. In other words, they would 
ask for more active participation in the work of 
co-ordinating and regulating their rights which 
would give the staff represented the guarantee 
that their problems are well presented and 
defended in the arrangements for co-ordination. 
It is evident that this problem can be 
examined only in the framework of the duties 
entrusted to the staff associations under the 
staff rules of the different organisations. This is 
a problem of co-ordination which has already 
been brought to the Council's attention in 
Recommendation 340, adopted by the Assembly 
on 4th December 1979, and to which the 
Council has not yet given a final answer. The 
committee wishes this answer to be communi-
cated to the Assembly without delay. 
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APPENDIX I 
WEU budget estimates for 1983 
Proposed expenditure and income 
for the total budget 
Section A Section B 
£ Francs 
Expenditure 
Salaries and allowances •••• 0 •• 0 0 •• 1,307,145 9,927,490 
Travel •••• 0 0 •• 0 •••• 0 0 •• 0 •••• 0. 26,850 207,200 
Other operating costs ............. 197,375 654,550 
Purchase of furniture and equipment . 10,290 70,250 
Building 0 •• 0. 0 0 0. 0. 0 •• 0 0 0. 0. 0. 0 - 45,000 
Total ordinary costs 0 ••••• 0 ••• 0 0 •• 1,541,660 10,904,490 
Pensions costs 0 •• 0. 0 •••• 0 ••• 0 0 •• 113,290 1,390,000 
ToTAL for all costs • 0. 0 0. 0 0 •••• 0 0. 1,654,950 12,294,490 
Income 
WEU tax 0 •• 0 0 •••• 0 0 ••••• 0 ••• 0 0 484,395 3,495,600 
Other receipts ••• 0 0 •••• 0 ••••• 0. 0 28,750 95,000 
Total ordinary receipts ............ 513,145 3,590,600 
Pension receipts 0. 0. 0 0 0 0 •••••• 0 •• 45,460 258,550 
ToTAL for all receipts •• 0 0 ••••••••• 558,605 3,849,150 
NET TOTAL (whole budget) 1 ........ 1,096,345 8,445,340 
Budget surplus 1981 (-) 0 0 •••• 0 0 0 0 80,102 426,331 
Contributions required in 1983* • 0 •• 1,016,243 8,019,009 
1. Increase 1983 j 1982. . ......... . - 4.48% + 9.73% 
Contributions* 
600ths £ 
Belgium 59 99,930.56 
France 120 203,248.60 
Germany 120 203,248.60 
Italy 120 203,248.60 
Luxembourg 2 3,387.48 
Netherlands 59 99,930.56 
United Kingdom 120 203,248.60 
600 1,016,243.00 
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Section C TOTAL B + C 
Francs Francs 
20,636,600 30,564,090 
512,700 719,900 
961,750 1,616,300 
115,300 185,550 
81,000 126,000 
22,307,350 33,211,840 
2,676,500 4,066,500 
24,983,850 37,278,340 
7,197,300 10,692,900 
200,000 295,000 
7,397,300 10,987,900 
672,000 930,550 
8,069,300 11,918,450 
16,914,550 25,359,890 
1,253,340 1,679,671 
15,661,210 23,680,219 
+ 2.75% + 4.97% 
Francs 
2,328,554.87 
4,736,043.80 
4,736,043.80 
4,736,043.80 
78,934.06 
2,328,554.87 
4, 736,043.80 
23,680,219.00 
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Establishment of Western European Union 
1983 budget 
A B c Total A 
Secretary-General 1 - - 1 1 
Deputy Secretary- 1 - - 1 1 
General 
Director - - 1 1 -
Assistant Secretary- 1 1 - 2 1 
General 
Hors grade 3 1 1 5 3 
A7 - - 1 1 -
6 1 - 3 4 1 
5 2 1 6 9 2 
4 - 4 8 12 -
3 3 - 1 4 3 
2 2 - 2 4 2 
A grades 8 5 21 34 8 
L5 1 - - 1 1 
4 1 2 - 3 1 
3 1 2 2 5 1 
2 1 - - 1 1 
L grades 4 4 2 10 4 
B5 - - - - -
4 8 4 9 21 8 
3 7 7 6 20 7 
2 5 - 3 8 5 
1 2 - - 2 2 
B grades 22 11 18 51 22 
C5 - - 1 1 -
4 1 4 - 5 1 
3 8 3 9 20 8 
2 2 - - 2 2 
1 - - - - -
C grades 11 7 10 28 11 
Total 48 28 52 128 48 
A - Secretariat-General. 
B - International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee. 
C - Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
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1982 budget 
B c Total 
- - 1 
- - 1 
- 1 1 
1 - 2 
1 1 5 
- 1 1 
- 3 4 
1 6 9 
4 8 12 
- 1 4 
- 2 4 
5 21 34 
- - 1 
1 - 2 
3 2 6 
- - 1 
4 2 10 
- - -
4 9 21 
7 6 20 
- 3 8 
- - 2 
11 18 51 
- 1 1 
4 - 5 
3 9 20 
- - 2 
- - -
7 10 28 
28 52 128 
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+or-
A B c Total 
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- +1 - +1 
- -1 - -1 
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
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Secretariat-General 
No. Grade 
-
Function 
1 HG Secretary-General 
2 HG Deputy Secretary-General 
3 HG Assistant Secretary-General 
4 A6 Legal Adviser 
s B4 Personal assistant to Secretary-General 
6 B3 Bilingual shorthand-typist 
7 B4 Private secretary to Deputy Secretary-General 
8 B4 Personal assistant to Legal Adviser 
General Affairs Division 
9 AS Head of division 
10 A3 Deputy head of division 
11 A3 Committee secretary 
12 B4 Assistant/verbatim writer 
13 B3 Secretary J assistant 
Administration and Personnel Division 
14 AS Head of division 
1S A3 Deputy head of division 
16 A2 Administrative officer 
17 B4 Assistant (Personnel) 
18 B4 Assistant (Administration) 
19 B3 Secretary 
Linguist Division 
20 LS Head of division 
21 LT4 Reviser 
22 LT3 Translator FrenchJEnglish 
23 LT2 Translator EnglishJFrench 
316 
APPENDIX 11 DOCUMENT 983 
No. Grade Function 
Registry and production services 
24 A2 Head of registry 
25 B4 Documentation clerk 
26 B4 Head of typing pool 
27 B3 Bilingual shorthand-typist 
28 B3 Bilingual shorthand-typist 
29 B3 Bilingual shorthand-typist 
30* B3 Bilingual shorthand-typist 
31* B2 Shorthand-typist 
32 B2 Shorthand-typist 
33 B2 Shorthand-typist 
34 B2 Assistant (distribution) 
35 B2 Assistant (reproduction) 
General services 
36 B1 Telephonist 
37 B1 Telephonist 
38 C3 Chauffeur /Mechanic 
39 C3 Chauffeur /Mechanic 
40 C3 Maintenance supervisor 
41 C2 Messenger 
42* C2 Messenger 
Security 
43 C4 Chief security guard 
44 C3 Security guard 
45 C3 Security guard 
46 C3 Security guard 
47 C3 Security guard 
48 C3 Security guard 
• No credits included for these posts. 
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No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
15 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
16 
17 
18 
19 
Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee 
Grade 
HG 
B4 
B3 
B4 
B3 
C4 
A5 
A4 
A4 
A4 
LT4 
Ll3 
LT3 
LT4* 
B4 
B3 
B3 
B3 
B3 
Function 
Head of the international secretariat of the Standing 
Armaments Committee - Assistant Secretary-General 
Office of the Assistant Secretary-Gener.al 
In charge of the private office and tlie private secretariat 
Secretary /Bilingual shorthand-typist 
Archivist, responsible for distributing documents 
Documentation clerk/Secretary, bilingual shorthand-
typist 
Driver mechanic 
Responsible officials 
Assistant to head of international secretariat 
Committee secretary 
Committee secretary 
Committee secretary 
Linguistic staff 
Reviser 
Interpreter 
Translator and minute-writer 
Reviser 
Secretariat group 
Assistant 
Bilingual shorthand-typist 
Bilingual shorthand-typist 
Bilingual shorthand-typist 
Bilingual shorthand-typist 
• This position is currently listed as LT3. 
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No. Grade Function 
--~ 
Administrative and general staff 
22 A4 Deputy to Head of Finance and Administration Section, 
Head of Finance and Account Office 
21 B4 Administrative assistant 
23 C4 Roneo operator 
24 C4 Storekeeper and technician 
25 C4 Security guard 
26 C3 Security guard 
27 C3 Security guard 
28 C3 Security guard 
17 bis B3 Telephonist 
TOTAL : 28 posts 
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Agency for the Control of Armaments 
No. Grade Function 
1 HG Director 
2 A2 Director's assistant 
3 A7 Deputy Director 
4 B4 Assistant 
Director's office 
5 A4 Head of Director's office, Security Officer 
6 A3 Head of central documentation office 
7 A2 Assistant, head of documentation office 
8 B4 Assistant, documentation office clerk 
9 LT3 Translator EnglishjFrench 
10 LT3 Translator FrenchjEnglish 
11 B3 Secretary 
12 B2 Shorthand-typist 
13 B4 Assistant, head of central registry 
Assistant to the Security Officer 
14 B3 Secretary 
Other services and security service 
42 CS Head designer and duplicator 
43 C3 Driver mechanic 
44 C3 Security guard 
45 C3 Security guard 
46 C3 Security guard 
47 C3 Security guard 
48 C3 Security guard 
49 C3 Security guard 
50 C3 Security guard 
51 C3 Security guard 
52 B3 Telephonist 
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No. Grade Function 
Information and Study Division 
1S A6 Head of Information and Studies Division 
16 AS Expert, armaments industry 
17 AS Expert, chemical and biological weapons 
18 A4 Expert, land armaments 
19 A4 Expert, air armaments 
20 A4 Expert, naval armaments 
21 A4 Deputy to Head of Division for General Questions 
22 B4 Assistant 
23 B3 Secretary 
24 B3 Secretary 
Inspection and Control Division 
2S A6 Head of Inspections Division I 
26 AS Expert, armaments industry 
27 AS Expert, guided missiles 
28 A4 Expert, biological and chemical weapons 
29 AS Expert, air armaments 
30 A4 Expert, land armaments 
31 B4 Assistant 
32 B3 Secretary 
Administration and Legal Affairs Division 
33 A6 Head of Administration and Legal Affairs Division 
34 B4 Assistant 
3S A4 Legal expert 
36 AS Head of Finance and Administration Section 
37 B2 Assistant accountant 
38 B4 Accountant 
39 B2 Senior clerk 
40 B4 Head of group responsible for general services 
41 B4 Accountant 
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Extract from the I 59th report of the Co-ordinating Committee of government budget experts 
Revision of remuneration adjustment procedure 
New rules 
CHAPTER I 
General provisions 
Article 1 
l. The Co-ordinating Committee shall carry 
out every year a review of remuneration of the 
staff of the co-ordinated organisations on the 
basis of a dossier compiled by the secretaries-
general and containing their proposals as well 
as the elements for information and assessment 
provided for under the present rules. 
2. The Co-ordinating Committee and the 
representatives of the secretaries-general shall 
agree at the beginning of each review on the 
timetable of work and the latest date on which 
the recommendations of the committee shall be 
submitted to the Councils. 
Article 2 
For the purpose of the present rules, 
"remuneration" shall mean, for the whole staff 
of the co-ordinated organisations, all the various 
elements which make up remuneration. 
Article 3 
These rules shall apply for the first time to 
the review of remuneration which takes effect 
from lst July 1978. Should any amendments 
be made subsequently to these rules no provision 
which ceases to apply shall give rise to vested 
rights. 
CHAPTER 11 
Review of basic salaries of staff in categories 
A and L 
Annual reviews 
Article 4 
With effect from lst July each year, and on 
the basis of comparable grades, the basic 
salaries of staff in categories A and L serving 
in Belgium shall be adjusted by the change in 
the international cost-of-living index in Belgium 
over the previous twelve months modified 
upwards or downwards by the applicable 
weighted average of the percentage changes in 
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real terms in the net remuneration in all the 
national civil services of the reference countries 
during the same period. This percentage 
adjustment shall be applied to the basic salary 
scales in force on lst July of the previous year. 
Triennial reviews 
Article 5 
l. The basic salaries of staff in categories A 
and L serving in Belgium shall be subjected to 
a full review every three years, based on the 
following criteria : 
(a) the increase in the cost of living in 
Belgium since the previous triennial 
review, on the basis of the international 
price index established in that country 
for the staff of the co-ordinated organi-
sations, brought back to base 100 at the 
date on which that triennial review came 
into effect: 
(b) the weighted average of the percentage 
changes in real terms that have taken 
place for comparable grades since the 
previous triennial review in the levels of 
net remuneration in the national civil 
services taken as reference ; 
(c) the level and trend of remuneration of 
staff of the European Communities and 
other international organisations; 
(d) requirements in respect of staff recruit-
ment in the co-ordinated organisations; 
(e) the economic and social situation in the 
member countries of the co-ordinated 
organisations. 
2. The starting date for the period of reference 
taken into consideration shall be the date from 
which the scales resulting from the previous 
triennial review took effect. 
Article 6 
For the purpose of Articles 4 and 5 above: 
(a) comparable grades means those grades 
of officials of national civil services 
whose duties correspond to those of 
category A staff of the co-ordinated 
organisations; 
(b) the national civil services of the reference 
countries means the civil services of the 
following countries : Belgium, France, 
• 
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Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom; 
(c) net remuneration in the civil services 
means the arithmetic mean of gross 
minimum and maximum salaries to 
which are added all the other elements 
normally making up the remuneration 
of unmarried officials in the grade in 
question, but with the deduction of the 
amount of compulsory contributions to 
social security, and also income tax 
levied by the central authority on 
unmarried officials and calculated 
without taking into account non-auto-
matic personal allowances ; 
(d) the applicable weighted average of 
percentage changes in real terms means 
the percentage obtained by the following 
operations : 
(i) taking into consideration in each 
national civil service of the grades 
comparable to those of category A 
staff; 
(ii) calculation, for each of these grades, 
of the changes in real terms of the 
relevant remuneration, by deflating 
the index for the trend in nominal 
salaries by the national index for 
consumer prices, the indices being 
brought back to base 100 at the 
date of effect of the last review of 
the same kind ; 
(iii) calculation for each grade of the 
average percentage change for the 
whole sample by giving the data for 
each country considered the follo-
wing weights: 9.6 for Belgium, 19.1 
for France, 23.6 for Germany, 14.2 
for Italy, 7.2 for Luxembourg, 10.2 
for the Netherlands and 16.1 for 
the United Kingdom ; 
{iv) calculation of the percentages to be 
applied by dividing the A grades 
into three groups, A7-A6, A5-A4, 
A3-A2, and calculating for each of 
these groups the arithmetic mean 
of the corresponding weighted per-
centages obtained for the whole of 
the sample. 
Article 7 
In the case of both annual and triennial 
reviews the basic salaries applicable in countries 
other than Belgium shall be obtained by 
multiplying the new basic salaries applicable to 
staff serving in Belgium by coefficients which 
ensure parity of purchasing power for all staff 
in the same grade and within-grade step. 
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CHAPTER Ill 
Review of basic salaries of staff in categories 
BandC 
Article 8 
The basic salaries of staff in categories B 
and C shall be calculated on the basis of 
surveys conducted by the Inter-Organisations 
Section in member countries, among the best 
employers in these countries. 
Article 9 
1. The list of best employers in member 
countries shall include firms in the private 
sector, establishments in the public sector and 
international organisations. It shall be drawn 
up in agreement with the national authorities 
and transmitted to the Co-ordinating Committee 
for information, together with any subsequent 
modification. 
2. Approximately half of the firms in the 
private sector shall be national, the other half 
multinational in character. The firms in the 
sample shall, so far as possible, be drawn f~om 
different sectors of the economy. 
3. In order to maintain a certain degree of 
stability in the surveys, no new firm shall be 
added without valid reason to the sample used 
in the previous survey. The sample should not 
normally be modified to an extent exceeding 
20% of the number of firms. 
Article 10 
1. The survey shall be carried out on the basis 
of the principles set out in CCGJW(73)1, 
clarified in the report by Working Party No. 
16, document CCG/W(78)2 Revised. Its pur-
pose shall be to establish, for each of the grades 
of categories B and C staff, the minimum and 
maximum basic salaries paid for comparable 
jobs by the employers in the member countries. 
2. The results compiled for each of these jobs 
in firms in the private sector shall be: 
(a) weighted by the numbers employed by 
the firms chosen in which the job under 
consideration exists; 
(b) calculated as the simple arithmetical 
average of the number of firms chosen 
in which the job under consideration 
exists. 
The simple mean resulting from the operations 
described in (a) and (b) above shall determine 
the salary level for the job under consideration. 
3. The results obtained from surveys of 
enterprises in the private sector, the public 
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sector and other international organisations 
shall carry weights of 80%, 10% and 10% 
respectively. If there is no international organi-
sation in the member country concerned, the 
private sector percentage shall be increased to 
90%. 
4. However, the inclusion in the survey of the 
public sector of the member country concerned 
must not result in a reduction of the purchasing 
power of salaries of staff serving in the country 
unless the survey results reflect a general trend 
in that direction recorded in that country. 
5. The percentages obtained as a result of the 
operations provided for in the present article 
shall be applied to the basic salaries of 
category B and C staff as they had been fixed 
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at 1st July of the previous year, with effect 
from 1st July of the current year. 
Article 11 
The surveys carried out by the Inter-
Organisations Section shall take place every 
two years in turn in member countries where 
there are large numbers of staff of the co-
ordinated organisations ; in other member 
countries they shall normally take place every 
four years. Between two surveys the updating 
of the results so obtained, for the period 
between the survey date and the effective date 
of the annual review of salaries, shall be 
effected ~n the basis of information supplied by 
employers and by national delegations. 
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APPENDIX IV 
ExtrtiCt from the 94th report of the Co-ordi•ati•g Comminee of gtwer•me•t budget experts 
different organisations developed on dif-
ferent lines, their staff would be conti-
nually making claims. 
PART 11 
Co•sideratio•s which led the Co-ordi•ati•g 
Comminee to the scheme which it recomme•ds 
31. The Co-ordinating Committee had to 
resolve three main questions : 
A. Should one think in terms of a number 
of separate schemes suited to the 
requirements of each organisation or 
adopt one single scheme applicable to all 
the organisations ? 
B. Depending on the choice made, what 
financing system(s) should be adopted? 
C. On what principles and model should the 
standards applying to the pension scheme 
(or schemes) be based ? 
A. U•iform scheme or separate schemes 
32. Since the Council of Europe has its own 
pension scheme, it would theoretically have 
been possible to let each of the other 
organisations have its own scheme and, for 
example, to provide a scheme for the OECD as 
proposed by its Working Party on Staff Policy, 
but the Co-ordinating Committee considered 
that there would be the following serious 
objections to having separate schemes : 
(a) as the organisations concerned had for 
long operated a common system of 
remuneration which they had continually 
co-ordinated, it appeared illogical to 
adopt a different basis for pensions, 
which are a natural extension of sal-
aries; 
(b) as the benefits provided by the different 
pension schemes should theoretically be 
identical, the only difference among 
these schemes would lie in the method 
of financing them, but one could not 
disregard the risk that, if a scheme 
failed to provide the pensions laid down 
in its rules, it might become necessary 
to institute a co-ordination procedure for 
pensions under conditions of some diffi-
culty; 
(c) most important, there would be the risk 
that, if the schemes set up in the 
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33. The Co-ordinating Committee therefore 
considers that it is clearly desirable as a matter 
of principle to set up a uniform pension scheme 
for all the co-ordinated organisations. 
B. Fiunci•g system 
34. The Co-ordinating Committee considers 
that the need to guarantee a certain level of 
benefits is incompatible with a funded scheme, 
because the persistence of inflation in western 
countries makes it almost inevitable that there 
should in time be some subsidising from 
national budgets, i.e. at least a partial breach 
of the principle of funding. 
(b) Natioul scume ;,. tu co••try of employme11t 
35. If staff of the co-ordinated organisations 
joined the national pension scheme of the 
country in which they are serving, this would 
have the advantage of observing the principle of 
territoriality usually followed in social security 
matters and also of providing cover against the 
risk of sickness for retired staff, but the 
existence of a guaranteed level of benefits would 
result in staff being given advantages in addition 
to those granted by the national insurance 
system in the country. In view of the wide 
geographical dispersal of staff, the Co-ordinat-
ing Committee rules out this alternative which 
would be unduly complex and would involve 
administration costs out of proportion to the 
size of the group provided for. 
(c) Pay-as-you-go system 
36. Another possible way of financing would 
have been to use the pay-as-you-go technique 
whereby the proceeds of contributions paid by 
serving staff, or by the organisation on their 
behalf, would be shared immediately among the 
pensioners. The Co-ordinating Committee does 
not consider that this would be a reasonable 
solution for such a small group as the co-
ordinated organisations, which does not seem 
likely to grow much. If in the long run the 
present rates of contribution (7% and 14%) 
proved to be inadequate, the further charge on 
member government funds would be exactly the 
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same as under a system financed out of budgets. 
In the short term, on the other hand, in view of 
the favourable ratio between serving staff and 
pensioners, a pay-as-you-go scheme would have 
the disadvantage that its apparent prosperity 
would encourage the payment of benefits at a 
high level, which it would be very difficult to 
reduce later as required by normal changes in 
the age structure of the group. 
37. A more attractive solution at first sight 
would have been to affiliate the staff of the co-
ordinated organisations to a pay-as-you-go 
scheme with a broader demographic base, as it 
would obviate the uncertainties to which their 
small numbers expose them, and this was in 
fact the solution proposed for the OECD alone 
by the group of actuaries whom the latter 
consulted. 
38. This solution was attractive to govern-
ments, because in the case of the OECD it had 
been shown that benefits could thereby be 
provided, although admittedly at a low level, 
without changing the current contribution rate 
of 21%. It was also attractive for staff members, 
as in the case of the OECD it gave them the 
prospect of keeping all or part of their holdings 
in the provident fund. 
39. However, the Co-ordinating Committee 
considers that such an arrangement would have 
the following considerable drawbacks : 
(a) uncertainty as to the future of the pay-
as-you-go scheme to which the staff 
would be affiliated (such as the ANEP) 
making it necessary for states to commit 
themselves in certain circumstances to 
guaranteeing the payment of benefits 
out of the budgets of the organisations'; 
(b) in the event of an organisation being 
wound up, the need to make a heavy 
compensation payment to the pension 
fund (such as the ANEP), or to accept 
a stoppage of pension payments from 
the fund, so again involving a charge on 
the budgets of the organisations and 
hence on the member states, when 
taking over this commitment ; 
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(c) financially speaking, if the demographic 
prospects of a scheme were unfavourabie, 
the operation would become unsound, 
while if they were good, the operation 
would become a transfer from the 
economy of one member state to the 
budgets of the organisations, leading to 
undue distortion of the basis for sharing 
expenditure among the states. It was felt 
that endorsement of a system closely 
dependent on the future of the economy 
of one member state would be expecting 
too much of the member states as a 
whole; 
(d) the difficulty of transposing a solution 
devised for the OECD alone to the co-
ordinated organisations as a whole. 
Affiliation to the ANEP- dependent on 
the affiliation of at least 66% of the 
staff - or to an equivalent French 
scheme might in the last resort be 
envisaged for organisations with their 
headquarters in France, but it could not 
be envisaged for the other organisations, 
as it would mean finding pay-as-you-go 
schemes outside France similar to the 
ANEP and prepared to accept their 
staff on equivalent conditions. 
40. Taken as a whole, these disadvantages 
were felt by the Co-ordinating Committee to be 
serious enough to rule out the solution proposed 
for the OECD. 
(d) B11dgeti•g 
41. As stated in paragraph 7 above, the Co-
ordinating Committee considers that the only 
solution which can be recommended is to 
charge the full cost of retirement pensions to 
the budgets of the co-ordinated organisations. 
It has the merits of being flexible, easily 
managed and similar to known precedents (for 
example, the Communities, and the civil services 
of certain member countries). It would enable 
a single pension scheme to be established for 
the staff of the co-ordinated organisations in 
which pensions can be calculated and paid out 
by each organisation. 
APPENDIX V 
Evolution of expenditure on pensions paid by WEU since 1978 
(a) A.ppropriatio11s for pe11sio11s for the P11rio11s orga11s of WEU (1978-1983) 
1978 
Appro- Pension/ 
Budget priations budget Budget 
total for ratio total 
pensions (%) 
£ £ £ 
Secretariat-
General. ........ 666,705 27,425 4.11 786,660 
F F F 
Standing 
Armaments 
Committee ...... 4,747,625 365,000 7.68 5,299,865 
Agency for 
the Control of 
Armaments ...... 10,207,655 704,300 6.89 11,928,930 
Office of 
the Clerk ....... 7,778,000 62,000 0.79 8,515,000 
1978 
Pensions 
SG ACA SAC OofC Total SG ACA 
Retirement ..... 4 16 8 1 29 5 17 
Survivors' ...... I 5 I 1 8 I 7 
Orphans' ....... Jl - - 1 4 31 }I 
Invalidity ....... I - - - I 1 -
Totals .......... 9 21 9 3 42 10 25 
Total 
establishment2 ... 45 51 27 26 149 45 51 
SG =Secretariat-General. 
ACA =Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
SAC =Standing Armaments Committee. 
0 of C =Office of the Clerk. 
1. Paid in conjuction with a survivor's pension. 
2. Excluding hors cadre officials. 
1979 1980 1981 
Appro- Pension/ Appro- Pension, Appro- Pensio~/ 
priations budget Budget priations budget Budget priations bud$et Budget 
for ratio total for ratio total for ratio total 
pensions (%) pensions ( %) pensions ( %) 
£ £ £ £ £ £ 
66,420 8.44 895,600 81,500 9.10 1,021,160 104,160 10.20 1,113,957 
F F F F F F 
421,200 7.94 5,975,945 602,000 10.07 7,034,670 861,800 12.25 7,696,630 
2,007,400 16.82 13,013,155 ,905,000 14.63 14,907,470 2,217,100 14.87 16,461,940 
83,000 0.97 9,632,000 91,000 0.94 10,866,000 106,000 0.97 12,282,000 
(b) N11mber of pensio11s paid o11t by WEU (1978-1983) 
1979 1980 1981 
SAC 0 ofC Total SG ACA SAC OofC Total SG ACA SAC OofC Total SG ACA 
8 1 31 7 19 8 1 35 7 17 9 1 34 7 18 
2 I 11 1 8 3 1 13 1 10 3 I 15 1 9 
-
1 5 }I 21 - 1 4 - }I - 1 2 - }I 
- -
1 1 - - - I I - - - 1 1 -
10 3 48 10 29 11 3 53 9 28 12 3 52 9 28 
27 26 149 45 51 27 26 149 45 51 27 26 149 45 51 
1982 1983 
Appro- Pension/ Appro- Pension/ 
priations budget Budget priations budget 
for ratio total for ratio 
pensions (%) pensions (%) 
£ £ £ 
104,880 9.41 1,028,515 67,830 6.59 
F F F 
1,199,500 15.58 7,313,890 1,131,450 15.47 
2,803,100 17.02 14,910,050 2,004,500 13.44 
126,000 1.03 13,893,000 240,000 1.73 
1982 1983 
SAC OofC Total SG ACA SAC OofC Total 
13 2 40 7 20 14 3 44 
3 1 14 1 9 3 1 14 
- 1 2 - 1 - 1 2 
- - 1 1 - - - 1 
16 4 57 9 30 17 5 61 
27 26 149 45 51 27 27 150 
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ExtrfiCt from the report by the Joi•t Pe•sio•s Admi•istratiPe Sectio• 
11. Work done 
5. The activities of the Joint Pensions Admi-
nistrative Section during the financial year 1983 
to be continued in 1984 may be summarised as 
follows: 
In addition to their usual work, namely, 
(i) for the study unit 
- acting as the P ACCO secretariat ; 
- research, studies and reports ; 
- documentation ; 
- drafting information leaflets ; 
- negotiating agreements on the transfer 
of pension rights ; 
- proposing amendments to pension 
scheme instructions ; 
(ii) for the two computation units 
- managing monthly payments to some 
1,400 pensioners; 
- processing tax adjustment data ; 
- incorporating retroactive increases and 
changes in scales ; 
- checking the files of new pensioners 
and assessing their pension entitle-
ment, 
the study unit and computation unit I played 
an active part in launching and carrying out 
two operations whose purpose was to extend 
and improve the quality of service to the co-
ordinated organisations. 
6. First, a new software package was intro-
duced into the computerised management of 
pensions. Rather than amending the existing 
programme, which could no longer fully meet 
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the organisations' demands, the JP AS, after 
making a comparability study in 1982, went on 
in 1983 to a generalised and detailed analysis 
of the hard - and software required for an 
entirely new system. This incorporates strict 
checks ensuring greater reliability, and is 
designed to take advantage of the latest 
technical developments. As part of this task the 
JP AS revised all the monthly and annual 
printouts it supplies to the organisations. 
With the valuable co-operation of the OECD 
computer services, the section hopes to complete 
this task in the coming year. 
7. Secondly, with the agreement of the heads 
of administration, the section intends to stan-
dardise and simplify the questionnaire forms 
sent to pensioners as a regular check on 
entitlement, and also the vouchers they have to 
provide: pensioners had complained about their 
large number and complexity. There is a further 
advantage in that centralising these checks with 
the JP AS - which has all the necessary 
information, regularly updated, and the invalu-
able assistance of a computerised system - will 
relieve the organisations, if they so request, of 
a number of routine pension scheme manage-
ment tasks. 
The operation demanded a detailed study of 
current procedures in the five organisations and 
of the relevant documents. The JP AS has now 
moved on from the project and proposal stage 
to implementation, the first phase being semi-
manual and the second complete computerisa-
tion. 
8. Computation unit 11, in addition to its usual 
tasks as set out above, has already succeeded in 
meeting most of the demands made on it by 
pensioners (issue of a monthly pay slip, etc.). It 
will continue its efforts to perfect the PMIS. 
Finally, it will do its best to supply all the facts 
and figures needed for better accounting and 
better management. 
APPENDIX VII 
The Assembly, 
APPENDIX VII 
Recommendation 340 adopted by the Assembly 
on 4th December 1979 and reply of the Council 
RECOMMENDATION 3401 
on improving the status of WEU sta.ff 
DOCUMENT 983 
Welcoming the decision of the councils of the co-ordinated organisations to grant a reversionary 
pension to widowers of female staff in the same conditions as for widows of male staff ; 
Considering that the establishment of a single appeals board would be the logical follow-up to 
the establishment of a joint section for the administration of pensions; 
Again regretting that the Council has still not answered the Assembly's recommendation to set 
up a committee of senior experts to plan and promote a personnel policy, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
I. Promote in the framework of the co-ordinated organisations*: 
1. The creation of a single appeals board as soon as possible; 
2. The creation before 1983 of a joint body for the administration of pensions for staff of the co-
ordinated organisations; 
3. The establishment of a committee of senior experts to plan and promote a personnel policy and 
in particular : 
- to review the structure of grades ; 
- to study the possibility of introducing a dual grading system at every level of the hierarchy; 
- to study the type and length of contracts ; 
- to co-ordinate staff rules; 
- to review the indemnity for loss of job ; 
- to study methods of transferring an official from one co-ordinated organisation to another; 
- to make clear the financial consequences of their proposals ; 
11. Invite the Secretary-General to inform WEU officials of all staff vacancies so that they may 
take advantage of all possibilities for promotion which may arise within the organisation. 
* OECD, NATO, WEU, Council of Europe, ESA. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1979 during the second part of the twenty-fifth ordinary session (11th sitting). 
2. ExplanatOJI Memorandum : see the report tabled by Mr. Kershaw on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration (Document 824). 
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DOCUMENT 983 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIV 
to Recommendation 340 
APPENDIX VII 
Member governments have always been concerned that the pension scheme should be applied 
with maximum uniformity in all the co-ordinated organisations. 
I. 1 and 2. However, the creation of a single appeals board specifically to deal with matters 
concerning pensions would only be feasible if the joint pensions administrative section were to be 
given the power to take decisions. · 
As it is, this body which started its operational work on 1st January 1980 and was set up with 
a view to achieving maximum uniformity in the implementation of the pension scheme is only an 
advisory body to the co-ordinated organisations. It should be noted therefore that final responsibility 
for the uniform application, entitlement and subsequent payment of pensions rests with each 
organisation and its secretary/ director-general. 
Commensurate therefore with the responsibility of each secretary-general and each autonomous 
organisation is the institution of an appeals board for each of those organisations with responsibilities 
covering all appeals arising out of the application of the staff rules. 
The creation of a single appeals board to deal with pension matters and, even more, the 
establishment of a joint body for the administration of pensions as a legal entity could, in the 
interests of the staff, only be considered and gone into after an adequate running-in period - the 
length of which cannot be assessed at this stage - and in the light of experience. 
Whilst not rejecting the idea of developments along the lines suggested by the Assembly, the 
Council therefore feel that any initiative of this nature would, in present circumstances, be premature. 
In this context it is recalled however that the Co-ordinating Committee, in its 149th report, 
recommended that a system of mutual information and concertation should be established among the 
appeals boards of the co-ordinated organisations in order to avoid their reaching different decisions 
regarding similar cases. 
3. The Council have considered the possibility of setting up a committee of senior experts, but have 
come to the conclusion that the problems which such a group of experts would be qualified to 
consider should be discussed beforehand between the co-ordinated organisations themselves and, in 
the framework of the Co-ordinating Committee, with experts from the member governments. 
Certain co-ordinating agencies are looking at the problem and any conclusions which may 
emerge from this consultation should be awaited. 
In these circumstances, the Council recognise that the specific problems listed by the Assembly 
in point 1.3. of its recommendation should receive the attention of the organisation and, in particular, 
of its Secretary-General : 
(a) With regard to the grading system and the introduction of a dual grading system the problems 
are still under consideration at the administrative level. 
(b) The staff rules of each of the organisations contain many provisions, in particular regarding 
types and duration of contracts, which all have to take into account the specific circumstances of 
each organisation; nevertheless, those responsible within the organisation make every effort to 
harmonise these provisions wherever possible. 
(c) The Council consider that the indemnity for loss of job is satisfactorily dealt with by the staff 
rules, particularly for staff members with long service in the organisation. 
(d) The methods of transferring an official from one co-ordinated organisation to another are 
governed by both the staff rules and the pension scheme rules of each of the organisations concerned; 
as far as the Council are aware, this problem has given rise to little difficulty; only experience will 
show whether it will be possible in the future to consider simplifying these rules. 
11. The Council can inform the Assembly that the Secretary-General has taken all the necessary 
measures to ensure that all members of _staff are informed of vacancies within the organisation. It 
should be recalled in this connection that WEU policy is to take account first of the possibilities for 
promotion within the organisation before turning to the other co-ordinated organisations and, finally, 
to the open market. Moreover, selection of candidates is made in such a way that, as vacancies are 
filled, equitable proportions of nationals of the member states are observed, although this rule is not 
applied with such mathematical rigidity as to impair its implementation. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 14th May 1980. 
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Document 984 21st June 1984 
Military use of spliCe 
MOTION FOR AN ORDER1 
tabled by Mr. Tummers 
The Assembly, 
Bearing in mind the text of Recommendation 410 on the military use of outer space, in 
particular paragraph 10, 
Instructs its Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions to organise a 
broad-based symposium on the possibilities and desirability of the use of outer space for military 
purposes and to report back to the Assembly on the outcome of this symposium. 
Signed: Tummers 
1. See 6th sitting, 21st June 1984 (motion for an order referred to the Presidential Committee). 
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